

JOURNAL

OF THE

United Service Institution of India

INDEX.

VOL. LXXII

JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1942

Published under the Authority of the Council

LAHORE:

PRINTED AT THE CIVIL & MILITARY GAZETTE, LTD., 48 THE MALL,
BY E. G. TILT (MANAGER)

1943



Journal of the United Service Institution of India

INDEX

Vol. LXXII—1942

CONTENTS

	Page
AFTER THE WAR ? By Lieut.-Colonel G. F. Bunbury	333
BATTLE OF AMAR ALAGI, OR THE FALL OF AN EMPIRE: By Captain Shaukat Hyat	84
BOMBING: THE WORM'S EYE VIEW: By Lieut.-Colonel G. T. Wheeler	297
BURMA: A NEW TECHNIQUE OF WARFARE: By Lieut.-Colonel G. T. Wheeler	219
CAVALRY AND AIR CO-OPERATION: By Lieut.-Colonel H. S. Stewart	265
COMBINED GENERAL STAFF	313
COMMANDOS AND WAZIRISTAN: By "Watch and Ward"	351
DEFENCE AND DISPERSION: By B. O. W. Arrow . .	181
EDITORIALS 1, 119, 190, &	284
FLOATING DOWN THE INDUS: By Flying Officer C. D. Dunford Wood	252
GLIMPSE OF SHANGHAI (pre-1939): By Officer Cadet D. K. Hislop	54
GURKHA WITH LAWRENCE: By "Pheon"	124
HISTORY OF FLYING IN INDIA: By "Hereward" . .	305
HUNTING AND TRAINING FOR WAR: By Major-General A. V. T. Wakely, D.S.O., M.C.	46
INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL: By Lieut.-Colonel H. Bullock, I.A.	95
INDIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE DEFENCE SERVICES: By "Gunner"	147

	Page
INFANTRY PLATOON ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS: By Captain M. W. Hares	158
INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL, INDIA: By an ex-Student	257
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: By the Hon. Harold Nicolson, M.P.	236
JARBOIYAH 1920—SOME RECOLLECTIONS OF AN EARLIER IRAQ REBELLION: By "Jebb"	60
JUNGLE INTERLUDE: By Officer Cadet F. C. O'Hara	151
MUSINGS ON SEA TROUT FISHING: By Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Phayre, M.C.	361
OUR MILITARY MAN-POWER PROBLEM: By Lieut.-Colonel F. L. Roberts	337
POLITICS AND PUBLICITY IN GREECE: By G. Mackworth Young	21
PRICE MARCHES ON: By "Rasp"	176
QU' HAILANDS OF ENGLAND: By "Rs. As. Ps. retired"	106
RAISING A LABOUR BATTALION: By "Mugger"	80
REGIMENTAL NICKNAMES AND THEIR ORIGIN: By T. H. B.	324
SIDELIGHTS ON GURKHA RECRUITING: By H. R. K. Gibbs	344
SOME VIVID MEMORIES OF MALAYA: By Major G. T. Hayes	229
START OF THE WAR IN BURMA: By J. G. S.	198
STRUMA VALLEY, 1919	166
TRIBAL CONTROL ON THE FRONTIER: By B. Bromhead	241
TROUT FISHING: NOTES FOR BEGINNERS: By Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Phayre, M.C.	36
TWO WARS: By Captain C. P. CHENEVIX-TRENCH	99
VISIT TO NEPAL: By Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Phayre, M.C.	139
WARTIME AND POST-WAR JOBS: By "Rasps"	130
WAR ON THE SALVAGE FRONT	319
WESTERN DESERT: By Major G. T. Wheeler	6
WHAT DO I DO NEXT?	292
WHAT SHALL WE TALK?: By "Nimis"	356

EDITORIAL

As we go to press, the year 1941 is just coming to its end, and it may be of interest to compare our situation now with what it was a year ago.

At the end of 1940 the British Commonwealth stood almost alone against the Germans as a fighting nation. In Albania the Italians were being severely handled by the Greeks and in Northern Africa by the Imperial Forces, and the Italian Navy had received some heavy blows from the Royal Navy, in the Mediterranean.

The credit side of Germany's balance appeared to be high. She had disposed of two of her three opponents—Britain, France and Poland. She had overrun Norway, Holland and Belgium. Denmark, Bulgaria and Rumania had given way to her threats. Practically the whole of the European continent was under the heel of the Nazis, and the acquisition of the coast line from North Cape to the Bay of Biscay had given Germany air, submarine and invasion bases which covered the whole of the eastern and southern waters of Britain, very greatly facilitating her attempts to prevent the arrival of supplies of all kinds at British ports, and vastly simplifying an air offensive on Britain.

That the Germans were taking full advantage of the opportunities they had gained was shown by the fierce air attacks on London and on others of the big English towns, resulting in many casualties and much damage, and by the increased shipping losses in the Atlantic.

Let us look at the situation now, at the completion of 1941.

Last year ended with two nations, Britain and Greece, fighting against the Axis. Greece, after a most gallant struggle, was forced to succumb, but to-day we find, lined up against the powers of Nazism and Fascism, the British, Dutch, Russians, Chinese and Americans, with the whole weight of the enormous resources of man-power and production of the latter thrown into the scales. Germany has gained one active partner, the Japanese, but on the other hand, her ally, Italy, has received very heavy reverses and is not now the active helper she was expected to be when she entered the war.

The operations now being conducted against the Axis powers are taking place, broadly speaking, in four areas—the Atlantic, Russia, the Mediterranean and the Pacific.

In the Atlantic, owing to the measures now being taken to protect our convoys and to the gallantry and endurance of our merchant seamen, losses of ships have been very considerably reduced. Large numbers of cargoes are being delivered daily at ports all round the British Isles, and in this zone we can fairly claim to have got the better of the enemy and to have reduced his interference to a very large extent.

Our Allies in Russia, forced as they were to fall back for some months, succeeded in holding the German attempts to capture Leningrad and Moscow and to drive a way through the Russian positions in the south, and now have turned round and in their turn are beating the Germans back in retreat, inflicting on them enormous losses in men and material. The Germans call this straightening their line according to plan, a story hardly borne out by the now daily tale of Russian successes. In this long, battle-field, in spite of his earlier gains, Hitler can hardly claim success now.

Events in the Mediterranean area are going strongly in favour of the Allies. After months of preparation, the Imperial land forces, backed by our Naval and Air Forces, have driven the combined German and Italian army practically out of Cyrenaica, taking a huge toll of men and machines in the process. Further south, the last stronghold, Gondar, in the former Italian colonial empire has been taken, and that empire, founded by the seizure of an inoffensive kingdom, has now crumbled to nothing.

In the Pacific, at the moment, we cannot claim that things are going well for the Allies. Japan has succeeded in gaining great advantages at the outset. By attacking before war was even declared she has been able to inflict very serious losses on the Navies of both ourselves and the United States, she has come dangerously near to Singapore from more than one direction, she has succeeded in capturing Hongkong, and has been able to land large forces to threaten the safety of the Phillipines and other islands of strategical importance. By forcing Thailand to give way to her, she has now succeeded in getting into direct contact with Burma, and has brought that country, and, indeed, parts of India too, within range of her air attacks. It will take time and considerable effort to fight back to a position where we can say that these initial gains have been offset.

What turn events will take in the immediate future and what fresh blows the Axis powers will endeavour to deliver—and there is every likelihood of their making early efforts in fresh directions—we are unable to forecast. There is no doubt, however, that we may expect more of the “blood, toil, tears and sweat” promised us by the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, in the early days of the war. Still, the general situation is undoubtedly such as to allow us to face the coming year—to quote Mr. Churchill, again—“with sober confidence.”

* * * *

In our last issue we made some remarks on “Combined Warfare.” Since then, the world has seen two excellent examples of how the three Services of the sea, air and land can combine to bring about the desired object of the defeat and destruction of the enemy’s forces.

After months of the most careful preparation, the Imperial Forces in North Africa have now driven the German and Italian army practically out of Cyrenaica, inflicting enormous losses of every kind on them, and as we go to press, it appears that the final battle to complete the work is about to take place.

All three Services have taken their full share in this operation. The Naval forces have kept the seas of the Mediterranean open for the movement of our own ships, they have prevented a large proportion of the enemy vessels which were striving to carry greatly needed supplies of men, machines and material to North Africa from reaching that country, and they have assisted the land troops in their actual operations by bombardment from the sea.

In the air, our Air forces have held superiority from the outset. By bombing hostile aerodromes they have interfered very considerably with the air activities of the enemy. Air attacks on ports and on columns of supplies and reinforcements in rear of the actual battle areas have been most successful, and they have played a very full part in the fighting operations by their close support of our attacking troops, keeping off hostile attacks and themselves delivering fierce assaults on the enemy ground formations.

The results of this close co-operation, coupled with the dash and courage of the land troops and the skill of their commanders, are to be seen in the rapidity with which the hostile forces, led as they were by a commander reported to be one of the most capable German leaders of armoured formations and comprising

among other troops two specially selected German armoured divisions, have been driven back so far in so short a time.

The second example is the very recent raid on Norway. Here again, all three Services were working in very close co-operation. The safe landing and, later, the withdrawal of the land troops was ensured, and several enemy ships were sunk or destroyed by the Royal Navy. Protection from air attack was provided by the Royal Air Force by air fighting, attacks on the nearest enemy aerodrome and by providing smoke screens. The Army, when landed, carried out a considerable amount of destruction, and killed and captured an appreciable number of enemy.

The whole operation was completed with very few casualties to our forces.

In this connection we have recently heard some discussion on the desirability of having "commandoes" permanently composed of units of all three Services. This would be the ideal. It is an accepted fact that the best results in war are obtained when units are trained together, getting to know each other well, and by this mutual acquaintance gaining complete mutual trust in each other. It is a question, however, if, with the many calls that have to be made on the sea and air forces, it would be possible to take away from the multifarious tasks for which they are daily required any units of the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force and keep them solely for work of this nature. It would appear that whilst this object is one which it would be most advantageous to gain, it must be kept as something to be aimed at in the future when the number of available ships and aeroplanes has increased far beyond what it is now.

* * * *

Perhaps, the most important event in the last three months has been the entry of the United States into the war.

A year ago, President Roosevelt promised that half the production of the United States would be sent to Britain.

Later, came the Lease and Lend Act, by which the material assistance given by the United States to the forces of the British Commonwealth was very greatly increased.

On the 7th of November, 1941, the American Senate passed a Bill permitting the arming of all United States' merchantmen and allowing them to enter belligerent ports and "zones of combat." After a debate lasting some days the House of Representatives gave Congressional Approval to this measure on the 13th of November.

The results of this decision, which tore away the last remnants of the legislature by which the American republic, six years ago, strove to avoid becoming involved in the world crisis which it clearly saw approaching, would be far-reaching. It ensured that ships and men would be available to deliver materials for aiding the war effort at the points where they were most urgently needed, and would relieve the British Navy of part, at least, of its great responsibilities in bringing the Battle of the Atlantic to a successful conclusion.

Now, on December 8th, by the aggressive action of the Japanese the United States has been plunged into war.

The results of this on the American nation are easy to see. Previously, the Isolationist policy had a large number of supporters who were against President Roosevelt's efforts to give material support to the opposition to the Nazi and Fascist aggressors. The national industry itself met with frequent checks from strikes which had a serious effect on production, and which required severe measures to bring under control. Now, the whole nation is united, and we can say with certainty that their production, immense as it was before, will yet increase very largely and will no longer be hindered by such things as strikes, and that the great assistance given heretofore to Britain and her Allies will grow even greater still. Indeed, President Roosevelt himself has promised this. The expansion of her Navy and Army began immediately, and although, as in the case of Britain, it may be some little time before it reaches its peak, with the resources at her disposal we may confidently expect that time to be short.

* * * *

We have to record a most interesting and impressive ceremony, the presentation of the Victoria Cross to Captain P. S. Bhagat, Royal Bombay Sappers and Miners, and to the widow of the late Subedar Richpal Singh, 4th Battalion (Outram's) 6th Rajputana Rifles.

These Victoria Crosses, the first and second to be gained by members of the Indian Army in this war, were both won in the Abyssinian Campaign.

The ceremony took place in the forecourt of Viceroy's House, New Delhi, on November 10th, in the presence of a large number of spectators. A Guard of Honour was provided by the 6th Rajputana Rifles.

THE WESTERN DESERT

BY MAJOR G. T. WHEELER.

The Western Desert is indescribable to anyone who has not seen it. This is because its nature changes about every mile, and each change brings something that does not exist elsewhere. If a Matabele asked: "What is England like?", it would be necessary to describe grass fields, ploughed fields, crops of all sorts, tarmac roads, moorland, factories and so on, and at the end the Matabele would be dizzy, but without the knowledge he sought. So with the Western Desert. There is hard "put," sand-dunes, rock flats, tufty "ghots," scrub of many sorts and stony wastes—and many, many other varieties of barren land. From a military point of view it is sufficient to regard it as Salisbury Plain with the trees and grass scraped off and the undulations flattened to half their present relative height—or, alternatively, to the barren land between Rawalpindi and Khushalgarh. Tanks can cross most of it as fast as they like, wheeled vehicles will average 12 m.p.h. over most of it. In places they can go 50 m.p.h. without risk, in others 5 m.p.h. with acute discomfort from the stones or grassy tufts. Two impressions must remain. First, the desert on which we fight is nothing like the desert of "Beau Geste" or the desert round Cairo. Secondly, it is stony, not without vegetation and deceptively undulating.

The desert on which we have fought most, and still do, is on either side of the Sollum Escarpment. This is worth describing. It is about 500 feet high at its highest and is a steep, but never vertical cliff. *Wadis* run into it continuously, so concealment is easy, and although a man could walk along it half-way up, it would be a very tortuous and tiring journey, for he would go up and down, and in and out without ceasing. It is a complete vehicle obstacle except where roads have been made at Sollum, Halfaya, Halfway house and Sofafi. Infantry can climb it where they will.

Maps of the desert mark tracks, and possibly before the war these tracks existed as such. The desert track is not good going, it is a place where previous traffic has removed the soft top soil and exposed the loose stones thereunder. The wise driver, therefore, drives parallel to, but not on, a track. There are many

wise drivers and, consequently, many parallel tracks. The whole desert is in fact intersected with tracks, and those that connect main centres may well be two miles in width of parallel tracks. A new Corps Headquarters arrived in the desert and, presumably from some forgotten manual, produced an order to "signpost all cross-roads and report completion." Cross-roads are not places, they are vast areas; and the idea of completing the signposting of a track-infested area bigger than Yorkshire was novel. They were a good Corps Headquarters and explained that the order was signed in a "Khamsin"—the hot wind which makes all men feel stupid and all motor radiators boil.

In theory, an attack during a duststorm is a very desirable military event, but in practice it is risky because if the attack goes down-wind—and the wind veers fast—there is a chance of having every vehicle stranded for lack of water to refill the radiator. A Ford V-8 going down-wind will do three miles to the gallon of water, a figure no supply system can face in a waterless desert. The Germans have attacked in a duststorm, and so have we. Both attacks were successful, but since those attacks took place we have advanced towards each other and met just as a duststorm began. When the dust died down and the Tac R. went up it reported an empty space of 24 miles between our troops and theirs. Both sides had gone back 12 miles, which suggests that there are two subjects on which we and the Germans agree: it is not good to fight in a duststorm, and it is good for a German to die for his Führer.

The climate of the Western Desert has been maligned through one suspects, the desire for sympathy of its military inhabitants. Soldiers write home and say: "Dear Mother, We've just moved again. It is very sandy here and hot, and there are no trees to give shade;" and so the reputation of the "scorching desert" grows. It would sound wrong to say "there is a lot of sand here, no trees, and although the sun shines all day it is never as hot as Delhi is in October;" yet, such is the case. The months of April, May, June, September, October and November are perfect from a temperature point of view. Men wear sweaters in the morning and evening and shirt-sleeves in the middle of the day. The nights are cold but not uncomfortably so. July and August are fairly hot in the middle of the day, much the same as in Delhi in early November, and cool enough at night. From December to March it is cold by day and really cold at night. These facts should be better known, for high military circles still

insist that the winter is the desert campaigning season. It is not. The nights are unbearably cold in the open and duststorms are frequent. The summer is the proper campaigning season, particularly June to October when duststorms are very rare. In those months men can sleep in the open with either one blanket or a great-coat, and can fight by day without anything that our troops would call discomfort. The German, on the other hand, is not so accustomed to even mild heat; and reckons that he is in a "sweltering heat"—which is good for him. The campaigning season of the desert may be in the winter by elimination of other theatres, but for no other reason.

The course of the war in the Western Desert has been told, so far as it may be told, in the daily press. No historical account is yet possible, but it may be useful to build a framework of the war's course and hang thereon anecdotes which depict the conditions of modern desert warfare.

The day after Italy declared war our mobile forces in the frontier area captured Fort Capuzzo and, with it, 500 Italian soldiers. Graziani regarded this early start as a flagrant breach of military etiquette and sent a large force to recapture it. The force was allowed in with little opposition, and then given a very harassed life. Fort Capuzzo lends itself to being shelled, and shelled it was. On one occasion the gunner O.P. established itself due west of the Fort whilst the guns fired from due east. Increases in range were given cautiously. The Italians tried a tank sortie against the guns and came out in line ahead. The front tank was hit. The rest halted and finally withdrew. Tank manoeuvre was still a closed book to them.

In August, 1940, the might, majesty and Lybians of the Italian Army swarmed down Sollum Pass and advanced on Sidi Barrani. Our forces withdrew to Matruh, leaving mobile troops in contact. The Italians built dry-stone breastwork forts round Barrani, south of it at Tummar and Nibeiwa, and far south at Rabia and Sofafi. These breastwork forts are well built and worthy of the descendants of Balbus and Hadrian. They probably have some military value, other than as land marks in a featureless desert, but we have not yet found it. They have never been used by us, though the Italian airman still saves their builders' faces by bombing them at infrequent intervals.

Matruh was defended on an all-round basis, and 20 miles east of it the Baggush Box was made on similar but less elaborate lines. Between these two the Nagamish Nullah position was

made. No one knows why. Matruh and Baggush both contain good and plentiful water. Nagamish does not.

The air situation during this period was unfavourable. At the start we had nine Gladiators. They flew daily to rain death on the Italian Air Force, and death they rained. But like the ten little nigger boys, there came a time when "then there were two." The Italians reinforced their Air Force until they were able to bomb Matruh daily and nightly with very unpleasant strength. At last our Hurricanes arrived.

British, Dominion and Indian troops were given a first-class view of an air battle with Italian planes falling like ripe plums all round. Day raids on Matruh stopped. Night raids continue regularly to this day. They do some damage occasionally.

The mobile troops that remained in contact with the Italians were set the task of keeping an open gap in the enemy's defences. The selected spot was between Nibeiwa and Rabia. This task caused the birth of the "Jockcols," named after Jock Campbell, the gunner. A Jockol accepts the fact that the field gun is the true patrolling weapon in the desert. The rifle has not got either the range or weight to be effective. The A. Tk gun is a one-purpose gun, and also short of effective range for that purpose. The field gun can engage tanks, vehicles or men at a range from which it can withdraw in safety if rushed by a superior force. The F. O. O. has to be well forward and so needs some protection; this is provided by armoured cars and/or motor infantry. If the enemy decides to rush the column with tanks he must be delayed whilst the F. O. O. and his escort withdraw, and possibly whilst the field artillery step back. For this A. Tk guns are interposed in the area between the field guns and the F. O. O.

The whole force is known as a Jockcol and has stood the test of time. The columns hurried and frightened the Italians without ceasing, and the gap was kept open. It was used on December 9th, 1940, when Nibeiwa, the Tummar and consequently Barrani were captured. Fascist bubbles were pricked at Bardia, Tobruk and Derna. The remnants of the army surrendered to us at Beda Fomm, south of Benghazi. The seasoned troops who had made this wonderful conquest were taken elsewhere and replaced by new troops, armed and briefed as an army of occupation rather than as a spearhead of the Empire.

The price of this misconception was paid in April, 1940, when one German Light Motorized Division attacked and retook Cyrenaica.

The main infantry force and a few mobile remnants were rallied into Tobruk. The Germans attacked Tobruk almost at once, but the defenders by then understood war. They allowed the German tanks to over-run the forward infantry, which lay low whilst the tanks passed inwards. The infantry concentrated on the lorry-borne German infantry which followed, or rather tried but failed to follow. The tanks ran into the artillery area without support. They paid their toll and left. So began the siege of Tobruk, the place where British Empire troops first said a successful "No" to the Germans. The siege has lasted many months and the initiative has passed to the defenders, whose patrols are a constant dread to the enemy besiegers.

We have learnt much about defence in Tobruk, and one of these lessons is that an infantryman in a small parapetless firing-slit is safer and more effective than an infantryman in the approved "section defended post" of complicated layout. In his firing slit he cannot be seen from the ground and is no target from the air. All defended positions in the desert now depend on mine-fields watched by infantrymen lying, kneeling or standing in a trench about 4 feet deep, 2 feet wide and 4 feet long, it may be longer if the men would sooner fight in pairs. In each trench is stored water and food for the day, S. T. No. 68 and Mills grenades, and rifle and ammunition. There is no need to store more than a day's supply for the men can replenish at night. These are the battle positions. In normal times the men live further back in something that may well resemble an approved section post. The resemblance should be sufficiently good to deceive the enemy artillery and airmen that it is the right target.

After Tobruk had failed to fall the German came straight on and occupied the line that he virtually holds to-day—Sollum, Halfaya Pass to Sidi Omar. There he stopped for the same reason that we stopped after Beda Fomm. He had run his limit. We left weak mobile troops in contact with him and re-occupied Matruh and Baggush. The mobile troops re-started Jockols and life returned to what is now regarded as normal. (A fuller definition of the word "normal" will come later.) This was at the end of April, 1941. During the summer of 1941 there were four occasions when normal routine was interrupted. They will be described in such detail as is allowed.

On May 15th an infantry brigade supported by a few tanks and artillery moved up the escarpment from Sofafi and by direct assault captured Capuzzo, Sollum and Halfaya Pass. The left

flank battalion was in Capuzzo and suffered heavy casualties from a German counter-attack with tanks. Otherwise the positions were captured and held with few casualties. If this action is regarded as the first of three dreams, like those of Duffer's Drift, then we may say that the lessons learnt were that Halfaya Pass is easier to take from above than below, and that infantry must have A.Tk guns available at once in considerable numbers if they are to hold ground after it is captured.

On May 31st the Germans attacked Halfaya Pass with a strong force of tanks and infantry, well supported by artillery. The Pass was lost and our infantry suffered some unnecessary casualties by delaying their final withdrawal until after daylight. Their line of withdrawal was on the plain below the pass, and the Germans took advantage of the observation afforded by the escarpment to shell and machine-gun them as they went back.

On 15th June the second dream took place. Capuzzo, Sollum and Halfaya Pass were again the objectives. We deployed two brigades of infantry supported by 'I' tanks, with cruiser tanks to guard the left flank. The plan was to attack Halfaya Pass with an infantry brigade supported by artillery and some 20 'I' tanks. One battalion and two-thirds of the 'I' tanks were to attack from the top, the remainder from below. The other infantry brigade with the remainder of the 'I' tanks was to attack Capuzzo and Sollum from the south-west.

The attack of Halfaya Pass was a failure because the 'I' tanks were trapped both above and below the escarpment. On the plain they ran on to an unlocated minefield and were knocked out by German 88-mm. dual purpose guns. On top of the escarpment they met a low dry masonry stone wall, as each tank reared up on this wall was shot through the belly by an A.Tk gun sited just the far side of the wall. The 'I' tanks brought away two things: the lesson that manoeuvre is necessary even with their thick armour, and one 'I' tank. The rest had paid for the lesson. The remainder of the force prospered on June 15th and 16th. They captured Capuzzo on the 15th, and Sollum Barracks (which are on top of the escarpment) during the night of 15-16th June. On the 16th June the German tank counter-attacks on Capuzzo began. There was one at 5-30 a.m. and two more before 9-30 a.m. They averaged about 50 tanks each. As the day went on they became less frequent but more powerful. They were beaten off by 'I' tanks, A.Tk guns and field artillery, but without heavy loss. The range at which A.Tk fire should be opened had

not been decided, so the German tank commanders were given timely and long-range warning by the 'I' tanks who opened fire at 2,000 yards. This fire tended to turn them, so the field guns opened too for fear of not getting a shoot at all. It was only on the extreme left flank where one battery of A.Tk guns was alone that any damage was inflicted. This battery held its fire until the German tanks were within 800 yards. By the end of the day 16 German tanks lay dead before this battery. The other batteries of A.Tk artillery only lent ammunition to the 'I' tanks as they expended their own.

The day of the 16th closed with ominous reports of German tanks moving in strength in the Sidi Omar area. This was a direct threat to our left flank and rear. The threat developed early on the 17th June, and withdrawal became inevitable. The force withdrew by Halfaya House with little loss except the heavy material loss of tanks left on the battlefield. Recovery of damaged tanks had not been effected. One incident marred this day, it was the dive-bombing of a field regiment as it came into action. Three guns and some 30 men of one troop were knocked out. It is fashionable to say that the effect of dive-bombing is moral rather than material. This may be true in soft countries where the bombs burst below ground level and where slit trenches can be dug. In the desert slab-rock areas it is not true. Men cannot dig, so must lie down on the level ground. The bombs burst right on the surface, a 250-lb. bomb is unlucky if it makes even a 5-inch deep crater, and splinters fly around with unfortunate results. Twenty-five per cent. casualties from a dive-bombing raid in the desert are not abnormal.

So ended the second dream; and the local Backsight-Forethoughts learnt much. Let us summarize:

1. No amount of armour is a full substitute for manoeuvre. 'I' tanks must look before they leap and, if necessary, wait for the support of other arms.
2. Consolidation must be immediate against tank counter-attack, and the A.Tk fire policy must be decided, known, and enforced. To shoot at a tank at over 800 yards is a waste of government time and ammunition, and, incidentally, a high road to the grave, since some German tanks carry a 75-mm. gun which is highly effective at ranges up to 2,000 yards once it has located a target.

3. Everything is easy in a withdrawal except recovery of damaged tanks. So avoid getting tanks involved in a withdrawal, and if there are tanks strain every recovery nerve from the earliest possible to the latest possible moment.

The troops which had fought returned to rest areas, and Jock columns took over their former role. The third dream is yet to come, but there is confidence that all the essential lessons have been learnt in the first two.

It used to be customary in the desert to use the words "Nilrep" or "Sitnor" in the Sitreps (Situation reports) which are sent rearwards four times daily. The words meant "nothing to report" and "situation normal," respectively. The latter word has since been abolished on the ground that there is no such thing as a normal situation in war. In the desert there is. The enemy holds a strong position below Halfaya Pass, where liberties cannot be taken by patrols except when Italians have relieved the usual German garrison there. Even then defensive fire is well disposed and the advantages are too heavily with the defender for patrols to penetrate into the position.

Activity in the coastal plain is therefore largely confined to artillery sniping. A gunner officer goes forward before dawn and establishes himself in one of the O.Ps. that are in sight of Halfaya Pass. He waits and watches. One or two 25 prs. have moved forward into a position from which they can engage the Pass. The range is known and registration has been completed, maybe weeks previously. As soon as the F.O.O. sees traffic on the Pass that constitutes a target, he starts the day's sniping. As a rule the enemy reply with artillery fire at either the O.P. or the gun position, or both. As the day goes on the mirage starts and the sun moves out of the East, so visibility becomes bad. The day's sniping is then over. On some days nothing further happens, on others the enemy send over fighters who dart in from the sea and shoot up any vehicle they find on the move, and then go off westwards. Provided they hit nothing the day will be described as "Sitnor."

On top of the escarpment the enemy holds a series of defended localities from just south of Halfaya Pass, through Sidi Suleiman to Sidi Omar, thence south to Sheferzen. The latter is held by day only. His patrols of tanks and armoured cars move a few miles south of this line. Not many miles, for the Jock columns are jealous of their shooting rights in the wide No Man's Land, and are rough with poachers.

Before dawn each day the columns move out. First go armoured cars. It is their task to secure the O.P. which has been selected for the day. They move cautiously forward for it is always possible that the enemy has got there first, though they never do. When it is reported clear the F.O.O. takes up his position and the armoured cars move forward to make contact with the enemy. Then their reports start coming back:

"Three enemy met* moving southeast at 521360; four enemy met stationary at Kinibish."

Then later: "The three enemy met previously reported at 521360 are now identified as one tank and two armoured cars." The light is getting better.

"Four enemy met in the watch-tower area, believed to be armoured cars, have been smartened up and withdrew into dead ground to the West." The enemy has offered a target to a F.O.O. who has taken the offer.

Then towards 9 a.m.: "The four enemy met at Kinibish are moving north out of sight. Otherwise N.M.S." (No movement seen.) The mirage is up and the morning patrols are over. It is useless to patrol in the mirage when bushes, men, tanks and trucks all look like hazy shadows of about equal size.

At mid-day the previous night-patrol reports start coming in. Small parties have moved deep into enemy territory on foot; studying his minefields and his defences. His minefields are surrounded by a single or double strand of barbed wire, so are easy to locate. In any case the Tellermine can be trodden on by a man without exploding. One patrol from the coast has visited the *wadis* in front of the enemy position around Halfaya Pass. They were unoccupied; but the enemy were heard talking German in the next *wadi* forward. That is interesting, for sometimes the Italians hold that area. Another patrol has visited Sheferzen. There were no enemy but some new trenches have been dug. A Booby trap was set in one of these and the patrol returned without hindrance. A third patrol encircled Kinibish, located a new minefield, were shot at, and returned without loss but carrying one Tellermine, in case it was a new type. The Sappers will examine it alone with carefree joy. There were no other patrols that night.

At 1 p.m. a distant drone is heard. It increases into the unmistakable noise of a Me. 110. He is known to some as "Lonely Bill," because he always comes alone, without escort. He is the

* "Met"—Enemy M. T. Perhaps an abbreviation for Motor Enemy Transport. Originally used by the R.A.F. Now universal.

German Tac R machine, and comes over daily to see that everyone is in the right place. He is never rude, and no longer causes any real animosity. There may be some of our fighters going up or already up, so his position, height and course are reported to Fighter Command, but that is routine.

In the afternoon the columns prepare for the evening work, which is the same as that of the morning. The night patrols prepare for their tasks. The sappers continue to lay mines (they only laid 20,000 last week, so the work is getting behind), and the signals continue to lay cable, they have 180 miles down in the divisional area and are running short, though their commitments are still only half met. The infantry division held some four miles of front in the last war, and had about 40 miles of cable. It now holds 50 miles or more of loose knit front, and the Signals say that they need more cable, and the case seems good.

The evening reports of the columns' patrolling come in during the evening, as they did in the morning, except that the last one is always very final. "Three 'met' at Bir Nuh were not seen to move north but are now out of sight in the dark. N.M.S. elsewhere." The columns and the armoured car patrols move back into their night laager positions and the day is ended: "Sitnor."

The 13th September brought news that the enemy was likely to be active very soon. That night the armoured car patrols reported the rumbling of tanks in the area south of Halfaya. The rumblings continued from 2 a.m. to 5.30 a.m. when the storm broke in the form of a rush of tanks and "met" southwards from Bir Nuh. They came in two columns; on the east a column of about 80 tanks moving south, parallel to and about 5 miles west of the escarpment; on the west a column of some 40 tanks and 250 "met" moving parallel to and 5 miles west of the other column. The tanks moved ten or twelve abreast with little more than 25 yards between columns. They came fast; "so fast," in the words of an officer with a close-up view, "that I had difficulty in going ten miles an hour faster than them. But my truck is unresponsive after 40 m.p.h." No one was paid to stay and stop them, and no one did. They halted after some fifteen miles and looked around. Then they decided to replenish. They always do that around mid-day. Unfortunately they chose a place within sight of our troops and collected into a very small area. The news went to the Air Force and in due course twelve Marylands arrived. It was not the dull "woomp—woomp—woomp" of the German bomb but a sharp, fierce, efficient-sounding "woomp." Just one. The news of where it had all landed was important for accidents are easy in

the desert where landmarks are not—the Germans dive-bombed their own troops at the top of Halfaya on the 16th June. The joyful news came back: "plumb on the target; there are bits of German still falling." After that the withdrawal became more cheerful. It was the first time that our men had actually witnessed the German tasting air power; and the effect was electrical. A German who was there, and subsequently captured, said that complete panic resulted and all their tanks and lorries that could, scattered wildly in the desert. The track marks confirm his remarks. The scene of this event remained a show place for long. One Mk. III tank had a direct hit over the driver's head and was just scrap-iron inside. Two ammunition lorries, four petrol lorries and one staff car were also left as complete wrecks. His recovery is good, so it is safe to put a handsome total on the number of other vehicles which must have been damaged and removed.

At 4 p.m. he made another dash, straight into the position that our rearguard held. His tanks drove through 25 pr. fire, thus proving themselves to be experienced, but turned from short range 2 pr. fire, proving themselves to be wise. None too soon the rearguard withdrew to the next position. It would be wrong to say that the Germans' tanks followed, for in fact it was a neck-and-neck race and at times they may have led. They stopped after about ten miles and our forces took up the next position without any loss at all. The next day the Germans withdrew. Why they came is hard to understand, and all that is certain is that they paid dearly for no information and an insignificant dividend. We lost a truck with three clerks in it. They found stuff bursting around them, so got out and lay down clear of the truck. They had been bombed before and knew the drill. The bombs were, in fact, shells from an advancing Mk. IV tank's 75 mm. gun, so they were "captured through technical ignorance." Two men were killed too, both by the same A. Tk shell. That was about all we paid for his indiscretion. It cannot be called a proper dream, but, rubbing one's eyes, it is pleasant to have confirmation that a withdrawal is easy provided one has got elbow room and no tanks. The day after the Germans withdrew was "Sitnor," and "Lonely Bill" came over twice to be sure that everyone was in the right place. Everyone was.

A week later "Sitnor" had died. New arrivals came, the water ration fell from one gallon to three quarters of a gallon a day and the B.B.C. talked of "the campaigning season in the desert." The troops put on their great-coats to be ready for it.

The desert has changed the tasks and the values of many arms of the service. The gunner has come into his own whether he be field, A. Tk or A.A. Guns and more guns are always wanted to support and defend both infantry and tanks. Infantry have fallen in importance. In defence they are the guardians of minefields, which in turn are the guardians of all. In attack they take over what the 'I' tanks have secured.

A visiting Brigadier, new to the desert, was shown one of the forward defended areas. He went all round it and his first question was: "Where is the wire?"

The Infantry Liaison Officer who was showing him round said: "There is no wire, only a continuous minefield."

"But supposing infantry attacked?" he asked.

The Liaison Officer gazed forward with joy into the desert. "Oh, supposing they did," he said. The thought was a beautiful dream. They can't, of course, and never will. All this, of course, applies only in the Desert.

Sappers lay mines and work compressors to make vehicle and gun pits. The number of compressors and mines which are available is limited, so they get time off to eat and sleep; otherwise they would not. The desert has set new standards of mine figures and anyone who thinks of mines in units of less than 100,000 is probably unable to ride a bicycle. A defended area depends on mines for its safety, and signal cable for its efficiency. If soldiers are ever denied a full and continuous supply of those two simple war stores, then some man in the Empire supply organisation will have blood on his hands, and may that fact be known.

Signals lay cable, but only those that deal with cable. The wireless-operators live a harried life. In the intervals between operations they have to observe wireless silence, so get little training. During operations they have to be perfect, more than perfect, at wireless operation. They have to work over distances which may well be double those for which their sets were designed. They have many more sets on one net than the book foretells. Fourteen on one net is handled successfully by the veterans in the forward area. There is no longer any "Hullo, Hullo, Hullo—BOLO, speaking, BOLO, speaking—I have a message for you" and so on, with everything said twice.

It is: "BOLO, speaking, can hear noise of tank movement one mile west of Kinibish; over."

"Hullo, BOLO, say again word after 'west of'; over."

"BOLO, speaking, K - I - N - I - B - I - S - H; over."

"Hullo, BOLO, OK; off."

Bolo may have been wrong not to have said "Kinibish" twice, but he took the chance of the operator knowing the place. It is assumed that all sets are well enough adjusted to allow speech to be heard without repetition, and usually rightly so.

Let us end with those who come first —the Air Force; the whole unity of Imperial Squadrons that work in the Western Desert. Co-operation between the Army and the Air Force is close-knit now and almost beyond criticism. We will take Tac R first: As a rule two Tac R sorties go up each "Sitnor" day. A sortie used to consist of one Tac R Hurricane which flies straight ahead, followed by a fighter Hurricane escort which weaved hither and thither in his rear. Neither has an enviable job, for the Tac R plane looks only at the ground, so risks both A.A. fire and unexpected attack from the air. The escort has to engage any attacking fighters, whatever the odds, in order to give the Tac R machine a chance of getting out and home with his news. The news is not wirelessly home, for a Tac R pilot has plenty to do in the air without also sending messages; also his set will not cover the vast distances involved. He is usually more than thirty miles from the nearest ground set. Latterly, Tac R sorties have had increased escorts, perhaps six fighters for one Tac R pilot. The Tac R pilot is valuable, and his value increases every day that he spends over the enemy forward troops. A new Tac R pilot will often cause a mild flutter by reporting every derelict vehicle in the area as a "met." The derelicts total about 150, so the enemy strength shows a startling increase. A new pilot, a new A.I.L.O., and a new G. Staff might almost lead to a new military occasion." During active operations the Tac R squadrons will put, say, two Tac R sorties on to the Advanced Landing Ground at first light. According to the night's news the A.I.L.O. is briefed by the G. Staff and he in turn briefs the pilot of the first sortie. The sortie takes off and is replaced from the rear by another. When the first sortie returns his report is collected by the A.I.L.O. and telephoned to the G. Staff. From this report and developments on the ground the next sortie is briefed, and so on throughout the day. It is not fair to ask Tac R pilots to fly again and again over the same area for very soon enemy fighters will be in that area, and the Tac R pilot will be lost. If either side has two Tac R sorties over the actual battle area in the

course of a day it would be about normal. Each will stay over for a few minutes only. Thus an enemy Tac R machine over our own troops is sufficient of an event for all to note, and those that are unduly congested do more than note it. They disperse. The remaining sorties throughout the day are sent over the enemy rear areas to locate his reserves. The area will be very wide, so great economy of sorties is necessary.

Tac R pilots become known by name to the army through the A.I.L.O. after quite short periods; and there is probably many a modest pilot to day who would be startled to hear that he is known to some 5,000 soldiers as Bill So and So, the Australian expert on the Capuzzo area." The most famous was Andy Mc." Whenever the Germans seemed to be up to something and no news was available, Andy Mc's turn for Tac R was eagerly awaited, and he always solved the problem. He it was who flew at 50 feet along a newly made tank obstacle between Capuzzo and Halfaya and brought back full details of its nature. He was followed home by a German fighter in the middle of June and shot up as he landed. He gave in his Tac R report, and then died, having never left a job for the army uncompleted. The army mourned his loss widely and deeply, yet it is unlikely that Andy Mc ever knew that a single soldier knew his name. Perhaps one day the Tac R aces will have a fan mail. They deserve it.

Fighter pilots become known to the army in a different way. There are periodic fighter sweeps and specific sweeps to cover definite operations by patrols. The latter are asked for by the Army, and are very seldom refused, the former are arranged entirely by the Air Force, and frequently cover Photo R sorties. In these sweeps casualties inevitably occur, and a certain number of our fighter pilots land in the forward area either in their machine or by parachute. One or two of these fighter pilots have already been greeted on landing with the words "Hullo, you again!"

Bombers are more detached. They live a long way away, and normally work a long way the other way. However, they too have taken part recently in an occasion which may have a future. It was decided to carry out a harassing shoot at night on one of the enemy's defended localities. The Air Force were asked whether they would like to join in and they agreed with enthusiasm. The bomber pilots came forward and a plan was made. Artillery would shoot for 15 minutes, whilst the bombers would pick up the area in which the shells were falling. The gunners asked very searching questions of the pilots to ensure that they knew the


difference between a gun-flash and a shell-burst. It seemed to be important to them. The bombers were to drop flares whilst the guns were still firing and then take up the tale with bombs. Finally, the guns would give a parting period of rapid fire and the incident would close. On the chosen night all went to plan, and even better, for the bombers found that with their flares they could see without difficulty both the shell-bursts and the details of the target. Had the guns been missing the target, which they were not, the bombers could have put them right. It was a re-birth to Arty R that has been quickly exploited.

The Germans now have many an unhappy night lying in the light of a parachute flare waiting whilst the gunfire is brought their way.

* * *


In leaving the desert men will have varied anticipations. The first bath for three months, the sight of something really green, the sight of a house, or a tree or a woman or a cold whisky and real soda. But there will be many who come back just listening for some peaceful sound. In the desert there are no voices except those of soldiers, no patter of childish feet, no dogs to bark, cocks to crow, or birds to sing. Leave comes after three months, and after that time a Bedouin woman screeching at her young can be music in one's ears.

THE WESTERN DESERT



THE BATTLE AREA

APRIL — NOVEMBER 1941



POLITICS AND PUBLICITY IN GREECE

By G. MACKWORTH YOUNG,

Director of the British School of Archaeology in Athens.

The following impressions of Greece as it was just before and during the war may interest readers of the Journal, particularly those who are unacquainted with the country, and to whom the magnificent resistance of its people may have come as a surprise. The writer lived in Greece continuously, except for short vacation, from the autumn of 1932 until the German invasion in April, 1941. During the war, he was employed by the Ministry of Information as Director of Publicity under the British Minister in Athens.

The psychology of the modern Greek shows many points of resemblance with that of his great ancestors. Foremost among these is his passion for independence. Independence of the country, of the individual, of the intellect—these are not merely worshipped as ideals, but are assumed as the normal and necessary conditions of existence. "You have shown the world," said Metaxas in his message to the citizens of Salonica after the first murderous air bombardment of the city, "that life has no interest for you unless you can live it as free men." It may seem strange that a people imbued with such sentiments should at that moment have been governed by a dictatorship on the Fascist model; and stranger still that the words just quoted should have been uttered by the dictator himself. But the paradox, as we shall see, was more apparent than real.

Another characteristic which the modern Greek has inherited from ancient times is his absorption in politics. Politics are the atmosphere that he breathes, and political discussion his favourite pastime. Though generally a devoted and self-proclaimed adherent of one cause, he is fully prepared to argue at a moment's notice in favour of any other, and will repeat with satisfaction a saying, said to have originated in Italy, that wherever there are two Greeks, there are five political parties. During the war, it was as well to keep this latter propensity in mind whenever individual Greeks were reported to hold pro-German views. Politics pervade every walk of life, dividing communities and even families into hostile camps. The inherent good nature and commonsense of the Greeks normally keep the factious spirit within bounds, and their quick sense of humour enables them to

enjoy the Gilbertian situations that often occur. But there are times when the current of partisanship sweeps them off their feet. It is then that acts of tyranny are committed which perpetuate feuds and encourage the vicious circle of grievances and reprisals. A revolution, whether successful or suppressed, involves not only the imprisonment or exile, or even the execution, of leaders, but usually also the dismissal of public servants suspected of sympathizing with the defeated party, and their replacement by relatives or adherents of those in power. It is not difficult to imagine the state of insecurity and bitterness thus created. Greece is a poor country. Her plutocracy, with few exceptions, accumulate their wealth in foreign countries, and hold it in foreign currencies. The remainder have a hard struggle for existence and the competition for posts in the public services is therefore at the best of times acute.

These evils which, one must remember, were equally characteristic of the ancient Greek states in the height of their vigour, are humorously admitted by the Greeks of to-day. Some years ago the writer, on accepting an invitation to join the Athens Choir, received a complimentary letter announcing his election, and expressing the hope that he would long continue to take part in the activities of "this cultural and non-political organization." It was indeed a growing weariness of party strife that led to the establishment of the dictatorship in 1936, though it did not put an end, unfortunately, to party jealousies and suspicions.

Cradled as the Greeks are in politics at home, they possess an unusual capacity for understanding the international situation and the politics of other countries. This facility is by no means confined to the townspeople. In the years before the war, Englishmen taking part in discussions in village cafés, might hear a very clear appreciation of the aims of Germany and Italy, together with some biting comments on the policy of appeasement, and on individual statesmen associated with it. During the war, friendly critics of our broadcasts in Greek (these included a former Prime Minister) would often beg us to remind the B.B.C. that the standard of political intelligence among artisans and agricultural labourers in Greece was the highest in Europe and that it was useless to "talk down" to them, or to teach them where their own interests lay.

The political sagacity of the Greeks had consequences of the utmost value and importance. In the first place, it overcame internal differences and the unpopularity of the government, and enabled Greece to enter the war with a

solidarity that any nation might have envied. In his tactful but firm dealings with Germany, his contemptuous defiance of Italy, and his noble efforts for Britain, Metaxas counted, and counted rightly, as much on the intelligence of his countrymen as on their other virtues. The only point of difference among Greeks, after the war with Italy had begun, was whether Metaxas was leading the people, as his supporters claimed, or whether, as the Venizelists maintained, the people were leading him. Secondly, it was political intelligence, combined with their love for England, that rendered the Greeks impervious to German propaganda. They had already gathered all that they needed to know of the Nazi character and aims, and had formed their own conclusions, before the war began. They enjoyed moreover a flair for propaganda which would have detected methods far less obvious than those of the Germans. German propaganda in Greece was formidable in its bulk and persistence, but not for its content. It made work for the government, but never affected the public.

To these two outstanding features of the Greek character, their passion for independence and their political sense, we must add a third, which has just been mentioned, their love of England and the English. "Friendship" is too colourless a term for this feeling, which dominates the foreign outlook of the nation, and abides independently of the vicissitudes of either country. The Venizelists have no monopoly of it, nor is it peculiar to any section of society. It is strongly ingrained in the people as a whole, and even more strikingly apparent among those who cannot speak English than among those who can. "We are fond of the English," the villagers say, and give no further explanation. Any Greek will admit that the proportion of Anglophiles in the country stands at not less than 90 per cent. Some place it higher. It seems strange that a bond so close should exist between peoples differing so widely from each other in race, language, religion and temperament. Much is attributable, no doubt, to history, to the lives of the great British Philhellenes and to acts of friendship such as the cession of the Ionian Islands and the liberation of Crete. Byron, Canning and Gladstone have prominent statues in the capital, and there are many streets named after British worthies. Yet other nations can, and do, boast their Philhellenes. More is due to the long-sighted political intelligence of Greeks, who see in the survival of British power the best prospects for their own destiny. But neither historical associations nor self-interest, nor both together, offer a complete explanation. We must seek it rather in an underlying similarity

of character, transcending the obvious and superficial differences. The sentiment is easier to illustrate than to describe. It finds unconscious expression in the first person plural. "Our mistake," observed a mason at work on the British School early in 1939, "was not exterminating the Germans after the last war." "Shall we eat (i.e., defeat) them (the Germans)?" asked a brilliant young musician in October 1939. "What I say to my chaps is 'This is a big war: we must expect some hard knocks'"—this from a leading member of the staff of a great Athens daily after the sinking of the Royal Oak. A taxi-driver depositing the writer at his house one night in July, 1940, clutched his arm and said anxiously, "Tell me, are we going to win?" One had only to read the jubilation in the faces and demeanour of the ordinary crowds in the streets after, for instance, the sinking of the *Graf Spee*, and their dejection after a German success, to realise the unity of their feelings with ours. Our troops, during the withdrawal, saw this love of Britain translated into action, and many of them owe their lives to it.

We may now briefly survey the state of affairs in Greece before the outbreak of war. The internal situation which had fluctuated for many years, became, after the failure of the Venizelist rising in March 1935, utterly chaotic. The Royalist party, seeing their opportunity, organized the restoration of the monarchy and the return of the exiled King in October of that year. It was a wise move and one which the great majority of the nation welcomed at heart, though it was achieved with the help of a faked election in which the number of recorded votes for the King's return was said to have outnumbered the total electorate by several thousands. Unfortunately, the Royalists who had engineered the *coup d'état* lacked the vision and statesmanship to use it for the advantage of their country. Their sole object was to concentrate power in their own hands. In the absence of any attempt to sink differences, the chaos continued. Eventually, after an indecisive general election in the summer of 1936, the King appointed General Metaxas President of the Council of Ministers with dictatorial powers, and the parliamentary system, which had long ceased to function, came officially to an end.

The government of Metaxas had thus been in power for three years at the outbreak of the war in September 1939. It continued until the end of January 1941, when Metaxas died three months after Greece entered the war against Italy. This

is not the place in which to attempt a detailed criticism of its acts and policies; but some description of it is necessary in order to understand the situation in Greece at the outbreak of the war and during its earlier phases. On the material side, the dictatorship undoubtedly pulled the country together, although some Venizelists would strenuously deny this. There were, inevitably, elements of absolutism, coercion and repression in its methods. The Press was virtually muzzled and remained so during the first year of the war. All editorial comment was absolutely forbidden. This measure, which was introduced originally in order to stifle criticism of the government, was later extended, to cover all aspects of foreign affairs and the progress of the war itself. Journalists and politicians who incurred the displeasure of the authorities were liable to be imprisoned or banished to an island. The secret police was organized on lines somewhat resembling the German and Fascist models. Its activities, although mild in comparison with its prototypes, were strongly resented. The same dislike extended to the *Neolaia*, a youth organization of the Fascist type, in which the Premier himself took the greatest pride and interest. Though much abused and derided, the *Neolaia* had its good points. But its main features, especially its compulsory character, were objectionable to the majority of Greeks, who saw in it at the best a waste of money and at the worst an organized attempt to influence their children. The administration could, however, point to considerable achievements, including a big programme of social legislation and a notable advance in public works and amenities. A measure of stability was restored to the currency. The Army was re-equipped. The behaviour of the police as a whole showed a marked improvement on the immediately preceding years. As conditions became more settled, complaints became rarer. Stories of the ill-treatment of political prisoners—never very well authenticated—were heard no longer. It was even suggested that certain statesmen who had escaped internment were chafing at the implied affront to their political consequence.

Although one might still suppose from conversation in some Venizelists salons that the country was groaning under a tyranny comparable to that of the Nazis, the average citizen, even if a Venizelist, would often admit that there were advantages in stable government, and that the suspension of party warfare was on the whole a blessing.

The government, however, could never be popular. Not only was the system directly at variance with Greek ideas of

liberty, but the Venizelists, who formed the bulk of the Opposition, found their leaders debarred from public office as well as from expressing their opinions openly. Several of these were imprisoned or interned, and there was the standing grievance of the Venizelist officers, numbering over a thousand, who had been removed in consequence of the revolt of 1935 and remained unemployed and in disgrace. These included the flower of the Army.

General Metaxas, great man though he was, did not attempt to solve these problems. His omission, if deliberate, can easily be understood. Party feeling at the time of his accession ran extraordinarily high. The rank and file of his administration, many of whom owed their positions to the elimination of political opponents, were unlikely to favour measures of conciliation or reinstatement. The Venizelists, as far as is known, made no overtures to the government and appeared, not without reason, to be implacable. Metaxas himself seems to have regarded his functions as those of a dictator in the original sense of that much deteriorated word. His first task, as he saw it, was to restore order and stability in the political and economic life of his countrymen. When war came, he rightly regarded himself as their only possible leader. It is doubtful whether he looked further ahead. His enemies accused him of purely personal ambitions. His friends declared that he would retire joyfully to his native island of Cephallonia as soon as his work was done. The latter picture was probably nearer the truth: but, whatever his intentions may have been, the facts are that he was an old man approaching 70 when he took office, and that his health was uncertain. He died without having laid plans either for a return to parliamentary government or for ensuring the continuance of his own regime.

The internal political situation had no practical effect upon Greek feeling towards Britain; but it did lead to some confusion and occasionally to unfounded suspicions. Those Venizelists whose main objective was a change of Government at first endeavoured to persuade their English friends that the existing administration was not only illiberal, which was to some extent true, but also anti-British, which was very far from the truth. The leopard, they said, could not change his spots: the Metaxas of 1939 was still the Metaxas of 1916. This, if correct, as it probably was, merely proved what many have asserted, that the Metaxas of 1916 was not anti-British. When it became clear to all that Metaxas

himself both desired and counted on the ultimate victory of the Allies, stress was laid rather upon suspected pro-German elements in the subordinate ranks of his administration and upon the alleged progress of German bribery and Fifth Column activities. The volume and persistence of German pamphlet propaganda was attributed to the connivance of the police, who were, in point of fact, doing their best to check it. Individual officials were reported to be in German pay. This may have been true in a few instances, but the allegation arose more often out of party or personal rivalries. Some high provincial officials, particularly in certain islands, deliberately adopted an anti-British pose, presumably in order to harass their political opponents. There seems no other explanation of their conduct, for popular sentiment was too overwhelmingly pro-British to be affected by it. Internal political differences were similarly responsible for most of the friction between officials of the Ministries of Press and Internal Security on the one side, and individual journalists on the other. Since the latter were invariably Anglophile, the real issue was sometimes confused. In the case of both Ministries there seemed ground occasionally for supposing that the authorities were not altogether friendly towards us. But, as events proved, this inference was very wide of the mark.

Of popular sympathy with the Germans, there was none. Among the classes in which, if anywhere, one might expect to find it, the tobacco growers and merchants of Macedonia, the learned classes, the archaeologists, theologians, doctors and lawyers, who had been educated at German Universities, the musicians whose connections were largely German—the general attitude was precisely the same as elsewhere. A few Greeks who had married in Germany enjoyed unenviable repute as pro-Germans, but had no other importance:

Among such was Professor Logothetopoulos, an obstetrician, whom the Germans have since appointed Minister of Education. After the French collapse, a society of "Friends of Hitler" was conceived by Logothetopoulos and a few others, no doubt at the instigation of the Germans. But it died in the womb as soon as British prospects improved. Many Greek men of letters who have been educated in Germany dislike the Germans intensely. Even old-fashioned Royalists, who had some admiration for Imperial Germany, retained no such feeling towards Germans of the Third Reich. Out of thirteen morning and evening papers in Athens, one only could be called pro-German. It had next to

no circulation, and was believed to subsist on German pay. Anti-German incidents were frequent after the Anschluss. Englishmen, mistaken for Germans, were liable to be insulted and even hustled, until they declared their nationality, when genial apologies were always forthcoming. A German lady who had lived for 15 years in Greece complained that, whereas she had always been treated with courtesy in the past, she was now-a-days greeted with cries of "German scoundrel" by children in the streets. A Greek who was sending a parcel to Vienna asked the post office clerk how it should be addressed. A German standing by at once made a scene, shouting, in provocative tones, "Put Germany: there is no Austria now." A free fight ensued, in which the culprit and other Germans who came to the rescue were severely mauled. The police arrested a number of persons on either side, but soon released them and took no further action. The correctness of the story cannot be vouched for, but this version was all over Athens within two days of the occurrence. A German lady went into a provision store and gave her order while the shopman was serving someone else. He asked her to wait. Soon after, she repeated her order, insisting that she was a German, and must therefore be attended to at once. "But that is just why I told you to wait," replied the shopman adroitly, "the lady I am serving is French." In 1938, the Frankfort Opera came to Athens on a propaganda tour. Outwardly the visit went off well, though the performances were not remarkable. But when a second visit was proposed for the next year, the Greek authorities declined on the ground that they could not undertake to prevent hostile demonstrations. A multitude of other examples could be quoted, were it not undesirable to publish particulars at the present time.

Anti-German feeling was so strong that the word Germanophile became virtually a term of abuse. Alternatively, Greeks would say that there were no Germanophiles in Greece, but only "Germanoplektoi," persons obsessed by fear of Germany. This was more or less true.

The Germans openly acknowledged the Greeks' love of Britain, and tacitly accepted their contempt for Italy and their dislike (to put it no higher than that) of Germany itself. German propaganda made no effort to counter these sentiments, recognizing that the attempt would be futile. Greek independence of character and Greek political ideals made it equally useless to endeavour to convert the Greeks to Nazi doctrines, while their subtlety and political acumen rendered them a very unpromising subject for cloaked propaganda or Fifth Column activities. The

Germans therefore resorted exclusively to the war of nerves. They sought to unsettle the public mind by the efficiency and volume of their output of printed matter, and gradually to induce a mood of panic and despair by the sheer brutality of its contents. There was no appeal to reason and virtually no concealment of malign intentions. Even before the war, from 1938 onwards, tourists on "*Kraft durch Freude*" cruises had spoken openly of the occupation of Salonica: and there was a sensational incident in the autumn of that year, when a member of the German Archaeological Institute, losing his temper during a quarrel with a Greek, publicly threatened his opponent and the bystanders with reprisals by the Gestapo. As soon as the war began, the country was flooded with books and pamphlets, mostly dealing with atrocities alleged to have been perpetrated, no matter when, by Britain or her Allies. The Boer War, the Denshawei incident of 1907 and even the Indian Mutiny were drawn upon, grotesquely distorted and garnished with the crudest of faked photographs. Thousands of copies of the infamous book of alleged Polish atrocities, with ghastly pictures of mutilated corpses, were dumped upon the bookstalls or left in private houses, together with masses of other material of the same kind, German "White Books," translations of Hitler's speeches, magazines and drawings occasionally humorous, but more often deliberately repulsive. The Greek Government at first exempted the official publications of foreign governments from the general prohibition on propaganda, but when it became evident that nothing was too scurrilous for the imprimatur of the Nazi government, this privilege was withdrawn as far as Germany was concerned. In spite of the delicacy of the situation, for at that time Greece neither was nor wished to be involved in war with Germany, the police were authorized to confiscate German pamphlets and books wholesale and to arrest persons who were found distributing them. As many as twenty-two thousand copies of one publication are known to have been seized, and nine thousand of another.

German war films exhibited the same terrorist features. They had to be shown privately at the German Legation or on premises owned by it, since the Government prohibited the exhibition of any war items in public cinemas, so long as Greece was not herself at war. A number of Greek officers went to see *Feuertaube*, the film of the Polish campaign, as a matter of professional interest. *Sieg im Westen*, the film of the campaign in France, was also on view at the German Legation shortly before Germany declared war on Greece. But this time no Greeks attended.

A more respectable form of German propaganda was the mailing of two thousand copies of the daily *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and the weekly *Hamburger Nachrichten* indiscriminately to individuals. The distribution of these respectable journals was something of a paragon, as few of the addressees could read German. Quite a number of them were dead. The writer saw a large pile of copies of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* with their wrappers still uncut in the corner of a shop. "I don't know why they bother to send these things," said the proprietor, "nobody looks at them."

German illustrated periodicals were more dangerous, mainly as a result of the greater difficulty of obtaining papers from England. In particular, a war-time illustrated called *Signal*, produced in German, French and English, with occasional columns in Greek and other languages, seemed at one time likely to make headway. It was a handsome publication, supplied gratis, half the sale-price of 10 drachmas (4½d.), going to the news-agent, and half to the vendor. Its very cheapness, however, stamped it as propaganda, and militated against its success. Later on, the authorities decided to treat all printed matter published by a belligerent power in any language but its own as illicit. This was a welcome decision, as many more Greeks can read French or English than German. *Signal* in German was harmless. After the French armistice, however, it was allowed for a time in French also.

No system of propaganda is deemed worthy of the name unless it includes a whispering campaign. That of the Germans was conducted principally by well-paid agents who uttered items of news or comments favourable to the Axis, in tones which were anything but whispers, in cafés, restaurants, and other public places and vehicles. These gentlemen did not lightly earn their pay. Besides being closely watched by the police, they incurred some bodily risk from the hands of the public. One of them, who expressed satisfaction in a tram at the torpedoing of an Allied grain ship, was severely beaten by his fellow passengers during the journey, and again, somewhat less severely, by the police on arrival. Some 'whispering' also was done by members of the German Legation and consulates: but this form of propaganda loses most of its venom when the source is known.

German broadcasts in Greek were on a lavish scale, amounting to four transmissions daily. Containing as they did little news and much propaganda, they could be, and were, more specially directed to Greek listeners than the Greek news bulletins

of the B.B.C., but, like the rest of German propaganda, they consisted mainly of menaces and abuse. The Berlin announcer, Kyriakis, a Cretan, was held in general detestation as a renegade and traitor, not only in his own island, but throughout Greece. The broadcasts were ineffective because they contained nothing to which Greeks wanted to listen. German pamphlets, it is true, similarly contained nothing which the Greeks wanted to read. But whereas a pamphlet sent through the post or pushed under a door has at least a nuisance value, no one can be compelled to tune-in a broadcast from a foreign country, if he does not wish to hear it. The Germans did what they could to force their broadcasts on the public by bribing or cajoling café proprietors into turning them on. In Crete, this action led to the destruction of the radio sets in at least two cafés by the enraged customers. The object of the Germans was not to secure a hearing for their own broadcasts but to obstruct ours. In this they partially succeeded. The authorities, to avoid further trouble, forbade the reproduction of any foreign broadcast in Greek in cafés and other public resorts. The ban came into force in the summer of 1940; but was relaxed, in favour of British broadcasts only, soon after the entry of Greece into the war. While it was operative, it did little, if any, harm. In Athens it was neutralized by the large number of private sets, and the fact that the latest British news was always available in the morning and evening papers. In the provinces, it seems to have been a dead letter. British broadcasts were at any rate turned on whenever Englishmen were present.

The Germans also scored an illusive victory over the British Legation news bulletin. This was a daily summary of the British wireless news, with an occasional commentary, produced originally in English only, for the benefit of the Legation and the British community. A widespread demand for it among Greeks, however, necessitated a Greek version, which soon reached an issue of several thousands, increasing at the rate of a thousand, every week. After a time the Germans produced a very objectionable imitation which so embarrassed the Government that they eventually stopped both bulletins. The British Bulletin was then reaching the climax of its popularity, and had already begun to exceed the means of duplication and distribution at our disposal. Psychologically, the decision, which was taken by Metxas himself, came at the right moment for us.

The Germans adopted the same bullying tactics in their dealings with the daily Press, with singular ill-success. Nowhere is Greece's spirit of independence more conspicuous than among her

extremely able journalists. It was useless to bribe or threaten any newspaper of standing, partly for this reason, and partly because even the suspicion of Axis bias in a paper led to a drop in its circulation. Accordingly, the German Legation tried to coerce the Press through the Ministry of Press and the Censorship. Editors were perpetually being called to order for exceeding their ration of British news and giving insufficient prominence to Axis messages. Public opinion would not be denied however, and the Ministry's half-hearted remonstrances were never sustained for long. Meanwhile, it was interesting to note how much extra matter of a distinctly British complexion, often curiously reminiscent of British broadcasts, continued to find its way into the papers under neutral date-lines, or headed "Our special service."

The British position in Greece, contrasting as it did with that of the Germans at almost every point, called for a different publicity technique. The Government and the people were our staunch friends. They were also as good judges as ourselves, if not better, of the European situation: they were certainly better judges of their own. What the public and the Press most wanted from us was, firstly, reliable news, and secondly, evidence of British strength, resources and determination. In propaganda, we had the great advantage over the Germans that our material was in strong demand, while theirs was unwelcome. In counter-propaganda, it was better on the whole to appear to be doing too little than too much. The former might suggest to nervous persons that we were not alive to German activities, but the latter would have given ground for supposing that we ourselves feared the German propaganda, and distrusted our friends. German propaganda could best be left to defeat itself.

In personal contacts, the advantage rested entirely with us. The maintenance of Anglo-Greek cordiality owes not a little to members of the British community in Greece, merchants, bankers, shipping and insurance agents, engineers, officials of public utility corporations and the like. Such men are truly representative of their country, and a permanent medium of propaganda in the best sense of the word. The Germans were less fortunate. The older members of their community were out of sympathy with the Nazis, and consequently, the objective rather than the channel of German propaganda. Other German residents, nurses, mechanics, business agents, doctors, artists and archaeologists were suspected by the Greeks, with good reason, of playing a treacherous role; while the swarms of tourists, artists and commercial travellers who

infested the country before and during the war with their sub-human features, ready-made civilian clothes, and super-efficient cameras, aroused nothing but uneasiness and disgust.

The Anglo-Hellenic League, which had a membership of over three thousand in Athens and important branches in the provinces was a most valuable factor in social and cultural relations. No such emblem of spontaneous fellowship existed or could exist between Germans and Greeks. The recently founded British Council organization, consisting of institutes of English studies in Athens and Salonica and a number of branch schools, possessed immense potentialities for cultural influence. Although it started, as one Greek friend charitably observed, on the wrong foot, it was doing good work under a new head and with re-organized staffs by the autumn of 1940, when war necessitated the closure of all educational institutions.

The test came, in Greece as elsewhere, in the summer of 1940. The first news of the Norwegian campaign had filled the Greeks with enthusiasm. This was followed by deep disappointment when the truth became known. The publicity handling of the campaign from London was bitterly criticised and the reputation of British news messages and broadcasts suffered a severe blow. The failure in Norway was, however, soon dwarfed by the catastrophies which followed. The Greeks, shrewd observers though they were, seemed no more prepared than anyone else for the French collapse. It was in these dark days that the courage and nobility of the people shone out. Now, if ever, was the moment for a Fifth Column to make its appearance; but there was no sign of one. German propaganda had achieved less than nothing. Desperate as the future seemed, and genuinely alarmed as the Greeks were, they never turned colour. The Press Counsellor of the German Legation at an unofficial gathering of the Foreign Press Association in July declared that Britain would succumb within 10 days. His listeners politely begged leave to differ. "Oh, do smash those brutes!" an old lady called across the street in broad daylight to the writer at about the same time. When an Italian spokesman was quoted on the Greek wireless to the effect that it was now the task of the Italian Navy to seek out the British Mediterranean Fleet in its harbours and destroy it, the audience in a theatre where the news was being relayed burst into hearty laughter, in spite of their anxieties. The outstanding popular reaction to the events of the early summer was an intense revulsion of feeling against the French for having failed us. The news of Oran was received with the utmost satisfaction.

Meanwhile, the Greeks were enduring with exemplary forbearance an ever-increasing pressure of threats and provocation on the part of Italy. The forbearance was dictated wholly by expediency and not at all by fear. The public were well aware that large numbers of Greek troops had been assembled on the Albanian frontier, and though they did not want war with Italy, the possibility of it did not scare them. In spite of the growing evidence of Italy's malevolent intentions, the torpedoing of the Greek cruiser *Helle*, as she lay beflagged at Tenos on the Feast of Assumption, came as an incredible outrage. On this occasion, the authorities waived restrictions on editorial comment, insisting only on the fiction that the submarine was of unknown nationality. This qualification enabled the Press to give a fuller vent to their feelings than would have been possible had Italy been named.

The sinking of the *Helle* had one very significant result. It obliterated whatever vestige remained of pro-German feeling in Greece. "I'm through with the Germans after that," was the immediate reaction of the few individuals who had previously seemed to be influenced by the German victories. After the entry of Italy into the war (an event in itself very damaging to Greco-German relations), the Germans had given carefully veiled assurances from time to time, in their broadcasts and in conversation, that they would prevent Italy from harming Greece. The *Helle* incident showed what these assurances were worth.

With the outbreak of war between Greece and Italy, all German publicity in Greece was comprehensively suppressed. From thenceforward, no messages or photographs of German origin were reproduced in the Press and no German newspapers or periodicals were allowed on sale. The "whisperers" went out of action and were not heard again. All German printed and typed propaganda similarly disappeared for good. The *Neue Athener Zeitung*, the twice-weekly local organ of the German community was given a hint, which it took, to cease publication. These measures were put through without fuss and almost as a matter of course, although Greece was not at war with Germany.

The German broadcasts in Greek thus became the only available source of German news and propaganda in Greece, and for this reason attracted more attention than hitherto. All "whispers" of enemy origin could be traced to them. Much of their material was obviously supplied from the German Legation in Athens. They were monitored in detail by the Greek Government, and countered promptly and effectively in the Greek Radio and Press.

From now onwards we worked in collaboration with the Government. Every facility was extended to us. The newspapers had unrestricted use of British material, and added to it much of their own which made better propaganda than anything that we could supply. British newsreels and war films from the Middle East drew enthusiastic crowds to the picture houses. Our photographs and posters were to be seen every where. The Government, with our assistance, organized a series of news and propaganda broadcasts in foreign languages, including English, French, German, Turkish, Bulgarian and Serbian. We took an active part in most of these; and were invited to contribute to all. During the summer of 1940, the Government had suspended all newspapers in foreign languages, including even the semi-official *Messenger d'Athènes*, the oldest paper in Athens. This ban was removed in September. The moment seemed ripe for the publication of an English paper. A weekly paper *News of the Week* was accordingly produced, its first number coinciding unexpectedly with Italy's declaration of war on Greece. The paper was cordially welcomed. It proved a notable success, and its issues had risen above 12,000 copies weekly—a high figure for Greece—when the end came.

TROUT FISHING NOTES FOR BEGINNERS

By LIEUT.-COLONEL R. B. PHAYRE, M.C.

Owing to the curtailment of furlough to the United Kingdom there has been an abnormal run on the various trout waters in India which have been filled to capacity. After heavy spells of office work, there is perhaps no greater relaxation than a pleasant camp in a secluded valley amid beautiful surroundings with a chance of casting a fly on a well-stocked stream.

Many of these anglers have not indulged in fly-fishing since the days of their youth. Some have never even attempted it, neither have their ladies who usually insist on taking out an additional licence. It is for such as these that the following elementary notes have been compiled. As the initial outfit is of considerable importance it must be discussed in detail.

1. RODS AND TACKLE.

Owing to war conditions the supply from the United Kingdom has been greatly reduced. Prices at home have risen considerably, in addition to that, the heavy customs' duty has about doubled the pre-war prices. In spite of these difficulties there is still a reasonable stock available at the various tackle shops.

(a) *Rods*.—For wet fly-fishing a split cane rod of from 9 to 10', preferably a two-piece, should be selected. It should be of fairly stiff action and weigh from about 5 to 7 ounces. If too heavy it is unduly fatiguing. Examine it to see that it is straight; bend it to see that the curve is an even one; waggle it downwards to test that it comes to rest quickly. Then fit on a reel to test for balance; normally the point of balance should be about 4" above the top of the hand as it grips the cork handle. The banks of many of our Indian streams are covered with trees which often limit the manipulation of a 10' rod, for such occasions. It often pays to have a light 7' rod in addition, but this is not an absolute necessity. It is harder to cast a long line with a short rod.

(b) *Reels*.—It is most important that a type of reel advised by the makers to suit the rod should be part of the equipment. Line capacity and weight are the primary considerations. In India large trout may

be encountered so it is undesirable to have *less* than 100 yards of line, some anglers insist on having 150 yards. This need not consist entirely of dressed line and the rest can be backing.

A reel should be easily taken down for cleaning and oiling and needs constant attention. The check should be just sufficient to prevent over-running.

- (c) *Lines*.—As already stated some 40 yards of dressed line will usually be found sufficient to attach to the backing. Tapered line, which is essential for dry fly-fishing, is not so important in wet fly; although it is easier to cast, it is more expensive, consequently a straight line of the 'Kingfisher' type is recommended, in cases where expense is a consideration.

Just as the reel should match the rod, similar matching is required for the correct weight of line. If the line is too heavy or too light casting will be seriously impaired; any competent dealer should be in a position to advise on this point. As regards breaking strains, the weakest link should be at the bait and the strongest at the backing, if this principle is not observed a great deal of unnecessary tackle may be lost when the angler has been caught up on a snag.

Lines in the East deteriorate so quickly that they need constant care and attention. It is essential to dry them after use. When a line is in condition, on unwinding the reel, it should hang down straight with the curve.

- (d) *Landing Nets*.—A stout staff of about 4' to 5' is desirable (preferably of ash). It should have brass caps top and bottom, both recessed for a universal screw.

The top end should take:—

- (i) folding landing net, or
 - (ii) gaff,
- the bottom end:
- (iii) a combined spike and hook (for releasing tackle), or
 - (iv) a combined spike and cutter.

The landing net frame should be of jointed metal with a diameter of not less than 18 inches. The net should be rather square and not pointed at the apex.

(e) *Casts*.—The best casts of all are gut casts but their supply has been seriously curtailed owing to war conditions. They are expensive and deteriorate very quickly, in the East especially, after being soaked and then exposed to the sun. The cost has risen to between Rs. 2/- to Rs. 3/- each.

Gut substitute (there are many makes on the market) is usually sold in lengths of 5 yards, but it is more economical to buy in reels of 100 yards. It is stronger than natural gut but must be discarded as soon as it frays. The cost works out at about 1/- a yard. It is sold in sizes (size O being the finest); size 3 is a useful strength for normal wet fly fishing. It has a disadvantage of slipping at the knots consequently these must be very carefully tied; a figure-of-eight knot is recommended. Avoid cutting off the ends too close to the knots. Six feet of cast will usually be sufficient with one dropper tied $\frac{2}{3}$ of the length of the cast above the tail fly. Always soak your casts before use or before tying any knots.

(f) *Hooks*.—The best hooks for wet fly are those with down-turned eye and deep rounded bend. The points must be kept very sharp. Test on the thumb nail; the point should catch on the nail; if it does not, sharpen with a file, or on a carborundum stone. For those who tie their own flies Allcocks 'Model Perfect' hooks give very good results.

(g) *Gut Mounts*.—As gut deteriorates so quickly in this country wire mounts are preferable to gut, both for lures and minnows. It should be remembered that whilst iron rusts gut will perish. It is no difficult matter to substitute wire for gut and this should be done whenever possible.

(h) *Spinners*.—On many waters spinning is permissible. The most acceptable form of minnow is the Devon and reflex Devon of about $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches in length. Plugs, both jointed and unjointed are also good killers.

Too many flights of hooks should be avoided as they usually catch up. One single treble is quite sufficient. The distance from the end of the bead to the extremity of the triangle should be about

$\frac{1}{2}$ " in the case of a 1" minnow and 1" for a 2" minnow.

(i) *Wire traces*.—The secret of success is to fish as fine as you dare. A 5 lb. breaking strain should be quite sufficient. Many good fish are lost owing to failure to examine traces; if wire kinks at all, discard it. Bought traces are expensive; it is simplest to make up your own at a fraction of the cost; all that is required are small link swivels and box swivels—the fewer the better. To attach wire to swivels insert a pin between the ring of the swivel and the crossed wire, twist the ends of the wire round themselves for about 5 turns, finishing up with a few round turns of the short end. When using weights, the weight should be attached above the main (usually the top) swivel.

(j) *Flies*.—Every angler has his own particular fancies. The answer to the problem is to learn to tie your own flies. It is quite a simple matter and adds 50 per cent. to the enjoyment of catching your trout, and in addition it cuts down the cost of these luxuries for they can be dressed at one twentieth of the cost of purchased ones. If you must buy flies, avoid the heavy over-dressed type the feathers of which protrude beyond the bend of the hook. As a general principle the tail fly should sink below the surface and the dropper (with its 3" of gut) be on, or just below, the surface. In clear and low water, the flies should be dark and small; in heavy water, larger and more coloured, often with tinsel bodies.

It is unnecessary to lay in an enormous stock of flies.

The following are renowned killers in India.

Flies.—Silver Doctor, Coachman, Teal and Green, Alexandra, Golden Lion Invicta, Butcher.

Flies and Lures.—Jock Scott, Peacock, Watsons' Fancy, Green Highlander, March Brown and Jungle Cock.

For both flies and lures one inch is usually a sufficient length for the tail fly and about half that size for the dropper.

In the case of lures the barb and point of the rear hook should be upwards *i.e.* barb amongst the feathers, the front hook should be below the body, facing downwards.

(k) *Care of Rods and tackle.*—It so frequently occurs that the heaviest fish are lost. If a post-mortem is held on the incident it will often transpire that it is really the fault of the angler—weak gut a perished line, a carelessly tied knot or a kinked trace. All tackle should be carefully dried after use and also inspected both before and *during* fishing to ensure that it is sound. If this were always done methodically, there would be far fewer complaints about losing good fish.

2. CASTING

At home it is comparatively simple to obtain lessons in casting from a qualified professional. In India the situation is quite different, for, unless the beginner can enlist the help of a friend, he is left to the tender mercies of shikaris who are usually worse than useless. As it is an easy matter to practise casting on any stretch of lawn, a few elementary methods are outlined.

Imagine you have a lump of mud on a stick which you want to flick off as far as possible. You will, probably, raise the stick behind your head and bring it through an angle of 45 degrees, checking it sharply so that the lump will fly forward. This example conveys the rough idea of casting.


With a rod and line you have the action of the top joint to help you.

(a) Backward motion; to lift the line off the water so that it travels back to its fullest extent.

(b) Forward motion; to use the action of the rod to flick the line forward in the required direction. Just as in the swing of a club in golf, it is all a question of timing, and this timing can only be attained by practice. No force is required, the only snag is to avoid the whip-like crack which will probably snap off the fly.

Hold the rod by the cork grip with the thumb pointing up the rod. Look behind you to see that there are no obstructions. Start your practice with a *short* line gradually letting out more line as you attain proficiency. Your object is to drop your fly on a selected target on the water, consequently you have to get out enough line to reach this spot. Drawing off line from the

reel with the left hand make false casts until there is sufficient line to reach the target. If the bait falls with a splash on the water it will probably put the fish down, consequently the object is to straighten out the line about 2 feet *above* the target, lowering the rod to let it drop *lightly* on the water. For beginners this can best be learnt by a count of four and can be most clearly explained by diagram.



Supposing XY to be the water line, the horizontal position of the rod will be about AB. When casting it is a mistake to take the line too far back—a very common fault—90 degrees from AB to AC is quite sufficient.

Count one.—For slow recovery from the water—then a flick to AC to throw the line back.

Count two.—Pause until the line has *almost* reached the extreme length of its backward passage.

Count three.—Forward cast with a flick of the rod at the commencement *i.e.* from AC to AD.

Count four.—Allow line to straighten 2 foot above the target then lower to AB.

Short line, short count; long line, long count. As soon as proficiency is attained counting is no longer necessary.

Side casting is equally effective and follows the same principles. There are, of course, a number of surer methods which can be studied later. For inaccessible places where back casting is impossible, a fish can sometimes be covered by 'catapulting.' Bend the rod like a bow by holding the fly on minnow with the left hand, then releasing it. Extra distance can sometimes be obtained (especially with a minnow) by first drawing off some line, allowing it to fall on the ground or by holding in the hand and then 'shooting' through the rings of the rod as the bait flies forward.

BAIT CASTING

Here again there is a knack in casting which can only be acquired by practice. Proficiency can be attained on any flat bit of ground before trying out the actual baits on the water. It is as well to start with a fairly heavy bait (say 2 ounces), working down later to the lighter ones. The larger the fish, the greater is its cannibalistic tendency, consequently the chances of catching a heavy fish are greater with a minnow than with a fly, but it should be remembered that all waters are not open to minnow, so the fishing rules must be carefully studied.

Most reels have a stud or catch which allows them to 'free wheel.' In the more expensive types, it is often possible to adjust the tension to the weight of baits used. This is a great advantage as it prevents the curse of over-running. Modern ideas have centred in 'multiple' reels which wind in the line at a quadruple ratio—quick recovery of line is obviously a great advantage and enables the angler to cast *upstream*. A trout which may obstinately refuse a minnow fished downstream will sometimes attack the minnow when coming down fast with the current. Multiple reels are frequently used with a 5 foot steel rod; (they are obtainable in India from Messrs. A. E. Verona, 153 Dhurumtollah Street, Calcutta, also from Manton & Co.).

Threadline fishing is fascinating, for a heavy fish can be beaten by a minute silk line of 6 lbs. breaking strain. The gear required is a 7 foot split cane rod and a thread-line reel of which there are many makes, The 'Helical' has proved to be one of the most reliable. These fixed spool reels are expensive for they have a watch-like mechanism with a slipping clutch and an adjustable tension. It always exerts the same pressure on a fish. Casting is effortless and a light bait can be cast an incredibly long distance. If expense is not of great consideration, a threadline outfit is strongly recommended.

For normal casting, assuming your target is at 12 o'clock on an imaginary clockface, point the left shoulder at the target with your rod pointing to 3 o'clock at an angle of about 45 degrees above the horizontal. Swing back the bait to 6 o'clock, then swing forwards and upwards, evenly and without jerking and without any excessive effort, the 'action' of the upper portion of the rod will do the work. With lighter baits you may have to swing back to 9 o'clock.

When casting with threadline the projecting should be almost flat; if force is used, it diminishes the power.

WHERE TO FISH

"Time spent in reconnaissance is seldom wasted." Your object is to find out where the fish are lying and for this it is necessary to know a little about the habits of the trout. They usually have their own 'lies' and wait expectantly for any food that may be coming down, consequently any junctions of streams or tributaries are always favourable places. A few good fish will usually be found in the rough water of dams, they will also be found lying in the deep hollows below banks and in holes formed by eddies. They like shelter from a hot sun and protection from the force of a strong current, so they may be sought in shady spots, in the scourings behind rocks and also in the deep water at the tail of a pool.

They are sensitive to shadow cast by the angler or his rod and vibration of 'the ground. Consequently it is desirable to keep out of sight as much as possible using what cover is available. Avoid getting the sun directly behind you. Approach with as soft a tread as possible, keeping your shikari well out of sight. If these simple, common-sense methods are not observed, the angler does not give himself a chance.

Shikaris have little imagination and are terribly conservative. As a rule they will only take the newcomer to places where fish have been caught before, and this probably well-flogged water where the trout are shy. The fly should be presented as naturally as possible; a good fish may often attack only once, so particular care must be taken that the first cast is a good one. If fish refuse to take, don't continue to flog the same water, but go elsewhere, returning to the original spot after an interval of time, with perhaps a change of fly.

In a swift current the fly may not sink much below the surface whereas the fish may be lying deep; it often pays to cast *upstream* above a rock, allowing the current to suck in your fly past the sides of the rock. Draw in any surplus line with the left hand otherwise it will be impossible to tighten on the fish when it takes.

You should plan to cover the whole water. In wet fly fishing this usually means casting across and slightly downstream, allowing your flies to sweep down until the line straightens, then either reel (or handline) in. A fish may be following and this is the time he usually takes. Pause for a few seconds and perhaps let *out* a little line before you commence to reel in. For the original cast you should attempt to drop your fly under the far

bank and this may mean letting out a good deal of line. Remember that several good fish may be lying under your own bank; if you approach the edge too closely you may disturb them before you start operations, so it often pays to cast down under your own bank first; in doing so it is necessary to keep back as far as possible, otherwise the least movement may give you away.

STRIKING

This is an important branch of the anglers' art and can only be learnt by experience. It does not mean a wild jab at the fish which may merely pull the fly out of its mouth. Tightening is a better definition; all that is required is to drive the barb home—the larger the fish the greater is the firmness required. If you can see the fish and it turns, tighten at once.

As a brief guide:

- (a) Strike quick for: Upstream, small fish, fish attacking a dropper, rapid and shallow water.
- (b) Strike slow for: big fish, slow water, surface rises and dapping.

More fish are lost through quick striking than by slow tightening.

PLAYING A FISH

Fight your trout and do not let him fight you; the longer he is in the water, the better are his chances of escape.

Always get below a fish if you can for he will then have to fight against the rod strain *and* the current which may drown him if it forces him to open his gills. The normal time taken in playing a fish is about one minute for each pound of its weight. Keep your line taut; if the fish wants to run, let him run, reeling in when the rush is over. Additional braking can be effected by fingertip control on the spool of the reel. Should he move upstream, follow him, reeling in as you go; excessive line on the water may result in a 'drowned line' and consequent loss of the fish.

POSITION OF THE ROD

The correct angle of the rod above the horizontal is from 60 degrees to 70 degrees. This is not a mere personal opinion but one confirmed by the experts. Many experiments were carried out and the results were published in the angling press some time ago. If the rod is held at 90 degrees there is a tendency either to pull the fish to the surface, or to make him bore standing with his head on the bottom in his endeavour to release the hook.

If a 10 foot trout rod is held at 30 degrees the pull is twice that exerted by the rod when held at 90 degrees. With a heavy salmon rod this ratio increases three or four times.

'Giving the butt' means lowering the rod to about 30 degrees with the rubber button in the vicinity of the stomach the strain thus falling on the lower, *i.e.* thickest, portion of the rod. It is often misinterpreted to imply *advancing* the butt, in which case the strain imposed is actually less.

For a jumping trout, lower the rod to the right or left, not to the front.

LANDING A FISH

The general rule at home is to use a net for a fish up to 5 lbs. and a gaff when over that weight. Never attempt to net a fish over 10 lbs.

At home the average angler nets or gaffs the fish himself. In India shikaris are notoriously bad at landing fish and, consequently, many are lost when actually brought to the net. Whilst playing the fish, the most suitable landing place should be settled. Play the fish out before attempting to land a large fellow; when he turns on his side for the third time, he is generally ready for the net, but keep a little loose line handy in case he makes a final rush.

The net should be wet; put a small stone in it to make it sink easily. Keep your net handy but concealed until the last minute. Your shikari should be out of sight also and not doing his wardance on the bank. Slip the net into the water, downstream, below the fish and draw him over it, then raise the net drawing it slowly towards you—should you fail, lead your fish to another spot and try again.

Should the fish appear too large for the net to take him sideways, try to net him tail first rather than head first. A little loose line is still useful as you may strain, or even break, a rod tip when bringing him up the bank.

When using the gaff don't snatch. Put the gaff over the fish, between the head and dorsal fin, then draw with a firm stroke towards you and down on the back. Never attempt to gaff a struggling fish or one that is more than a foot below the surface. Put the gaff *behind* your line—not *over* it.

I have described these methods in greater detail in my book "Hints of Flying-fishing and Fly-tying" which is shortly to be published by Messrs. Thacker & Co., Bombay. I have also added chapters on elementary fly-tying and on what feathers should be selected for flying dressing.

HUNTING AND TRAINING FOR WAR

BY MAJOR-GENERAL A. V. T. WAKELY, D.S.O., M.C.

In *The Onlooker* of October 1941 an article was published on Hunting and Training for War. The chief points made in that article were, first, that training of very great value to a soldier can be obtained while hunting, and that the mechanisation of the Army has increased the value of hunting as training for officers. Secondly, it was suggested that each day's hunting could and should be used to give officers a type of training that is not easy to obtain in the ordinary way.

The object of the present article is to describe the type of exercises that have been set this season to officers hunting with a pack of foxhounds in Northern India, and to give anyone who wishes to do this training some idea of the sort of exercises which can be usefully set.

When these exercises were started this season, some doubts and criticisms were expressed about them. These crystallised in two directions:

- (i) Hunting is a recreation, and should be treated as such. Therefore officers engaged in recreation in their spare time should not be asked to do work!
- (ii) In any case, most people would be so busy riding their horses that they couldn't possibly do any work without falling out of the hunt for that purpose. In fact, the exercises would ruin the sport.

As regards the first argument, it should be remembered that there is now no such thing as spare time. We are engaged in a war against efficient and ruthless enemies, who have been preparing themselves for it for many years. We are far behind them in our preparations, and we have many junior officers whose training has so far necessarily been of the most elementary kind. We have no time to lose and we must make ourselves fitter and more efficient than our enemies. Nearly a year ago, our late Commander-in-Chief in India said, "Nothing else matters now, except that you should get yourselves ready for war in the shortest possible space of time. Your leisure and comfort or leave do not count. Of course you must have time off, in order to avoid getting stale, but there can be but one object for every one of us and that is to make

and keep ourselves mentally and physically fit to beat the Germans." Incidentally, he is now demonstrating in no uncertain fashion how well he has carried this out himself.

The prime necessity for making ourselves fit for war should now never be absent from our thoughts for a single moment, and we cannot afford to miss a single opportunity for training. Any form of recreation which involves an expedition into the country is an opportunity for training. Hunting, shooting, golf, and an afternoon's walk are instances of such opportunities. At the present stage of the war, when time presses, all these chances of doing some small exercise should be seized.

There is an old English saying that "Battles are won on the playing fields of Eton." This is all right for a gentlemanly war, but something more has to be done about it in *total* war. To win a *total* war we must have *total* training.

The second criticism about the hunting exercises has more in it. Most of the exercises required accurate map reading and it is certainly difficult, if not impossible, to do that on a restive horse at a tearing gallop. This is exactly where the value of these exercises comes in. When moving at speed across country, a rider is forced to rely on his memory and observation to keep track of where he is going. In war in a cross-country vehicle the same situation will arise. It will be very difficult to read a map accurately without stopping to do so, and it may be most inadvisable to stop!

In an Eastern theatre of war when dealing with mechanised forces, or partly mechanised units, every officer should be a good cross-country leader. If he is not actually driving the vehicle himself he will in all probability be responsible for two things, picking the way and finding the way. Riding across country gives good practice in picking the way. Finding the way may be more difficult. In the desert, with an armoured formation the navigator does it, but the trucks of an Infantry Unit, supply vehicles and many others will have to find their way on their own, and possibly singly, across country, sometimes in close proximity to the enemy. The man in charge of these vehicles must be able to know exactly where he is on the map at any moment and he must know where he is going. Otherwise he may drive straight into the enemy. In Eastern countries roads are not numerous and most of the driving is cross-country. Good training for this type of driving can be obtained while hunting. When the map cannot be used, the ground must be memorised, direction and

location should never be lost and the map position should be regained at the first opportunity.

These exercises with hounds can be conveniently done in three stages:

- (a) Officers bring their maps with them, the exercise being given to them the day before hunting.
- (b) The exercise is given the day before hunting, but officers do not carry their maps with them.
- (c) The exercise is set *after* hunting. Maps may be carried out hunting.

Almost any kind of exercise can be set, but at first it is better to make them very simple. With the first two stages it is impossible to say how a problem set will turn out. There is no previous Directing Staff solution. There is a D.S. solution afterwards, but it may be liable to severe criticism, since the D.S., who may be the Master or the C.O. of the unit, can quite easily make mistakes the same as anyone else. These exercises give great opportunities for catching the D.S. out in an error and he will be caught out unless he keeps his eyes very much wide open, has a good memory for country and, above all, a good "bump of locality" and an "eye for country." The exercises develop all these things and are therefore excellent training.

The exercise set after hunting is much more difficult, both to set and to do, but there is a much wider scope.

To get a fair picture of the exercises set this season a brief description of the country hunted by these hounds is necessary. It is generally undulating. There are good landmarks at a great distance, but practically none in the actual country run over by hounds. It is, therefore, easy to tell whether you are going North, South, East or West; but extremely difficult to locate exactly where you are. This difficulty is accentuated by the map makers. There are hundreds of nullahs in the area, some are very wide sandy nullahs, others not so wide; some are narrow, while others, shown on the map, cannot be distinguished on the ground at all. Except for the wide sandy nullahs the map makers show no difference in all these, marking them all with a thin black line; so it is very easy to get mixed up in them. They offer no obstacle to horses, except in a few places. The country also has many very small hillocks, all of which look exactly the same. The going is light sandy plough, perfect for galloping on and there are few fences. Therefore when hounds run, there is nothing to stop them, and when there is a good scent they go at a terrific pace.

Horses have to gallop all out for considerable distances to keep near them. On a good day the average pace is 3 to 4 minutes to the mile. In such circumstances map reading is at a complete discount, and the rider has to trust to his memory and powers of observation. These conditions, however, approximate closely to those experienced by the driver of a cross-country vehicle and that is why exercises with these hounds are such good training.

A brief description will now be given of some of the exercises done this season. When considering the results obtained the conditions described above must be remembered, because the map reading is really difficult, and unless one knows the country pretty well it is very easy to get lost.

The first exercise set was intended to be very easy. Owing to unexpected action by the hounds (a fast hunt straight away.) It turned out to be very difficult, but many lessons came out. It was:

1. *Mark on the 1-inch map the route taken by hounds during the morning.*
2. *The Master did not take the direct route from the meet to the first covert. Why did he do this?*
3. *If an enemy M.G. post were located in the first covert, by what route would you lead a platoon from the meet to attack it?*

The first thing that happened was that officers brought out only the map on which the meet was shown. Hounds soon ran off that map. The first lesson was, therefore, always bring out sufficient maps for the job in hand.

The second question was intended to produce the answer that a circuitous route was taken, first, because the direct route lay through very thick country in which the hounds would necessarily have to be kept packed up. Secondly, it crossed two tank obstacles which, if full of water, would be difficult to cross and there were bridges on the circuitous route, and thirdly the longer route lay through open country where the hounds could move, spread out and had a good chance of finding the line of a travelling jack. This is what actually happened and hounds went off at a very fast pace. It was quite difficult to follow where they went. Thus, many officers got their route as much as 2 miles wrong and never located the first covert, which was drawn after the first hunt and was approached from an entirely different direction from that first intended. This produced the answer to question 2 that the Master had taken a circuitous route because he had

found a jack, and it spoiled the third question, which would have been a very interesting one.

The result of the exercise was to show that several officers were not sufficiently good at map reading to lead troops in war, except for a limited distance and at a walking pace. This war is being waged at a greater pace than that, and it is essential that officers should take a much wider view of the country they may be called upon to traverse and be able to find their way both with and without a map across country over very much larger areas than we have been accustomed to in the past.

Subsequent exercises confined to marking the route on the 1-inch map showed a great improvement in the solutions. It was quite clear that those who did the exercises were in fact getting valuable practice in map reading and that it was producing good results.

A senior officer reported that the practice had greatly improved his map reading. He developed a sort of instinctive triangulation for checking up his initial estimate of his position by memorising what he could see at checks and at places where hounds changed direction. This will not pin-point the position, but it will indicate at once whether the first estimate is badly out.

Another exercise set was as under:

You are commanding a Coy. of Inf. (Higher Scale Mech.) engaged in pursuing and trying to round up a large number of Germans who have escaped from the main battle. For various reasons the Germans are likely to take an unpredictable route (that taken by hounds).

Your men are lightly equipped and it is essential that the trucks should keep near them. Your Coy. is advancing on the route taken by hounds and is moving two up, covering a wide front.

1. *Mark on map the route taken by your Coy.*
2. *Mark any deviation from that route which you would order your trucks to take.*
3. *How would you send your orders to the trucks?*

Problems 2 and 3 proved to be beyond the powers of a number of officers, whose only solution was to move the trucks "by bounds."

If, as in this case, the direction taken by the enemy is unknown, previous orders to move to certain bounds will not work, and did not work in this case. Incidentally, the "enemy" (the

hounds) went much faster than real Germans could go (those now in Cyrenaica excepted).

The D.S. solution was to divide the five trucks into two groups and move these on two tracks about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles apart, keeping in touch with them by signallers on chosen hillocks, which abounded in the area.

This solution was not ideal, and it was subjected to much criticism, the chief one being that the truck is a platoon vehicle and should go with the platoon. In this case, however, it couldn't accompany the men. Anyhow, no one could produce a better solution, but the country was very difficult.

The exercise showed that sufficient attention had not been given to the problem of moving these trucks across country, and most officers had very vague ideas about how to get orders to the trucks.

Another exercise was:

You belong to a force advancing towards the East.

At 0730 hours (time of the meet), you started on a reconnaissance in a light tank (along route taken by hounds).

At 0800 hours precisely you were fired on by an isolated hostile M.G. from a point 500 yards from where you are (the place where hounds are at that hour).

The true bearing from you to the enemy M.G. is 100° .

You decide to send an Inf. fighting patrol to clear up the enemy M.G. You arrange this on return to your own lines near the camp, but, owing to the conference on your reconnaissance, you can't lead the patrol yourself. You, therefore, have to explain to the patrol commander where to go and what to do.

- 1. Give the map reference of the enemy M.G.*
- 2. What advice would you give the Patrol Commander?*

This exercise entailed synchronising watches and memorising exactly where hounds went during the half hour between 0730 and 0800 hours. Everyone got the position of the enemy M.G. accurately. As luck would have it the exact point happened to be marked by a prominent lone tree. But where many officers failed was in giving advice to the Patrol Commander. This required a wide consideration of the ground and a knowledge of its tactical significance.

There is no doubt that we do need more training in the appreciation of the value of ground and in memorising the main tactical features of country as we pass through it.

An exercise which gave rise to much argument was the following:

Make a mechanised movement map of the area covered by the hounds during the morning.

(See Army in India Training Memorandum No. 2 para 13).

The area covered by the hounds may be taken to be a strip one mile wide ($\frac{1}{2}$ mile on each of the route taken by hounds). No one need leave hounds to reconnoitre the area and no area outside the above need be considered.

In order not to spoil maps the 1-inch map should be shaded in lead pencil, which can afterwards be rubbed out. The term "cross-country movement" will refer to 15 cwt. trucks.

The following shading will be used:

- (a) Areas suitable to cross-country movement—horizontal shading.*
- (b) Areas impassable to mechanised movement—vertical shading.*
- (c) Areas difficult but traversable—diagonal shading.*
- (d) Obstacles to mechanised movement—ringed in pencil.*

At first sight this was very well done, but when we came to move trucks across some of the horizontally-shaded country, they all got stuck in the sand.

This showed that the making of a mechanised movement map cannot be lightly undertaken, and, if this map is to be of practical use it must be done by people who have considerable experience of cross-country driving and who know the capabilities of the various vehicles.

It will be seen from the above examples that the exercises set included map reading and simple tactical problems suitable for platoon commanders. They are good examples of the sort of exercise that can be set during any expedition into the country. It has been proved this season that they do provide good training of a type that is not easy to obtain in the ordinary way, because to do them, much time during working hours would be taken up

in getting out into the country. When they are combined with hunting that time is not normal working hours, *e.g.*, before dawn on Sundays. It is true that the number of officers doing them is limited to those who hunt, but it is better that these should have training which can be done without any extra expenditure of time and petrol rather than that they should lose an opportunity for doing something useful. Furthermore, those officers who do the exercises can devise similar ones for their companies and platoons on route marches and on other occasions when the men move out into the country. This is good training for the men. It keeps them on their toes, and relieves the monotony of route marches and long treks to manœuvre areas and training camps.

A GLIMPSE OF SHANGHAI

BY OFFICER CADET D. K. HISLOP.

Shanghai conjures up in the minds of most a picture of bright lights, lonely ladies and the attendant gay life. The picture is a very true one and life there is a pleasant one. But Shanghai was not always such an enviable spot and behind its present eminence lies a story of toil and pioneering comparable with any in the world.

The growth of this great city is a long and interesting story—a story of a handful of Britishers, who living in little more than shacks scarcely a century ago, by their courage and their hard-headed business acumen, changed a flat muddy swamp in China into one of the world's greatest cities, a city where to-day a skyscraper of twenty storeys is no uncommon sight, where the brightness of its Nanking Road is comparable with Broadway and whose markets are of world wide importance.

Shanghai grew and prospered on the Yangse. The Yangse-Kiang, China's longest and most important river, is born in the Tibetan Plateau and for 3,500 miles makes its way eastward through China, draining and irrigating a great part of that country until it flows into the Yellow Sea.

This grand river is the lifeblood of Cathay and on its waters the many and varied exports of the country find their way to the coast. Ships of every conceivable shape and size, of every nationality, are found ploughing their ways up and down, from the lordly 10,000-ton freighter to the lowly sampan.

Shanghai, situated fourteen miles up the Whangpoo river which meets the Yangse at its mouth, became the centre and distributing point for China's exports. It grew as the demand for China's tea, cotton, oil and other exports grew, but its growth was due mainly to foreign—chiefly British—initial energy and enterprise and to the belief of those pioneers of nearly a century ago in the future of their city.

In 1843, Shanghai was opened by the Chinese to foreign trade and a strip of land outside the city and on the banks of the Whangpoo river was marked out, in which foreigners might buy plots from the native owners for trade and residential purposes and over which they might have municipal control. The French secured the inner section, making it the French Concession over which they exercised complete control in every respect.

The British obtained the outer section, and it was intended that this should become the British Concession over which Sovereign rights would be exercised. The American authorities, however, hoisted their flag there. What it was like in those days it would be hard to say, and despite protests by both British and Chinese authorities the Settlement became international and has been so since 1863.

Shanghai, therefore, is divided into two parts: the International Settlement and the French Concession, occupied and governed by foreigners. Here the term 'foreigner' may be explained. It is a term first used by the Chinese of Europeans, including Americans, and now the common one used by Chinese and Europeans alike for non-Chinese.

The French Concession, the area of which covers about 25 square miles, is governed in exactly the same way as any French Colony or Protectorate, with its own French Municipal Council. An efficient military force is maintained there and its police force is composed of French officers and N.C.O.s with Chinese and White Russian constables enrolled locally and Annamite constables from Indo-China.

Except for general co-operation with the Settlement Authorities, principally in times of war, there is no association between the two Councils. It must be remembered that no physical boundary separates these two administrations and in many cases one side of a road may be French and the other International. Reciprocation takes place between them in the way of licences for vehicles and in a few other minor ways, but that is all.

Up to a few years ago, French Town, as it is known, was considered the finest residential part of Shanghai for foreigners, and long straight avenues on a typical French fashion were built and, as time went on, lined with stately homes worthy of any place in the world. Times change, and with the growth of the Settlement and extension of the roads there a slow move of the residents took place, and many of French Town's bigger homes were vacated and taken over by speculators for night clubs and for other similar purposes.

Owing to the comparative laxity of certain restrictions, as might be expected and as is the case, in any spot under French control, the concession was a popular centre for these night clubs and the more famous cabarets. Night life there resembles closely that of Paris, except, perhaps, that the high Parisian moral standards are not always maintained and one will hear Russian spoken

more frequently than French. Another very important point is that chits may be signed for drinks and dances and other pleasures where for some reason cash may not be available. These chits find their way with depressing regularity from French Town to one's office in the Settlement at the end of each month. If one is not *persona grata* in a particular haunt of vice where one's signature has been cheerfully accepted in place of ready cash, the chits then appear on one's office doorstep very early the next day. Economic experts and the older residents of Shanghai declare that at least ten years' study of the subject is necessary before a story sufficiently convincing can be concocted on the spur of the moment to persuade the beady-eyed old so-and-so, who comes to collect, to give a further month's grace wherein to save sufficient to pay for your fun of the previous evening.

French Town supplies sport in plenty. Among other amusements is Hai Alai, the Basque game of pelota, and a vast amount of money changes hands every night at Hai Alai. The Chinese are great gamblers and lovers of the game. The standard is very high and only professional players, imported from Spain and Cuba and other places where it is a national game, take part.

Grey hound racing, shooting ranges and really every kind of game, professional or otherwise has been or is played in French Town. Needless to say the 'wheel', although officially frowned upon, carries on its good work.

So much for French Town.

The International Settlement is a much more complicated place than French Town. It has an area of about forty square miles with the French Concession on one side, Chinese territory on another and the Whangpoo river on the third. It is said that at least one representative of every nationality in the world will always be found between its boundaries, and there is very little exaggeration in this as the nationality returns show.

The Government of the Settlement is an able body known as the Shanghai Municipal Council, comprised of British, American, Japanese and Chinese, in the ratio of 5:2:2:5. The Chinese representatives are nominees of the Chinese Ratepayers Association and are there for the purpose of protecting their nationals and representing them in disputes which arise from time to time over assessment of property taxes.

The majority of the British representation has been fiercely contested from time to time by non-British nationalities in Shanghai and this has culminated in the very strong and underhand efforts which the Japanese are making at present.

The facts are that we were the founders of the settlement and we built up the present administration, of which America and Japan have taken full advantage. Again our financial interests in Shanghai alone amount to £150,000,000 as compared with Japanese £44,000,000 and American £26,000,000. The British contribution to the Municipal Revenues is at least three times as much as the next highest.

With all this in mind one will perhaps realize the difficult and delicately balanced position in which an international administration with a British majority finds itself, governing impartially and fairly the most cosmopolitan population in the world. One must realize too that while so governing, the interests of their own nationals must be safeguarded at all costs.

This has been carried out in a most able and successful manner for many years, but if our friends from Nippon are allowed to progress much further it will be the end of the "Modern Settlement" as it has been called.

For defence purposes the Settlement is divided into four sectors, allotted to the British, Americans, Italians and Japanese. Since the Chinese uprising in 1927 and the attack on Shanghai we have maintained a garrison there. The Americans have a detachment of marines, the Italians a small force, supplemented usually three months after trouble starts. In the recent trouble in 1937 which continues to-day, although not in Shanghai, the Italian troops which ultimately arrived were their crack Alpine ones and reached Shanghai dressed in military skiing kit, skis, snow goggles and beautiful hats with feather dusters on the side. The Shanghai hills are twenty miles away in Chinese territory, and September in Shanghai is pretty hot, as were our Italians.

The Japanese force is a considerable one and has grown out of all proportion to the others during the last few years.

In addition to these Government troops Shanghai has its own Russian Regiment, of about five hundred, enlisted from White Russians living there, a very able body. There are also the Volunteers, comprising the Shanghai Scottish, 'A' Company Light Horse, and Portuguese and Chinese Companies. The whole of this force is in the charge of a British Commandant. There you have internationalism at its best.

The Russian Regiment and the Volunteers are called out for internal security and have proved their worth many times in the past. At the outbreak of disturbances in 1927, 1932 and 1937, Shanghai depended on them for its safety for the first few days until reinforcements could arrive from Hong Kong and Manila.

The Japanese, as has been their habit in all countries to which they migrate, concentrated in one area of the Settlement known as Hongkew. This has become their 'Little Tokyo' and, in fact, reminds the visitor of Japan rather than of China. Hongkew, naturally, was the sector allotted to the Japanese in the defence of the Settlement. We will return later to 'Little Tokyo.'

The next, or perhaps it should be the first factor in safeguarding Shanghai's safety is the Municipal Police Force. It is one of the finest organizations to be found anywhere in the world. One must realize that these uprisings, or "incidents," or what you will, bring with them a mad hooliganism that cannot exist in a well-policed successful city at peace. With its mixed population, its open arms to all comers—no passports required—Shanghai has collected as good a gang of toughs—Chinese, Japanese, all nationalities as are to be found anywhere. In normal times the Police Force has kept them well in hand, but with the added burdens of a war of no mean dimensions at their front door their peacetime duties must suffer.

The Commissioner of Police is and always has been British (to-day he is an ex-I.P. Officer). His deputy is Japanese, a sop to our Japanese friends, and the remaining officers are comprised of British, Japanese and Russians. Constables are Chinese and Sikhs, with officers of their own nationality. This Police Force has always proved itself loyal to its international character and to the Council which it serves. All except the Japanese.

The policing of the Hongkew district—the Japanese area—was given over very slowly and very reluctantly to the Japanese representation in the Police Force although some stations manned by Japanese officers have steadily been maintained in the district. After the beginning of the '37 trouble the Japs showed themselves in their true colours, closed Hongkew to all but Japanese, and cocked a snook at the Municipal Council and at all it meant. Under the guise of safety precautions no one was allowed over the fifty-yard long bridge into Hongkew without Japanese police or military passes.

Unbelievable indignities were suffered by foreigners wishing to enter Hongkew, and at last Nippon was able to show to the world the contempt in which she held Europeans.

Japan is undoubtedly the biggest menace to the future of Shanghai, and Shanghai just now is going through a very difficult and tricky period. She has been through many such ones before, though perhaps none so serious as to-day. She has weathered

many a storm and come up smiling. Through all her vicissitudes her brightness and cheeriness have never deserted her, and her gay life has continued, even though curfews time and time again have prohibited residents from appearing on the streets between ten at night and five in the morning.

There is what is called a 'Shanghai Mind,' a peculiar thing that exists nowhere else in this world. It is a mind which permits one to enjoy the biggest booms in an open-handed full-of-the-joy-of-living manner. Money is easy to get and goes as easily as it comes; there are no cliques and your neighbour is your friend. So in times of slump. Little money is available, but what is there is given readily to the most deserving cause. It is a mind which believes that Shanghai will always come out top—it allows one to sit in the Shanghai club and watch the Japanese blowing China, and possibly one's own possessions, to pieces with guns not two hundred yards from where one is sitting, with a feeling that it has happened before and it will happen again but Shanghai will weather any storm.

Before concluding this attempt to describe the 'Modern Settlement' I must explain the many references made to White Russians. These people are the remnants of the Revolution of 1917 and their descendants. They fled eastwards through Siberia to Manchuria and a haven was offered to them in the city of Harbin in Manchuria by the Chinese. There they colonized and started life again. Many came as far as Shanghai, a city where no questions were asked. Most were penniless, but those who had money helped their less unfortunate brothers, and they have been a credit to the city which gave them a home.

Their records in the Police, the Chinese maritime customs services, and wherever a chance has been offered them, are records to be proud of. Their lady folk, as one already knows, have helped to make this city one of bright lights and cheerfulness, and have made the name 'Del Monte' one to be conjured with wherever the subject of night clubs and cabarets is raised.

So, these past hundred years have produced in far Cathay—a modern city and a world's foremost port, a city of twenty-storey skyscrapers, a city where Internationalism has been preached and successfully practised, an example in tolerance, high-heartedness and able administration which could be well followed to advantage in many parts of this world. We should be proud of our countrymen who founded this 'Model Settlement.'

JARBOIYAH—1920

SOME RECOLLECTIONS OF AN EARLIER IRAQ REBELLION

BY "JEBB"

It was originally intended to devote the whole of this article to a description of the defence and siege of the small post of Jarboiyah during the Arab Rebellion (as it was commonly called) of 1920 in Mesopotamia. But in view of the events which took place in that ancient and turbulent country in April and May 1941, a short account of the earlier insurrection may also not be without interest. And different as the two rebellions were, both in cause and scope, there may, who knows, be lessons to be derived for the future from a comparison of the two.

It will be as well first to refer briefly to events in Mesopotamia which succeeded the signing of the armistice with Turkey in October 1918. From a military point of view the situation was all that could be desired, and British prestige in the country never stood higher. Mosul lay at the mercy of the 1st Corps which, after a rapid advance up the Tigris, had captured at Shergat the Turkish general, Ismail Haqqi, with his force of 11,000 men and 50 guns. The 3rd Corps were on the borders of South Kurdistan; while the 15th Division, operating on the Upper Euphrates, had successfully enveloped the 50th Turkish Division almost entire.

Further west, all had gone even better. In Syria, British, Australian and Indian cavalry, with infantry pressing close behind, had captured the whole of the Turkish army and were riding in triumph through the streets of Aleppo and Damascus. The British Fleet had passed the Dardanelles, and Constantinople had fallen. Bulgaria and Austria had already accepted armistice terms, and Germany was soon to follow.

All this was not lost on the people of Iraq, and they accepted with resignation the occupation by the victors of all the principal towns in Northern Iraq and South Kurdistan. On the Upper Euphrates, Anah and Dair-al-Zaur were also taken under our administration. But when they saw us apparently settling down in their country for keeps, they began to get a bit restive.

The Political officers to whom the administration of the country was entrusted consisted largely of demobilized officers of

very little experience, while the administrative work at headquarters was mainly in the hands of the Indian Civil Service. Stout-hearted and conscientious as many of these officers were, under the leadership of their gallant Chief Commissioner, Sir Arnold Wilson, there can be little doubt that their inexperience, coupled with the highly centralized and perhaps rather unimaginative system of control, was one of the principal causes of the unrest which came to a head in the summer of 1920. To the Arabs, accustomed to the elastic and easily evaded administration of the Turk, the meticulous collection of revenue, the heavy demands for forced labour, and our 'Sandeman' system of dealing through the Shaikhs rather than with individuals, to all of which they were unaccustomed, were distasteful in the extreme.

There were of course other causes. In Syria the Emir Faisal, son of Hussain of the Hedjaz, had been established as practically independent ruler, and many Iraqis dissatisfied with the non-introduction of a similar indigenous government in their own country, had gone to Syria and were now occupying important positions in the army and civil administration. From here, knowing well the state of feeling in Iraq, they began an insidious propaganda designed to secure their country's independence; which propaganda was sedulously fostered amongst the tribes by the 'Ulamas' or Shiah religious leaders of Karbala, Nejaf, and Kadhimain, the three holy places of Iraq. Current talk of the Anglo-Persian agreement, whereby the Iraqis got the idea that Persia would become a British dependency and that the same fate would soon overtake their own country, was also not without its influence.

Another contributory factor was the gradual departure of our troops after the armistice. There is an Arab saying that the brain of the Arab is in his eyes—"seeing is believing," in other words—and not being an over-intelligent individual, he failed to realize that the trains and steamers which took the troops away could equally readily bring them back, and did.

Altogether, what with one thing and another, there were by the end of 1919 all the ingredients of first-class trouble. These ingredients moreover had been given a stir on our part by a gratuitous piece of 'appeasement,' in the failure to re-occupy Dair-al-Zaur when that place was seized by a Sharifian firebrand on the 13th December 1919. This was followed by the evacuation of Albu Kamal.

Henceforth the betting on a rebellion taking place was odds-on; the question was merely—when? But in spite of steady pro-

paganda, underrated and unchecked, the first explosions did not occur until June 1920. There was a preliminary and very unpleasant incident at Tel-Afar, 36 miles West of Mosul, in which not only the Police and Political officers-but the entire crew of an armoured car detachment were murdered; but the real beginning of the rebellion may be said to have taken place at Rumaithah on the Middle Euphrates.

Before describing this and subsequent events, we will pause for a moment to examine the military situation from the British side. At the moment of the outbreak there were under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer Haldane, G.O.C.-in-C., nominally some 60,000 men, consisting of 7,000 British and 53,000 Indian troops. In this total, however, were 3,000 British and 23,000 Indians employed on non-combatant duties such as guarding prisoners of war and refugees. After reductions, therefore, the balance amounted to only 4,000 British and 30,000 Indian troops, consisting of units many of which were under-strength and weak in officers. Roughly speaking, they were disposed as follows: 18th Division, between Mosul and Baghdad, and 17th Division between Baghdad and Basra, plus two extra battalions at Baghdad and three on the L. of C. In addition there were five batteries of armoured cars, distributed in Persia, Mosul, Baghdad, and on the L. of C. Of the two squadrons of the Royal Air Force, three-quarters at least of one squadron was detached to Bushire, Kazvin and Mosul, leaving only four flights at Baghdad. There were no troop-carrying aircraft, nor were any available from India.

With the above forces a country three times the size of England had to be garrisoned and administered. But the study of a map conveys no idea of the time factor involved in moving troops from one part of the country to another, aggravated by indifferent railways, lack of roads, and the heat of a Mesopotamia summer. Actually, by 30th June when the rebellion broke out, only some 500 British and 2,500—3,000 Indian troops were available as a mobile force, of which one battalion only was in a position to reach the Middle Euphrates area within 24 hours. It was, therefore, no easy problem which faced General Haldane, and the proper exercise of those well-worn principles of war, Concentration and Economy of Force, were to give him much anxious thought.

It was at the little town of Rumaithah, standing on both banks of the Hillah branch of the Euphrates, about 28 miles above Samawah, that the insurrection burst into flame. On the 25th June the Assistant Political Officer had been ordered to arrest and

send to Diwaniyah one Sha'alan Abu, a Shaikh of the Bani Hachaim tribe, for non-payment of an agricultural loan. While the party was waiting for the train to Diwaniyah, the retainers of the Shaikh took the law into their own hands, killed the Arab guard and released Sha'alan.

This incident was perhaps the match that set the Middle Euphrates alight, but the country round Rumaithah had been in a highly disturbed state for some days and there were several incidents of railway cutting. At the urgent appeal of the Assistant Political Officer, one-and-a-half companies of the 114th Mahrattas arrived from Diwaniyah and Samawah on the 1st and 2nd July, and during the latter night all civilians were moved into the Political serai on the left bank of the river. On the 3rd a company of the 99th Infantry arrived from Hillah after an adventurous journey, and this brought the total of the garrison to 527, of whom 312 (including four B.O.s) were combatants.

Unfortunately, the force, which now became besieged, had only two days' rations, and the task of providing food for it soon became a cause for anxiety. Raids into the surrounding bazaar brought in food for a few days, but on the 12th supplies were again running short. However, another successful sortie on a large scale, with two platoons of the 114th acting as covering party and the remainder of the garrison armed with bags, tins, and blankets, produced rations for another twelve days, consisting of half a ton of grain besides some sheep and chickens. The covering party also accounted for 20 of the inhabitants without loss to themselves. On the 8th, three boxes of ammunition, asked for by helio through Samawah to Baghdad, were dropped by aircraft. The only box to land in the serai unfortunately also landed on and killed an N.C.O. of the 99th, but the other two boxes were eventually recovered—one from the river and one from among date-palms 100 yards from the serai.

Meanwhile a small relief column, accompanied by a train carrying ammunition, food and water, had reached on the 6th July a point some six miles north of Rumaithah. Next day the insurgents were encountered in very large numbers, and the force after suffering 200 casualties was compelled to withdraw to Imam Hamza, 18 miles north of Rumaithah, where it halted. It was by this time clear that a much larger force would be needed to effect the relief, and the G.O.C.-in-C., not liking the look of things generally, also took the precaution of asking the War Office for reinforcements, which to his disappointment he learnt could not embark before the end of July. He had, therefore, for over a

month in the most critical stage of the rebellion, to do the best he could with what he had got, and the juggling process must have given him nightmares. The immediate situation, let alone any others that might develop, was unpleasant enough. Only by denuding other areas to a dangerously low level could he concentrate a force adequate to the task, and this force he was committing into the blue over ill-guarded communications, and with every prospect of other tribes rising between the force and its base at Baghdad, 150 miles away.

The relief force, consisting this time of six battalions, with one squadron of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, a sapper and miner company and details, were concentrated by the 16th July within 16 miles of Rumaithah; and to cut a long story short, after considerable fighting it entered Rumaithah on the 20th and relieved the garrison. In this operation, in which there were about as many casualties as in the earlier abortive attempt, the 45th Sikhs and the 1/10th Gurkhas particularly distinguished themselves. Indeed, to the author, the Arab Rebellion of 1920 will always be linked in memory with the names of these two units, and of the intrepid commander of the Rumaithah relief column and many other columns, Brigadier-General F. E. Coningham, C.M.G., D.S.O. One of the features of this and other operations that year was taking a railway train with the column. It meant of course tying troops to the railway and so hampering their freedom of manoeuvre, but the great advantage of having the wherewithal to carry plenty of water and ammunition and medical comforts, not to mention a mobile hospital far outweighed any disadvantages.

We must now leave the Rumaithah garrison, the relieving column and its train at Diwaniyah, and turn to events nearer Hillah. What had happened at Rumaithah was happening in rather similar measure at Kufah, 33 miles South of Hillah on the other branch of the Euphrates. This place, which was situated only five miles from Nejaf, hotbed of intrigue, was originally garrisoned by two companies of the 108th Infantry (the author's unit), which garrisoned had been reinforced by another company early in July. By the 20th it too was in a state of siege, and General Haldane's intention was to send a brigade to Kifl—21 miles South of Hillah and terminus of the 2 feet 6 inches railway from that place—and then later with reinforcements from Diwaniyah to set about the relief of Kufah. On the showing of Rumaithah it would be unwise to attempt the relief with less than a brigade-and-a-half.

Unfortunately, the local commander at Hillah, under pressure of the Political Officer, was persuaded to send a small detachment from the small garrison at Hillah in the direction of Kifl. All the usual arguments in such cases were brought to bear. We must show the flag—if we did not, other tribes would rise; and so forth. Here in passing would seem to be one of the outstanding lessons of the campaign—the clash between military and political interests. You constantly had on the one hand the urge of the political to scatter all available forces, often small in number, in order to maintain law and order, on the basis that such action would help to stave off greater trouble; and on the other, the deeply ingrained instinct of the soldier to concentrate his forces and so avoid the danger of being weak everywhere and strong nowhere. At any rate, the result on this occasion was the disaster to what came to be known as the Manchester Column; though it must be said in fairness to the political that though they were responsible for the situation arising, it was the failure in judgment and commonsense on the part of the commander that led to the actual disaster.

Briefly, what happened was that the column moved out on the 23rd July to a point six miles from Hillah, found the water brackish, moved on in the heat of the next morning to a canal ten miles further on, and there encamped. In the evening large numbers of Arabs were reported approaching, but instead of standing his ground—which was not too bad, being protected on three sides by bunds—the commander decided, on the advice of the Political Officer attached to the column, to withdraw in the dark to Hillah. Of course, the situation was one that any Pathan or Arab or savage enemy might dream of, and in spite of great gallantry by the 35th Scinde Horse acting as rearguard and a small party of the Manchesters, of whom Captain Henderson won the posthumous V.C., the Arabs got right in. The transport stampeded and there was deuce and all of a shemozzle. Of the 318 missing from the column on arrival at Hillah, 79 British and 81 Indians became prisoners with the Arabs, and our net loss in killed was thus little short of 200. One 18-pdr. gun of the 39th Battery was also lost, in spite of heroic efforts to save it, and many transport vehicles and animals.

It was altogether an unfortunate affair, occurring at a most inopportune moment. The answer seems to be—

- (a) If you must show the flag, be certain that you are strong enough to do it.

- (b) Make sure of your water before you start out into the blue in the desert.
- (c) Don't always believe the Political Officer but rely on your own military judgment.
- (d) If you have to withdraw in the face of a savage enemy, try and avoid doing it at night.

* * * *

And that, after a somewhat lengthy preamble, brings us to Jarboiyah. Relief of Kufah was now of course out of the question; the immediate necessity was to get Brigadier-General Coningham's column and train to Hillah, and 14 miles South of Hillah, at Jarboiyah, was a small but vitally important bridge, spanning the Hillah branch of the Euphrates, over which the column and train had to cross. General Leslie, commanding the 17th Division, rightly appreciated that if he didn't do something about it the Arabs certainly would; and so it was that at about 0130 hours on the 26th July the author, who was then Adjutant of the 108th Infantry (henceforth he will refer to himself in the first person) was woken up and told that what remained of the 108th (Headquarters and one rifle company, less details) would proceed in the morning to Jarboiyah and there, like Horatius, hold the bridge.

There were only two British officers with the small detachment—M., who was officiating for the C.O. then on his way back from leave, and myself—and our first job on arrival at Jarboiyah was to decide how the bridge was to be defended. It was an interesting little problem, of the same variety as that which faced the bewildered hero of "The Defence of Duffer's Drift" way back in the South African war. But there were really only two choices open to us: either to defend the original camp and station (see sketch) with a detachment at the bridge; or to let the two former look after themselves and have the post actually at the bridge. We were fortunate in having on the train Major Bradney, C.R.E., 17th Division (later to be Commandant of the Q.V.O. Madras Sappers and Miners), and he came in strongly on the side of the actual bridge site; so bridge site it was. But though obviously the right choice, it wasn't too pleasant a site, being completely overlooked by bunds on either flank and the fort to the west, and with a nasty thick belt of palm trees on the North, across the river. The river here is quite a little chap, being hardly wider than the average Punjab canal, and it was unnecessary to do more than wire the north side of the bridge; though later we were compelled to keep a post there at night. The bridge itself was a simple

affair, with one rather elongated set of wooden piles and one smaller set supporting the girders and rails; there was no roadway, and to get from one side to the other one had to hop across the sleepers.

So far all was peaceful on the Jarboiyah front. Whether the Arabs had been impressed by our sudden arrival, or whether they were waiting until they could attack *en masse*, I don't know; but the respite gained was very useful to us. In the evening, to our surprise, a railway construction train arrived from Diwaniyah, bringing three platoons of the 32nd Sikh Pioneers, with Major P. in command. (He was an M. too, but I call him P. for he was known affectionately as Pop throughout the Corps of Sikh Pioneers.) He being senior to our M., took over the post, and in an incredibly short space of time his Sikhs were out of the train, spaced on to their tasks and started digging, while our men put up the wire. The construction train, meanwhile, having started back for Diwaniyah, found the line cut and turned round and went to Hillah instead. Next morning it returned, bringing a platoon of Sappers and Miners, and what was more important, 15 days' rations for the garrison; but as a set-off to this it removed 100 men of the 108th to act as additional escort on its rail-mending journey to Diwaniyah. These three platoons were not seen again until the end of the siege, and we were left with roughly 300 rifles with nine Lewis guns, and 120 non-combatants. Not too bad.

By 7-30 p.m. on the 27th we were more or less dug and wired in and ready for anything that might transpire. Our particular little balloon went up in rather curious fashion. At that moment, 7-30 p.m., a party of Arabs set fire to a small bridge about 1,000 yards S.E. of the camp, and we decided to let them have a burst of L.G. fire to register our disapproval. This in turn brought a bout of sniping from the bund, and as though at a signal every blessed man in the garrison (we were standing to at the time) let off his musket in reply. Nerves were taut, I suppose; at any rate, it required all the whistle-blowing and shouts and oaths that B.O.s and I.O.s were capable of, to put a stop to it before all our ammunition was expended. But we were undoubtedly besieged from that moment. Next morning found it impossible to send out patrols and piquets in daylight, and any man unduly exposing himself was instantly fired at. One of our first casualties, as bad luck would have it, was Major P. himself, who was hit in the fleshy part of the right thigh while sitting rather too far up the railway embankment, talking to the author. Regrettable as it may seem, we had no doctor not even a sub-Assistant Surgeon: an

omission to which, doubtless, we ought to have drawn attention before leaving Hillah—but, well, we were busy and it is generally up to the staff to think of these little details. They had sent us back our station-master on the construction train (under arrest; he having deserted his post and jumped the train the previous evening, in the evident belief that Hillah was more healthy than Jarboiyah), but he did not quite fill the bill. Our only personnel with any claims to knowledge of medicine were therefore a Sanitary Havildar and a few stretcher-bearers, with some bandages, lint and a bottle of iodine. With these we dressed Major P.'s wound morning and night, and by a miracle it kept clean and he was eventually safely evacuated to Baghdad where he completely recovered; but it was an anxious time for both the patient and us. Casualties were not heavy on either side, in spite of *The Pioneer* of 6th August alleging that as a result of the Arab attack on the night of the 30th/31st (that was wrong too: it was 27th/28th) the ground round the post was "littered with rebels dead." Actually, the attack, if one could call it so, was a very half-hearted affair, and in the morning we saw only one corpse, though doubtless others had been removed during the night.

Our chief excitement in the early stages of the siege was the attempts by the rebels to set fire to our precious bridge with fire boats. The first time, at about 2-30 *ack emma* on the second night, i.e. only a few hours after the abortive attack, rather caught us bending; but we got away with it, because the boat they sent down was no more than a small raft (obviously constructed on the spur of the brain-wave), and though it bumped against the piles and set them alight we were able to put out the flames with our fire buckets. The raft then floated harmlessly on down stream. Such initiative on the part of the Arabs was unexpected, and might have earned a better reward had they remembered the lessons of German gas and British tanks; to wit don't spring your tactical surprise until it can be really effective. Of course, we were ready for them next time, on the following morning and again in the evening; but let me describe the latter occasion from my diary—the only diary I have kept at any length for any period of my service:

"7-30 p.m. Sun just going down. Another fire boat alarm—this time a big one. I can see it pushed out into the stream and then suddenly burst into flames. This is the third in about 18 hours, curse them! Well, we are ready, provided it isn't so big that it sticks under the girders of the bridge; this is the great danger. I make a leap and a jump across the railway embankment into the L.G. post on the left of the bridge and make them turn the gun round so as to fire on the Fort as soon as the polewalas go out.

The latter are ready, close to the L.G. post, and the bucket people behind them in case the bridge catches fire anywhere. I anxiously look out to see where it is coming—between the near piles or the middle ones. This time the brute is coming straight for the centre pile, and the pole-men will have to double out there; no other way of doing it. Things are pretty lively by this time; in fact I seldom remember spending a livelier 10 minutes. The old Arab is firing very heavily on the bridge and vicinity, and the crack-crack of the bullets seems unpleasantly close. The boat is within 50 yards now and it is time the men went out with the poles. I have to shout at the top of my voice at them for at least half a minute and for an awful moment I thought they didn't understand; then they get up and double across and let themselves down on to the middle pile, poles in readiness. What a scene! An artist would revel in it. The light of the setting sun made redder still by the flames from the boat, the flashes from the fort, the clatter of rifle and Lewis gun fire, and this fiendish boat floating slowly towards the bridge! It is almost on to the pile now and the men are pushing it away so that the wood won't catch. A roar of cheering as the third boat also passes harmlessly downstream. The men get up and double back from the central pile. These two men are going to be recommended for bravery.

"We feel fearfully cheered by this little fracas, at least I do, but we don't get off scot free. The havildar in charge of the bucket party, Yasin Khan, has been hit in the stomach, it is feared pretty badly; but on the whole we are remarkably lucky to have got off so lightly."

Quite picturesque. The two pole-bearers (Rajputana Mussulman Lance-Naiks) each got the I.D.S.M., but the havildar died of his wounds, which was not so good.

That finished the efforts of the Budhus to burn our bridge and as they obviously had no stomach for more attacks life settled down to trench warfare routine, sniping and all. It seemed incongruous to us somehow, stuck there in the middle of the desert and in a daily temperature of about 110° maximum, to be stumbling about in trenches and not able to put one's head over the top without getting a bullet fired at it. I forget how many bullet holes we found in our E.P. mess tent (dug down, of course, with Major P. on his stretcher in one corner), but there were quite a lot. Later the Budhus attempted to sap their way forward close to the bridge through the palm trees on the other side of the river, and we had to keep a bombing post there at night. Arabs sapping! A fantastic idea, but true enough.

In addition, we were completely cut off—from Brigade H.Q. in Hillah, from the rest of our battalion in Kufah, from the column at Diwanayah—and we had no idea for how long. The only way G.H.Q. could get in touch with us was by air. We had noticed chaps flying about and put out our Popham Panel to encourage them, but having been designed primarily for France it was not a very intelligent means of communication. For instance such messages as "We are stopping out for the night," or "Where are the nearest infantry?" didn't seem appropriate. However, we

were at least able to show the pilots by means of signal No. 289 "Inform" that we hoped for a message, and sure enough, on the 31st, an aircraft came over very low and dropped two streamers, both wide, but we were able to recover one without loss of life or limb. This was the message it contained:

"Please look out for helio from HILLAH and make every endeavour to get communication, keeping your station open as long as light allows.

"2. Expect Genl. Coningham to leave GUCHAN (9 miles S. E. of JBH) for you on 2nd August. Help with your construction train if you can. Will send cavalry to you to-morrow if there is safe camping place for horses. If so fire a Very Light when machine flies back over you and itself fires one RED Very Light. Keep good lookout for this, as there are many machines flying about. If no Very Lights fired by you, I will understand cavalry cannot go to you.

"17th Division 0650."

An odd message to send to a small beleaguered garrison, we thought. Surely the chaps could see that there was no construction train within miles of us, and that we had put wire and barricades across the rails? As for the helio suggestion, M., who was our mathematician, worked out that our answering helio would have to be raised 30 feet up, which meant suspending a signaller from our solitary palm tree. He would certainly have been dead as mutton within a minute of getting there, so we didn't awfully like that idea either. Needless to say we fired no Very Light and hoped the cavalry were duly grateful. It was however cheering to hear that General Coningham might arrive on the 2nd; but plans might go awry and we felt we must be prepared for a much longer siege than that. Of rations and ammunition we had sufficient for a month by going carefully, and as mess secretary I amused myself by making out a list of stores for consumption by the four of us. (Did I say that we had a Sapper officer too? His chief claim to fame was the construction of a natty wire rope to fling across the river to catch fire boats; unfortunately, by the time it was in position there were no more fire boats.) This list of stores is recorded in my diary, and I see that while we could open one tin of bully beef every day for a month and one tin of milk every second day, we had to make judicious spacing of such items as tinned soups, fish, vegetables and fruit. I was indulgent in allowing coffee, porridge and bacon to be consumed every day while they lasted, but insisted on the retention of marmalade, jam, biscuits and curry powder. I suppose the idea was that if we were finally reduced to biscuits and bully, the jam and marmalade would improve the taste of the former, and the curry powder the latter.

So life went on. By the 1st August we felt it was time to take the initiative against these Arabs, whose sniping and singing and array of red, green and white flags on the bund were beginning to irritate us. Singing and beating of *dhols* usually reached its crescendo at about 7-30 *pip emma*, so we planned to send out at that hour a small raiding party consisting of two rifle sections of Sikh Pioneers and one bombing section 108th, under a Subadar of the 32nd: the party to creep up to the walls of the fort, hurl their bombs inside at a suitable moment, and then return. It all went off like clockwork and we hadn't a single casualty. The party interrupted the Arabs drinking tea, and from our posts in the trench it was most comforting to hear the crump of bursting bombs, followed by groans and then silence, instead of the usual nightly sing-song. My diary records in conclusion: "With a few more men we might have smote those Philistines hip and thigh to-night, but one never knows and after all it is our job to hold the bridge. These little outings are only to keep up the offensive spirit!"

We were now sending out patrols again, night and morning, up and down the line, who usually reported no enemy in sight but much damage to the track. It was astonishing the way those Arabs could mess the rails about. Every night we would hear banging and hammering and would hopefully let them have a burst or two of L.G. fire, but every morning it was the same: if the rails hadn't been bodily removed they had been bent completely out of shape.

It was early on 2nd August that we first heard sounds of gun fire from the S.E. in the direction of Guchan, and though we had only been six days in a state of siege we felt like the heroes of Mafeking at least. But it is undeniably thrilling in those circumstances to realize that in a day or two one may be able to walk about like free men again. There was also the sound of gun fire from Hillah on that day, indicating a battle in progress there too, which afterwards proved to be the truth. The Arabs had in fact made quite a determined assault on our home town, but like most of their ventures (fortunately for us, as again in 1941) it went off at half-cock.

But to return to Jarboiyah. Three more days were to elapse before we saw the relieving force, and meanwhile it became increasingly difficult to pass the time. Much as I liked my companions, I had one thing against them—none of them played bridge; and I was forced to take to patience. Our library consisted, not, I regret to say, of classics or even of military manuals,

but of three novels of mine and a copy of the "Motor Cycle" belonging to M!

August 4th, 1920, the sixth anniversary of the opening of the first world war, thus found one still at war and still in trenches, though there was a musical comedy atmosphere about this little war which had never existed in France. By this time our patrols were meeting with more opposition, and reported much movement of Arabs in a S.E. direction, doubtless all going to see what fun—or loot—could be got out of harassing General Coningham's column. With the morning of the 5th came the sound of gun fire much closer, and Major P. decided to send out about half the garrison to try and assist the oncoming troops. I found myself with two platoons 108th on the bund S.E. of the camp, and will let my diary describe events later on that morning—

"1.45 p.m. Things have been moving a bit. About a quarter of an hour ago we heard a perfect fusillade of firing from the river bank, and learn later that it was the 10th Gurkhas effecting a crossing of the river in order to work down the gardens on the other side. Our troops can be seen coming over the bund about 1,000 yards away. We realize that they may take us for some more Arabs trying to oppose their advance, and sure enough in about two minutes we get L.G. and rifle bullets whistling over our heads. Unfortunately, we have no means of showing them as we have no signalling flags or helio with us. It is really rather a comic situation. We fire several bursts of L.G. fire into the blue, and M. puts his helmet on a rifle and waves it frantically in the air! Still the bullets come over . . . Finally, a flag arrives from the 32nd and we signal with it, and Major P. from camp sends a bugler who blows the "Cease fire" and "No parade" at short repeated intervals. We cannot help laughing, especially when we see one of our men wandering slowly down the railway line waving my handkerchief tied on a stick. He is wounded in the arm during the process which is rather hard luck! Anyway, we finally work the oracle and the firing ceases."

Didn't I say there was a musical comedy atmosphere about this war? Half an hour later we had made contact with the 116th Mahrattas, advance guard of General Coningham's column, and the siege of Jarboiyah was over. The first British officer to greet us was H. of the 114th, attached 116th, who had been in the besieged Rumaithah garrison. 'Irish of the Irish, his chief amusement, it transpired, had been to emerge from the fortress at dusk armed with rifle and bayonet and chase Arabs round their houses in search of a duck or hen for the evening dinner.

G.H.Q. would have liked the column back in Hillah on the 6th, but there was a full day's work ahead to get guns and transport over the bridge, which first had to have a roadway laid over it. One began to hear scraps of news and to piece together the adventures of the column since leaving Diwaniyah on the 30th July. Opposition until the final battle near Jarboiyah on the 5th

had not been severe; the delay in arrival had been due to the necessity for bringing the train back to Hillah too, and over a track which for miles was largely non-existent. The Arabs had removed sleepers and rails wholesale, and in spite of what the train was able to carry in the way of construction material, it often became necessary to pull up the rails from behind the train and lay them in front before it could proceed further. And what a train—oh boy! Over three-quarters of a mile long, it consisted of no less than six engines and 251 wagons. In these wagons were all the ammunition and stores that could be saved from Diwaniyah, together with numerous non-combatants which included amongst others 13 Armenian woman teachers who could not be left; while in addition to the train General Coningham had brought safely to Jarboiyah 4,000 troops and 2,000 non-combatants, nearly 400 A.T. carts, over 100 Ford vans, 8 lorries and 22 guns with their limbers and equipment. A notable achievement; but as my diary sadly remarks: "The tragedy is to think of all the stuff that *had* to be left in Diwaniyah for the Arabs. 500 E.P. tents and a huge amount of canteen stores, including 48 cases—of *beer!*"

At one time there was some chat to the effect that the train might be left at Jarboiyah with ourselves to guard it, while the troops marched post-haste for Hillah, a prospect which did not amuse us in the least; but after order and counter-order the 86th Carnatics with two mountain guns were left at Jarboiyah, while we and the train moved off at 3 p.m. on the 7th. But there was still a surprise in store for us from the practical joke department. At 3 p.m. on the 8th, having waited all morning in the heat of the August sun for the line to be repaired, we were told that the train would go on but that General Coningham's brigade would stay behind to build blockhouses, and that we, 108th, would garrison them. But, of course, it *was* only a practical joke. At 11 p.m. all previous orders were cancelled, and 3 p.m. on the 9th, exactly a fortnight from the day we had left Hillah, saw us marching into it again, very hot and dusty and sore about the feet.

So ended the siege of Jarboiyah. Although described as a "small affair" by General Haldane in his book—and doubtless it was, against the background of the rebellion as a whole—we felt we had played a not unworthy part. We had held the bridge; and the subsequent operations would have gone ill without the 6 engines and 251 trucks, which but for us would have remained on the wrong side of the Euphrates for some months. Our total

casualties in the post had been 6 killed and 10 wounded, the latter included Major P.

* * * *

We will now return to the main scene. There was now a large force assembled at Hillah, but before relieving Kufah, which it appeared had ample rations, there were other more important jobs to be done. The railway between Baghdad and Hillah had to be repaired and blockhouses built; the Baghdad defences must be improved and strengthened; and more important still, control had to be secured of the Hindiyah Barrage and the town of Musayib, 8 miles up the river from it. The Barrage, *i.e.* dam, built by the Turks before the great war on the advice of Sir William Willcocks, controls by means of its regulators the amount of water flowing down the Hillah and Hindiyah branches of the Euphrates; and though the local Arabs were unlikely to tinker with the works, since by so doing they might deprive large numbers of their countrymen of water, it was obviously better that we should be in control of the barrage and not they. The occupation of Musayib gave us control not only of the bridge over the Euphrates which carried the Baghdad-Karbala road, but of the canal and regulator which supplied Karbala with water. This town, greatest of the Shiah centres of pilgrimage, with its tomb of Hussain son of 'Ali, had been in no small degree responsible for the insurrection, and the moral effect of seizing the regulator and thereby controlling its water supply was considerable. The blockhousing of the railway, started first, on the Hillah-Baghdad portion, eventually involved the garrisoning of some 300 blockhouses and 25 railway stations, distributed along 250 miles of railway. Meanwhile, Hillah was attacked again on the 21st August, and on the 27th a column reached Jarboiyah—our old friend—and withdrew its garrison which could no longer be spared to hold it. *Eheu fugaces!*

Thus another month had passed, but the relief of Kufah was to be delayed still further by events north-east of Baghdad, which necessitated transferring most of the available troops to that quarter. These operations followed the usual course and will not be gone into in detail. Their main object was to localize the rebellious areas as much as possible by a display of force, and at the same time to restore railway communication between Baghdad and Quaraitu and its branch line to Kingarban. Not only was there a considerable force in North Persia, whose communications had to be kept open, but some anxiety began to be felt for the large conglomeration of British families then camped at Karind

in Perisa. General Haldane, who had found this awkward baby on his hands (or should one say mother and baby?) on arrival in March, was determined to dispose it of as soon as possible; and this he was able to do as soon as the line had been opened and blockhoused. Fortunately, the Kut/Tigris area, thanks to the work of some excellent political officers and the good sense of the tribes, did not go up with the rest, and General Haldane was thus assured of his communications with Basra, along which fresh reinforcements were now reaching Baghdad weekly. The Upper Euphrates, under a stout-hearted Shaikh, also remained loyal; though lower down the Zoba tribe had risen and murdered at Khan Nuqtah Colonel Leachman, one of the outstanding political officers of his generation.

Thus it was not until the 6th October that a force at last moved out of Hillah to effect the relief of Kufah. This town, to digress for a moment, was founded as far back as 638 A.D., three years after Iraq had fallen to the Muhammedans. Its main interest lies in the fact that 'Ali, nephew of the Prophet Muhammed and originator of the Shiah Sect, was assassinated there in 661 A.D. He was actually buried at Nejaf, five miles to the west, the story being that as he lay dying he instructed those around him that as a Bedouin Arab he desired to be buried in the desert, and that after death his body was to be tied on the back of a camel; the camel would then be allowed to wander and graze at will, and wherever it lay down to rest, there would be the burial place.

By the time the relief force started the Arabs were getting a bit tired of being hounded from pillar to post, and opposition was slight compared to that which the Manchester Column had met in July. Progress though slow was steady, and on the 17th October at 9-30 a.m. Kufah was relieved, the leading infantry to reach the town being appropriately the balance of the 108th. All the troops of the garrison were found to be in good health and spirits, in spite of having to subsist on rice and horse-flesh for the last three weeks. The siege had followed the usual course, the Arabs being enterprising to begin with, with fire, mines and what not; but as soon as they realized that the garrison meant business, their efforts slackened off. What, however, distinguished this siege from the others was that the Arabs were able to use against the garrison the 18-pdr. gun which had come into their possession as a result of the Manchester Column disaster. Though the breech-block had been removed before capture, another had been roughly forged, and on the 17th August the gun opened fire on the gunboat *Firefly*,

which had arrived from the Upper Euphrates in the middle of July to assist the garrison. The first shot caused her to burn fiercely, and she had to be sunk by L.G. fire in case the ammunition exploded. Round One was undoubtedly to the Budhu in the contest Budhu *vs.* Dowling (Dowling being commander of the Kufah garrison). Next day the gun was discovered to be only 250 yards away, so all the L.G.s of the garrison were turned on the spot and the gun was damaged and the crew annihilated. Round Two, Dowling. That night the gun was removed, but turned up again like a bad penny at the end of the month though at a more respectful distance. From here it fired some 90 shells and caused a few casualties, but many were inflicted in return by rifle fire. Round Three was probably a draw. I was able to take a photograph of this gun later and its shield was perforated like the top of a pepper-pot.

On the 18th October Nejaf made submission and next day the 79 British and 81 Indian prisoners taken on the 24th July were handed over. The British prisoners, already almost naked and without boots and socks, had been disgracefully treated on their march to Kufah, but thereafter, thanks to the good offices of a Deputy Assistant Political Officer, cousin of the Aga Khan, had been tolerably well looked after at Nejaf. Incidentally, in spite of having had their topees stolen with the rest of their clothes, except for a pair of shorts, not one of these British soldiers suffered from sunstroke. This would appear to lend proof to the theory that if your feet are bare as well as your head, you act as a conductor and the sun cannot hurt you. But the experiment is perhaps not one to be encouraged.

We have so far had our eyes focussed on the Hillah-Baghdad scene, but all this time stirring events were taking place in the River Area, as it is called, that is roughly all Mesopotamia South of the line Kut/Nasiriyah, and with the reader's indulgence they will be briefly described. The disturbances at Rumaithah at the end of June spread quickly South and displayed themselves mainly round Samawah. At this place were two-and-a-half companies of the 114th Mahrattas, and at Nasiriyah the 2/125th Rifles with a detachment at Ur (Ur of the Chaldees), the railway junction for Nasiriyah and 9 miles from it. These were the only troops between Jarboiyah and Basra.

Samawah being the centre of the trouble, reinforcements were sent in the shape of 100 men of the 2/125th, an armoured train from Basra, and the gunboats—or more correctly, "protected defence vessels"—Greenfly and F. 10 from Nasiriyah. Seventy

five Euphrates Levies were also sent to Khidr, the only station between Samawah and Nasiriyah that lies close to the river and therefore of some importance in that waterless area.

With these reinforcements on the scene all remained quiet for over a month, but then things began to happen. First, the Greenfly, proceeding to Khidr on 10th August, ran aground five miles above that place, and all efforts to refloat her failed. (We were not at that time in control of the Hindiyyah Barrage and the water was particularly low.) It then became necessary to evacuate Khidr, which operation was only achieved with great difficulty. The Levies in this action behaved with great coolness; but an accident occurred to the armoured train from Ur which had come up to assist and though the greater part of the garrison got away, 17 men of the 10th Gurkhas in the train were butchered.

Samawah could not now be evacuated as was General Haldane's hope, either by rail or river, and the garrison prepared to stand a siege. The trouble about Samawah was that no less than four different posts had to be defended: the main camp and supply camp, close together; the Barbuti bridge post half a mile west of the main camp, where the railway crosses the Euphrates? and the station, half a mile south of the main camp. On 26th August the Arabs attacked the railway station camp with great vigour, and it was here shortly afterwards that one of the most gallant actions of the whole campaign was fought. The garrison consisted of about 75 men each of the 10th Lancers and 2/125th Rifles, all under command of Captain Russell of the former regiment; and in addition was No. 1 Armoured Train, with its 13-pdr. gun and crew and loopholed trucks manned by the 10th Lancers. The post, badly sited and with an uncertain water supply, very soon became untenable, and it was decided to evacuate the garrison to the main camp. All went well until the armoured train jumped the track about 200 yards from the station. Some of its occupants were able to make a dash to safety, covered by the 114th Mahrattas, but Captain Russell, together with his Medical Officer, Captain Pigeon, deliberately stayed with the sick and wounded, and here after a heroic and bloody fight, during which with a few men they defended one of the loopholed trucks for many hours, they both perished. The Arabs hereabouts, long after the rebellion had ended, still spoke of the bravery of him whom they called "Abu sil Sillah" (Father of the Chains), on account of the steel chains worn on the shoulders of his khaki cavalry jacket. One lesson seems to stand out here; that in unsettled or semi-settled


countries railway construction and other work for which protection may be demanded, *e.g.* stations and bridges, should not be undertaken without the advice of the military authorities as to security.

Samawah was finally relieved by the ubiquitous General Coningham on the 14th October, after a siege of about two months; he was just too late to save the crew of the ill-fated Greenfly, who had surrendered on 3rd October owing to lack of food, and were then murdered. "Cooped up in the unbearable heat of summer in what was little more than a tin box, with nothing to drink but the hot muddy water of the river, slowly to starve and not know that every effort was being made to relieve them, such was the fate of those on board." Thus writes General Haldane in his book. It was certainly one of the grimmer episodes of the campaign, and there were not a few.


With the relief of Samawah and Kufah the most serious part of the rebellion was over. It is interesting to recall that while the Arabs were keeping us busy in Iraq, our forces in North Persia—"Norperforce" as it was called...were having inconclusive battles with the Bolsheviks! The force, which consisted of little more than a brigade, had its H.Q. at Kazvin and its main position at Manzil, S. E. of Enzeli (Pahlavi as it is now called). As the Bolsheviks advanced the force withdrew to Kazvin and vicinity "according to plan," whence they played a sort of hide-and-seek with their opponents in the mountains, with the Persian Cossack division every now and then joining in the fun. It was Norperforce that General Sir Edmund Ironside came out to command at the end of September 1920, but since its role by then was entirely defensive and continued so until it was withdrawn in the following Spring, it is to be feared that his command lacked interest and excitement.


The final stage of the Iraq operations, which lasted until the end of the year, was the disarming and fining of those tribes which had had the temerity to seek arbitrament by force. To ensure that there should be no nonsense about this, columns were sent hither and thither over the countryside, and as a result rifles and rupees came in with gratifying regularity: altogether over 63,000 rifles, 3 million rounds of S.A.A., and some Rs. 800,000 were either collected or extracted. As a grand finale, in January 1921, two formidable columns moved into the Shatt-al-Hai, one from Nasiriyah and one from Kut, which met about half-way at Karradi and then returned to their starting points. Though the well-armed Muntafiq tribes inhabiting this area had been kept in check

Plan Showing Original
Station and Camp



PLAN OF CAMP





IRAQ AND WESTERN PERSIA

Scale 1 inch to 48 miles

MILES 50 40 30 20 10 0 50 100 MILES

during the rebellion, it was thought advisable for the future peace of Iraq to show them that we were capable of moving into their country at will, more especially as our earlier attempts to do so, in 1916, had resulted in a somewhat ignominious withdrawal.

So much for the Iraq Rebellion of 1920. Though not perhaps fraught with the same dangerous possibilities as its successor in 1941, it had nevertheless been a period of frequent mishaps, even greater anxiety, and more prolonged fighting under very trying conditions. "Indeed," as General Haldane himself put it, from the beginning of July till well into October, we lived on the edge of a precipice where the least slip might have led to a catastrophe." All credit to him and his troops, therefore, for their courage and constancy. Our G.O.C.-in-C. certainly deserved well of the telegram he received after the relief of Samawah in October. It was from Mr. Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for War, and read as follows:

"During these difficult months your patience and steadfastness have been of great value, and I congratulate you upon the distinct improvement in the situation which has been effected by you."

RAISING A LABOUR BATTALION

BY "MUGGER"

"Raise a Labour Battalion," these were the orders that I received at short notice six months ago. Another officer and myself made up the entire British officer establishment of the unit at that time, and, for that matter, was all the Battalion consisted of for the first few days. I was soon to discover that except for two of the Indian officers, little assistance of much value would be at first forthcoming. Besides this, every one in the Area where the Battalion was to be raised was working to full capacity and could not be expected to give much time to my troubles. One Staff Officer in particular, however, was quick to realize that although it was only a Labour Battalion that was being raised, a considerable amount of exertion would be required to get it going, and, having lent an ear to some of my difficulties, produced assistance in the shape of drill instructors, etc., which helped very much to start the ball rolling.

Men soon began arriving in large numbers at a temporary Headquarters which was established in two rooms of another unit's lines. Food, clothes, stationery for the office, etc.,—no one knowing very much about how to procure these—had to be hurriedly obtained. The young civilian enrolled clerks knew absolutely nothing about army work. They had to be taught. With considerable effort stopgaps were produced by borrowing, and we thus managed to contend with the situation. Sometimes what appeared to be dreadful and hair-raising problems arose, but somehow we solved them. Contending with the office work was a most exacting task, and the issue of the first Part II Orders became an achievement in itself. I had to be always on my guard when signing a document of any kind. A ration indent on an Arsenal was once hopefully placed before me for signature.

Soon we were 300 strong and were forced to find accommodation elsewhere. This resulted in a move of a few miles, where the Battalion remained until it left India for Overseas some months later.

Gradually the unit took form. Squads moved up and down the parade ground and stacks of equipment rose up around the Q. M. Stores. Desertions and other military offences were frequent. Some concern was caused by a section of one company entic-

ing others to mutiny. Accusations of harsh treatment, of disrespect of religious prejudices and of inadequate food were lodged against me and anonymously communicated to higher authority. These things made life more trying than usual, but, gradually, with perseverance, the unit took shape in spite of all that was said and done against it.

After pay-days extra outbreaks of crime and drunkenness were to be expected. Discipline in the lines was none too good, and the local inhabitants had good cause to complain of latrine smells and of being awakened in the small hours by unruly troops preparing for parade. However, onwards we progressed, each week showing some improvement.

The provision of Sub-Unit Commanders was a problem in itself. All respectable men were being taken for combatant units, and although the recruiting authorities did their utmost, suitable leaders very seldom appeared. I used to move about the mass of humanity looking for individuals who showed an intelligent gleam in their eyes and who had a reasonably good physique. It was amazing how men of any quality stood out from the rest, and I eventually had a crew selected as a framework on which to build the Battalion.

Later, personnel for an anti-aircraft platoon had to be selected from the non-combatants. This inclusion of a combatant platoon in the unit gave considerable moral uplift, and there was great competition to get a place in it. Why a large portion of India has been categorised as non-fighting seemed rather surprising as the so-called non-fighters that came to my unit took every opportunity they had to start a fight and, I am certain, could be formed into combatant troops. Get them overseas and arm them, and they would very soon be a useful body of men with which to confront an enemy.

And so did the unit develop, doing useful work in the Area in the meanwhile. Its *major opus* was the repair, which almost amounted to a reconstruction, of a mountain road. This was a great achievement, and having received the thanks and compliments of both the civil and military powers on this effort, I made the most of it to raise the morale of the men.

This raising of morale was one of the chief tasks that I set myself to do, and I seized upon every opportunity and introduced various schemes to accomplish it. One idea was that of Company flags and the award to them of silver or gold stripes for any good or specially good work of Sub-units. The Company that had constructed the mountain road mentioned above, received the

only gold stripe so far awarded. Another company already has four silver stripes on its company flag.

The reader must realise that the four enormous companies (approximately 400 strong each) were at that time each commanded by only one dug-out Indian officer, he being the only officer in it. This seems astonishing, but such was the case. Since then, one British Officer per company has been added. However, that was the unit W. E. on which I had to work, but wonders still do happen, for one morning, on opening the dak, I read that four more real live British officers were being posted to the Unit. Almost by the same dak I received orders for the Battalion to be ready to proceed overseas at a future nearby date.

There was little time to form an Officers' Mess, but we managed to collect the necessary items, and soon had a Field Service Mess of sorts running.

The preparation of records and field service documents for such a large number of men was an enormous task. Piles upon piles of sheet rolls (in duplicate), had to be prepared, and sacks full of A.B.s 64—the vade mecum of the soldier on service had to be completed.

The daily dak was of considerable dimensions, swelled by returning verified descriptive rolls and letters from anxious relations to the "Officer Commanding-in-Chief" of the Battalion, asking about their absent offspring or absconded husbands.

At last, however, the unit was up to full strength, nearly all equipment had been received and documents ready, and I could state on my weekly report to Army Headquarters "Unit ready to proceed."

All this time I had been working at high pressure and with horrible feeling that I was trying to raise a unit that stood on very thin ice indeed. The news of the British officer reinforcement had been a considerable help, but on their arrival they brought fresh problems with them which had to be dealt with and overcome in their turn. "All is not gold that glitters."

I feel that I must mention the fact that had I not been so fortunate as to find a few friends locally, I might have given up the task that I had been set. I received much encouragement from these friends, and their cheerfulness and bright outlook on life invariably went to cheer me up after a long, hot, back-breaking day.

Orders to stand down, and, orders to prepare to move were received and then at last we did move.

The monsoon was raging at the time we left our mobilization station. We were to move in three trains, H.Q. and $1\frac{1}{2}$ companies in first train, and the rest of the Battalion in two other trains a day later. The first train was wrecked on its way to the port of embarkation owing to flood-water washing away part of the railway line. The other two trains were held up for a whole week. Meanwhile, the personnel of the first train crossed the Arabian Sea in the teeth of the South West monsoon.

* * *

EPILOGUE.

After Three Months Overseas.

On a sandy plain in the pale purple half-light of a dawning tropical day, 1,200 men are fallen in on parade. Short sharp orders and groups quietly move off and fade into the distance. These men have gone to their day's work and will not return to camp until evening. If you drive through the Base Ammunition Depot or Base Ordnance Depot with its widely dispersed branches, you will find these men working in groups, handling heavy boxes of ammunition and stores of all description throughout the heat of the day. Behind them these men have left an orderly camp, where the administrative staff of their unit is busy making preparations for the provision of food and water for those out on work and for the future maintenance of the unit as a whole. The anti-aircraft platoon might be seen swinging along towards the rifle ranges, and a smart quarter-guard may turn out to you, while the wail of pipes and the beat of *dhols* will signify to you that the unit pipe band is practising!

There are no drunks and practically no crime. Clerks know their duties, and the office work is proceeding smoothly. In the evening, when the men return, there will be football and volleyball for those who were so fortunate as to have been off work that afternoon, and if a Saturday, then there may be a "Tamasha" that night. At retreat a bugler (none on W.E.T.s) will sound the call, and with the age-old ceremony the Battalion Flag will be folded away for the night.

"A Labour Battalion has been raised and is serving in the Field."

THE BATTLE OF AMBAR ALAGI OR THE FALL OF AN EMPIRE

BY CAPT. SHAUKAT HAYAT

With the fall of Massawa, Eritrea, the oldest colony of the Italians in East Africa, was now virtually in our hands. The only enemy in the country at the moment was the small bands of Italians who had drifted away from the main positions. These were seeking protection rather than a battle, because the Abyssinians, who had been waiting for such a state of affairs for a long time, were now definitely making much of their opportunities.

At this point 4th Indian Division was recalled to Egypt. This left to 5th Indian Division, rather weak and war-worn after their assaults on the heights of Cheren and their storming of the defences of Massawa, the task of providing protection to the newly fallen foes, of looking after those hordes of prisoners, of protecting their long L. of C., and of maintaining the British prestige in the conquered land. Taking into consideration the extent of these multifarious duties, we thought in our minds that we were going to get the sorely needed break from that Italian chasing, in order to repair and replenish our losses of the past ten weeks. It turned out to be only wishful thinking. The powers that be decided to give no respite to the Italians, to strike while their morale was still at a low ebb and to see if we could not end the campaign before the outbreak of the rains in May.

The enemy was reported at two different places. One force of some 14,000 strong at and about Gondar in Abyssinia. Another of a similar strength, under the Duke of Aosta, the Viceroy and C.-in-C. of Italian East Africa, astride Asmara-Adis Abbaba road, some 250 miles South of Asmara.

The G.O.C.'s recce party came to a standstill some 40 miles from Gondar on account of a gigantic road-block the Italians had prepared with the help of Nature. It was along the Great African Rift, where the Italians had literally carved out a road on either side, by letting down their workers by ropes, a few years previously and was now so thoroughly demolished that it once again assumed its original form. It was now apparent that even if our Sappers succeeded in achieving the impossible, the passage over the temporary road would prove to be a hazardous task even

under the best conditions. With the danger of rains looming above us it was decided to abandon this line of approach, at least for the time being. Consequently, a company of SDF MMG Group was left to guard the frontier, and our allies, the Patriots, were asked to keep the Italian garrison occupied. The Abyssinians did not have to be asked twice, as this was an occupation after their own hearts. Soon some 25,000 of them were skilfully and efficiently carrying out their operations.

The second line of advance was taken up by the Divisional Cavalry Regiment. Soon a Squadron was on its way along the main road. The Italians had withdrawn in such a frightful hurry, and so great seemed to be their confidence in the Alagi defences, that they had not even taken the trouble of carrying out any demolitions on their way back. Consequently, this Squadron arrived at a Brigade Garrison Town called Qiha, over 200 miles from Asmara, without meeting any opposition. Here they met the first hostile force of any strength. As the forward elements of the Squadron entered the town they encountered a whole Italian Battalion, about a thousand strong, all ready to march back towards Alagi, 20 miles further South. The Squadron Commander, true to the traditions of the force, challenged this out-numbering force to surrender. Obviously, they had not expected us to get there so soon as the officers were still having lunch in the mess. They came out to meet our officers but flatly refused to discuss the terms of surrender unless our officers went and shared lunch with them. When, after partaking of a sumptuous meal accompanied by Chianti and followed by excellent Mokha coffee, our officers came out, they found the Italians mounted on vehicles, which in the meanwhile had been turned about to face Asmara. The Italian officers were awaiting orders to march their commands into captivity. A small party was detailed to show these the way back, while the rest of the Squadron proceeded further to gain contact with the main force.

Soon the Cavalry came across an obstacle against which they could not make any headway. They were face to face with a mountain wall of inhospitable-looking hills, precipitously rising to a height of some 11,000 feet. It was a mass of rugged and bare hills intersected by deep and impassable ravines—quite a fortress in itself. The Italians had made exceptionally good use of this, nature's insurmountable barrier. They had dug themselves caves along the tops of these unscalable heights. The cliffs were bristling with these dug-outs, from which pointed guns at anyone who dare assault these defences. Even the road running

from Quiha to Fort Tosselli was thoroughly demolished at the numerous hair-pin bends, and extensively mined. Any advance along it was impossible till the seven well-covered blocks had been cleared. In fact, if the defenders had been other than the demoralised and disheartened Italian Army of the East, this would have become a well-nigh impregnable line of defences.

The G.O.C., General Mayne, decided to attack the enemy. On account of various reasons such as the long L. of C. which now extended over very nearly a thousand miles from Port Sudan, the limited amount of transport available, and the duties mentioned previously, all the Divisional Commander could muster together for the siege of the Duke of Aosta's fortress, manned by some 12,000 men and guns numbering over 200, consisted of Skinners Horse, the divisional Cavalry Regiment the 18 R. Gharwal Rifles, and the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, comprising the Worcestershire Regiment, 13th R.F.F. Regiment and 2nd Punjab Regiment. All these Regiments were below strength on account of the recent operations at Cheren and elsewhere. To support these we had two Regiments of 25 Pdr. gun/Hows., two 60 Pdrs. in action and two batteries of 3.7 Hows., all of these mechanically drawn.

The plan was simple and well conceived. The commander knew that the Italians themselves had used the eastern track running over the Flaga Pass to get round behind the Abyssinians, who were holding the same position against them in 1936. Secondly, they displayed unshakable confidence that the hill-top defences were unassailable. Thirdly, at Cheren we had attacked the centre and taken the flanks in detail from the rear. Taking these and the various other factors into account, the following orders were issued:

- (a) The Gharwal Regiment to relieve Skinners Horse on the main road and demonstrate vigorously along it.
- (b) Skinners Horse to proceed along the Flaga Track and demonstrate on that flank.
- (c) Both (a) and (b) to intensify their demonstrations two days before Zero (4th May), (b) putting a feint attack on Flaga Pass itself, in order to stimulate an attack from that direction, drawing and pinning the enemy there.
- (d) 29 Indian Infantry Brigade to put in an attack from the west, moving along the top of the hills, taking each feature in turn. It was hoped that the Italians would fall into our eastern trap and that this attack at Zero would come as a complete surprise.

The Gharwalis moved forward and succeeded in puzzling the enemy along the main road by a series of original ruses.

Skinners Horse advanced along the Flaga Track, meeting no opposition other than heavy artillery concentrations and a couple of road-blocks covered by mines. Four days before Zero the troop of Commandoes attached to the Skinners Horse was ordered to put in a night attack on the western spur running from Flaga (later known as the Commandoe Ridge). After a stiff night-march the Commandoes assaulted the cliff itself hauling themselves up by means of ropes. The Italians had allowed the Cliff to beguile them into a sense of false security, and the attack went as a complete surprise. The enemy gunner O.P. was found to be without any other protection and was captured. This success worried the Italians very much and they subjected our troops on the Commandoe Ridge to a terrific strafing. The next day Skinners Horse moved forward and occupied the lower slopes of the eastern spur (Wireless Hill) without any opposition. Here a number of deserters surrendered to us.

A patrol soon reported that owing to our shelling the enemy had abandoned Wireless Hill, Skinners Horse advanced and occupied it by the evening. Our troops kept their position so well-concealed throughout the next day that the Italians thought that we had not taken it, so a party of some 250 enemy came forward to re-occupy the hill. Our troops held their fire till the enemy was crossing a nullah about 150 yards from our position. When fire was suddenly opened it surprised the enemy so much that we were able to capture the whole party. Thereafter the enemy very heavily mortared us, cutting the Artillery O.P.'s line which considerably delayed our counter battery fire. That night Skinners Horse put in their final attack on the feature commanding the Flaga Pass. Two squadrons were employed for this task. As they had to leave their drivers behind as well as the carrier troops, they were very low in bayonet strength, each being no stronger than a troop. One of these made its objective, but the other met a hail of hand-grenades when some 20 yards from top. Some men fell, others stopped to attend them and got wounded themselves. The squadron that had got into position found it impossible to assist owing to the close nature of fighting and to the complete darkness, and the attack had to be abandoned. Though the attack failed in itself, it served the purpose of worrying the Italians about this flank. When the next day the 12 R. F.F. Regiment (so far on L. of C.) moved on to the Wireless Hill it helped to conform their fears and they were convinced that the

main offensive was coming from this direction. Consequently, they moved a considerable number of troops to this side.

On the night of 3/4th May, 29th Indian Infantry Brigade after seven hours' march over that treacherous bit of country formed up on Sandy Ridge. Early on the morning of the 4th the 13th F.F.F. Regiment led the attack on Pyramid, Fin and Whale-back. Within 40 minutes' picqueting, screens were seen reaching the tops of these features and a short but stiff hand-to-hand fight resulted in the capture of all those strong points. The Punjabis who were the next to go were not going to be outdone by their compatriots. They rushed forward and captured Elephant within 20 minutes. The comparatively easy progress here showed that the Italians had never expected an attack from that quarter and had weakened the garrisons of these very important posts to reinforce the eastern flank. On the capture of Elephant it was found that what had looked like a plateau joining this feature to Middle Hill, Little Alagi and Bald Hill was no more than a razor-edge very well covered by enemy M.G.s, mortars and guns on those features. The next day the Worcesters did manage to get up to the lower slopes of the Little Alagi, but only to be beaten back by a shower of grenades and M.G. fire from the caves. They had to fall back on to Middle Hill which the Punjabis had secured. After this the advance from this direction came almost to a standstill. The Italians, however, tried hard to dislodge our troops by counter-attacking us. Though their 4-inch mortars succeeded in making our position fairly unhealthy, all their attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to themselves.

On the Flaga front it was discovered that the track reported beyond the pass was non-existent. Therefore the cavalry was brought back to the main road to relieve the Gharwalis, who in turn took its place back at Flaga. On this front the 12 R.F.F. Regiment attacked and captured Gumsa, taking 1,000 prisoners and 7 mountain guns.

The Gharwalis on arrival, formed a new Brigade with the 12 R.F.F. Regiment and the Commandoes, but this Brigade was soon forced by the early rains to withdraw, except the Gharwalis.

Even without the rains the track was in a precarious condition. The portage of supplies over so many miles and then hauling them up by ropes took almost one battalion to maintain another. The Gharwalis however pushed forward towards the Twin Pyramids and the Triangle, in order to exploit our success on this front up to date.

The Patriots now arrived on the scene and volunteered to do their bit. They rushed up in swarms over the Twin Pyramids. Soon however we found their tactics at variance with the well-established customs of the British Armies. They reached their objectives, collected all the trophies that were to be found, slung them round their belts, and returned to the starting line proudly displaying the fruits of their toils. When the Gharwalis went forward they discovered that the Italians had once again taken possession of the features. They had to be attacked and captured all over again. Progress beyond this point was made impossible by well-controlled hostile fire from the Triangle, the Ft. Tosseli, Ambar Alagi, and the forward slopes of Bald Hill.

To resume the narrative of the force in the West, the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade on being held up, consolidated its gains and turned towards the South-West. The 13 R.F.F. Rifles after an approaching-march, which lasted some six hours during the night, over extremely difficult country and under pouring rain, attacked and captured the first two objectives on Castle Hill, to the South of Ambar Alagi. As one of the companies advanced towards the third objective it met a most familiar object, which had succeeded in expending most of the white yarn in the Italian Empire. The enemy in the position had hoisted the white flag. The Company being used to this form of adornment all over the housetops and the surrendering positions in the past, unsuspectingly advanced to secure prisoners. As they were making the last 50 yards they fell victims to the most villainous type of treachery used even by the conquerors of Abyssinia. They were welcomed by a shower of hand-grenades and an artillery and mortar barrage. Seventy three men in this company fell a prey to this foul play. There, however, was the Pathan Company of the Regiment just behind, a witness to the foul murder of their comrades. Unheeding the hail of M.G. bullets and the artillery concentrations they rushed forward with their famous war cry, and what they did to the Italians in that position, is nobody's business.

The South African Bde. which had to pass through to go to Egypt now arrived from Dessie. It was an extremely creditable performance, as they had to get over some impossible road-blocks to reach Alagi. They were put under our Div. Comd. Their gunners started pounding the enemy main positions from the rear. The only snag about this support, however, was that if their long-range guns missed the narrow target of Alagi the shells would have

landed in our Divisional Headquarters. Thanks to their superb gunnery such a situation did not ever arise. The next day, 14th May, the South Africans attacked the Triangle, but by the evening all they could achieve was to secure a footing in the lower slopes, the following day the S. A. Artillery supported the Gharwalis, who attacked the feature from the North. They got up without meeting much opposition because most of the Italians had skedaddled from the position overnight.

Meanwhile, the Divisional Cavalry had kept the enemy pinned down to the Bald Hill by various ruses such as sending carrier patrols along the main road and mortaring Bald Hill. They captured Cannefat a day before the fall of the Triangle, thus getting within small arms range of Alagi itself.

The Italians were all forced into Alagi-Bald Hill area, where life was being made most unpleasant by our gunners. If any of the cave-men ever dared to peep out of his hole he stopped a shell or two. Consequently, the Italian Haven of Refuge was rapidly assuming the ugly aspect of also becoming their grave. Alagi was not intended to hold such big numbers. Therefore, what with the multitude now herded together there, and the rotting dead bodies, existence was becoming rather insanitary even for our foes.

Desertions amongst their numbers now become rife. Their morale got to such a low ebb that on the slightest excuse they gave up the struggle. Reports of incidents where the Italians surrendered without putting up much of a resistance became more and more common. One of them that I heard was that of an N.C.O. who was out on a road reconnaissance, with a couple of men, when he perceived some movement under a culvert. Considering it to be a jackal or some such animal he threw his staff at it. To his horror he saw 40 Italians come out and surrender themselves. He had to keep all his wits about him to bring his prisoners back without disclosing the strength of his available force. Another similar incident was reported by an officer of the Worcesters who was out with a small patrol and encountered some enemy far superior in numbers. The enemy's party had apparently captured some patriots and were leading them back towards Alagi. On meeting our patrol, without trying to ascertain our strength, the enemy laid down their arms. The Officer faced with the problem of handling so many with so few, armed the patriots with the Italian rifles to help his escort the prisoners back.

Although our troops were all round and within a short range of the Fortress, our own supply problem was getting rather acute.

In order to maintain 29th Bde., supplies on locally commandeered mules now had to leave the base 24 hours previously to get to the forward troops, while for the Eastern Force the supplies had to be carried over more than 15 miles of difficult country. In addition, clouds were now hanging unpleasantly above us as a reminder of things to come. It was, therefore, decided to put an end to our task by resuming the attack on Alagi from all directions before the rains made the situation really precarious. 19th May was the day appointed for the advance.

As it turned out, the enemy were in a worse pass than ourselves. On the morning of 17th May, while I was having my morning cup of tea, I heard a tumult just below my H.Q. Someone was asking questions as to where I was, and an offended Jemadar was saying that if they did not hand in their arms, they would be produced before me. As the tempers seemed to be getting rather frayed, I considered it an opportune moment to intervene. The first person I saw was the sleek-looking Italian interpreter who had put me through it five months before when I was taken a prisoner. He heaved a sigh of relief on seeing me; evidently he was worried as to whether our troops employed the same tactics as our allies, the Patriots. On enquiry it transpired that this party had walked in under a white flag, and our troops wanted to disarm them. Despite the Italian claims of being envoys, my men were having, nothing to do with the white flags. I was shown the Duke of Aosta's request for their safe conduct, as they were the envoys of peace.

Having been blind-folded they were taken to the Divisional Headquarters. The General wanted a more responsible envoy, so the poor Italian Colonel had to climb back all those 11,000 feet to send another representative with full powers to negotiate the terms of peace. The new envoy had to be in by 1300 Hours. Armistice was proclaimed till 2100 hours that night.

Our representatives ceremoniously went out to the Rendezvous at 1245. There they waited and waited without the other party's appearance. At 1630 hours, although the Italians were seen moving about their positions, there were still no signs of their envoys. This gave rise to suspicion and doubts in our minds as to the genuineness of the Italian proposals, and our representatives returned rather disappointed. Orders were issued to resume operations at 2100 hours and to give them no rest, when a frantic request was flashed from the Duke's H.Q. asking us not to resume hostilities and if possible to control the Patriots. Then

followed an explanation about the non-appearance of their representatives. Apparently they had left their H. Q., but when the fire had ceased our Abyssinian allies had taken the decision to do their bit before the fun was really over. They had seen the Italian General Envoy coming down the hill with his four senior staff officers, so they pounced on them, laid them out and stripped their dead bodies rather thoroughly—an indignity which very nearly started the war all over again. The local villagers were now playing havoc even in the Italian lines.

The Italians quite naturally flatly refused to sacrifice any more generals as peace-offerings. Consequently, we sunk our pride and sent our own party up. They were given a rousing reception by the defenders, but on seeing the sights and smelling the prevailing odours they soon realized why the Italians did not resist for as long as they had proclaimed originally.

Our terms included a flat refusal to the suggestion from Rome that the Duke of Aosta and his Staff should be permitted to remain in their caves for the duration. The rest was a nicely worded invitation virtually amounting to an unconditioned surrender.

The next day, the Italian and our sappers had cleared most of the road-blocks. Then, judging from the weight of their decorations, what looked like some three hundred generals and staff officers heading a procession of some 6,000 prisoners marched past and honourably laid down their arms. What could be a more satisfactory and befitting culmination to that glorious advance into the Italian Territory started sixteen weeks earlier.

These operations not only succeeded in the recapture of the recently conquered Empire of Abyssinia but they also achieved the magnificent result of removing Italian East Africa completely from the Map. Moreover, they tended to prove that libellous appreciation of the capabilities of the Italian armed forces, that if the Italians were our allies it would require twelve divisions to hold them, as opposed to only three to fight them if they were our enemies.

Why did the Italians miss the opportunity of invading Sudan, and what was the reason for the collapse of their army of the East, which had superiority, both in men and materials, to the extent of ten to one? The frivolous answer in American slang would be that they were yellow. But on the other hand, one had seen some brilliant examples of heroism and gallantry on the part of some Italian units. The reason for these being spasmodic rather

than consistent throughout was, apart from our superior generalship, to be found in the following qualities:

- (1) Morale;
- (2) Training, determination and initiative;
- (3) Bayonet; and
- (4) Confidence, cohesion and co-operation.

Taking each in turn one found that:


1. The Italian General when deciding to withdraw some 200 miles into the well prepared defences of Cheren, had apparently not taken the morale of his troops into account. Consequently, when the troops were suddenly ordered to withdraw, for want of reasons, assumed that the end had come and that we had arrived with something colossal instead of only the two Indian Divisions which we had. This demoralised them considerably. On the other hand our Generals had taken pains to build up the morale of our troops by well-conceived limited advances, so that when we really started, our morale was already high and every step forward tended to increase it. As time went on the Italians got more and more disheartened until at last they gave up the ghost altogether. The apologists for the Italian Generals used the lame excuse that having been faced by superior numbers, the generals had decided to withdraw. This did not improve matters for the Italian troops.

2. While our Junior Officers, N.C.O.s and men had been given an intensive training both in leadership and use of common-sense and initiative, a majority of the Italians displayed a complete lack of all those all-important qualities. The determination of our troops proved the dictum that "no position is impregnable for determined troops." There were in every phase of this advance, numerous and brilliant examples of courage, determination and the use of initiative by our junior leaders, N.C.O.s and even men. It was these qualities which to a large extent paved the way for our ultimate success in this junior leaders' campaign.

3. The successful use of the bayonet by our troops during these operations, proved even to the sceptic who termed it as the dead arm of the past, that it was still very much alive. Even the best Italian units did not stay to face it.


4. The Italians generally showed a lack of confidence in their cause, objected to the German domination of their country and criticised their leaders for the war and the general inefficiency. Co-operation and cohesion within the force was missing. The Blackshirt (Fascist) Army could not stand the sight


of the King's Regular Army, who in their turn loathed the sight of the so-called political imposters who wished to usurp their rightful place in the regular armed forces. Their generals, like their leaders, were unpopular. On our side the troops displayed great confidence in Providence, their cause and their officers. Understanding and cohesion within the force was magnificent. There was excellent co-operation between the Arms and the Services, between the Army and the Air Force, and, above all, between the British troops and the Indian troops. This last is evident from the following story. The G.O.C. was going up to inspect an O.P. position. On the way he saw an Indian Section post where two of the British Gunners were being entertained to tea and refreshments by the garrison. On his return the General stopped at the post and asked the Indian section if it was a practice with them to treat all passers-by to tea. The answer was, "No, Sir, but the soldiers you saw having tea with us were our Gunners." Those Gunners belonged to the 5th Division. It was this spirit of friendship and comradeship which won for the 5th Division a place amongst one of the most successful formations of our times.



PANORAMA OF ALAGI
BATTLE FIELD

Rough Plan of L. of C.





THE INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

BY LIEUT.-COL. H. BULLOCK, I.A.

The blue-and-red ribbon of the Indian Distinguished Service Medal is familiar to all who have served in India, but it is not generally realized that relatively few of these medals have been awarded—only about 4,200 in all, of which all but about 1,000 were for services during the War of 1914—18—and, moreover, no connected account of the medal has ever been published. Further, the I.D.S.M. has now existed during the reigns of four sovereigns and has from time to time undergone changes of design.

The following account, though not exhaustive may be of service to regimental annalists and to medal collectors, as well as of some general interest. The statistics, which I have tried to keep simple, show that the I.D.S.M. has always had a very high place among the orders and medals which are conferred upon the forces of the Empire. It is interesting to compare the figures for the I.D.S.M. with those for the D.C.M. and M.M., of which about 25,000 and 115,000 respectively were awarded during 1914—20 alone.

The Indian Distinguished Service Medal was instituted by Royal Warrant dated 27th June, 1907, and the first awards were notified in the *Gazette of India* in the following month. The obverse, *i.e.* front, bore the head of King Edward VII, crowned, surrounded by the words "EDWARDUS VII KAISAR-I-HIND": a design which appeared on the obverse of the Delhi Durbar Medal, 1903, but so far as I am aware on no other. The reverse, *i.e.* back, bore the words "FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE," in three lines, within a wreath of laurels. This reverse has never been varied subsequently.

During the reign of King Edward VII few medals were issued, as the King died within three years and only one campaign in which Indian troops were engaged took place during the period.

The number of Edward VII I.D.S.M.s awarded was:

Original awards, July 1907	...	48
Gazetted 1st January 1908	...	10
Mohmand operations, 26th June 1908		56
Gazetted 1st January 1909	...	5
Gazetted 24th June 1909	...	5
Gazetted 1st January 1910	...	9

133

Two of the recipients were subsequently awarded bars, making the total number of medals without bar 131.

During King George V's reign, 1910—1936, a very large number of I.D.S.M.s was issued, owing to the War of 1914—18 and post-War operations, and the longer reign. Details are as follows:

Year	Medals issued	Bars issued
1910	7	-
1911	9	-
1912	8	-
1913	10	-
1914	12	-
1914—20	3,174	25
1920	151	3
1921	237	6
1922	75	3
1923	56	2
1924	23	-
1925	8	-
1926	3	-
1927	3	-
1928—9	nil	nil
1930	26	-
1931	8	-
1932	2	-
1933	21	-
1934	5	-
1935	19	-
1936	14	-
	<hr/> 3,871	<hr/> 39

These figures for the period 1914—20 are principally taken from the official *Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914—18* (London, 1922), page 554; and for the remaining years from the *Gazette of India*. They may not be absolutely complete and accurate but may be taken as reasonably so.

The medals awarded during George V's reign, at any rate up to about 1930, were in all respects similar in design to those with Edward VII's effigy, except that the head of the new King was shown on the obverse, and "EDWARDUS VII" gave place to "GEORGIUS V". There was, however, a minor variety which was issued to some /at least of the Indian soldiers in the British Expeditionary Force in France and Flanders, 1914—18: it was evidently struck at the Royal Mint in London, instead of at the Calcutta Mint, and has the English pattern of scroll

suspender and scrolled attachment to the medal, which are easily distinguishable from the Indian-pattern suspender and claw attachment. If, as appears probable, the design on the obverse of the I.D.S.M. was changed about 1930 to a new pattern with a Latin inscription "GEORGIVS V D. G. BRITT. OMN. REX FT. INDIAE. IMP."—as was done for example with the Indian General Service Medal and the Indian Long Service and Good Conduct Medal—there is a second type of the I.D.S.M. with George V head, of which less than a hundred can have been issued.

Of the present type of I.D.S.M., with King George VI's head (which is understood also to have the Latin inscription, and not "Kaisar-i Hind"), the awards to date are:

Year	Medals issued	Bars issued
1937	80	2
1938	24	--
1939	8	--
1940	31	--
1941	57	-- (to 20th Sept. 1941.)
	<hr/> 200	<hr/> 2

It is understood that no medals were issued with the effigy of King Edward VIII.

The I.D.S.M. has on occasion been awarded to members of the Royal Indian Marine, now Royal Indian Navy; and I have an example given in 1919 to a Sikh sepoy of the Malaya States Guides.

By far the most uncommon examples of the I.D.S.M. are the 41 which have a bar added for a second act of gallantry. The particulars of all recipients of these are:

Date of Gazette of India	Recipient	No. & date of Gazette of original award
17th Aug. 1917	Sub. ALI DOST, 106 Hazara Pioneers ..	4/1910
17th Aug. 1917	Sub. FAZAL SHAH, Bahadur, 1st S. & M. ..	187/1916
17th Aug. 1917	Sub. MIT SINGH, 47th Sikhs ..	1386/1916
1st Dec. 1917	Sub. NANDU GURING, /1 Gurkha Rif. ..	849/1916
22nd Dec. 1917	2475 Daf. JOT RAM, Cavalry ..	1151/1917
3rd May 1918	1937 Daf. AILAH DITTA KHAN, Lancers. ..	not traced
3rd May 1918	2026 A/L/Daf. SIBHA SINGH, Lancers ..	not traced
3rd Jun. 1918	1985 Hav. KHARKE PUN, Gurkha Rif. ..	L. G. 15-3-1918
3rd Jun. 1918	3374 Naik DEWA SINGH, Rifles ..	356/1915
19th Jul. 1918	Jem. AMIR SINGH, Cavalry ..	598/1917
26th Jul. 1918	Risldr. FARMAN ALI KHAN, Rifles* ..	not traced
26th July 1918	Jem. PARTAB SINGH, Rifles* ..	not traced
25th Oct. 1918	Sub. AKBAR KHAN, 51st Sikhs F. F. ..	1388/1916
8th Mar. 1919	Sub. AMAN GUL, 27th Punjabis ..	1360/1917
22nd Mar. 1919	Jem. NARBAHADUR GURUNG, 5th Gurkha Rif ..	680/1916
27th Jun. 1919	41 Hav. NUR MAHI, 1st Signal Co., S. & M. ..	89/1919
24th Oct. 1919	422 Naik CHANDU RAM, 27th Punjabis ..	9/1918

*Apparently, Burma Mounted Rifles.

Indian Distinguished Service Medal

<i>Date of Gazette of India</i>	<i>Recipient</i>	<i>No. & date of Gazette of original award</i>
24th Oct. 1919	Sub.-Maj. FARMAN ALI, M. C., I. O. M., 92 Punjabis ..	528/1915
1st Aug. 1919	Sub. FAUJA SINGH, Guides Infy. ..	527/1908
17th Oct. 1919	Sub. HUKMI, 48th Pioneers ..	728/1915
6th Apr. 1920	3376 Hav. SAMUNDER KHAN, 17th Fd. Co., 3rd S. & M. ..	1357/1917
6th Apr. 1920	573 Hav. BADLU, 1/76 Punjabis ..	1160/1915
6th Apr. 1920	3069 Hav. GANESHA RAM, 104th W. Rifles ..	1357/1917
6th Apr. 1920	1546 Nk. RAMBAHADUR RAI, 2/7th Gurkha Rifles ..	1160/1915
6th Aug. 1920	Sub. KUMBSING GURUNG, 4/3 Gurkha Rifles ..	1/1920
6th Aug. 1920	Jem. RANBAHADUR SAHI, 2/9 Gurkha Rifles ..	313/1915
10th Apr. 1920	Sub. SANSAR CHAND, 52nd Sikhs ..	2086/1919
20th Aug. 1920	Jem. SUNDAR SINGH, 1/66th Punjabis ..	1357/1919
19th Mar. 1921	Sub-Inspector SHER KHAN, Ind. Tel. Dept. ..	584 1919
26th Mar. 1921	567 Hav. MAGHAR SINGH, 2/41 Dogras (formerly 1/69 Punjabis) ..	1938/1917
5th Aug. 1921	Sub. MANSUR ALI, 1/102 Grenadiers ..	525/1916
7th Oct. 1921	Risaldar AMIR MUHD., 5th Cavalry ..	2332/1920
7th Oct. 1921	3049 Daf. GULISTAN KHAN, 10th Lancers ..	846/1920
7th Oct. 1921	3256 Nk. GANU SAWANT, 114th Mahrattas ..	2076/1919
1st Apr. 1922	Jem. LALBIR SUNWAR, 1/7th Gurkha Rifles ..	693/1920
1st Sep. 1922	3557 Hav. TEKBAHADUR KHATTRI 2/9th Gurkha Rif. ..	not traced
20th Sep. 1922	3536 Nk. MAN SING RAWAT, 1/39th Garhwal Rifles ..	1062/1919
19th May 1923	Sub. QUDRAT SHAH, Tochi Scouts ..	944/1922
20th Jul. 1923	167 Hav. DHERU KHAN, 2/13th F. F. Rif. ..	1388/1916
10th Dec. 1937	Jem. SAKTIPARCHAND MALL, 1/9th G. R. ..	not traced
21st Dec. 1937	Sub. DALIP SINGH, 30 Indept. M. T. Sec., RIASC ..	not traced

TWO WARS

BY CAPTAIN C. P. CHENEVIX-TRENCH.

During the last few months there have been frequent references in the Press to the similarity between this and the Napoleonic Wars. It is commonly believed that the newspapers are always wrong, but this is by no means so. There is quite often an element of truth even in leading articles, and in this case there is more than usual. Too much is made of the changes in the art of war brought about since 1918: too little of the essential similarity between this and other great wars of movement, particularly that which ended in 1815.

In 1789 a new political creed exploded in Europe which replaced in its adherents' minds all politics and all creeds. It owed something to the American example, but developed most fully in France. Although fiercely nationalist (its song was addressed to *enfants de la Patrie*) it soon began to propagate its ideas throughout Europe.

Substitute Germany for France, Italy for America, and the previous paragraph might have been written of the National Socialist Revolution during the last decade.

Purges, executions and concentration camps became common place, enforced by Committees of Public Safety and People's Courts. The European Powers took the gravest view of these horrors, but they took no action until they found themselves threatened. Then they formed alliances against the aggressor.

"Germany is encircled by the pluto-democracies," bellowed Hitler, an uninspiring echo of Danton's terrible challenge. "The kings of Europe rise up against us; we will hurl in their faces the head of a king!"

The motives underlying the aggressive spirit differ; in the one case the fierce idealism of 1789, in the other the racial nonsense of the 1930's combined with shrewd economics. But the result is identical; all democratic, all socialist ideas were thrown overboard, the army took control, and democratic France and National Socialist Germany changed into military dictatorships.

The aggressor country appeared to start with many handicaps. All the European Powers were actively or passively opposed to it. Its armies were outnumbered, its generals inexperienced, its trade vulnerable to blockade and its own people by no

means unanimous in support of the dictator. The greatest navy in the world led the opposition in alliance with the most famous army.

But many of the imponderables were on its side.

Its armies fought with a fire and enthusiasm which could not be matched by its enemies until its very victories created such a spirit among the peoples it had defeated; Austria after Austerlitz, Prussia after Jena, Spain after the occupation of Madrid and Britain after the evacuation of Dunkirk rose purged and invigorated from the most crushing disasters.

The inexperienced generals were not mentally constipated by misleading lessons of recent campaigns, and developed a speed and technique which dazzled their slow-thinking, slower-moving antagonists. Directing their countries' policy were dictators who had the most utter contempt for considerations of honour, for the sanctity of treaties and for the rules of war.

The greatest military powers in the world, Prussia in the 18th and France in the 20th century, turned out to be the most hidebound in strategy, sluggish in manoeuvre and feeble in morale of all European Powers.

The blockade was countered by the conquest of Europe, the most ruthless and efficient organization of its resources and a counter-blockade of Britain.

Throughout Europe a Fifth Column undermined the opposition of the allied countries; everywhere were found Tom Paynes and Quislings who favoured the Revolution. Though the conquered peoples later recovered their souls and revolted, Spanish guerillas, German Tollenbund, Serbian comitadjis and Czechoslovak saboteurs were unable to save their countries from defeat and occupation.

Only England, the greatest naval power in the world and fortunate in her geographical position, remained in the field. Deeper than any considerations of politics or alliances was the determination not to make peace while the English way of life was threatened, and in particular while a hostile great power held the European coast-line opposite Kent. (It had long been an axiom of British policy that this would mean defeat. It is being proved to-day, as it was 140 years ago, that we can overcome this grave strategic handicap.)

"The so-called strategy of British Cabinets," wrote Philip Guadalla, "has always consisted of a large number of divergent gestures."

He wrote this of the campaigns of Toulon, the Netherlands, Sweden, Sicily, South America and Corunna. Recently our efforts in Norway, Dakar, Greece and, very nearly, Finland have demonstrated our perennial affection for such gestures. Even the force which we evacuated from Dunkirk (all our gestures end in brilliant evacuations) was so small beside the huge French and German armies as to be scarcely more than a token army.

It is an advantage of sea-power that it enables us to make such gesture: a disadvantage, that it tempts us to do so at unsuitable times and places.

In both wars our powerful allies have been utterly defeated, leaving us alone. The same danger faced us in 1940 as in 1805. To win the war quickly, both Napoleon and Hitler had to invade England. Napoleon believed that he only needed a Channel clear of the British Fleet for 24 hours; Hitler needed a clear sea and sky for as long. So the first care of British strategy was the prevention of invasion. The great air battles over England during the summer and autumn of 1940 were as decisive as the battle of Trafalgar; like Trafalgar, they made it impossible for Britain to be suddenly defeated, though she could still be blockaded or stalemated. And the war went on for a long time after Trafalgar.

The second object was the maintenance of her sea-borne trade. It was not, perhaps, as vital then as now. None-the-less, Napoleon hoped to wear us out by building up a new order in Europe under French leadership, from which British influence and trade would be excluded by his Continental Decrees. His battle-fleet, after Trafalgar, was negligible; but his privateers forced us to convoy our merchant shipping with frigates just as we do to-day.

It was not enough to avoid defeat by blockade or invasion; there still remained the problem of how to achieve victory.

We had to face the fact that we could never land in Europe a force equal to the Grande Armée. But the Grande Armée had to defend the coasts of Europe from Poland to Dalmatia; it was a very long front. Therefore we should be able to land a force in some part of Europe which would have local superiority, and irritate the Empire like a running sore, hindering the creation of a New Europe until our blockade did its work.

Or until 'something turned up;' as it did in 1812, when Napoleon invaded Russia in spite of the non-aggression pact which he had signed with her.

Our land strategy was thus to harass the enemy with well-trained, well-equipped, locally superior forces until our blockade and his own ambition brought about his downfall. Our greatest General was Wellington, expert in defence and withdrawal, 'master of the cautious advance and the limited pounce.' It would have been very convenient if we could have kept open a running sore in the Balkans in 1941. As it is, we shall have to make our forces in the Middle East play the part of the Peninsular Army. They are commanded by another 'Sepoy General.'

The enemy's strategy was the blitzkrieg. There is nothing new about 'lightning war.' Tanks and bombers have merely developed the attack to the point where it can compete with the art of defensive warfare which was so highly developed between 1914 and 1918. Napoleon's blitzkrieg was as dazzling in speed and as devastating in its effect on the leisurely 18th century armies as Hitler's is to-day. It was achieved by the same methods, very rapid movement, the massing of overwhelming force at the decisive point of the attack, and a ruthless pursuit which he achieved by living largely on the country and by making demands on his men greater than the enemy could make. The march of the Army of the Coasts of the Ocean from the English Channel across Europe to encircle the Austrian army at Ulm averaged 16 miles a day for hundreds of miles; a staggering speed for any unmechanised army and unheard of at that time. The pursuit of the Prussian army after Jena was as relentless and as decisive as the pursuit across France in 1940.

Napoleon's methods were made possible by brilliant improvisations on the part of his subordinates. The capture of the Dutch battle-fleet by cavalry charging across the ice (*) is, perhaps, only equalled as a daring and unorthodox operation of war by the capture of the island of Crete without command of the sea entirely by air-borne forces. And surely the two German Fifth Columnists who secured the bridge at Maestricht had heard of Lannes' and Murat's exploit on the Danube bridge before Austerlitz.

The Battle of Austerlitz was probably the supreme Napoleonic masterpiece. It has been judged the second tactical masterpiece in the world, the first being Hannibal's victory at Cannae. At Austerlitz Napoleon's left wing was in position on a strongly entrenched hill which formed a pivot of manoeuvre.

* Napoleon had nothing to do with this action, but it is, for all that, a good example of Napoleonic warfare.

Davout's Corps on the extreme right succeeded in drawing the enemy left into an attempt to outflank him. The allied command sent more and more troops to extend and advance their left flank; when the 'battle was ripe,' Napoleon's hidden reserve, Soult's Corps, advanced out of dead ground, smashed through the weakened enemy centre and swung right to drive the whole allied left wing with shocking losses into the marshes in their left rear.

One hundred and thirty-five years later Hitler—with his left pivoted on the Siegfried Line, his hidden reserve behind the Ardennes in the centre and his right drawing the allied advance into Belgium—duplicated the whole battle on a rather larger scale.

The answer to the blitzkrieg to-day is the same as it was then: counter-blitz where we have sufficient strength (which will not be often, as the first essential is overwhelming force at the decisive point, and sea transport, formerly the fastest, is now the slowest method of moving an army); and 'scorched earth,' guerilla warfare and all-round defence at other times.

It is generally realized that the Spaniards and the Russians during the Napoleonic wars gave us an example of guerilla warfare and 'scorched earth' methods. One would imagine, though from reading and listening to our military correspondents, experts, spokesmen and commentators that all-round defence is something new. It is no newer than the all-out attack, to which it is the obvious answer. It is certainly as old as the British square.

Linear defence is an excellent form of defence provided the attack is not too strong. It succeeded at Agincourt in 1415, and generally on the Western Front during the last war, both periods when the defence was in the ascendant. It has the great advantage of bringing the maximum fire to bear on the attackers. Wellington's infantry stood in line to meet the dense, impetuous columns of French infantry, and blew away the head of those columns by superior fire-power.

But the line could not stand the charge of the French Panzer units (Cuirassiers) and other cavalry. To meet a cavalry charge the British infantry formed square; the line became a series of cavalry-proof, all-round-defended pockets between which the Panzer forces could pass with considerable losses, but on which they lost their momentum and formation. When they were suffi-

ciently disorganized, the British cavalry drove them off by a counter-attack assisted by fire from the squares. Let anyone who wishes to conduct a modern defensive battle study that of Waterloo.

A great deal has been written of the suffering of civilians in this war as if it were something new. As a matter of fact, it is a new idea that civilians should *not* suffer in war. Up to and during the Napoleonic Wars it was an accepted rule of war that a besieged town which held out after a practicable breach had been made in the walls should be given over to sack by the besieging army. Probably the citizens of Coventry, Rotterdam and Mannheim suffered no more than those of Saragossa and Badajoz.

The Napoleonic Wars lasted 23 years. What grounds have we for hope in a quicker victory?

We may base our hopes on four main factors:

1. The support we shall obtain from enemy-occupied countries.
2. The greater efficacy of the modern blockade.
3. The development of air-bombing, and
4. The help we are obtaining from the overseas empire and the United States.

Eighteen months ago the Prime Minister described Britain as "the only champion now in arms of a world cause." In the Napoleonic Wars, too, we were often alone; but it was a long time before we came to be regarded as the champion of anything more than our own interests. The kings and emperors fought for their own crowns, and the peoples of Europe were inclined at first to welcome Napoleon as a liberator. It took many years of French exploitation to arouse among them a nationalist sentiment; and this only grew into revolt after the bloody, drawn battles of Eylau (1807) and Aspern-Essling (1809), the surrender of Dupont at Baylen (1808) and the retreat from Moscow in 1812. But when the break-up came it was final the long-suffering French people themselves welcomed Wellington's advance across the Pyrennees, and at last even the Marshals deserted Napoleon and took service under the Bourbons.

We are, perhaps, inclined to indulge in much wishful thinking about the effects of the blockade on Germany. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Europe to-day, in spite of the development of 'ersatz' substances, is much more susceptible to blockade than it was 140 years ago. Then, Europe was almost self-sufficient in the necessities for maintaining life and taking it.

If coffee was unobtainable, bread poor in quality and wool scarce, no one could expect the Grande Armée or the French morale to collapse quickly because of this. But now there are a large number of substances which can neither be obtained in sufficient quantities nor manufactured in good enough quality for the needs of a total war. German reserves and ingenuity may postpone the shortage for a long time, but hardly for 23 years.

This inevitable shortage and the consequent collapse in morale may be hastened by heavy air-bombing of the enemy's factories, communications and great cities. The necessary air-superiority can be achieved through the huge resources of the British Empire and the United States. In the Napoleonic Wars the empire was undeveloped and the United States non-belligerent or hostile; now they are becoming important sources of supply, virtually free from the threat of enemy bombers.

In 1815 European Democracy was decisively defeated; by 1848 it was shaking every throne in Europe. Will Fascism rise from the ashes of defeat to trouble the world again?

It may well do so if we make the mistake which was made at the Congress of Vienna, if we merely re-build the pre-war Europe buttressed by a few guarantees and sanctions. Whether we like it or not, we are fighting more than the Luftwaffe and the Reichswehr; we are fighting an idea, and the only way to defeat an idea, however false, is with a better idea. The re-establishment of the conditions and boundaries of 1935 is not a better idea; it shows a lack of ideas, even though we may be able to enforce it with a bigger stick.

THE QU' HAILANDS OF ENGLAND

By "RS. AS. PS. RETIRED"

*[Being a digression on where to settle in post-war England—
town, country or Qu' Hailand Spa.]*

While toiling through a bath of blood and sweat and tears and constantly jogging ourselves to remember that we must "go to it" and follow similar slogans of stern duty, it is meet and right that we should cock an enquiring eye at the place in which we will settle when we are entitled to a bath of the more rose-scented variety—the days of retirement in a bombed, poor, but pleasant England.

It happens that I have lived in "town" itself, in an industrial city, in the heart of the country, in a seaside resort and in a Qu' Hailand Spa. As to every Indian Army officer comes the day when he must choose between one of these, it is possible that my experiences (bound up as they have been with the need to reconcile my Indian-acquired tastes with the 'necessity of supplementing my pension and educating my children) may be a guide to others. You may argue that as one can arrive at no decision now, such ponderings are futile. Well, let us leave such single-minded thinkers to their straight and narrow path; I find it pleasant to wander off that dull road and dream my dreams of living under various pleasant conditions, tempering my dreams with a few practical-pointed shafts such as the difficulty of finding a job near my favourite bathing bay or of catching a sizeable trout in Piccadilly. I hope in giving my little picture of life in each place, to take into account the post-war angle.

Needless to say, my tastes will suit few as well as myself, but in order that the reader may judge how far or near my experiences will tally with his desires, I give my dream of retirement. It has six ingredients: to settle in a humble house, to have my children under my roof, to get a job to supplement my pension, to see a little of town, a lot of trout and plenty of friends.

WORK AND PENNIES

To those whose private incomes equal or exceed their pensions the problem is simple—they merely pour out their filthy lucre till their greedy lusts are satisfied! But the majority find that finance lays a cold delaying hand on their shoulder which-

ever way they step. The two coldest hands are those of, firstly, that unknown spectre who reduces a pension of say £800 to about £745 because of (God forgive him!) the "fall in the cost of living" and, secondly, the Collector of Income-Tax who with a leer presents the following little sum:

Pension—	£745.		
Tax free—	(a) Earned income relief 1/10	=	£ 75
	(b) married and two children	=	£240
			<hr/>
	Tax free ...	=	£315
			<hr/>
	Balance taxable	=	£430
Taxation—	First £165 @ 6/6	=	£ 53-12-6
	Next £265 @ 10/-	=	£132-10-0
			<hr/>
	Total tax due	=	£186-2-6

leaving you with £558-17-6 or considerably less if you have completed your children's education, less still if you have no children and practically nothing at all if you have no wife! And quite right too!

If you have any income over this the Collector quietly pouches exactly half.

That kind of arithmetic, even if the tax remains as low as 10/-, brings out that the job which we thought would be desirable on retirement has become a necessity and this has a distinct bearing on our choice of locality.

Well, who am I to say where we will find work in England; we may make (or lose) it in the fields, in the pigsties or in the hen coops but I feel that in general it will be more likely to be found in towns, London or in an industrial city. I've tried both.

"THE LONDON I LOVE"

I don't expect everyone will hate London as much as I did but I fancy I will not be alone in my views. I disliked the petrol fumes and noise perhaps more than anything and though I admit one *can* live very cheaply there, it is a form of cheap living for which life in India has ill-prepared us. To live well, a big income is needed and even then we are cooped up in a flat or in a suburban house with, instead of a dusty sprawling compound and its mysterious basket hidden discreetly at the back, merely a 5-foot brick wall separating us from Mrs. Smith's scanties flying bravely on the line next door.

Theatres, cabarets and similar expensive so-and-sos of the flush days of leave see us but rarely, and the principal entertain-

ment is the cinema or a walk to the nearest park with the dog if he has survived life in the flat.

Golf or a day in the country? Yes, but it certainly entails a tiresome journey as one of an endless stream of cars to get there.

An evening's troutng? Oh yeah!

Well, there's the London I love—patently a biased view but of course one must remember that I am obviously not one of those fortunates who can appreciate one of London's greatest advantages—the varied possibilities of satisfying a love of art in any form.

Incidentally, if London still appeals to you and you would like to settle there, I feel, I should sound a note of warning on the house situation. The bombing of London has materially reduced the accommodation available and it is reasonable to expect that there are further reductions to come. Moreover, a number of houses now used as residences have been so shaken that a few winters' rains may make them scarcely worth repairing, so finding a house there will not, taking the most optimistic outlook, be as easy as in pre-war days.

However, there are still lots remaining and (facing a charge of extreme irrelevance to which I freely plead guilty) I would tell of a recent visit to London, a distance of round about 150 miles. I drove 125 miles by car across some half a dozen counties, passing through innumerable villages, several small towns and three cities without seeing any trace whatever of war. True, one of the cities had been bombed and by going out of my way I saw some demolished houses as well as old ladies having tea at the café as if they had never heard of a bomb. I passed into London by train feeling a bit of a hero till I saw a slip of a girl of 13 travelling off to tennis alone swinging her racket! On emerging from the main railway station in London and gazing round with expectant eyes I saw, believe it or not, no sign in any direction of bomb damage. Nearby was a long stretch of trim grass with neatly arranged rows of tulips—hardly what I had expected. I travelled down to the House of Commons and could see no trace of damage to the blooming place (charge of extreme irreverence) till I walked round to another side where I admit I did see its scars.

Of course I did not happen to visit the more heavily hit areas but it does show that all London is not flat and perhaps, therefore, my view that houses will be hard to find is unduly pessimistic.

However, let us return to our mutttons which naturally enough we find around

"THE LITTLE GREY HOME IN THE WEST"

Holding the views I do on London, I was lucky to be offered a soldiering job in the heart of the country with a famous trout river meandering along.

Instantly, one great advantage strikes one—houses are much easier to come by and there is usually more room to swing a cat indoors or outdoors should you feel so disposed. Just at the moment the house situation is very grave—in fact they are almost unobtainable—because though bombs are dropped here from time to time they are not, we feel, dropped with real malice, and so this is a "safe" area and houses are scarce. But this should not be the case in peacetime.

Well here I find my "humble home" and my "sizeable trout" which my wealthy friends most generously allow me to beguile from the water. What joy these occasional evenings are by the river many a reader in India will appreciate. After contenting oneself for years with mahseer spun out of a hot stony banked river, it is just plain Heaven to approach a stream on tiptoe through a mass of thigh-deep foxgloves and to throw a dry fly from one lush grass bank to that rising trout just under the leafy bough at the far side. And how hard it is to keep one's eye off the varying countryside—the spring lambs, the unhumped sleek fat blissful cows, even the clean pink baby pigs, to say nothing of the daily changing chestnuts and blossoms, buttercups, cowslips, pale primroses, brave bluebell and the honeyed meadow sweet. And to be awakened from this reverie, just as the sun sinks, by a screaming reel.....

Ah! there *are* good things still even in 1941.

But perhaps your wife is not one of those who loves you even though you fish—perhaps she is one of those who hates you because you fish! What then? You'll note that so far I have achieved only two ingredients of my dream and that there is no "little of town," no "children under my roof," few friends and in peacetime, I fear, no jobs.

Possibly one could do without the town part altogether if all the other amenities were included, but unfortunately as a rule good schools and universities are not at hand in the heart of the country. Of course one might argue that in any event the children would have to be away at universities or boarding schools; to this I reply that after a life's service in India many prefer to have

the family under one roof, and, secondly, that the one roof solution may be the only one financially possible on retirement. However, I will return to this aspect later. Anyway, meanwhile, let it be noted that there are no suitable schools in most country districts.

Financially I was much better off in every way in the country than in London or any of the places I shall describe later.

Friends? Yes, and very nice ones but they live so far apart that one rarely sees them. There is, for example, only one tennis club which fits our needs but this serves the whole county and so distances are great and games cannot be counted on except on one day a week. My friends are generosity itself with regard to their grouse moors and trout streams, but then I find that I can secure no pleasure of my own within my means which I can ask them to share.

Before leaving the country, there is one advantage of serious import to-day—food is easier to get and queues are shorter. No doubt this advantage will diminish when peace comes, but not, I feel, for some time.

And so it was with pained regret though with anticipatory interest that I found myself transferred to

THE PROVINCIAL INDUSTRIAL CITY

The provincial city, as I viewed it in advance had, bearing in mind my dream, certain solid advantages compared with London or the country. A reasonable choice of houses of a modest type should be available, schools and a university might fill our needs, a job would anyway be more likely than in the country, and if there were no trout in the local park lake, at least there ought to be a greater chance of making friends than in vast London and of seeing them more often than in the scattered countryside. Golf too, and a day in the country would be nearer.

I found that some of my vision came true but only to a limited extent. The golf, the day in the country and the schools all worked out according to expectations, and the factor of "all under one roof" was nearly accomplished by sending one son to the local school and the other to the local university. Detailed enquiry proved, however, that while most provincial universities cover every career, this particular one only dealt with my son's subject at a very low standard; the standard at another was so much higher that we fell to the temptation of sending him off there.

As far as theatres and cinemas were concerned, this city of course put the country in the shade not only in comfort but in the

quality of the films and sound machines, while in the little theatre we saw occasional first-class London shows and, to our relief were able to afford the best seats.

Houses there certainly were in abundance and the furnished house I took was complete in every detail an enthusiastic housewife could ask. It was small, everything was completely modern, everything in the right place, near the shops, no houses opposite (there was a park with a lake) nothing was slightly dingy, nothing old, nothing rambling and *it had no soul*. No such house in such an environment could; it could never be a "home" and we felt damned in a prim suburbia as we have never been damned before.

"Too hard to please," you say.

All right, try it. I'm only giving my reactions; and try the Sunday walk along the lake with all the others.

Friends are certainly easier to make and easier to see often than in London, but I fear they found they had little in common with me, and the intensity of their local interest put up a veil which nothing could pierce; unless it is one's own "home town." In short I felt clean out of water. This aspect has, to my mind a distinct bearing on the possibility of getting a job and holding it down in a provincial city. However, little I see myself as acceptable to London men when a job is on offer, still less do I see myself as acceptable to provincial eyes.

Frankly I felt prim, pasty and podgy, and loathed every minute of it.

THE SEASIDE TOWN

It was a strange chance which sent me in war-time to a well-known seaside town where on peacetime leave I had spent so many hours beautifully wasted on the beach. To those who retire with very young children, the seaside town has one obvious outstanding advantage and this can usually be followed up by good Prep. schools on the spot. Yachting too provides a recreation for those who are not so mentally deranged as I am about fishing; it is healthy, not too expensive if taken up permanently, and what better for turning young men into men? And by the way, now that I think of it, you can of course work in with it a little sea-fishing!

I found that a seaside town had several desirable qualities—golf and the country were near 'at hand as well as the sea, the shops were good and the town clean and bright. The cinemas and theatre were as good as those of the provincial city. Nice houses were to be had but at a very high price. In some places,

as well as a good Prep. school, a good day or boarding Public school is to be found but in practically no case is there a university of repute; this latter may well be a deciding factor.

The choice of the actual seaside town is of primary importance from two angles—friends and post-war conditions. My seaside town was pretty hopeless from the point of view of making friends as there were in the main two great communities—the imposing army of landladies who cater for a glamorous army of blondes. This however though general is not universal as there are many seaside towns with a residential community large and varied enough to meet the needs of most temperaments.

The present-day picture of my seaside town compared with it in the heyday of peacetime brings home to me the sad deterioration which has occurred in some. Those which are bombed fairly regularly or are likely to be invaded have suffered an exodus of not only visitors but the visitors' money and so vanishes the flowers, paint and so on, which that money provided. The army of blondes has been replaced by an army of less glamorous appearance which fills the curtainless windows of the empty hotels and boarding houses; hobnails in place of pink nails patrol the wired and protected beach. Of course no one complains of this to-day—it is all in the day's work—but will we like it in peace? It will take a considerable time and a lot of money (higher rates?) to restore it to its pristine glory.

For those to whom the seaside still appeals, let me end on a pessimistic note! Not only are jobs a rarity but I found by actual statistics that the cost of living was markedly higher than in the country or small town.

Having by now damned most parts of these isles, allow me to take you finally for a short trip to.

THE QU' HAILANDS

By this I mean, of course, not specifically town, country or seaside resort but those centres, maybe in the country or at a Spa where Qu'hais congregate. I tried such a one. Of course the various factors which weighed for and against my inclinations in each of my experiences, weigh equally in Qu'Hailand. It is the Qu'hais more than the place I am considering.

You, young reader, may say "God forbid that I should join the Qu'hais." Yeeess? But remember that one day you *must* be one yourself and perhaps a crack about the good old days of 1941 may not be so unacceptable as you now feel. Though I

found, I admit, a certain air of decay (to which I no doubt contributed) in the particular place I chose, I found more hospitality and more of a language I understood there than anywhere else in England.

If (I repeat if) I can ever find a Qu'Hailand which includes all the ingredients of my dream, I'll fly there.

THE SOLUTION

Have I found a solution?

For you? Oh! No. Choose your own poison. But I've found my own—a compromise.

It is a house in the country within less than an hour of London whence my younger son can go to a day-school (he has a wide choice within a few miles) and my elder can go daily to a London University. I can get my little bit of town and when I am satiated with the evils of the great city can so easily reach the balm of my country home. I fear I shall see less of my spotty trouty friends than I would like, but I do not despair. I can certainly get coarse fishing locally and can at least visit the trout once a year at the perfect season—spring. Here, too, my prospects of seeing plenty of my friends are rosy for we are an even community. A few pass me graciously in their Rolls, and I do occasionally see rather more of Mrs. Smith's scanties than I had hoped, but anyway they are not so near as just over a 5-foot wall.

The job? Ask Hitler, but I feel that when the war does end I shall be in an area in which I have a better chance than in most, of accepting work without the necessity of moving from the small niche I have carved for myself and mine.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

12th December, 1941.

SIR,

Our Military Leaders and Statesmen combine in their reiteration of the essential need for the stimulation and continued maintenance thereafter of the rate of recruitment to all branches of the Defence Services.

Wise and weighty words on this topic were uttered some weeks back at the initial send-off from Lahore of the Touring Train. The Premier of Bengal shortly afterwards announced his intention of conducting a whirlwind recruiting tour in his province; a few days later the Labour Member in the Governor-General Executive Council suggested some eminently practical and practicable instructions relating to the liaison of the civil and military branches in the matter of recruiting. Then the Duke of Devonshire in a public speech alluded to the great voluntary effort being made in India, with special reference to the recruitment aspect of the question.

It is clear, and the argument needs no labouring, that men are needed, and will continue to be needed (in ever-increasing numbers) for as long as the present emergency lasts.

The point arises whether some System—simple, sure, practicable and economical—could not be devised to implement the present ways and means of recruiting, to act as a certain and steady feeder to our main current of new entries (the present method of supplying which is itself a highly organized and complex mechanism). I believe that there is such a one, almost all ready to hand, and needing only a little careful planning and co-ordination to enable it to function well from the start, and to continue to function satisfactorily.

I refer to our complicated and smoothly-running civil provincial Education Departments.

Would it not be possible, Sir, for the civil Liaison authorities to evolve a simple scheme, in conjunction with all heads of provincial Education Departments, whereby the organization of the latter could be used to bring home to the villager the great opportunities for helping the Motherland and himself and his family which are lying open to him almost at his door? (In these days

of rapid transport and incredibly speedy communications we are apt to overlook the fact that there are thousands of populous villages to which the battery wireless set is unknown: which never receive even a vernacular newspaper: which are far removed from a by-road—let alone a main or district one, and from the railway line) which would be willing to help—if only a simple way of helping were shown to them.

Now all of our soldiers have been, for varying periods, in a village school. At least once a year, and more often three times, they have had their progress examined by the Assistant District Inspector of Schools. They know him well. Their relatives know him well. He is (he has to be) a man of great authority and trust, of knowlege and of good repute. Most of his rural journeys are made on foot. He mingles freely with all classes, from the Deputy Commissioner downwards. A lot of his extra-inspection time is spent in discussing affairs with the village folk, in keeping in general touch with them on all aspects of their daily life. He is, very often, the only regularly-visiting official of the provincial government from the tehsil and district headquarters that they can ever be definitely certain of seeing, or of hearing of his presence in the locality, from one year's end to the other. (After all, nearly every village has its school nowadays, and even if there is not a school in a particular village, there's usually one in an adjacent one.)

If, therefore, liaison between the A.D.I.S. and the nearest recruiting officer is once established: if the A.D.I.S. is empowered, under clearly-defined instructions, to do his level best to rope in as many likely men as he can by means of discussion, persuasion, meetings, carefully-prepared literature and so on: if he and his Staff could be granted a capitation fee for every man finally and definitely enrolled: I feel confident that a steady additional stream of suitable men from the remoter areas could, at practically no cost, be obtained to swell the ranks of our Indian Army.

The submission is made to you, Sir, that the idea, along with its concomitant implications and ramifications is, at any rate, worthy of consideration and discussion.

KHABARDAR.

NOTES ON SOME BOOKS RECENTLY PLACED IN THE LIBRARY

"Action Stations—The Royal Navy at War," by Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield.

A copiously illustrated and brief account of each of the many branches of the Royal Navy and a summary of its activities in the present war. It describes the work of the Destroyers, the "Little Ships" such as Sloops, Trawlers, Motor Torpedo Boats, etc. Battleships, Cruisers, Submarines, and of the Fleet Air Arm.

"Engines of War—The Mechanized Army in Action," produced in collaboration with the War Office.

It gives a short, vivid and as far as national security allows, a complete and freely illustrated picture of the various branches of our modern mechanized army, finishing with a short chapter on its technical training.

"War in the Air," by David Garnett.

A very clear account of the position of the R.A.F. in 1939 before the commencement of war, the work of the different Air Commands, a comparison between the R.A.F. and the Luftwaffe, and the tasks of the R.A.F. in the different theatres after the outbreak of war.

"From Dunkirk to Benghazi" by Strategicus.

This book is an attempt to select, now, what will prove to be the significant features of the war, and, dealing with them episodically, to group about them the events, which are logically connected with them. After describing the Battle of, and the Surrender and Fall of France, it goes on to describe the Battle of Britain. The air attacks on London and other cities are described in detail, and the story of the British Counter Air Offensive is recounted. The book finishes with the tale of the Italian invasion of Egypt, and later of Greece, and of the British reply in Libya.

"The Battle of Britain, 1940," by J. M. Spaight.

Commencing by describing the German air attack, it discusses the threat of invasion, and the attempted blockade of Britain, and our counter-offensive. After dealing with

German reports of their successes in the air, it has something to say on our Defence by day and by night, and ends with a summary of what has been described in the book and the conclusions drawn.

"The Strategy of Indirect Approach," by Liddell Hart.

This volume reproduces a book published by this author in 1929 under the title of "The Decisive Wars of History" and adds to it a few extensions of former chapters and some fresh chapters. The first part of the book consists of a survey covering wars from 490 B.C. to 1914 exemplifying the indirectness of approach and its results. It then goes on to "construct a new dwelling house for strategic thought" and gives a concentrated essence of strategy. In its second part it surveys the World War on its various fronts from 1914 to 1918, and in the last, part III, it discusses Hitler's strategy before and after the outbreak of war in 1939.

"The Red Army Moves," by Geoffrey Cox.

The story of the campaign between Russia and Finland, 1939-40.

"The Eastern Question—A study in European Diplomacy," by J. A. R. Marriott.

The original work consists of a study of this question upto 1914. Since then, the author has had it republished three times, bringing it up to date on each occasion. The present volume takes the study up to 1939.

"Suicide of a Democracy," by Heinz Pol.

The author starts by describing the birth and growth in France of the political body known as the Cagoulaards. He then discusses the Fascists of France and their leaders, De La Rocque, Doriot, Deat, Bergery, Maurras, and others, and the work of Bonnet and the Fifth Column. The career of Mandel, ending with his attempt to find support in North Africa for the continuance of the War, is described. The effect of the Maginot Line on the French outlook is his next subject, and after a description of the concentration camps of France the book finishes with the tale of the collapse of the country.

"The Viceroy and Governor-General of India," by A. B. Rudra.

An historical and analytical study of the position of the Viceroy and Governor-General in the Indian constitutional system. Part I of the volume deals with the position of the Governor-General under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919. In Part II the author makes an estimate of the place assigned to the Governor-General by the Government of India Act, 1935.

"Military Science To-day," by Lieut.-Colonel Donald Portway, R. E.

A short, illustrated account of the development of various branches of military activity in which scientific principles are involved, treated mainly from the soldier's point of view.

EDITORIAL

Early in January, 1942, it was announced that as a result of proposals brought forward by the chiefs of staff of the United States and Great Britain it has been decided to create a system of unified command in the South West Pacific area which would control all the forces in that area, in the air, and on land and sea.

General Sir Archibald Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., A.D.C., the Commander-in-Chief in India, was selected for this appointment and left India for his new headquarters early in the month.

General Sir Alan Hartley, K.C.S.I., C.B., D.S.O., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command, was selected to succeed him in the post of Commander-in-Chief.

The rapid Japanese advance, and particularly the capture of Singapore and Sumatra, radically altered the situation in the South West Pacific. Java, which had been looked on as the base for the counter-attack which it had been hoped it would be possible to deliver, had now become practically the last stronghold of the United Nations in that area, was fighting on its own and was no longer a part of the general strategic scheme. It was decided, therefore, that the command of the land, sea and air forces of the United Nations in the Netherland East Indies should pass to the Dutch, and General Sir Archibald Wavell has returned to India to resume the appointment of Commander-in-Chief in India.

* * * *

In our last issue we summed up the Allied position as it appeared at the end of the year. Events since then have moved at a very rapid pace, and in the East we have had to suffer some very serious setbacks. The Japanese have succeeded in gaining possession of Malaya and Singapore, capturing our large forces there, and have extended their seizures of territory widely among the islands of the South West Pacific. They have brought the air war to the northern parts of Australia and are now in a far more favourable position to send a sea-borne expedition against that country if such is their intention. They have entered Burma and are now trying to advance towards Mandalay. Here their immediate object is, undoubtedly, to cut off the Burma road, an

object which if attained will help them very considerably in their attempts against China. It will also place them in a still stronger position for any attempt against India itself and against Allied shipping in the Indian ocean and the waters of Africa.

In Libya the situation, after the first successful advance to the east of El Agheila and the subsequent withdrawal of our forces in face of the reinforced German and Italian columns, has been more or less stationary. It has been announced that more reinforcements have been reaching the enemy, although our naval and air forces have been very active in interfering with the passage of enemy ships to the North African coast, and we may expect that there has been a steady flow of troops and material to our own forces there. With the approach of more suitable weather in other theatres it is probable that developments will occur in this theatre in the near future.

Our Russian allies have been continuing their very successful drive against the German armies all along their front, and in spite of numberless counter-attacks have forced back the German line in some places to a considerable distance. We watch with particular interest their efforts to wrest back the Crimea. If they can succeed in getting this important area again in their hands they would be in a very strong position to interfere with any German attempt towards the Caucasus oilfields or against Turkey.

* * * *

In August, 1940, the British Government issued a statement about the aims and policy being pursued in India. This amounted to a promise that as soon as possible after the war India should attain Dominion Status under a constitution to be framed by Indians by agreement amongst themselves and acceptable to the main elements in the Indian national life.

For some months there has been a growing feeling in the United Kingdom that the time had come to take definite and very considerably advanced steps in the attainment by India of Dominion Status and this has resulted in the arrival of Sir Stafford Cripps on a special mission to discuss the future of India with the political leaders in this country.

The War Cabinet have agreed unitedly upon conclusions for present and future actions, but before making a declaration of these conclusions, decided to send a member of the War Cabinet to India to satisfy himself on the spot by personal consultation that the conclusions will achieve their aim.

The object of the proposals is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a dominion associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.

Sir Stafford Cripps, the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House, volunteered to undertake this task, and arrived in India on the 22nd of March, reaching New Delhi the next day.

Discussions with officials and with leaders of Indian opinion started in New Delhi immediately. As Sir Stafford Cripps was staying in India for two weeks only, discussions had of necessity to be short.

The proposals have now been made public and in a few days Sir Stafford Cripps will return to London to make his report on the response to them.

* * * *

The Royal Indian Navy, like its very much older sister service, qualifies for the title "The Silent Service", and as a result not much is known by the general public of its development or of the way it is carrying out its many duties in this war.

The veil was lifted to some extent by the Flag Officer Commanding Royal Indian Navy recently, in an address at a Press Conference. There has been very considerable expansion in the personnel, the number of officers alone being now more than five times the number commissioned before the war. The rank and file are drawn from all parts of India and have shown themselves to be magnificent material. Boys are now taken at an early age for training, and after four years at a training school are drafted into the service.

The ship-building yards of India, too, are now engaged in constructing ships for the Royal Indian Navy, and are already turning out corvettes, anti-submarine trawlers, patrol launches and smaller boats for hunting submarines.

The activities of the Royal Indian Navy have covered a wide area, and it has won laurels in the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the waters near Burma and Singapore, and has even taken part in the Battle of the Atlantic. Its latest exploit was when the *Jumna*, the last ship to leave Batavia, fought her way back to India successfully, her anti-aircraft guns accounting for four enemy aeroplanes on the way.

The increase in the Royal Indian Navy is of very recent growth and "Rome was not built in a day", but we look forward

with every confidence to a future in which a navy of ships built in India and manned by Indians will be carrying out the complete task of defending India's very extended coast line.

It has frequently been said that in modern war, oil is an all-important factor for victory and that the ultimate aim of many strategic movements will be to gain possession of the sources of this commodity.

For both the Axis and the Allied powers the oil situation has now changed considerably from what it was when battle was first joined two and a half years ago.

At the commencement of hostilities the Axis powers were far from well off in this respect. They now have control of the Rumanian oilfields, but these by themselves cannot be sufficient for their huge needs. The Russian oilfields and the large supply in Iraq and Iran are still far from being in their grasp.

The fruitful fields which existed in the Netherlands East Indies have, as a result of the Japanese aggressions, been wrested from the possession of the Allies, but owing to the policy adopted, these cannot be made available for Axis use for many months to come, and even if they were made productive once again, the difficulties of getting the essence to German bases would be enormous.

The Japanese advances in Burma now threaten the oil source in that country, and it is obvious that the loss of this supply in addition to that in the islands of the Dutch East Indies would be a very serious inconvenience to the Allied powers.

There are, however, still large supplies available for the Allies. Huge quantities are to be found in the United States. Mexico and Venezuela both have their oilfields which produce considerable quantities.

The question of supply from these countries hinges on the available shipping and this is realized by the Axis powers as strongly as by anyone else, as is evidenced by their intensive submarine attack on tankers in the waters of those countries. However, the building of ships cannot be hindered by hostile action to any appreciable extent and with the enormous facilities at the disposal of the United States the provision of a sufficient number of ships can be only a question of time. It will then remain to ensure their safe arrival at their destinations, and with increasing experience in this matter on the part of the American naval authorities, it should be possible to keep the

losses down as low in proportion to the number of vessels sailing the seas as has been done in the past.

On balance, therefore, it appears that the oil situation is now, and is likely to remain, considerably more favourable for the Allies than for their enemies.

It has been clear for a long time that the attainment of fresh sources of supply is essential for the Axis success, and in consequence we may expect to see, as soon as it becomes possible for them to undertake, the commencement of an even more widely extended pincer movement than heretofore, with its claws reaching from Russia, Africa and further east, aimed at the oil supplies of the Caucasus, Iraq and Iran.

May the editor make an appeal for articles for the Journal! It is fully realized that members have little time outside their daily work for anything of this sort, but war experiences of any kind, particularly while they are fresh in the mind of the individual concerned in them, would be of such interest and value to others that the editor is emboldened to make this plea, and any contributions of this nature would be most welcome.

A GURKHA WITH LAWRENCE

By "PHEON"

The various books that have been written about the exploits of T. E. Lawrence in Arabia hardly mention the fact that a small force of Gurkhas took part in the final phases of his attack on the Hejaz railway. In fact, the writer was unaware that the Indian Army had been connected with this almost fabulous campaign until he found that there was an individual in his company who had participated in it. The discovery occurred some years ago. It was the time of the start of the annual collective training and the Company had been practising the "Platoon in the attack". At the evening conference on the day's work, in order to emphasise a point, I said: "We'll never win the war like that."

My senior Subedar nodded wisely and proclaimed: "Ah! yes. I know how we won the war."

This rather surprised me so, after the conference, I asked him how we had won the war. He replied: "We sent a party of men to blow up the Railway bridge and line behind the enemy position and then the General Sahib ordered the attack. The whole line charged and the enemy was defeated."

"Where did this happen?"

"In Palestine, Sahib, I was there."

This surprising information rather shook me, but thinking rapidly I decided that he must mean Lawrence's raid on the Hejaz railway. "Who blew up the railway line? How do you know about it?" I inquired.

"Havildar Manbahadur Gurung was one of the party who destroyed the railway; he was detached for special duty from the 3rd battalion. When he returns from furlough he can tell you all about it."

Manbahadur Gurung was a pleasant, rather stupid, N. C. O. who had failed to make the grade as Company Quarter-Master Havildar, and who was now merely waiting for his Havildar Pension to ripen.

On his return from furlough I sent for Manbahadur and questioned him. At first I had difficulty in explaining to him what I wanted, but finally found that he remembered the show

as "Camel work" (Unt ka kam). Even after he knew what I wanted he insisted on relating the whole of his adventures in the Great War of 1914-18.

This is a fair, though abbreviated, translation of his story: "In the German war I went to France with the Regiment in 1914. We were there for many months. Then the regiment moved to Egypt and I came home on sick leave, for I had been sick with fever in France. Many others were sick also; this was due to the fact that we had to wait for a ship at Karachi for many weeks in the middle of the hot weather. I rejoined the regiment in Egypt in the fourth month of 1917. There we dug many trenches." Manbahadur paused for some moments and then continued.

"After a while we went to Palestine. I was transferred to the 3rd battalion which was formed from parties from our battalion and some other regiments. We were at the battle of Gaza in October or November, I forget which, and also at the capture of Jerusalem. After this we had a lot of fighting. I was there when the company commander sahib got his M.C. But in one attack in mid-December I got wounded in the right arm. See, here is the scar—just above the elbow." Manbahadur drew his arm from the coat sleeve to show me. I made sympathetic noises.

"I was sent to hospital in Suez. A very big hospital beside the sea, down to the right of the town. They did not keep me there very long, only about a month. I was sent back to the base though my arm was still weak. I rejoined the regiment and was put on a drill cadre, but my arm hurt and gave me a lot of trouble. I was afraid to complain lest I should be sent back to hospital. In April, I was in another attack, when we had heavy casualties. About this time I got fever again and went back to hospital, only this time the hospital was near to the regiment. After I returned to the regiment, I was put on another drill cadre, but my arm still hurt when I did rifle exercises; so I was sent back to my platoon. In July or August volunteers were called for to go on a camel training course in Jerusalem. I did not like camels, but my arm still hurt when I did drill, so I volunteered."

"From our battalion one Havildar and twelve sepoy volunteered; I was only a sepoy then. There were also volunteers from other Gurkha regiments. In all there were about twenty-four of us.

"We were put in a train, but instead of getting to Jerusalem we arrived at Suez. I thought that there had been a mistake, but the Captain Sahib, who was in charge of us, said that it was all right. He told us that there was no course, that the story about the course was only a lie to deceive the enemy, and that we were going on a secret and important mission. At Suez we went on board a steamship. We were several days and nights on board the ship and then we arrived at a place called I forget the name."

"Was it Akaba?"

"Yes, yes, Akaba, that was the name. In Akaba we did one week's training in camel-riding. After the week none of us were very good camel-riders and all of us were stiff. But we were then ordered to march and were sent off into the desert. We rode for more than twenty days into the desert in a north-easterly direction. I began to think that we would go on riding for ever. We never had a rest, never stopped for more than one night in one place. It was hard work for we were still untrained camelmén, but the worst difficulty was food. The only ration that had been issued to us was *atta*. As you know in our regiments we eat rice. We had to cook *chapatties* somehow. On most nights we had to lie quiet on account of the enemy and fires were not allowed. During the day we only had one halt of an hour's duration, which was not long enough to cook the bread. One cannot eat uncooked flour. On many days we went hungry. The Sirkar, however, gave us one packet of cigarettes per man per day and sometimes we each got a tot of rum—but only sometimes, not always."

"Did you stop at a place called Ab el lissan, in the hills to the west of the railway?"

"No sahib, I don't remember that name. We stopped at no place for more than one night for about twenty-four days. Then we came to a place where there was a big building, like a fort. This fort was very old and was falling down. To the south of the fort there was a big pool of water surrounded by reeds and grass—like a *jheel* on the plains of India—there were lots of geese and duck there too."

"Was its name Azrak?"

"It might have been Azrak . . . but I forget. We rested there for one day. In this place there were many troops."

"They were mostly *'badus'* that the Sirkar had made into soldiers for the war. They were rather like the frontier militia

we have in Waziristan—not proper troops. There were also some Egyptian Sappers and Miners and some French Artillery—not proper 'Top khana' but very small guns. The next day we went out with the Egyptians to break the railway line. We rode for a long way and then broke the rail for the first time near Maan."

"Did you help to break it, or was that Sapper work?"

"We Gurkhas did some of the breaking. We tore down the telegraph lines and broke them by hammering the wires between two stones. When we finished the work we retired into the desert and rode north towards Amman. We travelled one or two days on the way. Near Amman we broke the line again. This time our party was employed on covering work only. After this we rode north again to a place about six miles north of Deraa. We arrived at our objective about daybreak after riding all night and we started work on the railway line about six o'clock in the morning. This time the Turks attacked us, but we had Lewis guns as well as rifles, and we drove them back; they never got nearer than six hundred yards from us."

"Were there no other covering troops?"

"Oh yes, some 'badus', the small French cannon and an armoured car. They helped us. We worked right on at breaking the line and bridges until about twelve o'clock when a great number of Turkish aeroplanes came and attacked us."

"How many aeroplanes—ten—twenty?"

"I can't say, but there were lots and lots of them; they seemed to be everywhere at once. We only had one aeroplane on our side. It used to stay with us all day but had to go away at night. It was with us when the Turkish aeroplanes attacked us and it counter-attacked them at once. Our aeroplane Sahib was very brave, but what could one do against so many and he was forced down lower and lower. Fortunately, there was a small *maidan* near us, so our aeroplane got down all right. Then the Turkish aeroplanes came right down on top of us, till they were only about five yards above our heads, and again attacked us. The French guns fired at them and I held a Lewis gun up to my shoulder, like a rifle, and fired at them too. So the aeroplanes got afraid and went up high again. They continued to drop bombs and to fire machine-guns at us but they were very bad shots and we had very little damage; only a few camels and 'badus' hit. Not like when our aeroplanes attacked the enemy, as I saw them do in Palestine. After a while the Turkish aero-

planes went away and we went on destroying the line. We worked all day and destroyed about four or five miles of line as well as the bridges; we helped the sappers. When it became dark the General Sahib came and said that the Egyptians could not see at all in the dark, so we Gurkhas would have to hold night piquets to cover the area."

"What was the general sahib's name?"

"I forget."

"Was it Lawrence?, No?, Joyce?, Peake?"

"No sahib I forget but he was the burra sahib who was in command of the Arab militia people. We held the piquets until one o'clock in the morning when our Captain sahib whose name I forget also, came and ordered us to retire. He told us that our troops in Palestine had orders to attack the Turks on the next day and that we had broken the railway line behind the enemy's position in order to prevent reinforcements reaching them. Now, if all went well, it was too late for the Turks to repair the line; for we would win the war first."

"We marched the rest of that night and all the next day. The Turkish aeroplanes came and attacked us again. They did us little harm, though one camel was killed near to me—it was blown into little pieces. The day after this we reached the place where the ruined fort was, the place from where we started the raid, where the pond was. There we had several days rest; we needed it badly in order to cook bread. It was a nice place, though there were far too many mosquitoes. Then one of our aeroplanes came and told us that we had attacked and defeated the Turks near Jaffa. The Turks were completely beaten and the war was over. We had helped a lot by destroying the railway."

"So we returned to Deraa, where we rested for several days. Then we marched on and halted at many places, whose names I forget. I was sent into Nablus to collect rations for the camels; I was away for some days on this work. Finally we reached Hailfa and even went on for one or two days north of that. We were at this time ahead of nearly all our infantry, there were only cavalry and armoured cars in front of us. After a little however we managed to find a Gurkha regiment. It was the only one so far forward and we got decent food from them. We had not tasted rice or *dal* for weeks. All this time we received no pay so we had no money to buy food from the bazars. After some days we received orders to hand over our camels to the

transport people and we returned to our regiments by train. It was December when I rejoined the battalion at Kantara."

"How did you like camel riding?"

"It was not good but not bad. It made me ache at first but it was better than walking."

"How did you get on with the other troops?"

"We did not have anything to do with them. They were all Mussalmans, or something like that, not a Hindu among the lot. We had our own Captain sahib, who was from a Gurkha regiment, and we kept separate."

"How did you like it Manbahadur?"

"Oh it was all right; not worse than the rest of the war. Though the cooking was difficult of course, we did get rum sometimes, but not always."

WARTIME AND POST-WAR JOBS

By RASP

No, Sir, it is *not* futile to consider at the present juncture the possibility of a job in the future.

This blunt opening denial seems necessary, because whereas in days of peace officers devoted considerable thought to the subject, to-day the reader will be inclined to pass it by as outside the realms of reality.

This is not so. Not only may it concern serving officers to-day more than they thought two years ago, but there are certain steps which can be taken now in India in wartime in anticipation of this eventuality.

It so happens that the writer's present duties are not only military and take him into contact with officers seeking jobs but take him into daily contact with the industrial world. These contacts have opened his eyes to several aspects, hitherto unrealized, of the job-getting situation, both military and civil.

Agenda

In this article it is, therefore, proposed to make certain deductions from the military-cum-civil knowledge and to stress certain major changes which have occurred in job-getting since 1939. The possibility of *getting* a job will next be discussed very shortly, but the principal attention will be devoted to the *making* of a job and the steps which can be taken in India in wartime towards this aim.

Officers affected and Military jobs.

The reason that many thought, at the beginning of the war, that this question of job-getting was as unreal as Peter Pan, was that the war appeared to be going to be a long one. This very length of the war already shows signs of causing the reverse effect—in short, officers will be requiring jobs before the war is over.

So far two categories of officers may be visualised. The first will be composed of middle-aged, or even young, officers who are retired through ill-health. This will admittedly be small, but it may include the reader of this article. Of course, every officer in India will feel that "it will not happen to him," just as all of us in England to-day feel about a bomb! But the longer

stretches in India without leave, which the conditions of war will impose, are bound to cause large increases above the peacetime wastage—particularly among the middle-aged.

However, be you an optimist and exclude yourself from that category, you may still fall within the second category.

This will consist of officers who retire in the normal course before the war is over. Here again the very length of the war tends to increase this category. Only the young and those one hundred per cent. fit can fight the good fight these days.

First let us see how the wind blows on military jobs in England. True, officers may be re-employed in a military capacity in England and this has been the lucky lot of many, but it should be noted that the tendency to cut the dead wood from the tree is increasing. Many fine soldiers are being retired from age, from the really active list of the British service. Being still fine soldiers, albeit somewhat lacking spring in the knees, jobs are being sought in which to place them, reward them and use their knowledge and experience. It follows that they will be placed in administrative jobs now held by older retired officers who have been re-employed and who will thus retreat again to the evening of their days.

Will the future retired Indian Army officers have good prospects in the face of this competition?

I leave it to the reader to judge.

So far, in discussing military posts the writer has had in mind primarily staff and administrative posts in the regular military machine. From time to time, however, new classes of jobs, slightly outside the border of regular service, arise.

A notable case has been the recent huge demand for adjutants for the Home Guard. An Indian Army officer would be eminently suitable for these, and though most vacancies are now filled, there will be, by the reason of their large numbers alone, a fairly frequent turnover. The work is pleasant, intensely practical and the successful applicant is paid for doing what he would be doing without pay if he had no job—for in such circumstances he would, as a matter of course, be devoting practically all his time to Home Guard duties. Adjutants are paid as Captains at £430 approximately, plus 25 per cent. in lieu of pension, totalling £537 per annum, plus important allowances. These allowances vary according to whether the officer is married, the number and age of his children and whether he is able to live with his family, and so on. But taking the case

of a married officer whose wife lives elsewhere and who has one child, the allowances amount to £285 per annum, making a grand total of £822 per annum. Note, however, that the allowances are entirely free of tax, a point of importance as will be examined later.

Whether the salary is a benefit to a retired officer depends on the rate of his pension. A valuable alternative is that he may draw in lieu his pension plus 25 per cent., *all* of which will, however, be taxable.

Another new large class of jobs recently thrown open is that of Administrative Officer at a Battalion, Group or Zone Headquarters of the Home Guard. In this case, too, a reasonable turnover may be expected. The pay is £300 per annum, all taxable.

Other opportunities which have recently been occasionally available are Ground Defence Officers at aerodromes. Casual unusual jobs appear from time to time; the writer has recently, for example, had difficulty in obtaining suitable ex-regular officers for a post in certain vast industrial undertakings which required officers for a civil post with the task "in addition to his other duties" of relieving the Manager of all defence matters. The pay offered was about £450 per annum. Such posts are, however, rare and to get a sense of proportion on the home outlook let me tell the aim of a Brigadier who is just about to retire for age. He contends that everyone says they want to do their bit. He says he is more honest and he not only wants to do his bit but must supplement his pension to the fullest extent possible. He, therefore, intends to join a Government Training Centre for a six months' course as a fitter. He will thus obtain a job in a munition factory and, thanks to his education and experience in leadership, hopes in time to be promoted to shop foreman who, including overtime, earns about £600 per annum. He is over 60 and realizes that he will have to take his place on the rota like everybody else for night shifts and to queue like the other workmen in rain and snow for the home-ward bus.

The writer does not contend that this is usual, but feels it gives an interesting sidelight to readers in India on the home view-point.

The Major Change

So much for military possibilities. Before turning to prospects in civil life the writer would like to stress one aspect which,

to his mind, alters the whole outlook on the job on retirement problem. This is an increase in the rate of Income-tax to 10/- . Who knows, by the time this appears in print, it may be raised to 12/6. The point is not that this 10/- tax makes it financially difficult to scrape along on a pension; the point is this: in pre-war days many officers felt that if they could get a job at £300 a year they would be content. To-day the position is that if you secure a job at £300 a year you net exactly £150. If, therefore, the job entails living in a place you would otherwise not inhabit, or which is, say, away from suitable day-schools, it will not be worth accepting. It might even be a source of debit rather than credit financially, especially when the cost of petrol (if you can get it) or rail and bus fares, smarter clothes and the cost of lunches and teas are taken into consideration. Will it, moreover, be worth the loss in health or strain on nerves which lack of open air and the rush and scramble of civil life may impose? Many officers may feel that they can do their duty best, and manage as well financially by living at home and devoting all their time to training a Platoon, Company or Battalion of the Home Guard which is, of course, unpaid but entails practically no expenditure.

If, however, we aim higher and need, say, a net £250 a year to supplement our pension it must be borne in mind that the salary to produce this, namely £500 a year, is not easily come by in wartime and will only fall to the very fortunate in peacetime. Even then there will not be a net gain of £250 a year, for the expenses referred to above must be deducted. If, for example, it entails sending children to a boarding school, who would otherwise go to a local day-school, the disadvantages will outweigh the financial benefit.

There is one case, however, in which it may pay the applicant to accept a salary which gives a small return, and this is the case where he sees prospects of a good rise later. If the rate of tax rises to 12/6, the situation will be worsened, for while it will be harder to live, it will be still harder to secure a job which will be worth accepting.

What a "gloomy Dean" he is, you exclaim!

True, but he will produce what he considers, for what it is worth, his silver lining. Not quite yet, however, for he has one depressing deduction from his experience in the industrial world to expound.

A Job in Business

The writer had hoped that his experience in handling men would, in peacetime, help him to secure a job in a small way in big business.

Having now for over a year visited innumerable big businesses and having worked in intimate touch with men of varying grades from Managing Directors to foremen in a wide variety of trades, he is forced to see that the businessman would have few, if any, vacancies in a civil capacity which he could offer to ex-officers. It is patent to the writer himself that this view is sound. He could not hope to hold down a civil job to his own satisfaction, working daily with men who have had a specialized knowledge in each varied branch of each trade.

Another factor, apparently of slight moment, but which has a very real effect on the flow of work is that, except in London, nearly all employees excluding the important heads of departments, are local men. The writer has seen repeated cases of friction arising where a man comes in from outside. Yesterday the writer came across a whole factory which started nearby a certain town over three years ago. The Management was meeting friction from every quarter; they were regarded as "foreigners" and were openly referred to as "supercilious interlopers"!

This may seem petty, but if such is the reception of a big firm engaged on vital war production in wartime on entering the business world of a provincial town, the writer has no hopes that he could prove acceptable in peacetime. This, be it noted, is the opinion of one who is on a better wicket than most in that he is in close and amicable touch with many influential companies.

However, this is only the opinion of one, and those who hope to enter business can, if they have the opportunity in the meantime, usefully take up a Business Correspondence Course and on retirement will find the Bureau for the Employment of Ex-Officers invaluable in putting them in touch with firms of real standing.

Before leaving this aspect, the writer would like to record one class of job which is open in the business world to-day to ex-officers, namely Welfare Officer. This is a good post, but it is doubtful if the officer would be retained in peacetime.

Possible Jobs

So far the experience offered has been more or less of a defeatist nature. It is now proposed to discuss more likely openings and in so doing the writer is guided by:

- (a) Whether the work is "away" or "at home".
- (b) If it requires big, little, or no money.
- (c) If influence is required.
- (d) If it can be studied in India in wartime.
- (e) If the earnings will be fully taxable.
- (f) If it is likely to boom after the war.

Having analysed each it is most convenient to consider them in three categories:

First Category—Job-Getting: Jobs which take one away from home, or which need a good deal of capital or influence, or which cannot be studied in India.

This category is dismissed briefly and only really possible careers considered.

The principal openings appear to be games or school master, Bursarships, Land or Estate agent, private secretary or hospital secretary. These do not appear likely to boom, but, on the other hand, do not call for capital. Air Raid Precaution officers and Fire Service Staff officers are included in this group as they normally take one away from home. A good deal of study can, however, be done in India by writing to H. M. Stationery Office or a reputable book-seller for all the Home Office handbooks on this subject.

Vacancies in these posts are continually open. Many people feel that these posts will continue after the war; probably no one knows whether this will be the case or not. In this category, too, are several possibles which will boom after the war. Motor-ing, commercial aviation and all forms of travel, especially to the sea and outside England, are bound to be in great demand. Most will call for a good deal of capital and experience and, of course, very sound advice before the risk is taken, but possibles are travel agencies, race horse training, various posts in connection with greyhounds, hotel management and reception for which an apprenticeship would be necessary unless one is setting up one's own business.

Job—"Making"

Before dealing with the remaining categories there is one very important aspect which applies equally to both.

It is this.

If the retired officer can "make" a job instead of relying on "getting it" from someone else he will have several advantages. Firstly, he will be more or less his own master; secondly, he can probably make it round his own home and thus avoid the expenses which an "away" job entails. There is a still greater advantage not so easy to explain. If he secures a job at, say, £300 a year, he loses, as has been pointed out, half of this in tax. Now if he makes for himself a job which partially feeds or houses him he will be as well off as if he was "earning" twice as much as he saves through this job. If, for example he writes, or takes P. G.s or market gardens or keeps poultry, a certain amount of his income will be exempt from tax as "expenses".

If, to take another example, he kept himself in fruit, vegetables and eggs and thereby saved himself expenditure of, for simplicity's sake, £150 a year, this would be equivalent to earning £300. In addition to this, he would have his profit from the sales of his produce.

Second Category: Careers "at home" which need some capital and cannot be studied in India.

Many careers under this category will occur to the reader. It is proposed to consider those which are good possibilities and on which a certain amount of literature is available though they cannot be effectively and fully studied.

Firstly, there are those which provide the amusement which will be sought so widely, such as road houses, roadside cafés and petrol pumps, riding schools, wireless, television and pheasant breeding. Similarly, furs will be needed. There is a negligible quantity on the market now compared with even six months ago. Prices are soaring and the officer who breeds rabbits, silver fox and the like should be on a good wicket, especially if he can produce his skins shortly after the war.

Other careers for consideration are farming, pig keeping and fruit growing. Anyone who can produce this, especially during wartime—and who knows how long the war will last—cannot fail to make a good profit, and, incidentally, will be able to supplement his rations. The prices of fruit are high and there are many types of soft fruit bushes and apple trees which are quick bearing. A study of the growing of Cox's Orange Pippins in Mauser's "How to Live in England on a Pension" will be a great help to those interested.

Third Category: Jobs "at home" which require little or no capital and which can be studied in India.

If the reader is the type who would like a job in his own home, probably in the country, and in which his wife is willing to share the burden, there are quite a number which can be studied both in theory and practice in India.

This, of course, only applies to officers stationed in India, but in some cases where the husband is sent overseas, his wife, if in India, can continue both the theory and practice. In fact, in many cases her co-operation will be an essential to success.

Those who aim at securing an appointment as a Golf Club Secretary or Club Secretary have many opportunities, which should not be missed, of gaining useful experience in India. Where the Club is residential, particularly valuable experience can be gained.

Officers who are good with their hands and especially those whose hobby is carpentry, will find varied fields to explore in post-war England. Furniture is only obtainable at fantastic prices—furniture and cabinet making is not a reserved occupation so that no apprentices are being engaged, and there will be a great shortage of skilled and well-educated craftsmen. Skilled craftsmen will be in high demand not only as actual workers but as foremen and managers of furniture manufactories, and there is the possibility of establishing one's own furniture or cabinet-making workshop adjoining one's own home.

Journalism can certainly be attempted in India by joining a correspondence school for either free lance work or short stories. This work requires no capital, can be done by the family fireside, and if the writer can develop the knack of twisting his experience to bear on subjects of topical interest at home, his rewards will be both quick and big. If he fails, he will only have lost a few pounds in fees and these would be covered by even one or two acceptances.

Honey is always needed and bees can certainly be kept and studied in many parts of India, especially if one's wife, anyway, is likely to stay in the one place. This is well worth investigation, especially during wartime when the supplement to the ration for one's family will be invaluable. It could be combined too with any of the other careers suggested.

Market gardening on a large or small scale has the same benefit. The price of vegetables is beyond belief. Why not sack the *mali* in India or use him for flowers only and start vegetable

growing with one's own and one's wife's hands, particularly aiming at growing vegetables a little earlier and a little later than the normal "season."

Gundogs and well-bred house dogs are bound to be in demand in the days of peace to come. The breeding of house dogs and the breeding and training of gundogs can, and often has been successfully carried out in India as a pleasant and lucrative hobby.

Another step, which can be taken in India, which does not directly lead to a job but which will save considerable expenditure and discomfort in England is to become really competent in carrying out household repairs. There should be no difficulty in India in learning to cope with all repairs to electric light fittings, with soldering really efficiently, with small carpentry tasks and even plumbing. We have the example of the Prime Minister who took up brick-laying and who is doubtless able to build, say, a garage for himself. To-day it is impossible to get labour and the writer has been waiting three months to get a small plumbing job carried out. When he does get a plumber the bill will be very high. Following the argument previously adduced, every pound saved thus is equal to two pounds earned.

The keeping of poultry and eggs can easily be put into practice in India. Hens, ducks, turkeys, guinea fowl and, above all, eggs are worth their weight in gold in a land where one egg a fortnight is all one gets even in the country these days. Provided one has sufficient experience and seeks sound advice in England there appears to be no reason why this should not provide a very welcome addition to a pension. Admittedly, the procuring of chicken-feed is a serious problem in England to-day. All the more reason for studying *kachcha* Indian devices of coping with such problems.

In conclusion, it is emphasised that the careers suggested are by no means exhaustive nor, of course, will they suit all tastes; but it is stressed that if one's hobbies and inclinations are studied there are many careers for which wartime preparation is possible and which will not be subject to a deduction of half of every pound earned.

A VISIT TO NEPAL

BY LT.-COLONEL R. B. PHAYRE, M.C.

The Gurkha soldier has always occupied a warm corner in the hearts of the British Commonwealth, but few know anything of his home life. The uninformed imagine that Nepal is an Indian State, whereas it is actually a foreign country similar, in some respects, to Afghanistan, for each country controls a long frontier adjoining British India. That of Nepal is some 450 miles in length, is situated on the North East Frontier of India, and its 150 miles of breadth is bounded on the north by Tibet

It possesses a king of its own, but one who takes no active part in the government of the country, the ruling power being the Prime Minister, the Supreme Commander in Chief, H. H. Maharaja Sir Joodha Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

Students of military history will recall the numerous campaigns in which the Gurkha has fought for the British Empire ever since the conclusion of the Nepalese War, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. During that war the Gurkha not only proved himself to be a redoubtable enemy, causing us severe losses, but he also exhibited a spirit of chivalry and trust which was, at that time, almost unknown in Eastern conflicts. Records show that, to the astonishment of the troops, a badly wounded Gurkha would stagger from a besieged fort into the British lines in order to have a wound dressed; when this was attended to, back he went to his post to continue his stubborn defence against us.

Nepal has always guarded its inaccessibility to the foreigner, so it is only with the greatest difficulty that a Muslim or European can enter the country. In the case of the British such entry is only made possible by the joint invitation of H. H. The Maharaja and H. B. M.'s Minister at the court of Nepal. Landon, in his fascinating book 'Nepal', describes a conversation on this subject with a former Maharaja, the late Sir Chandra Shamsher Jung. When asked why he insisted on such complete seclusion, H. H. replied:

"My friend, the English have at times difficulty in the Government of India. These difficulties arise from the fact that, in the days of easy travel, all English sahibs are not *sahibs*. Now

I am convinced that the prosperity of Nepal is bound up with the maintenance of the British predominance in India, and I am determined that the sahib, who is no sahib, shall never enter Nepal and weaken my peoples' belief that every Englishman is a gentleman."

Our friend and ally made a really great contribution to the war of 1914-18 in both men and money. When facts and figures can be disclosed, statistics will show that Nepals' War effort in the present World War is out of all proportion to the size of the country, and, is a truly magnificent one. Some two years back H. H. The Maharaja was awarded the G.C.B., and it is pleasing to note that his Ambassador at the Court of St. James has recently had the honour of Knighthood conferred on him by His Majesty King George VI.

Any traveller hoping to reach the fringes of Nepal by car would find it a very difficult business, owing to very bad roads, broken bridges, ferries, etc. Enquiries as to access by rail met with very guarded responses as the railway departments concerned were none too certain of their ground. The best route proved to be *via* Lucknow, thence on to the metre-gauge changing at Segauli for Raxaul.

At Raxaul, guests of the Minister are put up at the Legation bungalow. This is on the fringes of the Terai where breeds a particularly virulent form of mosquito responsible for the deadly "awal" fever which has caused more deaths to foreigners than any defending army. This fever forms a kind of Maginot line to Nepal between March and October. Only one tribe, the Tharus, are said to be immune.

Although there is a plentiful water supply in Nepal, there is supposed to be mica in suspension, consequently drinking water for the Legation is sent up to Katmandu from Raxaul in small metal tanks.

A Nepalese railway runs from Raxaul to Amlekganj with very primitive rolling stock and no workable fans. The distance is only 24 miles, mainly through sal and teak forests, but it takes four hours, a big slice of which is taken up at the first station for a prolonged inspection of passports.

Amlekganj is the terminus, the next stage of the journey being a trip of some thirty miles in modern Chevrolet lorries. A petrol pump at the start-off is a rather unexpected sight. There is a track which can be negotiated by motors between Raxaul and Amlekganj but no road has yet been made. The road from Amlekganj to Bhimphedi is metalled and graded up

the hillside. It is very much bridged, the planks in the fairway being laid rather loosely they rattle vigorously as the lorry leaps on these bridges and passes over them, there is also one tunnel of some 260 yards.

At Bhimphedi, the road ends abruptly and further progress has to be made on a pony, in a dandy, or on foot. A method of transport, peculiar to the Gurkha, is the kiltā; old men, old women and children and even young men, who should know better, can be seen with their legs dangling from the conical baskets fastened on to the back of a sturdy-limbed Gurkha who transports them up the khadside, it is attached by a brow-band which passes over his forehead.

Three and a half miles of a really stiff climb brings the traveller up to Sisagarhi where there is a fort and a garrison. There is a Rest House here for invited guests, with bedding and electric light. There is a fine view looking down over the plains. The scrub jungle has given way, first to pines, then to ilex and rhododendrons. A few deodars are scattered about and there are many orchids hanging in clusters from the forks of the trees.

An early start is advisable on the morrow for there is a long march ahead to reach the capital before nightfall, and the track is precipitous in places, very stony and hard on the feet.

A short pull up to the Chisapani Pass discloses a view of eternal snows with the Everest group some fifty miles away in the distance, some thousands of feet below twinkles the Marku River, and a yellow thread shows the onward track winding through the valley.

The Gurkha seems to be a veritable beast of burden for there are plenty of them on the road—men, women and children—humping impossible loads of wood, charcoal, timber, corrugated iron sheets and even motor cars. Two of the latter were passed on the journey slung in wooden frames and carried by 150 men, a larger one was said to have 800 carriers working in relays. Overhead runs a ropeway, halving the distance by taking a direct line. A family party is met, the women-folk carrying the loads with their lords and masters walking, unladen, behind.

The track winds through the valley crossing and re-crossing the river; at intervals there are suspension bridges. Fields are being prepared for the rice crop, but it is the women who are working in them, although the ploughing seems to be confined to men. Fish traps are set in the river but the catches are small and the fish merely tiddlers.

The villages are picturesque, many of the houses being richly carved. As the journey proceeds the type of house greatly improves, many being built of stone and mud, they are mostly two storied but some have three, the prevailing colour being terra cotta.

The villagers are friendly and are always ready to have a chat, even the women. The ice is very speedily broken especially if the language is known. The Gurkhas are devoted to their children and great interest is shown if the camera is produced and aimed at the little ones. The mother will, probably, ask you to wait while she goes into the house to fetch another naked mite, looking for all the world like a Japanese doll.

Some of the smaller children are lying on their little tummies in the sun, their bodies being covered with oil; this is supposed to be a remedy against various illnesses, particularly chills.

The track winds on until a vertical scar is seen in the midst of the trees on a high hill, looking very like a large fire belt. Actually it is the zig-zag track ascending at an impossible angle to the Chandragiri Pass. From the top of the Pass another superb view can be seen, not only of the wonderful expanse of snows but also of the Valley of Nepal. This is somewhat similar to the Valley of Kashmir but is only some twenty miles long by fifteen broad. Like Kashmir it was said to be once a lake, but Manjusri cleft the hills with his sword so allowing the pent-up waters to escape.

Descending some thousands of feet, at the end of a long march of about sixteen miles, is very hard on the feet especially as the surface in many places is jagged and rough. A prayer of thanksgiving goes up from the traveller that he was not born to be a cooly humping a car over such a road. A sigh of relief also when, far away in the distance, two cars can be picked out with the glasses in the hamlet of Thankot.

The next nine miles is luxury travel over a moderate road through densely populated villages and towns. The men are wearing cross-over coats with a thick white girdle into which a kukri is thrust, their nether limbs usually being clad in white jodhpurs but sometimes a kilt is worn. The women are attractive and gaily dressed in homespun of many colours.

As Katmandu is reached, a tall white pillar dominates the city. The carving on the doors and windows becomes richer

and more intricate. There is a large *maidan* on which some three thousand troops are drilling. To one side are their barracks, further along are white modern buildings such as the hospital and the palaces of the ruling families. There are several very fine equestrian statues of former Maharajas. After the mountainous trek when the *ultima thule* seems to have been reached it is surprising to see a modern roundabout with khaki-clad police on traffic control duty. In a side street can be seen two red, motor fire-engines ready to move off in an emergency, a very necessary precaution for the old timber of the houses will burn like matchwood.

It is almost unbelievable, as the car turns into the Legation drive, to see an English country house in a setting of green lawns and garden with tennis courts, and a squash court to one side. In former days it was known as the Residency but its status has been raised.

The inhabitants of the Valley are mainly Newars, Thakurs and Chettries. Other races usually enlisted in regular Gurkha units (Magars, Gurungs, Limbus and Rais) have their homes in the distant hills into which very few white men have ever been permitted to penetrate. No British Recruiting Officer is allowed into the country, recruitment has to be carried out by the Gurkha soldiers.

The Newars of the Valley are highly skilled artificers, famed for centuries as experts in metal work and wood carving. Many were employed by Tibet and even China. The eaves, doorways and windows of nearly every one of the old houses are richly carved, mostly in deodar wood black with age. It is doubtful whether any other country can compete with such a wealth of magnificent ornamentation. Many of the buildings, on most of the temples, are pagoda-shaped, suggesting a Chinese influence, but some of the great authorities deny this stating that the type of building originated in Nepal.

There is a superb door of metal work (gilded) at Bhatgaon and another at Patan, said by some experts to be unsurpassed in Asia. These two ancient cities are some nine miles away from Katmandu and date from the time when there were three rival capitals in Nepal.

Time is required in which to absorb these gems of architecture; they cluster together so closely in the Durbar squares that it causes the visitor sheer, mental bewilderment. Buddhist, Jain

and Hindu buildings are massed together; closeby is a group of Malla figures also Nepalese lions and dragons.

Irreparable damage was done by the severe earthquake some six years ago when several of the palaces and temples were destroyed and carved symbols crashed from their high pillars. The work of restoration is still proceeding.

The foreigner is an object of interest; a crowd quickly collects and stares, goggle-eyed, at the strange individual armed with a camera. Every visitor is accompanied by a Mukia, an under-official who denotes his rank by silver-threads and a coat-of-arms on his headgear, the Subadar's badge being of gold. The Mukia's job is to see that the sight-seer does not stray into holy places.

The inhabitants seem to like being photographed; a broad grin spreads over their wide Mongolian features, and the girls laugh heartily when the Mukia suggests that the Sahib would like to take their pictures. They do not expect *bakhsheesh*, but a few copper coins are useful for the children. Hundreds of these Nepalese pice can be obtained for a rupee,—incidentally the British rupee is still known as "Kompani" (from the days of Hon. East India Company.)

The towns and cities are densely populated, crowds attending the markets in the squares. In the side streets the women are weaving cloth and numbers are seen washing their hair at the standpipes. The town streets are mostly paved with stone or brick tiles and open drains run through them exuding a none too pleasant aroma. Everybody seems to be carrying a load of sorts, *kiltas* are laden up with merchandise and coolies progress at a jog-trot with heavy, conical, grain bags suspended from a pole balanced across the shoulder.

Troops are in evidence everywhere, their kit is very similar to that of the regular Gurkha units. They were formerly mostly armed with Martinis, but the bodyguard used to parade with Lee Enfields. This *corps d'elite* is a fine body of men, many of them six feet in height which seems astonishing in a Gurkha. There are daily parades on the *maidan* at Katmandu where every company appears to carry a small standard.

The durbar square at Katmandu is of great interest, filled as it is with historical buildings. Perhaps the most interesting is the original building from which the capital took its name (*Kath* wood, *Mandu* temple or house) which is reputed to have been constructed from a single-tree; it is now used as a shop. Here again many beautiful edifices are far too close together, and

the ancient grandeur is greatly marred by the uncouth standards and heavy cable of the electric light and telephones.

There are Buddhist relics everywhere. One of the most interesting is at Buddhnath where there is a fine temple. The Chini Lama is in charge. An interesting man, clad in a green silk coat and head-dress, he is most courteous and is always glad to show visitors round; he speaks English excellently and is a fund of knowledge. Most of these temples are attributed to the visit of Asoka who came to Nepal in 225 B.C. Of course a great deal of Nepal is unexplored by antiquarians and so much of interest may well remain hidden. In 1895 Doctor Fuhrer discovered an Asoka pillar on which was written "The Buddha Sakyamuni was born here."

A prominent landmark to the west of Katmandu is a high hill on which rests the giant stupa of Swayambhunath. Six hundred steps, graded and flanked at intervals by figures, give access to the summit as they ascend the wooded slopes of the hill. Throughout Nepal the Hindu and Buddhist religions are curiously intermingled.

Pashpati is the Benares of Nepal. Through its *ghats* and terraces of temples flows the sacred River Bagmati. Upstream are *ghats* reserved for the royal family, below the bridges are many other *ghats* for the more humble folk. Here the dying are laid on the sloping banks so that their feet may touch the holy stream, the ideal passing of the devout. Maidens place votive offerings at the innumerable shrines from which monkeys take their fill.

Nilkantha is worth visiting for here is a large, recumbent figure of Vishnu Narayan lying on a bed of cobras and awash in the water, sometimes entirely submerged. It is a very holy place and much visited by pilgrims. The King of Nepal is not allowed to visit this spot as he is supposed to be a reincarnation of Vishnu, consequently the results might be disastrous if not fatal. A replica has been built at Balaji where the king may make his devotions. It is a peaceful spot amidst tall trees and gigantic bamboos, flanked by large tanks in which huge carp break the surface of the waters when grain is cast in by the priests. Below the tanks is a picturesque wall of stone with a line of cobra heads through which the water flows.

In Katmandu, scattered about, are several white palaces of fine proportions and good design. That of the King is surrounded by a high wall with a smart guard at its gates. The Maharajah's residence is known as the Singha Durbar, it is approached

and Hindu buildings are massed together; closeby is a group of Malla figures also Nepalese lions and dragons.

Irreparable damage was done by the severe earthquake some six years ago when several of the palaces and temples were destroyed and carved symbols crashed from their high pillars. The work of restoration is still proceeding.

The foreigner is an object of interest; a crowd quickly collects and stares, goggle-eyed, at the strange individual armed with a camera. Every visitor is accompanied by a Mukia, an under-official who denotes his rank by silver-threads and a coat-of-arms on his headgear, the Subadar's badge being of gold. The Mukia's job is to see that the sight-seer does not stray into holy places.

The inhabitants seem to like being photographed; a broad grin spreads over their wide Mongolian features, and the girls laugh heartily when the Mukia suggests that the Sahib would like to take their pictures. They do not expect *bakhsheesh*, but a few copper coins are useful for the children. Hundreds of these Nepalese pice can be obtained for a rupee,—incidentally the British rupee is still known as "Kompani" (from the days of Hon. East India Company.)

The towns and cities are densely populated, crowds attending the markets in the squares. In the side streets the women are weaving cloth and numbers are seen washing their hair at the standpipes. The town streets are mostly paved with stone or brick tiles and open drains run through them exuding a none too pleasant aroma. Everybody seems to be carrying a load of sorts, *kiltas* are laden up with merchandise and coolies progress at a jog-trot with heavy, conical, grain bags suspended from a pole balanced across the shoulder.

Troops are in evidence everywhere, their kit is very similar to that of the regular Gurkha units. They were formerly mostly armed with Martinis, but the bodyguard used to parade with Lee Enfields. This *corps d'elite* is a fine body of men, many of them six feet in height which seems astonishing in a Gurkha. There are daily parades on the *maidan* at Katmandu where every company appears to carry a small standard.

The durbar square at Katmandu is of great interest, filled as it is with historical buildings. Perhaps the most interesting is the original building from which the capital took its name (*Kath* wood, *Mandu* temple or house) which is reputed to have been constructed from a single-tree; it is now used as a shop. Here again many beautiful edifices are far too close together, and

the ancient grandeur is greatly marred by the uncouth standards and heavy cable of the electric light and telephones.

There are Buddhist relics everywhere. One of the most interesting is at Buddhnath where there is a fine temple. The Chini Lama is in charge. An interesting man, clad in a green silk coat and head-dress, he is most courteous and is always glad to show visitors round; he speaks English excellently and is a fund of knowledge. Most of these temples are attributed to the visit of Asoka who came to Nepal in 225 B.C. Of course a great deal of Nepal is unexplored by antiquarians and so much of interest may well remain hidden. In 1895 Doctor Fuhrer discovered an Asoka pillar on which was written "The Buddha Sakyamuni was born here."

A prominent landmark to the west of Katmandu is a high hill on which rests the giant stupa of Swayambhunath. Six hundred steps, graded and flanked at intervals by figures, give access to the summit as they ascend the wooded slopes of the hill. Throughout Nepal the Hindu and Buddhist religions are curiously intermingled.

Pashpati is the Benares of Nepal. Through its *ghats* and terraces of temples flows the sacred River Bagmati. Upstream are *ghats* reserved for the royal family, below the bridges are many other *ghats* for the more humble folk. Here the dying are laid on the sloping banks so that their feet may touch the holy stream, the ideal passing of the devout. Maidens place votive offerings at the innumerable shrines from which monkeys take their fill.

Nilkantha is worth visiting for here is a large, recumbent figure of Vishnu Narayan lying on a bed of cobras and awash in the water, sometimes entirely submerged. It is a very holy place and much visited by pilgrims. The King of Nepal is not allowed to visit this spot as he is supposed to be a reincarnation of Vishnu, consequently the results might be disastrous if not fatal. A replica has been built at Balaji where the king may make his devotions. It is a peaceful spot amidst tall trees and gigantic bamboos, flanked by large tanks in which huge carp break the surface of the waters when grain is cast in by the priests. Below the tanks is a picturesque wall of stone with a line of cobra heads through which the water flows.

In Katmandu, scattered about, are several white palaces of fine proportions and good design. That of the King is surrounded by a high wall with a smart guard at its gates. The Maharajah's residence is known as the Singha Durbar, it is approached


through a massive French gateway with iron gates and a huge garden gay with flowers. The square entrance hall is filled with trophies of the chase and pictures of incomparable sport of the Terai. The private reception rooms are upstairs, the walls being lined with mirrors. For official occasions, the distinctive head-dress of the Maharajah and the commanding-generals is very remarkable with its bird of paradise plume and encrustations of jewels. That of His Highness is said to be valued at £1,000,000 and those of the generals at £10,000 each. They caused a great sensation when worn in England and France on the occasion of the visit of Maharajah Sir Chandra Shamshere Jung in 1908. The succession does not pass from father to son, but from brother to brother. When the last brother dies, the son of any brother (not necessarily the eldest), who happens to be born first, becomes Maharajah.

Sport in the Terai is perhaps the finest in the world and prodigious bags of tiger and rhino are accounted for. Game is marked down and surrounded by a wide ring of elephants; they gradually close in towards the centre of the circle until they are touching, flank to flank. The sportsman to take the shot is nominated and moves inside the circle of elephants until he sights his prey, be it rhino or tiger; then another gun is nominated and so on. A glance at the game book at the Rest House at Raxaul shows an incredible number of animals bagged in a single day.

The average height of the Valley is 4,500 feet, although some snow peaks can be seen the surrounding ring of high, wooded hills prevent a glimpse of Everest. To see it a stiff climb is necessary up the steep mountain tracks, even so the weather conditions must be favourable. Once seen, this magnificent panorama remains in the memory for ever.

It is hard to take farewell of this beautiful, "forbidden" land. Returning homeward towards the heat of the plains, the track seems longer and more tiring. Patient little Gurkhas are toiling up the passes, halting to rest in the shady corners, supporting their heavy loads on forked sticks.

All good times come to an end, but such memories are imperishable.



THE INDIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN RELATION TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEFENCE FORCES

By "GUNNER"

Modern war involves the use of complicated weapons, vehicles and scientific instruments needing a high standard of education, general intelligence, alertness, power of leadership and physical fitness. The high speed mechanical movements of to-day demand quick thinking and quick decision. Not only must officers have had a good general education, but to a lesser degree the rank and file must have sufficient elementary education to enable them to understand and carry out their duties efficiently.

The Defence Forces provide elementary education after enlistment for those of the rank and file who need it. As regards those who aspire to enter the services as Emergency Commissioned Officers, a standard of general education which is high enough to enable them to absorb rapidly the short intensive course of military training given at an Officers' Training School, is an absolutely essential qualification for selection as an Officer Cadet.

The War is now at the frontiers of India, and India is threatened with invasion. The fall of Singapore gives the Japanese naval superiority in the Bay of Bengal and in the Indian Ocean for an indeterminate period. Thus the long coastline of India is threatened, apart from the increasing pressure on Burma by the large Japanese land and air forces already massing on that front. The need for more rapid expansion of the Indian Defence Forces is obvious, and this entails the provision of a large number of officers.

The fullest co-operation of all classes and communities is essential in the task of providing potential officers for the rapidly expanding fighting forces. We need the best and most capable young men, both mentally and physically, that India can supply—and we need them quickly.

Hitherto, many people in India have regarded the war as something vague and distant. Many are in no sense "war-minded", the war being something in which their active participation is not considered by them to be essential, and regarding which they need only be interested spectators.

The entry of Japan into the war and the invasion of Burma have made many change their views, but even this serious threat to the security of India has not caused the best material in Universities and Schools to come forward and offer their services. The majority of "star" students still prefer to try for good posts in the Government Civil Services or in business. Though a large number of candidates offer themselves for Emergency Commissions, some being of excellent quality, the standard of education of many is so low that it is not possible for them to be turned into efficient officers in the short condensed course of training given at an Officers' Cadet School. Yet these men of ages from 19 to 35, have nearly all graduated at a University. Whereas a degree obtained at a University in England ensures the possessor to have sound general knowledge apart from the specialized knowledge of certain subjects taken up by him for his degree, this is not the case in India. It is found that elementary general knowledge, powers of observation, inquisitiveness and alertness are sadly lacking in the cases of many University graduates.

A number of University students appear to have passed examinations by learning paragraphs in text books by heart with little understanding. It is a regrettable fact that a B.A. or even a M.A. Degree taken at an Indian University is no hall-mark of having received a sound general education.

The Simon Commission in 1930 urged the need for education reform in no unmeasured terms. To quote from its report:

"The standards of admission to some Universities are deplorably low. Many of the students are unable to follow the lectures owing to their defective knowledge of English which is used as the medium of instruction. There are no signs of any consistent or sustained resolve to grapple with the coils arising from the large admission of unfit students. The Universities are overcrowded with men who are not profiting either intellectually or materially by their University Training"; and again "The necessity of University reform can hardly be put too high. Its difficulty in the face of vested interests and fixed tradition is very great".

It is regrettable to think that these words written in 1930, apply equally to 1942.

Now that India is fighting a war for existence, every effort should be made by educational authorities to produce the type required to take its place in the Army, Navy, or Air Force. As time is all important, priority should be given in all colleges and

schools to the production of the type required. Red tape should be cut out. Vested interests should be ignored. We need potential officers and ask Universities and Schools to give us of their best.

The conservatism of school masters and professors as a class is notorious in all countries. The teaching of the same subject to relays of students year after year causes the mind to move along a well-defined rut, out of which the teacher feels disinclined to extricate himself, and narrows his vision. Any radical change in the system of instruction, alterations in the curriculum, or a freer hand given to examiners in setting papers, would undoubtedly be unpopular to some members of the teaching staff, who would have to revise their methods and cover a larger field, even though this would benefit both themselves and their students.

It should not be possible to become a University graduate by learning paragraphs from text books by heart with little understanding. Examiners should be given a freer hand, enabling them to evaluate the powers of reasoning, deduction, and initiative of the candidate as well as his actual knowledge of bare facts. Professors and teachers unable to adapt themselves to reforms should be replaced.

So much for generalities.

Whilst the war lasts, we want our educational institutions to produce a satisfactory embryo officer. This, at the present time, is their most important task.

The qualifications looked for in a potential officer who is shortly to lead men in battle have been widely broadcast, and are qualities that are valuable in any walk of life. They may be summed up as follows, assuming that the candidate is within the age limit and up to the physical standard laid down:

(a) A good general education of a high standard. This includes good general knowledge, acquaintance with current world topics and the part played by the Army, especially the Indian Army, in the War, and fluency in English.

(b) Intelligence, quick thinking, and commonsense.

(c) Personality, so as to command the respect and obedience of Indian soldiers, and a capacity to assume responsibility.

(d) Resourcefulness.

(e) Initiative, and adaptability to circumstances.

(f) Power of drive without being aggressive.

(g) Tactful behaviour to superiors, subordinates and others.

It is of the greatest importance that educational authorities should do their best to produce as many students as possible with these characteristics. There is plenty of good material in the country. It needs guidance and development.

To make a few suggestions:

(a) Raise the Matriculation standard. This will cut out those who can never hope to benefit by University training, and who will be of far greater value to their country doing manual work. These "unfits" act as a drag on the student of average ability and hamper instruction, thus lowering the standard of the whole.

(b) Daily Physical Training to be compulsory for all students under properly qualified instructors.

(c) Enrolment in the U. T. C. to be compulsory for all potential candidates for Emergency Commissions. Attendance at camps and on parades to be compulsory for these candidates.

(d) A compulsory general knowledge paper to be included in all standard examinations.

(e) A weekly compulsory lecture to all students on the progress of the war and particularly the part being played by the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force.

(f) Special classes for those students who have entry into one of the Defence Forces in view. Any Government grant allotted to the educational institution should be given with the proviso that an adequate definite proportion is spent on development of qualities required by the Defence Forces.

(g) Personal encouragement and advice by the heads and staffs of educational institutions to be given to students having the necessary qualifications to urge them to join the Defence Forces in preference to any other career at the present time.

(h) Encouragement to be given to those unfit for the Defence Forces, physically or for other reasons, to join local Civil Defence Organizations, Civic Guards, A. R. P., etc.—the aim being to instil in the mind of every young man the need for him to play an active part in helping to win the war.

There is much to be done, which must be done quickly. Those who control educational establishments can do a great deal in this great country, which alone amongst the British Commonwealth of Nations, has not had conscription applied to it.

JUNGLE INTERLUDE

BY OFFICER CADET F. C. O'HARA

Mac and I stood in the half-light of an April dawn and watched a fine herd of bison make their way leisurely into the jungle in front of us. This was our last camp on the open grass hills and as soon as the porters could be got under way, we were to follow the bison into the heavy rain-jungle which stretched below us farther than we could see.

Our party consisted of ourselves, half a dozen wiry, hooked-nosed hillmen and thirty-odd cooly porters. The hillmen who were our guides, sat together contemptuously, apart from the porters who were busy tying up the headloads into which our camp equipment had been divided. The head guide, whom I shall call 'K' for short, was my own shikari and, as well as being thoroughly trustworthy in a tight corner, was necessary for liaison between ourselves and the other members of his clan who came from the farther jungles and who had probably seen few white men.

We were out on the job of inspecting a remote district boundary and up till then it had been a pleasant, easy trek from one boundary cairn to the next, over rolling grasslands at about the 7,000 feet level. But this was over and for the next three days we knew we could expect difficult jungle country and the things which are seldom absent from those jungles—elephants, leeches and perhaps a tiger or two.

Before the sun rose we were under way and had soon entered the 10-foot wide ride in the jungle which connected the successive survey stones and so marked the boundary which we were inspecting. A community of hillmen, representatives of which were with us, had been paid a goodly sum to clear this path, and it was to see that they had done an honest job that this trip had been undertaken.

We had been going for several hours and were congratulating ourselves on the unexpectedly easy nature of the trail when we met our first obstacle. The path led out of the overhanging trees onto a large outcrop of rock, giving us a wonderful view over miles of evergreen jungle stretching out below us. But it was too early in the day to stop to admire views. "Where", I

asked, "does the boundary go now?" One of the guides motioned me forward and, leaning cautiously over the edge of the rock, I could see the track begin again several hundreds of feet below.

"And how does one get there?" Over the edge, I was told. When I asked whether there was no way round, my question only produced smiles at first—why should anyone want a way round when there was a perfectly good cliff to climb down? But then white men were unaccountable beings! No, no one knew of any way round.

The only thing to be done was to drop down the hillside off the path and to try to work round to the foot of the cliff. The descent was easy: the jungle trees were tall here and little grew beneath them to hinder our progress, though the slope was in places too steep for one to walk upright.

When we judged that we had dropped about 300 feet and should be opposite the bottom of the cliff, we turned at right angles and very soon our troubles started. Some giant landslide years before had carried away the tall jungle, and the secondary growth which had taken its place was a mass of bamboo and thorns. Through this we had to track our way and soon it became obvious that we were badly held up. From our map we knew that we were at least eight miles from the nearest accessible water, a stream at which we had planned to camp. Our guides, not dreaming that an almost perpendicular cliff could be counted as an obstacle, had not warned us of it, and consequently we were carrying little water: not nearly enough to go round.

At about 4 o'clock, after hours of cutting our way through dense thickets and at times lowering men and loads from rock to rock, we reached the track again and, looking up at the top of the cliff, we realized that we had progressed perhaps 20 yards on our way since we had that morning looked down from the top.

The guides were for pushing on to water, but the porters were in no shape for further travel and we decided to camp where we were. All hands were put to gathering dry wood, two large heaps were made in the path and camp was pitched between them. These heaps would be fired at sundown and would, we hoped, be sufficient to keep away any unwelcome visitors. We had seen few fresh signs of elephants and would, with luck, be undisturbed.

It was a cheerless camp. By an unfortunate mistake no cooked rice was being carried for the porters that day, and without water none could be prepared. Soon after sunset the hum

of talk ceased and the porters settled down to sleep, huddled in a group near one of the fires. Our blankets were spread near the other fire and in between were our guides. I noticed that they were a little closer to us than to our porters: I had often been told that they considered the smell of a white man to be offensive, but apparently it was preferable to that of a cooly.

I arranged to take the first two hours' watch and, telling K to keep awake, I settled down to wait with a ball-loaded shotgun across my knees. This may sound an unsuitable weapon for big game, but its stopping power at close quarters is considerable and it is very useful in a tight corner.

During my first spell all was quiet, but when I had taken over the watch again I soon realized that we had a visitor: a snapped twig, a rustle in the dry leaves, first this side, then that. A sign brought K to my side "Tiger—he has been here for ten minutes."

This may not sound very exciting, but if you can picture yourself with your back to one dwindling fire, your face to another fifteen yards away, on either side of you a black wall of jungle and a tiger—possibly ten feet away from you—I certainly wished I was somewhere else. Fortunately, man-eaters are rare in those jungles and after a while his curiosity seemed to be satisfied and when I woke Mac for his spell, I reported "all clear" and did not mention our visitor. Mac was not used to the jungle and I did not want any unnecessary fireworks.

By noon next day, we had reached water and after a hurried meal for the porters we pushed on towards our next camping place, a Forest Shed which I had visited before and which promised a secure night's rest as it was built high up on 'stilts' and was protected by a deep trench. It was, however, a good distance ahead and as the intervening country was, I knew, much favoured by elephants, it was desirable that we should reach the shed as early as possible.

We soon realized that we were going to be late. Some of the porters were tiring and I had to take my place at the end of the line to threaten with awful death by wild beast anyone who showed signs of falling by the wayside. We had to pass through the edge of an abandoned rubber estate, a favourite playground of elephants, and it looked as if we would get there just about the worst time of day—five o'clock in the evening.

In these jungles the elephant does not usually move about in the heat of the day. He chooses some cool shady spot and spends

the hot hours there, often fanning himself sleepily with a small branch broken from a tree. When the sun begins to sink he comes out for his evening drink and feed, and it is at that time that he is most likely to be met with as he makes his way to the nearest water.

We were making fair progress when I noticed that K was taking an interest in the track behind us. "What is it?" I asked. "There's a tusker following us." I was beginning to wish I had taken the head of the procession, instead of the rear, when the line stopped and a message came back that Mac wanted me.

I hurried up to the front and saw a sight which I shall always remember. The track had reached the wide ford of a river, and strung out across it was a herd of about a dozen elephants, ranging from a fine old bull down to a pair of little fellows, who looked about four feet high and were trying to push each other over in the water. They were all drinking and blowing water over themselves and each other and were obviously enjoying themselves thoroughly. A sight one would have loved to watch under other circumstances, but there was no time to lose—I did not like the thought of that tusker in our rear.

The long-suffering porters were hustled down into the river bed, a little upstream of the ford, and herded in the lee of a large boulder, while I went off with the guides to try to drive away the elephants which were holding us up. Fortunately, the wind was just right and we made our way carefully towards the herd to a position from which, K judged, we could drive them on to the bank which we had left and so leave free the ford which we had to cross.

Now, if a cooly wants to scare off an elephant he shouts at the top of his voice and beats a tin-can or anything else he can lay his hands on and as often as not brings an irate tusker to find out what all the noise is about. The hillman's method is very different. He emits a single high-pitched call and the elephant will usually move off obediently.

This was what happened in this case and it was with considerable relief that I saw the whole herd plunge out of the water with many squeals and trumpeting and disappear into the jungle in the direction from which we had come.

We hurried the porters on over the last few miles and though we saw several elephants, we were now in more open country which had once been a rubber estate and we were able to avoid them.

As we were nearing the Forest Shed in the dusk I realized how quickly uncurbed jungle will obliterate the traces of human occupation. The road I remembered from my previous visit three years before had almost disappeared. The bamboo had closed over it leaving only a narrow path and as we followed this we came out on to a large girder bridge, high above the river. Three years before it had carried lorries: now the nearest road, which would carry even a bullock-cart, was forty miles away.

A few minutes brought us to the shed. Here the bamboo had not yet taken complete control and the shed still stood, though the trench was almost filled in in places and elephants were evidently frequent visitors. However, it was at least a roof and we slept well and undisturbed.

This river marked the turning point of our route and also the lowest point of the boundary. Till then it had mostly been downhill: the last part would be mostly up.

Next morning it was plain that our porters were quite unfit to start the climb, so we decided to rest there for a day. This day was unremarkable except for a short encounter Mac and I had with a tusk. We were walking along a path near camp early in the afternoon, not thinking of elephants and talking, probably, of our next, or our last, home leave, when we met him at close quarters round a corner. We had scared him, so he gave chase and, remembering the fabled speed of an elephant over short distances, we covered the next few hundred yards in remarkably good time. Fortunately, he was only demonstrating and did not follow us far, but later gave us a good example of how quietly one of these beasts can move. We saw him leave the path 25 yards away from us and after a time went along to investigate. The track he had made down the hillside through the heavy undergrowth was plainly visible, but no sound had reached us as we stood a short distance away.

Next day at dawn, we were on the move again. The boundary from this point went in a wide arc, and our guides volunteered the information that they knew of a short cut through low ground to the next night's camping place, which would save the porters many miles. We eagerly accepted this suggestion and leaving Mac to cope with the 'baggage train', I set off alone with the guides.

My recollection of this day is one of unrelieved toil and monotony, and many times I cursed the necessity for such boundaries to be cut on the watershed. We were now in very dry,

bamboo-covered foothills. The path was a dark tunnel in the tall bamboo and every hill we met that day we climbed straight to the top and down the other side. The heat was intense. Incidentally the main characteristic of a watershed in this part of the world seems to be that there is no water within miles of it.

I can remember only one incident during that day's march. We were moving along the trail when without warning pandemonium broke loose around us and heavy animals could be heard crashing away through the undergrowth. When I had recovered from my first surprise, K was still beside me with my heavy rifle, but the rest of my escort—and arms—were high in the surrounding trees. We had surprised a herd of bison, but they had broken away from the track and we did not see any of them.

The good camping ground with water, which I had been promised, hardly came up to my expectations. The site was a large flat rock closely surrounded by thick jungle and the water only appeared after some scraping with knives among the jungle refuse in a nearby hollow. However, it is remarkable how a handful of strong tea can disguise both the taste and the colour of water.

We spent a quiet night and next morning prepared for the final stage. This was to be a short one but very steep in parts, and from the map it looked as if we had to climb about two thousand feet.

The going had been easier than the previous day's march—we were now much higher and the air was considerably cooler—when K suggested a rest for the porters as we were nearing a stiff climb. While we were sitting in the shade, I heard the loud report of bamboo broken by elephants and soon K appeared and explained that they were feeding in a hollow, just off the steep bit we were approaching, and that there was no way out of this hollow except on to our boundary track.

This was awkward; if the elephants heard us while some of the party were still below their feeding ground they would probably make off all down our narrow track with unpleasant results.

Our guides thought it unwise to try to get the porters past the danger point, but our luck had been in so far and we decided to trust it to see us through.

Before we started, we explained the position briefly to the coolies and told them exactly what was likely to happen to them if they made a sound. In a few minutes we reached the foot of

the climb we had been promised and we saw at once that it would be a stiff one, too steep to walk upright in many places. A few hundred yards from the foot we reached the point opposite which the animals were feeding and their track could be plainly seen leading off to the left.

Here, as leader of the party, I took my stand, whispering threats to each porter as he slipped and stumbled past me, and it was with feelings of relief and admiration that I saw the last one safely and silently past me. These men had spent five days in difficult and unfamiliar jungle, and yet they carried their 60-lb. headloads without a sound up a slope which had seemed difficult enough to me with two free hands to help me. The guides wanted us to fire a shot into the bamboo to watch the elephants bolt below us, but we thought this would be tempting providence too far and we left them in peace.

The final few miles were comparatively easy and uneventful and by early afternoon we were out of the jungle and back in the tea district from which we had started.

It had been a successful trip and we had several things to be thankful for: there had been no rain to bring the leeches out, the elephants had behaved like perfect gentlemen and we had had no casualties among the porters in spite of the difficult conditions we had met. I realized our luck fully when I reached home and found a warning from the District Magistrate waiting for me. He told me that a dangerous rogue elephant, with many deaths to his discredit, had been driven from the scene of his latest misdeeds and was reported to be in the country through which we had just come. The District Magistrate recommended that my trip should be postponed.

INFANTRY PLATOON ORGANIZATION AND TACTICS

BY CAPTAIN M. W. HARES

Prior to 1938 the infantry platoon consisted of a Platoon H. Q. and four sections. In the Indian Army three of these sections were known as rifle sections, and the fourth as the L. M. G. section. In the British Army there were two rifle and two L. M. G. sections.

Each section consisted of a leader, usually a L./Naik, and six or seven men. In the L. M. G. section one of these men was employed as the mule leader. The strength of the platoon was one officer and 31 other ranks.

In 1938, the organization was changed to a H. Q. and three sections. Each section was composed of a leader and ten men. The L. M. G. mule was replaced by a 15 cwt. truck, and the mule leader became the truck driver. Each section was armed with an L. M. G. Since the outbreak of war, the section armoury has been augmented by one Thompson gun, and the Platoon by one 2-inch mortar and one A./Tk. rifle.

These changes can best be seen if shown as follows:

	1937 Platoon	1941 Platoon
H. Q.	Pl. Comd. .. Pl. Hav. .. runner .. mule holder ..	Pl. Comd. .. Pl. Hav. .. runner .. truck driver.
No. 1 Sec.	.. 1 N. C. O. 6 men ..	1 N. C. O. 10 men
No. 2 Sec.	.. 1 N. C. O. 6 men ..	1 N. C. O. 10 men
No. 3 Sec.	.. 1 N. C. O. 6 men ..	1 N. C. O. 10 men
No. 4 Sec.	.. 1 N. C. O. 6 men
Total	.. 1 Comd. 31 men ..	1 Com. 35 men
Weapons	1 L. M. G. .. 26 Rifles grenades ..	3 L. M. G.s .. 20 Rifles .. 3 Thompson guns .. 1 A./Tk. rifle .. 1 3-inch mortar. .. grenades.

The rifle and bayonet strength is based on the probable number that would actually be employed in the field.

It can be seen at a glance, that, although the strength of the platoon has been only slightly increased, the fire-power has been increased three-fold. This is a very great point in favour of this new organization and scale of equipment.

There is one other point in its favour. The platoon commander has now only three sections to consider as against four, and can thus give more attention to the employment of his additional weapons, the mortar and A./Tk. rifle, which are under his direct command.

On the surface this may appear an important point, but is this so in reality? Each section is now composed of a leader and ten men, though it is admitted that some of these may, and very probably will, be required to man the mortar and A./Tk. rifle as well as for other duties within the company and battalion. However, in the words of Infantry Section Leading, 1941, page 16, "the section leader must be fully capable of handling a full strength section."

It has been an undisputed maxim of military organization that, in the field, it is difficult, if not impossible, for one man to command directly more than six subordinates. If this was true of yesterday, surely it is even more so of to-day. Yet we find that the most junior commander in the scale of military rank is expected to command almost double this number under conditions of modern warfare. Being the most junior, he it is who comes into closest and most frequent contact with the enemy. Is this a fair responsibility to place on the shoulders of so young and inexperienced a man, who yesterday was a sepoy, and the day before that a recruit in the Training Battalion?

In addition to a section almost double its pre-war strength the young lance-naik has other difficulties to contend with. Not least amongst these is the very considerable increase in the section and platoon weapons. In 1937, the section leader had to contend with *either* a rifle section composed entirely of riflemen *or* a L. M. G. section, whose primary weapon was one L. M. G., and secondary was the rifle; but chiefly it was the task of the section to keep the gun in action. Thus the role of the section was either to attack a given objective, or to support a rifle section onto that objective.

To-day *each* section is armed with a L. M. G., a Thompson gun, rifles, bayonets and grenades, and, in addition, may have one or both the platoon weapons placed temporarily under its command. Thus the section of to-day is capable of producing the same volume of fire as the platoon of yesterday, but the knowledge and experience of the controller of that fire is reduced from that of a V. C. O. to that of a junior N. C. O. With such increased fire-power and strength, section tactics have been so

enlarged as to resemble platoon tactics of 1937. Can the young section leader compete? In short, the section leader of to-day is expected to be just as competent as the platoon commander of pre-war days. With such rapid expansion and quick promotion in the Indian Army, it is obvious that the section commander cannot compete, and this through no fault of his own. He simply has not had the time, experience or opportunity to become proficient in his command.

What, then, of the platoon commander? Is his task increased to that of a company commander? We have already seen how his task has been made easier by the reduction of his command from four sections to three. We must also remember that he now has a 2-inch mortar and a A./Tk. rifle to control. However, these are comparatively simple weapons to handle, both tactically and technically. In addition, the platoon commander has a Havildar to assist him.

From the foregoing it is fairly obvious that the section commander's responsibilities have been increased out of all proportion to his rank, knowledge and ability, while those of the platoon commander remain very much the same as before the present war.

Tactically, however, the platoon commander is in a cleft stick, as the following example will, I hope, demonstrate:

Take the case of a platoon in a defensive position. The days of the thin red line have, at long last, ended. We are taught that we must adopt "area" defence. It is realized that the minimum requirements to hold an area are three sub-units. Hence we find three sections in a platoon, and three platoons in a company. But what of a reserve? We are constantly told that a commander must at all times keep a reserve, however small, with which he can influence the situation. We are also taught that there is no such thing as a front—we must expect attacks from all sides, and these attacks may develop simultaneously.

Visualize then a platoon holding a defended locality under conditions of modern war. It is separated from its neighbours by some 500 to 1,000 yards of open (or not so open) ground, through which the enemy infantry have infiltrated. The platoon is subjected to an attack from the front and flank or rear and, possibly, from the air at the same time.

The platoon commander has naturally disposed his sections in the shape of a triangle, with Pl. H.Q. in the centre or near a section locality. If one of his section posts is attacked and/or overrun by the enemy, what is he expected to do? His platoon

now no longer holds an area, but a line. Is he to counter-attack with one of his remaining sections, supported by the fire of the other L. M. G. and the 2-inch mortar? Is he to hold the enemy with fire, and wait for the company commander to do something?

The first course would be folly. The second unforgivable.

Should he adopt the first course of counter-attacking the section post if overrun, or reinforcing it if liable to assault, he would still find himself, geometrically, holding a line with a section at either extremity. Besides, two of his sections may be attacked simultaneously, and the third also engaged. To move a section already engaged with the enemy is madness, and yet to sit back and wait would, or should, result in a court martial.

The reason for this predicament is obviously that the platoon commander has no mobile reserve with which to influence the battle, and what applies to the platoon also applies to a greater extent to the company.

What then is the answer? I suggest that the fault lies in the organization of the infantry platoon.

I give below a suggested organization compared with the present one:

Strength		1941 Pl.	Suggested Pl.
H. Q.	{ Pl. Comd. (V. C. O.) ..	1	1
	{ Pl. Hav. ..	1	1
	{ Runner ..	1	2
	{ Driver ..	1	1
No. 1 Sec.	{ N. C. O. ..	1	1
	{ men ..	10	5
No. 2 Sec.	{ N. C. O. ..	1	1
	{ men ..	10	5
No. 3 Sec.	{ N. C. O. ..	1	1
	{ men ..	10	5
No. 4 Sec.	{ N. C. O.	1
	{ men	5
Mortar det	.. men	.. incl. in the above	4
A. Tk. rifle det	.. men	.. incl. in the above	4
Total	1 V. C. O. 36 men	1 V. C. O. 36 men
Weapons	{ L. M. G. ..	3	4
	{ Thompson gun ..	3	4
	{ 2-inch mortar ..	1	2
	{ A./Tk. rifle ..	1	2
	{ Rifles and bayonets ..	20	12

It will be seen that, although the strength of the platoon remains the same, the comparison of fire production is 8 rifles against 1 L. M. G. 1 Thompson gun, 1 2-inch mortar and 1 A./Tk. rifle.

Now let us review the position of the section and platoon commanders.

The L./Nk. will not now be expected to command more than five men as against ten. He will have the same variety of weapons as at present, but they would be much more concentrated under his control. He would seldom give a fire order to the whole section, but would confine his attention to the L. M. G. He would, in all probability, either fire the gun himself or act as No. 2. If not, he would certainly carry the Thompson gun himself, with Nos. 1 and 2 at the gun. No. 3 would be a reserve gun number, and Nos. 4 and 5 engaged as scouts, runners, flankers, connecting files or rifle-bombers, as the situation may demand. Seldom, if ever, would the section line a ditch, and the section commander give a fire order as laid down in S. A. T. Vol. II. In fact, the section commander is back where he was in 1937, only he himself is armed with a Thompson gun instead of a rifle. His task is to keep the gun in action, and to get onto the objective as soon as possible.

And what of the platoon commander? Again he has adopted a triangular formation with three sections at the angles. This time his H. Q. is in the centre with No. 4 Sec. as a reserve. No. 4 section commander is at the Pl. commander's side, while both watch No. 2 Sec. position being subjected to an assault. The Reserve Section L. M. G. is engaged in firing at an enemy dive-bomber, while Nos. 1 and 3 sections are putting down bursts of fire in front of No. 2 Sec. locality. Both 2-inch mortars are putting down H.E. bombs 150 yards in front of No. 2 section post. In spite of this fire, the enemy succeeded in getting a footing in No. 2 section post, but before they have succeeded in disposing of the garrison, the platoon commander has ordered No. 4 Section to counter-attack. This attack is supported by all the platoon weapons, and, if enemy tanks are not in the vicinity, the A./Tk. rifle detachments have taken over the role of rifle-bombers. Under cover of this hail of projectiles, No. 4 Sec. advances to the attack, the L. M. G. is carried and fired from the hip No. 1, the Thompson gun is in the hands of the section leader, Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 are armed with rifles, bayonets and hand grenades. The attack is successful. The enemy routed, and an otherwise dangerous situation is restored.

The decision as to whether the counter-attack should be launched just before or just after the enemy have reached No. 2

Sec. post will rest with the platoon commander. The mortar detachments and the reserve section commander are under the voice control of the platoon commander throughout, so that all may concentrate on expelling the enemy, should he get a footing within the platoon area.

It may be argued that a section of one N.C.O. and 5 men is too small a sub-unit to be of much material use in an immediate counter-attack such as that visualized above. The immediate counter-attack was abolished on this score in pre-war days. But it must be remembered that then the attack was carried out by a rifle section armed only with rifles and grenades, and supported by but one L.M.G. If this L.M.G. was knocked out by the assaulting troops, there was virtually no supporting fire at all. Under these circumstances the counter-attack may well have resulted in a dismal failure, and the last state of that platoon would have been infinitely worse than the first.

To-day such vast strides have been made in the equipment of the section and supporting fire of the platoon, that the enemy would find it a very much "tougher" proposition to beat off an immediate local counter-attack than formerly. The suggested organization of the section of six men would still possess practically the same fire-power as the 1937 platoon. While the supporting fire-power of the suggested platoon would be two L.M.G.s and 2-inch mortars. If the section is still considered too weak in personnel, then additional numbers could be raised from the two A./Tk. rifle detachments and P. H. Q.

It is suggested that the A./Tk. rifle detachment (of which there are two in the suggested organization) consisting of two men each should be especially trained in firing the Mills grenade from the rifle. This method gives the rifle bomber a range of about 220 yards. With one man handling the rifle, while his companion inserts the grenade into the discharger cup it has been found that the rate of fire can, with practice, be in the neighbourhood of 10 grenades a minute, with accuracy. Thus two such detachments could put down a concentration of grenades on No. 2 Section post amounting to about 18 bombs per minute, while the counter-attack was in progress. Ammunition, naturally would have to be dumped in the position before hand.

So much for the platoon in the defence. But what of its other roles?

The finding of fighting patrols is one of the infantry platoon's chief duties. Under present conditions, the whole pla-

toon must be used to find a patrol capable of producing effective fire-power. This, in turn, weakens the company finding the patrol, as the whole of the reserve of the company has to be employed, leaving the company dangerously weak if called upon to perform any duty while the patrol is absent.

The patrol itself is unnecessarily large in man-power and relatively weak in fire-power. For a fighting patrol these are very serious handicaps. Casualties may be many and the patrol is ill-equipped for dealing with them.

With the suggested organization, both these defects can be easily overcome. As will be seen, the platoon can readily be divided into two equal parts, one commanded by the platoon commander, the other by the platoon havildar. Each consists of two sections, one mortar and one A./Tk. rifle detachment. Its strength is a commander and 17 men. Its weapons two L.M.G.s, two Thompson guns, one 2-inch mortar, one A./Tk. rifle and 8 rifles and bayonets and grenades.

Should a company be called upon to produce a fighting patrol, it can do so and yet retain a reserve, capable of producing as much fire-power as the present day platoon, less one L.M.G.

It is admitted that the present day platoon can produce just such a fighting patrol as that outlined above, but the remainder would be so depleted in weapons, and consequently fire-power, that it would be virtually useless for any active operation. Furthermore a platoon on the suggested organization can produce two such patrols either simultaneously or throughout the day, and require no relief.

Fundamentally then, it is a question of providing the additional equipment, the possibilities of which are unknown to the writer. This is a war of machines and equipment, and not of man-power. Our object is to inflict the greatest possible loss to the enemy, with the minimum loss of life to ourselves. This can best be done by arming all units and sub-units to the maximum, consistent with efficient handling, or, alternatively, to reduce their strength to that absolutely necessary to handle the available equipment with the maximum efficiency. A comparison between the 1937 platoon with that of to-day will show what strides have already been made in this direction, but it is suggested that we can still go further before we reach saturation point in this respect.

DIAGRAM OF PATROL FORMATION
USED BY A PLATOON ON THE SUGGESTED
ORGANIZATION

1 Sec. Scouts in front 4 5 Nos. 4 & 5 act as
Sec. in patrol formation— L. M. G. near Sec. Comd. scouts.
Alternatively 1 2 Nos. 1 & 2 with
L. M. G. may be kept under Patrol Comd.'s hand at H. Q. 3 No. 3 as connecting
file.

H. Q. 2 " mortar and A./Tk- rifle under Patrol
Comd.'s hand—No. 2 3 4 5 A./Tk.R.
Sec. Comd. and runner 2" M with Patrol Comd.

2 Sec. Patrol formation 1 2 Alternatively, No. 2
in sight of Sec. Comd. 3 Sec. may be sent
out to a threatened
flank and L. M. G.
come under Patrol
Comd.'s direct con-
trol.
4 5

STRUMA VALLEY, 1919

From the snow-clad peaks of the Belaschitz mountains, through the low-lying swamps of Southern Macedonia runs the river Struma. From its pestilential marshes arise swarms of mosquitoes in summer, the most deadly enemy of the Salonika Expeditionary Force in 1915—18. From these self-same marshes in winter arises the quacking and splashing of innumerable duck and geese. Seldom are these wild fowl disturbed by the sound of the shikari's gun. Such of the local peasants as possess twelve bores touch but the outskirts of this amazing feathered sanctuary. Certainly during the period 1915—18, affairs of a weightier nature had conspired to render offensives against the feathered inhabitants of the Struma Valley quite out of the question.

Their numbers and variety, however, were well known to the members of the Salonika Expeditionary Force and the opportunity only was wanting for the enthusiasts of my own regiment to commence such an offensive.

The opportunity presented itself in the Xmas season of 1919. My Battalion had been transferred from Macedonia to Constantinople, short leave had been opened, and the supply of 12-bore cartridges, previously a grievous difficulty, had become ample.

On the 20th December, 1919, therefore, four of us, the Major, the Adjutant, "Mules" (so called owing to his connection with the Battalion transport) and myself, functioning in the onerous position of mess president to the expedition, invaded the Constantinople-Salonika mail at Galata station *en route* for the promised land.

We were accompanied by eight orderlies, their numbers being dictated by the possibility of encountering brigands, two followers, four thousand cartridges, and an introductory letter from a junior staff officer of the Black Sea Army G. H. Q. to the Greek Divisional Commander at Ceres which was to be the jumping-off place of the expedition. In addition, the estimated requirements of the small army were provided for in the shape of 25 large packages and cases, each weighing approximately 60 lbs. We were fortunate enough to discover two empty horse trucks proceeding empty to Salonika and into these we packed

the orderlies, followers, and kit, while we ensconced ourselves in the extremely superior Wagon lit reserved for the occasion.

Our troubles started at Dedeagatch, which we reached in the middle of the night after 36 hours' running. Here the N. C. O. in charge of the orderlies awoke us from our pleasant dreams with the information that the horse trucks were being uncoupled. We interviewed officials, pleaded, swore, and threatened, without any effect at all. Finally, we played our last card. The station master was demanded, and, in very bad French, the mess president informed him that the party was travelling on direct orders from G. H. Q. Army of the Black Sea with very important stores for the Greek "General de Division" at Ceres. The introductory letter was produced (but not opened), a bottle of whiskey was also produced (and was opened), and finally with mutual compliments among hurrahs for Venezelos, for the Allies, for the Ceres Divisional General and for the Allied Commander-in-Chief, we proceeded on our way complete with our valuable stores for "Monsieur le General" still intact in their horse trucks.

About 5 a.m. on the 22nd December we decanted ourselves at the extremely dreary station of Ceres. A light drizzle was falling and the grey gloom of a dank and cheerless dawn encircled us. We were hungry, sleepy, and cold, but in the dim distance we could hear the "quack, quack" of duck, in the mist overhead sounded the ceaseless swishing of wings, and despite our discomfort it would have been hard to find four happier mortals than those shivering on Ceres platform that morning.

We could find nobody in the station except an aged grey beard who could understand no known language, so presently, having shared a cup of hot tea with the orderlies, we moved off towards the ruins of Ceres now dimly visible about a mile from the station, clutching our letter of introduction and wondering if "Monsieur le General" would stand us breakfast. Enquiries from a Greek sentry presently brought us to Divisional H.Q. which we proceeded to reconnoitre. As it was then only about 8 a.m. it was not to be anticipated that many of the higher Staff would be visible. Nevertheless, our reconnaissance was most successful for we lit upon a Greek Colonel who, on seeing our letter of introduction and hearing that we came from Constantinople, and were British Officers, literally received us with open arms. How we revered that man! Speaking no English and little French; not knowing us from Adam, and with no other passport than a short letter signed by a G.S.O. III of the British Army he led us to his

house, fed us with coffee, cognac, biscuits, cake, and fruit, rang up the A.D.C. of Monsieur le General, arranged an interview for us, and in fact so completely out-Samaritaned the good Samaritan that we nearly wept with joy and gratitude. We christened him Colonel Tate on account of his moustaches which ran sideways from near his left eye to about three inches below his right chin. He wore the D.S.O. awarded in the last break through of the Allied Armies in Macedonia and he had one sentence of English "I have ze English medal." About eleven o'clock we interviewed the A.D.C., who spoke excellent French, too excellent for the mess president who was the linguist of the party and whose French was a relic of a public school education with later experience in such places as Salonika and Constantinople fame. He was desolated to inform us that M. le General was sick and much regretted his inability to receive us personally. We had only to ask for anything we required and it would immediately be provided for us. We asked for permission to shoot on the Struma marshes and for a local guide if available. We asked for some country carts to take our belongings out to our camp. We were informed that the whole country was ours. We were given a Greek Officer to act as guide, philosopher and friend during the whole of our shoot. We were informed that the entire pack transport of an Infantry regiment, with drivers and a working party, would be available to take our kit out to anywhere we wished to go at any time convenient to ourselves. A local Shikari was produced. Div. H.Q. was ransacked for maps of the Struma valley. A lunch party was given in our honour in the principal cafe; Colonel Tate presiding, and all the members of the Div. Staff being present to ensure that we were properly looked after. Never has such hospitality been dispensed with such little reason. Eventually, at 3 p.m., we set out complete with an infantry regiment's pack transport, our Greek officer, a local shikari, a supply of maps and a sack full of fresh bread, the last offering of our friend Colonel Tate.

Our objective was a small village called Jeni Mahale, some ten miles from Ceres, standing on the Northern end of one of the innumerable lakes which are formed by the Struma as it runs its marshy course towards the Aegean Sea. There had been heavy rain during the preceding weeks and all the minor streams and tributaries of the river, of which there are literally hundreds, were very full. The track we followed was only a track in places. In others it was a fully equipped snipe jheel, complete with snipe

which we shot as we marched. Our Greek Officer had brought his gun and was an enthusiast, but dangerous. His method of shooting snipe was to kneel down well behind the line and shoot at anything he saw. The Adjutant had the narrowest escape with a jack snipe that broke back. Both the snipe and the Adjutant were slightly wounded and after this incident Monsieur Vaselus was kept under strict discipline.

The ten miles dragged out its weary length. Four times did we have to ford turbulent streams that came up to our waists and which thoroughly wetted the mule-loads. About dark we came to a huddle of wattle huts occupying a slight rise in the dead level of the surrounding swamp. This was hailed by our guide as our objective and in view of the rapidly approaching darkness we determined to camp on the only level piece of ground available in close proximity to the village. It was not long before our tents were up and hot tea in the making, and despite the general dampness of tents, clothes, ground and bedding, we spent a fairly comfortable night. The mules and their drivers sought shelter in the village and the latter made merry over a measure of rum which we distributed for medicinal and warming purposes. They returned to Ceres, well rewarded for their troubles, the following morning.

The next day we devoted to reconnaissance. We changed our camp site to a position more remote from the village and explored the country for a radius of several miles in each direction. The Struma was still some considerable distance beyond Jeni Mahale but an arm of the lake extended in a semi-circle round the South edge of the village and from its reedy interior we could hear, and see, masses of wild fowl which promised well for our sport. During the day, we walked up all likely looking bits of cover. A vast amount of thorny bush covered all ground that was neither swamp nor cultivation. In the thornbush we found pheasant of the English variety, the cultivation held partridge and quail, the latter in great quantities, and snipe were prolific in the swamps. An occasional woodcock was flushed from the banks of the streams which fed the jheels.

The village of Jeni Mahale we discovered to be an island, occupying a small area of ground slightly higher than the surrounding country. South and East was the lake, West was a mass of bogland intercepted by streams which flowed into the lake, and North were the swamps and minor streams which we had traversed the previous day.

About mid-day it commenced to rain and, save for brief intervals that could be measured in minutes, we never saw the sun again till we returned to Constantinople. This poisonous weather, apart from the discomfort it entailed in camp, was destined to play an important part in the closing phases of our expedition.

In the evening we splashed our way down an indescribably muddy road to the lake for the evening lighting. The road presently disappeared into the lake where it continued as a stream, somewhat deeper than the remainder of the jheel, to some unknown termination at what, in normal times, was the edge of the lake. In view of the complete absence of visible landmarks this road formed our only connection with dry land. We moved out into the lake for several hundred yards. The depth of water remained constant at about three feet. Numerous patches of reed formed good cover for guns and we eventually established ourselves in a rough line and awaited the movements of the duck. Just before dark the whole lake appeared to get up and fly around. Heavy duck whizzed about in parties of twenty-five to fifty, the wings of innumerable geese filled the air with a soft swish. Snipe and teal zoomed round at an incredible speed in every direction. A constant "bang, bang," followed by the dull splash of a bird hitting the water indicated that all the guns were making the most of their opportunities, and from far away over the water an occasional thunderous boom proved that one at least of the local villagers possessed some form of arquebus. Meantime, a most disconcerting phenomenon occurred. Mist began to rise from the water and within fifteen minutes a dense fog had completely blotted out the landscape. So thick was it that one could with difficulty make out the water round one's knees. All sense of direction was completely lost and the problem of getting back to the land became one of pressing importance. By shouting the members of the expedition succeeded in concentrating and argument then waxed strong as to the direction in which to move. The Major and Mules were positive that the sunken road lay in one direction, the Adjutant and the Mess President were equally positive that it lay in diametrically the opposite direction. As any error entailed the probability of spending the night up to one's waist in the lake, if not complete entanglement in the fifty square miles of jheel which lay before us, the decision was not one to be taken lightly. Eventually it was decided that the Major and Mules should reconnoitre their idea of the correct

route while the remaining members of the expedition stood fast. In no circumstance was the reconnaissance party to move out of shouting distance of the stand-fast party. After half an hour or so the disconsolate scouts rejoined with nothing to report, and the Adjutant and Mess President proceeded to reconnoitre the opposite direction. They had not moved more than ten yards before the Mess President completely disappeared. On coming to the surface again, he expressed his opinion that he had found something a blank-side deeper than the blank-blank jheel, but whether it was the blank-blank-blank road he was unable to say. Cautious proddings indicated that it was merely a hole and the reconnaissance proceeded even more depressed than before. It was then the Adjutant's turn to do a little deep sea diving, and this time it became evident that the sunken road had been discovered. It was now a question of discovering which way led to the dry land and which way entailed further entanglement in the lake. Fortunately, the route we decided to follow proved to be the correct one, and in a few minutes a wet and disconsolate party found dry ground under their feet once more. The sudden appearance of the mist had forbidden the gathering of the majority of fallen birds, but a large number of these were picked next morning before the hawks had got at them. We found that this mist was of nightly occurrence though it never again assumed quite such alarming density.

After this experience we always left one gun on the sunken road and never went out without a compass. Almost continuous rain now greatly interfered with our sport, and the water surrounding the Jeni Mahale high ground began to encroach with alarming rapidity. Four days before we were due to return to Ceres our daily Courier, sent out by the kindness of our Greek friends, with fresh bread and milk, failed to materialize. His absence on the second day convinced us that his failure to arrive was not due to forgetfulness but was owing to the fact that we were cut off by the rising of the water. A conference that night decided us that a determined effort had to be made to establish communication with Ceres as, failing the arrival of transport, we should overstay our leave.

At 8 a.m. the next day, the Adjutant and the Mess President set out to reconnoitre. It was decided to try to outflank the various streams interposing between our camp and Ceres by moving first in a westerly direction, thereby striking them nearer their head waters and possibly bringing us onto the main Salonika-

Ceres road, which ran some fifteen kilometres to the West of the Jeni Mahale marshes before turning at right angles to the East to reach Ceres.

Moving in the Westerly direction meant that, somehow or other, we had to circumvent the very extensive swamps which stretched between the village and the road, but we found a villager in Jeni Mahale who claimed to know a track.

For the first few miles the going was quite good, and as we were marching parallel to the streams we had little fording to do. We then met our first obstacle in the shape of a marshy strip of ground with a miniature river running through the middle. Getting across this was unpleasant and somewhat dangerous. The mud was definitely "Fasan", in other words without bottom, and we struck pockets where one sank, with horrid squelching noises, right up to the waist. After the first of these experiences we returned to the bank and cut ourselves bundles of reeds to act as life-buoys. With terrific struggles we gained the other side, but it was a pyrrhic victory, for our guide definitely refused to adventure the crossing. To turn back thus early did not appeal to us, so, squelching from head to foot, and leaving behind us a trail of thick black ooze, the odour of which definitely resembled very old gorgonzola cheese, we proceeded on our way, guideless.

We selected as a marching point one of the summits of the far away Belaschitz range which we adjudged to be due West, and towards this we squelched our weary way. The fording of each stream was an adventure in itself, for it was impossible to tell the depth until we had proved it by experiment. It was not the water we feared so much as the mud, but by the time we had struggled across our tenth river even this had begun to lose its menace through sheer familiarity. About 5 p.m., we sighted the main road and reached it after a final struggle through 500 yards of most tenacious bog which took us over half an hour to conquer. In the middle of this bog the Adjutant lost his boot which was pulled clean off his foot. The recovery of that boot was an undertaking which even now haunts my dreams. Standing thigh-deep in odouriferous mud we scraped about with our arms immersed up to the shoulders. Eventually, it was retrieved and resting on the main road we thought our troubles were over. This, however, was a miscalculation for we had struck the road a good ten kilometres from Ceres, and the three-hour tramp, half of it in the pitchy dark, was a nightmare. About 8 p.m., we sighted the lights of Ceres and again we cast ourselves on the

mercy of our much-tried friend Colonel Tate. Our fears proved to be well founded. The courier had reported the route impossible and we found Div. H. Q. scratching their heads as to the best method of rescuing "Les panvres Anglais." We pleaded the urgency of our cause and the necessity of an immediate rescue party in view of the termination of our leave. With considerable misgiving our Greek friends allowed us to make the attempt to reach Jeni Mahale that same night with twelve mules and drivers. The rain had stopped and it was brilliant moonlight when, having fortified the inner man with cognac and sandwiches, we led forth the relieving party at mid-night. It was freezing hard, which did not make our night march any more comfortable. Despairing of retracing our footsteps by the route we had followed during the afternoon, we decided to make straight for the camp and trust to fording the intermediate streams.

Tired, and cold, we made good progress, negotiating the first few obstacles with comparative ease. By 2 a.m., we were within a kilometre or two of Jeni Mahale when we came to a swift broad stream where, on our outward journey, we remembered a minor water-course of no importance. The N. C. O. in charge of the mules looked at it and shook his head. Words of cheer and threats had no effect. Finally, we set an example by putting our mules at the flood. For a few steps all was well, then we found ourselves swimming. With considerable difficulty, and wet from the neck downwards, we gained the other bank and from this point of vantage cheered on the faint hearts on the other side. These, however, having made their decision stuck to it, and, after a few non-committal remarks, turned their mules round and headed back for Ceres.

With horrible oaths we once more swam that cursed river and hastened in pursuit. Not till we were within a mile or two of the town did we catch them and then, realizing the futility of further argument, we accompanied them back to our starting point. Chilled to the marrow, our teeth chattering like castenets, hungry, tired, and furiously angry, we demanded to be shown somewhere to sleep. The main hotel of Ceres was pointed out to us, a dingy wooden building without a light showing. As it was then 4 a.m. in the morning, this was possibly not surprising. Bangings and shoutings produced an incredible number of ferocious dogs, and an aged crone who was prevailed on by our chief muleteer to give us shelter for what was left of the night. Our immediate demand was food and drink, for, apart from some sandwiches, we had eaten nothing since breakfast the pre-

vious day. All that could be produced was a couple of eggs and half a bottle of some foul brew, surnamed "douzico", which tasted and smelt like pure alcohol. Thus refreshed we sought our couches, but here a further hiatus occurred. No beds were available. Eventually, we were shepherded by the old woman into a room containing four beds, on each of which were stretched in noisy slumber two recumbent forms. Horror-stricken, we recoiled and demanded blankets, and finally adopted the kitchen floor as our sleeping chamber. Even here we found no privacy, for the multitudinous inhabitants of our borrowed blankets soon made their presence felt, and we passed the last few hours till daylight crouched over the tired embers of last night's fire. At 8 a.m. we were again in the presence of Col. Tate who listened with working whiskers to the tale of our night's adventures. His rage and grief at the story of our desertion by the mule drivers was dramatic in its intensity. He swore vengeance upon those wretched men, and promised that in one hour's time the pick of the Divisional Transport led by a Greek Officer, renowned for his valour and energy, should set out from Ceres to effect the relief of our flood beleaguered comrades.

Thus assured, we left to fortify the inner man against the potential trials of the day, and, finding the Colonel as good as his word, once more left Ceres *en route* for Jeni Mahale at 9 a.m. with the selected heroes. This time there was no going back. Urged on by the whirlwind enthusiasm of our valiant and energetic Greek Officer, the mules swam the last river in magnificent style, and by mid-day we had reached camp and set about the business of loading up.

During our absence the Major and Mules had been reconnoitring eastwards along the edge of the lake and they had found a ford, some three miles downstream, across the nearest and biggest of the streams that had caused our downfall the night before. On consideration it seemed preferable to add on extra hour's walking onto the return journey rather than to risk the loss of baggage and mules in the hazardous business of swimming the original crossing.

All would have gone well had we contented ourselves with rejoining the known track after the fording of the big stream. Foolishly we allowed ourselves to be beguiled into heading straight for Ceres after the ford, only to find ourselves once more bogged. Hours were wasted retracing our steps and getting onto the track, and it was not till well after dark that we reached our

objective, the railway station. Even here our troubles were not over. The Salonika-Constantinople mail stopped for ten minutes at Ceres. During this brief period we had to entrain the orderlies, the followers, the odd half ton of baggage, and ourselves. There were no porters to assist, very few lights, and, when the train arrived, no accommodation.

On viewing our small mountain of kit the guard quite positively refused to open his brake-van door. By this time we were quite desperate. On the pretext of seeing what of our stores we could get into the van we prevailed upon the guard to open up the brake. Before he had time to utter a formal protest we had removed the engine driver forcibly from his engine, thereby preventing any untoward movement of the train till we were ready, piled into the brake-van our half ton of kit, our orderlies, and our followers, and, finally, pulled ourselves up into the corridor of the wagon lit as the infuriated engine-driver, released from his durance vile, bounded into the engine and turned all his wheels at once to make up for the precious time overdue.

Little more remains to be told. We completed the railway journey to Constantinople in an atmosphere of intense official hostility. By the time we had detrained we had given our names, the names of our fathers and mothers, our children and our wives, to at least a dozen different railway officials, all of whom evidently regarded us as criminals of the most dangerous type. Determined efforts were made at several intermediate stations to disgorge our orderlies and our kit from the brake-van. These assaults we left the orderlies to deal with themselves, merely telling them on no account to open the doors. Eventually, the battered expedition arrived still intact at Galata, and the brake-van doors were opened. From it, in the middle of a blue haze, staggered our devoted retinue, while, with one accord, the crowd of enraged officials, porters, policemen, and spectators fell back aghast. The crowded atmosphere of the van had proved too much for the game. It had definitely not survived the journey.

PRICE MARCHES ON

BY RASP

*A sequel to "How to live in India on your Pay"
and "Financial Ramblings in Retrospect and
Prospect".*

To wake up one morning to the realization that although one's pay has risen by £200 per annum, one has actually suffered a loss of £200 per annum before stepping out of the hall door to meet a higher cost of living, is a grim thought. Yet, such is the plight of many in England to-day, though all do not appreciate it.

Brooding on this and scanning two articles I wrote on this subject about a year ago, I feel it may be a help to review facts in the light of changed conditions. In those articles I had "found no great increase in the cost of living". I suggested measures to save £2,000 for a house and £500 for furniture, and to put by £200 for leave home. I suggested ways and means of providing for one's family and for education.

But plans made a year ago need revision owing to the change in taxation and cost of living. The latter has increased most considerably in the course of one year. What will it be in two or three years? Will it go back to the 1939 level after the war? All that one can say is, that after the last war, prices never even approached the 1914 level. To consider them is like considering the gallon of whiskey which the Victorian generation tell one they bought for £1. The wise family budgeteer will, therefore, assume that 1939 scale of living has gone for ever, and will provide accordingly.

Before considering the increase in the cost of daily purchases in the shops, let me explain the opening statement of this article.

Since last year, pay has increased by £50 per annum, but taxation has increased by £100. A house, furnished or unfurnished, in this town is unobtainable and, in consequence, rooms or an hotel are the only alternatives.

The cost of these has risen since a year ago from £7 to £10 per week (40 per cent.) making an increase of £150 a year. The owners of the rooms are honest and non-profiteering and there

appears to be no justifiable reason for objecting to the increase. The net effect of the above, however, is that apart from the enhanced cost of everything it is necessary to buy, one is £200 worse off than last year. This is a serious matter and must be faced as a reasonable expectation by those coming to this country later on leave or retirement.

The Increased Cost of Living

In previous articles, detailed costs of living were given under every conceivable head. It would be wearisome to read a re-hash of these, but a few random examples may put the reader in India in the picture.

The purchase tax does not apply to food, but in spite of this, eggs cost now nearly fourpence each, a beetroot 1/- and a cauliflower 1/3. Even the most daring *Khansamah* would not venture to charge 19 annas for a cauliflower! In general the increased cost of housekeeping may be taken at 20 per cent.

Other articles are affected by two factors; firstly, the purchase tax and, secondly, the law of supply and demand.

The purchase tax is as high as 33 per cent. on certain articles, so that an article which cost £4 last year may well have risen to, say, £6 this year owing to the general rise in price; adding to this £2 purchase tax, it would now cost £8.

The law of supply and demand naturally increases prices. A tin kettle and "parchment" lampshade which used to be obtainable for sixpence at a well-known stores were bought last week for 1/9 each. No more kettles are expected in this town for three months.

It is not known how many cigarettes can be got for a rupee in India nowadays, but here it would cost 3/9 for a tin of 50—were such a thing obtainable.

Whiskey has risen 40 per cent. from 12/6 to 17/6. Clothes, especially women's clothes, have soared in price and some of the prices given in catalogues are almost unbelievable. In a previous article, Colonel Flounder's wife boasted that she dressed from the Guinea shops and was shod by Bata. Poor woman, she'll be naked and barefoot if she sticks to those ideals!

However, enough of such details—possibly even the writer has sounded too pessimistic a note. It must certainly be stressed that there is no sign of suffering in respect of food or clothing, nor sign of a decrease in purchasers. Shops are well filled and

brightly dressed. Still, those who are making a long term budget for saving for security after the war, should take the undoubted rise in the cost of living into account.

The Post-War Home

In a saving scheme previously suggested, the figures of £2,000 for a house, £500 for furniture and £200 for a leave home were taken.

As regards the house, it is felt that the general rise in prices combined with a post-war house shortage is bound to increase the figures. Moreover, a house cannot be bought on the instalment system to-day. Whether the building societies will revise this after the war is not known—probably they will—but to-day even an insurance policy combined with an arrangement for house purchase after the war is difficult to secure.

Furniture is not only very scarce, but is subject to a 33 per cent. tax. In many cases it has increased by 100 per cent. and even furniture shops advised the writer against purchase. One firm offered a plain oak writing table 3 ft. by 18 ins. for £20! As the demand for furniture after the war will be on a huge scale, prices cannot be expected to fall for some years.

Education

In the writer's experience, the cost of education has not risen. This is most commendable on the part of schools as their expenses have unquestionably increased. An increase in fees would appear inevitable.

Previously the writer argued that Oxford University would cost little more than London and estimated the cost of the former at a minimum of £260 per annum.

Accurate statistics which have been recorded for one year at Oxford may be of interest to parents.

Fees, battels and college expenses amounted to £213, while pocket money, travelling, books and the bulk of clothing purchased came to £38, making a total of £251. As the case is that of a medical student, which involves slightly higher fees and a longer period in residence than other students, it is creditably low. This figure, of course, takes no account of the cost of living for four or five months' vacation.

It is stated that the cost for a woman student would be about £30 less, but as yet the writer has no proof of this. The cost would be considerably less if the man or woman was a "Home Student" at Oxford.

Current cost of one year's living in England

In "Financial Ramblings in Retrospect and Prospect" expenditure for June, 1940, was given in detail. The total amounted to £54 15s. The exact cost under all major heads for one year in humble and quiet circumstances is illuminating and is as follows:

Medical student at Oxford	...	£251
Daughter at school	171
Income-Tax	240
Insurance	46
Sub-total ...		£708
All other expenses, including 4 to 5 months' vacation for son and daughter	716*
Grand-total ...		£1,424

The statement that this covered a humble and quiet existence is literally true. A car was maintained, but there were no dinner parties, one dance, a good deal of visits to the Cinema and a negligible drink bill. There were no cocktail parties—as often as not there was no whisky nor sherry in the house. One week's leave in the year was, however, included at a first-class seaside hotel, the hotel bill alone being £30 for the week. Very few clothes were bought and needless to say no "useless" ones such as evening dresses.

As Mr. Grice of the radio says: "It makes you think—it makes you think."

Passages Home and Post-War Leave

These important subjects remain to be considered. It may be remembered that every time Mrs. Flounder used to go home on leave, her husband reluctantly handed £100 to Mr. Cook. If the post-war Mrs. Flounder has no Lee Commission passages left, I fear she will only get about as far as Port Said!

Then, too, pre-war expenses showed that about £200 was needed for each leave home. In view of the figures above, a saving of at least £300 is suggested as necessary in future.

The Man of Property

Well, after such a vista of gloom, will it really be worth while living at all!

Why not? It's only money we've been discussing after all and everyone will be in the same boat; but we must take every

* Average of approximately £60 per month.

step we can to become like, Mr. Soames Forsyte, a Man of Property, and build up a reserve of not only money but household goods.

A plan is necessary, following some such line as was suggested in "How to live in India on your Pay," but with greater sacrifice towards the "savings" aspect. In view of the increase in taxation, the Provident Fund should be used to the full permissible limit. Those who did not take out Insurance policies before the war, may have difficulty in securing cover for the present hostilities, but long-term endowment policies to cover post-war conditions may be obtainable. As regards savings, one solution is to assume that the tax is 8 annas in the Rupee (as it is in England) and place the difference between this and the actual tax paid, in savings.

Above all, those who are in India and not overseas, should steadily acquire property which is reasonably movable and useful in Europe. Property cannot, like money, be taxed. Even furniture to a limited extent, and of the folding type, might well repay eventual shipment home. If you try to buy a bed for your wife now, you will be taxed, but no Chancellor of the Exchequer has devised a system of taxing your wife's bed once purchased! Cushions, curtains, china, glass and the host of things so often sold in India must be hoarded and husbanded so that one day they may take their share in helping a dream to materialize—that dream of so many in India—a home in England on retirement.

DEFENCE AND DISPERSION

By B. O. W. ARROW

This is not a dissertation on the comparative values of attack and defence. Even if there ever existed such a thing as a soldier who believed that a war could be won by defence alone, he must have changed his mind by now, because even the civilian who before the war beguiled us the means to enable us to act offensively, has discovered it, and tells us all about it. It may be galling to the professional soldier, sailor and airman, but he can 'take it' because the maximum effort to put us in the position to be offensive is taking shape.

We are all agreed on the offensive; so, some say, let's not worry about defence, this war has shown that its no use anyhow. Has it? Or is it that during the last two years, we have ignored the principles of defence? Or failed to differentiate between defensive and delaying action, with the result that the junior leader's mind is now thoroughly confused on the subject? There is no doubt whatever that it is confused, hence this article.

Even when the offensive opens there will be places where small, and perhaps even large, forces will have to act in a defensive role. The company and platoon commander will often find himself temporarily on the defensive, however well the general offensive is going, and he must be confident that he CAN defend himself even against very superior forces. Recent events and conflicting ideas have shaken that confidence considerably, and the sooner it is regained the better.

In the War of 1914—18, we became accustomed to the defence holding out for protracted periods against superior numbers and overwhelming and accurate artillery fire, often supported by clouds of gas, and tanks. Why is it in this war, defences get overrun with such apparent ease? Some of the reasons put forward are:

Fast tanks with air support can maintain the momentum of the advance to such depth that the defence has no chance.

The concrete mentality causes the defender to put his trust in defences rather than in his will to resist.

The morale of the attacker is always bound to be higher than that of the defender.

The mobility of the attacker necessitates the defence being strung out over vast frontages.

Let us examine these reasons, and see whether they are really valid.

Fast tanks and air support are also the best way of paralysing the momentum of an attack.

The concrete mentality. The Germans never even tried to break the Maginot line.

The morale of the attacker may be higher, but throughout the history of war the defence has time and again overcome this disadvantage.

Dispersion of the defence. German 'shock' infiltration and Japanese 'seepage' have both been successful, so it looks as though this is the Achilles Heel!

During the past two years I have been concerned in the training of 16 battalions. Every one of them was steeped to start with in the 'penny packet' idea of defence, and in some cases it died hard. One of my most staunch adherents has recently found himself isolated with his company, fought it out for two days, then rejoined his battalion with his company more or less intact, having inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. I am quite sure his company was not in penny packets and he now wears a Military Cross.

It does not seem logical to say that men behind well-sited defences cannot hold up superior numbers for a long time, even if the enemy has air superiority. I suggest that we have drawn the wrong lesson from Desert warfare. The vast frontages in Africa were not defensive positions, they were covering positions, with the exception of Tobruk, and whatever the junior commander thought of them the high command never attempted to use them as anything but covering positions, and they were only held as long as there was no serious attack on them. Nevertheless, there seems to be a very widely accepted idea that the compact-platoon-defended locality is a thing of the past, and that its place has been taken by widely separated section posts. A defensive system based on dispersed section posts will not stop seepage, nor will it stop shock infiltration. Seepage can only be stopped by a continuous front or active and constant patrolling

in depth. Shock infiltration can only be stopped by mutually supporting localities too strong to be easily overrun.

The greater the dispersal, the greater the number of static sentries required, and, consequently, the fewer men there will be available for active patrolling. Moreover, control by platoon and company commanders becomes more difficult and, consequently, concentration of fire and rapid local counter-attack become an impossibility.

There are a few simple and well-proven rules for resolute defence: Frontages must be governed by what you can hold by night. Ability to concentrate fire on threatened points. Ability to launch an immediate counter-attack on any enemy, who reach a vital point in the defences, before he can organize.

Someone will say that the air threat forces wide dispersion of small sub-units, in defence. Let it be remembered, however, that it has been stated time and again that against entrenched troops dive-bombing has little effect, while even to fairly low level bombing a platoon locality is a very small target. The greatest danger to ground troops is still observed artillery fire, and by skilful use of ground that danger can be greatly minimised. There are two final pleas against the 'penny packet' complex. It takes far more mines and wire to protect a large number of widely dispersed section posts than it does to protect a compact platoon locality. If the whole area is dotted with little posts it makes it very difficult, if not impossible to lay on a counter-penetration fire plan, which is after all the most effective stopper of shock-penetration.

The object of defence is not to stop the enemy—if you merely stop him he can still attack again or walk round you—but to KILL him. In order to do this, it is essential to have the power to concentrate heavy and accurate fire on any point of attack, or if the country is very close, to have local reserves to destroy infiltrated elements by shock tactics. If the defence is too widely dispersed neither of these essentials is possible.

I am the last person to decry dispersion, but there is in my opinion a very urgent need to strike a balance between dispersion and the principle of concentration. If we think of it in terms of TIME only it may help. A motorised force moving at 20 m.p.h. can disperse itself seven times as widely as one moving at 3 m.p.h., and as a very rough guide I would say a battalion can disperse itself to 20 minutes and a company to 5 minutes.

Rough guides are in a way dangerous things as they have a habit of assuming the status of rules, but with the vast number of officers with little experience there are in the Army nowadays we must have guides, and the majority will I think use them intelligently.

One could write many thousand words on this subject, but paper and time are in these days very valuable. I hope enough has been said to give food for thought on a subject which, I have found, causes considerable confusion in the minds of many.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

BADGES

In 1919, most regiments received a letter, asking if they would present the Imperial War Museum with a set of the badges worn by them in the war of 1914—1918.

As a result the Imperial War Museum has a set of the, now forgotten, badges of most Indian regiments of that period. They are mounted in glass-framed cases and hung on the walls of the Indian Army section of the Museum, where they may be seen by the Public.

Unfortunately, quite a number of regiments, batteries, battalions and smaller corps, who wore distinctive badges or titles, omitted to send them—or had by 1919 been disbanded or amalgamated. Their places are blank in this record of the Grand Army of India.

After the conclusion of the present conflict, the I. W. M. will again ask O. C. units kindly to present a set of the distinctive 'badges', 'flashes' or 'signs' worn by their command.

It would be nice if all would respond.

Can we suggest that in each unit somebody should "take care" of this small matter, and that a distinctive little collection from *every* unit and formation of the Indian Army shall be available for presentation and record when the "Cease fire" blows?

They should not be sent to the I. W. M. before that time, even if only for reasons of security.

Unless some arrangement is made during the war, the danger is that after it in the general melee of reorganization and dismemberment, these souvenirs will have for ever disappeared.

Some people will ask why the Indian Ordnance could not supply these? Well, we hope that they will supply an official set, but, in addition to these "issue" titles, etc., there are always many units who wear a variety of their own—possibly entirely unofficial—there are also the odd corps, raised under queer circumstances, in strange places, who provide for themselves.

We do not wish to miss these out, nor perhaps others who, after a short life, have ceased to exist and are already forgotten ere peace descends.

Will those interested kindly see to it that souvenirs of what Bahadur Singh wears in the Second World War will be available to be placed alongside those borne by his valiant parent in the First World War?

NOTES ON SOME BOOKS RECENTLY PLACED IN THE LIBRARY

"The R.A.F. in Action", by Adam and Charles Black.

This book gives a very short description, with many illustrations, of the Coastal, Bomber and Fighter Commands of the R.A.F., during the first year of this war.

"Berlin Diary", by William L. Shirer.

A comprehensive eye-witness account of German activities up to the end of 1940. The writer was in Germany during the occupation of the Rhineland and the invasion of Austria. He covered the Munich Crisis. He went with the German armies into Poland, Belgium and France, and was in Berlin during the first air raids on that city. He spent most of his time in Berlin as Berlin Correspondent of the Columbia Broadcasting System of America and tells of life in Berlin, with shrewd comments on the information he was able to gather from German sources.

"Canada", by B. K. Sandwell.

This book describes, shortly, the country's progress from colonial status to that of a federal self-governing nation.

"Fishermen at War", by Leo Walmsley.

An account of the lives and experiences of the fishermen of the east coast of England during the war.

"Blitz Krieg", by F. O. Miksche.

The book deals briefly with the principal questions of modern tactical science. It is based on the experience gained and the lessons learnt by the writer during the Spanish War where he served with the Republican Forces. It begins with thrust and pocket tactics and battle on narrow fronts. It goes on to the use of the Air Arm over the battle, the Panzer divisions and their work, and the tactics of combat teams against this arm and the question of the decentralization of the artillery. It then touches the principles of defence, and finishes by discussing islands of resistance, web-resistance and the counter-blitz.

"The Rise of American Naval Power—1776—1918", by Harold and Margaret Sprout.

This work deals with the problems of sea power as they affected the American nation from the time when the nation first realized the necessity of that power, 1783, through the developments caused by the change from sails to steam to the beginnings of a new American Navy in 1881. It describes the growth of the American Navy from that date and the influence in producing that growth of some of the leading Americans. It discusses the politics and policy of the use of the Navy on the eve of 1914 and the American neutrality and preparedness until they entered the Great War, and finishes with the strategic lessons and political consequences of the share of this Navy in that War.

"Toward a New Order of Sea Power", by Harold and Margaret Sprout.

This book describes American Naval Policy and the world scene from 1918 to 1922.

"China Shall Rise Again", by Mme. Chiang Kai-shek.

A book written in three parts. In the first part, "I Shall Rise Again," the authoress discusses the faults of the Chinese and ways to overcome them. The second part consists of statements, prepared by responsible officials, showing how reforms are being inaugurated and how various departments of the government have been able to meet the national calamities. The third part deals with the "New Life Movement in China", the part played by women in China's reconstruction programme, and Chinese thought on democratic policy.

"The March of the Barbarians", by Harold Lamb.

It describes the rise of Genghis Khan to power, the welding of his followers into a powerful fighting nation, the extension of his kingdom to North China, the Indus, the Caspian Sea and Persia, and the steps he took to preserve that kingdom. It goes on to tell the tale of events after his death when the Mongols reached out as far as Central Europe, and the fortunes of the kingdom under successive rulers up to Kubilai Khan up to the thirteenth century. It finishes with a short description of the disintegration of the Mongol kingdom.

"Thus Spake Germany", edited by W. W. Cook and M. F. Potter.

A book of some three hundred pages, consisting of quotations drawn from the works of German statesmen, politicians, soldiers, philosophers, jurists, etc., from the time of Frederick the Great to the present day.

The first chapter deals with the cult of force and on subordination to force of religion, morality and law. The book then goes on to consider the Germans as a people of rulers, their view of other races and nations, their aims in international politics and in war, how they make war, and Germany in defeat. It finishes with the fate reserved for the vanquished.

"Valley of Forgotten People", by George Sava.

An account of various small tribes in the Caucasus, with description of some of their strange antiquated customs.

MATTERS OF MOMENT

FEW CAMPAIGNS IN THIS second World War have stimulated so much discussion or caused so much perturbation as the Malayan and Burma campaigns. That they have ended in the withdrawal of our forces is regrettable,

**The Burma and
Malayan
Campaigns**

but not indefensible. This is neither the time nor place in which to discuss the pre-war political aspect of the subject, but it is right, and our duty, to quickly learn all that can be learned from those who took part in the operations. Every crumb of information, every idea, is of value. Speedy communications, the "flash" story of newspaper correspondents, and piece-meal descriptive accounts have all tended to give a distorted picture of campaigns in which our troops fought with great gallantry against very heavy odds. We have, therefore, endeavoured to include in this issue of the Journal authoritative accounts of the operations, and readers will find in them a great deal of information hitherto unpublished. In each contribution there is much that will help those responsible for the future training of our troops, as well as valuable knowledge concerning the Japanese methods of waging war.

**

**

**

PROPHECIES IN WAR are dangerous, but now that victory over Germany becomes more and more certain, even to hardened pessimists, many people in India and elsewhere are speculating on the possible outcome of the Japanese conflict. Will Japan, having

**How will the
Japanese
Conflict End?**

consolidated her position in the captured countries, having acquired considerable economic advantages, and having secured a strategic hold on many key positions, crash with her co-gangsters in Europe, or will she require to be dealt with separately?

Many people feel that the countries occupied by the Japanese will have to be re-taken by force of arms, if only to re-establish the prestige of former rulers among Malays, Burmans and, indeed, all Far Eastern native peoples. For the last seven months these populations have watched with growing astonishment the temporary defeat of Britain's armies; their knowledge of the background of the picture—of how Britain stood alone for a year against the combined might of Germany and Italy, of how she had to fight with her back against the wall, is slight. Lying Japanese propagandists have intensified their efforts to contaminate the minds of these peoples, their work being assisted by Fifth Columnists ranged under the enemy's banner. Thus, at the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, there will be masses of people, ruled for decades by Britain, Holland and America, who will put their trust in the superiority of the power of Nippon over that of the Allied Nations. Such beliefs, firmly established, will not be erased by the restoration of those countries at the Peace Conference. The sight of Allied armies falling back before an overwhelming force of Japanese soldiers will not be effaced by discussions over a table thousands of miles away. Is the reverse of the picture—the driving home of smashing blows against the Japanese, the victorious march of Allied soldiers, the eviction of the enemy, to be the answer? If so, much may remain to be done after the German war machine has been broken. The struggle may be long or short, but given equality in numbers, equipment, air and sea power, the soldiers of the Allied Nations will show that they are more than a match for a nation which has by knavery and treachery temporarily established itself in the Far East. The triumphant Allied armies, routing an enemy who by that time may well be bereft of his naval superiority, will again bring confidence, hope and assurance to the peoples in that part of the World.

**

**

**

GLARING EXAMPLES of the tragic results of reckless and careless talk have proved that much remains to be learned from lessons of the past. Notwithstanding the display of picturesque

**The Remedy for
Reckless Talk**

posters (and a special series might well have been drawn for India and the East) there is all-too-frequent proof that words whispered in confidence have led to disaster for courageous men. Innumerable examples could be quoted. Before the attacks on Norway large numbers of the public in England were aware of details of the forces before they left; the impending occupation of Iceland was made known to quite a number of people just after our troops left the shores of the Mother Country; the efforts of the Free French to capture Dakar was no news to masses of people in London, where it was openly discussed while the force was on its way; and in Hong Kong the arrival of the Canadian contingent was known fully a month before their ships were sighted—although Press telegrams were careful to say that the arrival was a complete surprise. In the East particularly responsible people might do most useful work in assisting to stop the spread of stories which obviously spring from the minds of Fifth Columnists and defeatists. These few examples quoted at random reveal a lack of self-discipline, the fruits of which accrue not to the unworthy persons disseminating the news but to men whose very lives are at stake and to a cause for which millions are fighting. Human nature being what it is, the possession of "inside information" is apt to give an individual an exaggerated opinion of his own importance; the desire to let others know he is in close touch with Higher Authority is irresistible; the news is passed on and improved upon. What is the remedy? Rigid discipline, iron determination and a resolve never to discuss what are obvious secret matters is the only palliative. Until everyone takes those inflexible rules to heart, danger will lie ahead, the lives of our kinsfolk will be threatened, and the result of the biggest war in history imperilled.

**

**

**

ACTIVE RESISTANCE to German rule by the unfortunate inhabitants of occupied countries throughout Europe is obviously taking definite shape, but the conquerors have again made a blunder in their efforts to suppress insurrection. Brave people are not cowed

Hitler's Quandary in Europe

by the firing squad, and Germany, by her brutal and cold-blooded treatment, is building up a wall of hatred which for generations will make the very name of Germany synonymous with persecution, ferocity and barbarity. News filtering out from France, Norway and Belgium proves that Hitler faces an increasingly disquieting situation. He is coming to realise that other nations are not of the same calibre as the Hun, that they are not to be regimented into mass automatons, and that although he may have over-run the countries he has still to maintain large armies of occupation to hold them down. The assassination of Heidrich, whose unparalleled cruelty was typical of the Prussian, is indicative of the temper of the Czechs, and a sign of the depth of their hatred of anything German. No one can deny that until the United Nations deliver their smashing blow the valour and gallantry of these so-called vanquished nations will be of inestimable value. Nevertheless, too much hope should not be based on the early effectiveness of this opposition; a wide gulf separates unrest and revolution—especially when the conqueror holds in his hands the large majority of the backbone of France's army, as well as its fighting equipment and munition factories. The days when hastily-erected barricades could be thrown up and successfully stop a determined enemy have gone; tanks, bombers, dive bombers, tommy guns and bren guns are no mean counters to the frenzied fervour of an angry mob of subjugated souls. Though news of attacks on Germans gladden the heart, and announcements of Hitler's butchery of innocent people cause gloom, sanguine expectations that widespread revolution is "round the corner" must be avoided.

**

**

**

THOUGH HITLER may well have been startled when details of the Anglo-Russian treaty were announced, millions of people under his heel in Europe have good reason to herald it as the guarantee that the peace this time will bring in its train security and

The Anglo-Russian Treaty

safety against a nation which, while professing peace, lives and works for war.

Without doubt it is the most momentous political move which has taken place among European countries since the outbreak of war. That the two strongest Powers on the Continent should thus unite in a charter of security augurs well for the post-war position in Europe. The military alliance thus concluded pledges Britain and Russia not to enter into negotiations or conclude any armistice with Germany or her allies except by mutual consent; affirms the determination of both countries, after the war, to take all measures in their power to render impossible a repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Germany; declares that neither party to the alliance shall seek any gain or annexations at the Peace Conference; and agrees that the proposals are to remain in operation for at least twenty years. Thus has been laid the foundation of an edifice which will ensure not merely peace, but security—security for the crippled nations to build up anew, confident that at no time can the crafty Hun scheme and plan for a Third War. The effects of the treaty are not confined to the post-war period, however, for it has been officially stated that full understanding was reached between the two parties with regard to the urgent task of creating a second front against Germany in 1942, and this encouraging sign of the Allied Nations' strength will undoubtedly be the signal for even closer co-ordination between the countries fighting the Axis. To sum up, the new treaty will both contribute to the successful prosecution of the war, and to the realization after hostilities have ended of the principles of the historic Atlantic Charter concluded between Mr. Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt.

**

**

**

MODERN WARFARE demands individual initiative, minds receptive of ideas, and fired with invincible determination to overcome obstacles. Wars are not won by armchair critics with one leg in the library and the other in the past. Nowadays every officer, high and low, must be satiated with a firm resolve to acquire from others ideas which will assist in winning the war. For that reason, if for no other, officers can, by careful and regular perusal of articles appearing in these pages, glean valuable knowledge of modern war acquired in many cases from first-hand experience. Officers who are already members of the Institution can, by recommending the Journal of the Institution to their colleagues, render them a useful service. Such co-operation will bear fruit in added efficiency, invigorating the faint-hearted and inspiring the enthusiast. Our object is not to build up a huge circulation but rather to disseminate as much useful information to as many officers as possible. Members can also help in other ways, for among our readers are many whose fund of knowledge can be made available to a wider circle than their immediate friends. Such members could give valuable help to others in assisting them to formulate ideas, and, by thought-provoking contributions to our columns, increase their proficiency. This war will go to the nation which can mobilise its brain-power to the best advantage, and readers are invited to make this journal a rostrum from which their ideas and experiences can be conveyed to those anxious to acquire a wider knowledge of current military affairs.

**

**

**

SALVAGE, as the dictionary puts it, is the act of saving. There was a time when it was regarded by the civilian as having a nautical connexion only, but for some time past it has concerned the Services and civilian activities. The objects of salvage are the conservation of our resources by the avoidance of waste, the recovery of materials or stores for re-

**The Object
of Salvage**

use as they stand (or in some modified form) or for reduction to basic components. Economy of material is as important as economy in man-power—particularly in its repercussions on the use of shipping and on the national effort generally. Unnecessary waste in war is therefore a crime.

* * *

The first principle of economy is to refrain from demanding, using, or hoarding material that is not actually required. The second is to prolong the useful life of material by careful treatment and early repair when necessary.

Principles of Economy

The third is to return all unwanted material, serviceable and unserviceable, and all "empties", so that they can be put into use with the least damage or delay. The fourth is to retrieve all materials and stores that become derelict. Observance of these principles is an obligation which rests on everyone.

* * *

In peace-time stores and equipments are jealously safeguarded in a variety of ways. In war, on the other hand, the country's purse is opened, and nothing is stinted. The effect of this change is unsettling, and tends to create a wrong attitude of mind. Sudden relaxation of peace-time control may result in undisguised prodigality—an antidote to which is "conservation" drill. If everyone did his duty to-day by making "conservation" a drill, taking steps to see that his subordinates did the same, waste would largely disappear, for conservation is synonymous with absence of misuse. Much is already being done by the defence services; returned stores depots are working and expanding; salvage units have been raised and are functioning both in and outside India. But much remains to be done, and the salvage organization will shortly be strengthened. Control will gradually be stiffened, and co-ordination tightened up.

Salvage By Defence Forces in India

* * *

Civil, as opposed to Service salvage in India, is a problem entirely different from that which obtains in the United Kingdom. In peace-time India was a large exporter of salvage, and had not the plant and machinery to process her own salvage; moreover, collection and distribution over the vast distances involved, present a large problem. The Government of India (Department of Supply) has, however, done much to ensure a steady flow of usable salvage to consumers in India, and the process will be augmented. New plant is being installed and processes investigated to deal with the changed situation. Greater enthusiasm and effort are needed, and in that direction the Defence Services must play their part to the full.

Members are earnestly requested to notify any change of address to the Secretary without delay. Such cooperation will not only help to ease postal traffic at a time when mail services are over burdened, but will also ensure prompt receipt of the Journal each quarter.

THE START OF THE WAR IN BURMA

By J. G. S.

IT IS ALMOST exactly a year ago to-day since I arrived in India and sent to the Journal my article on Dunkirk. The long sea voyage out from Home gave me the time and opportunity to write that article, and a long spell of sickness has given me the time to write this one—time that I could have done very well without, but the rough must be taken with the smooth, and one cannot expect to do more than 29 years' soldiering without ever seeing the inside of a hospital.

Much has appeared recently in the Press about the second phase of the Burma war, *i.e.* from the fall of Rangoon until our forces were finally withdrawn into India, but not so much has been written about the opening phase of the campaign. This is only natural, as the fighting in Malaya, the Phillipines and the Dutch East Indies was occupying everyone's attention when the Burma campaign started. Nevertheless the first phase of the campaign held far more difficult problems for the Army Command than did the second. The small number of troops available had to be spread over vast distances, with the object of holding landing grounds and keeping invading Japanese forces as far away from Rangoon as possible for as long as possible.

This meant that the important principle of trying to concentrate superior numbers at the decisive point was continually warring with the necessity of trying to protect Rangoon. With the same object, *i.e.*, the protection of Rangoon, the troops in Lower Burma were tied to certain defensive lines until certain definite dates. This lead, perforce, to great difficulty in breaking contact when the time for withdrawal came, and to close-quarter engagements in country disadvantageous to us such as Sittang, which could easily have been avoided had the vital factor of Rangoon not existed. Also, of course, the troops in Upper Burma and the Chinese did not come into the first phase at all, and all the fighting fell on the 17th Division.

Once the second phase started, however, and Rangoon was given up, both divisions could be concentrated under a Corps Staff, on the Rangoon—Prome—Mandalay line, and the handling of the troops became infinitely easier. As General Alexander explained in his recent Press Conference in New Delhi, it was then difficulties of supply and re-inforcement more than anything

else which caused the withdrawal of our troops to India. Moreover, of course, the only two serious engagements and most of the casualties occurred in the first phase of the operations.

The events described in this article have already been mentioned in various articles in the Burma and Indian Press. The names of the Army Commanders, the numbers of the two divisions and nearly all the units have been mentioned in the Press already. The names of the Divisional Commanders and under, and the actual Brigade numbers have not however been mentioned in the Press, and they will therefore be omitted from this article—much as I should like to place on record the valiant and distinguished work carried out by many of those serving under my command.

Our lack of preparation for this particular campaign has been acknowledged both by the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, and by the Commander-in-Chief in India. It was simply due to our having so many irons in the fire that we had not the men or the resources to be strong everywhere. Nevertheless, if we are going to benefit by the mistakes which were made, as we surely must, it is essential that we should be frank and clear as to how and why they occurred. We shall then be able to concentrate our thoughts, energies and resources for our counter-offensive.

Ian Hay in the Foreword to his "The Battle of Flanders" wrote: "The British Army, by traditional usage, always seems to be compelled to start a war from small beginnings, and either play for time or take desperate risks until it has built itself up into an effective striking force. The entire history of that Army is chequered with tales of early reverses or expensive resistances, redeemed in the end, as resources and experience accumulated, by the final crown of victory". This is as true in a smaller way of the campaign in Burma as it was of the Battle of Flanders.

Four months after arriving out from Home, *i.e.*, in October 1941, I was given command of a new Indian Division which was being formed down country. The division was unique as far as Indian Divisions went at the time, as the Infantry battalions were all pre-war regular battalions straight from the frontier. I was in hospital when the order reached me, and it was nearly three weeks before the doctors would pass me fit. However, I arrived on October 20 and found that I was in plenty of time, as only the Brigade Staffs and a nucleus of the Divisional Staff had arrived. I had three extremely capable Brigadiers and the foundations of a really good Divisional Staff.

Within the next few weeks all the battalions arrived, and they much exceeded my expectations. Although they had, of course been "milked" several times, they had a nucleus of trained N.C.O.'s and men, and were based on very solid foundations. Moreover, they had all been recently engaged in frontier operations, and were therefore already alive and alert, used to movement and patrolling. In fact, they were an ideal division to bring quickly up to the standard required with one important exception—they had practically no M.T. drivers and the whole of our transport was to be M.T. All battalions were commanded by pre-war experienced officers and the other N.C.O.s, although mostly very young and new, looked most promising.

We started at once on a comprehensive and progressive system of training in ideal country. The supporting arms and services were starting to arrive, and everything seemed set fair. The spirit in the division was just that blend of trust, training and thoroughness which one always tries for but seldom achieves.

Suddenly, however, I had a sad and unexpected blow. The G.O.C. of the 17th Division (I need not conceal its numbers as it has been mentioned so often in the papers) went sick, and I was ordered to take command of that division, which was then doing its final training before going overseas. The telegram said "immediately" and I went off next day, very sad indeed at leaving my own division, of which I was extremely fond and proud.

The 17th Division was in the throes of its final training. Fully mechanized, it had concentrated on its mechanized problems, and was accustomed to moving long distances (at rather excessive speeds!). In fact, what with the terrible roads and long moves, it was obvious that the vehicles would be in a bad way if we did not call a halt and concentrate on maintenance for the last week or so. Moreover, the whole of the thick battledress had to be drawn and fitted, and the first Brigade was due to leave 10 days after I arrived.

I was able to get a very good comparison between the men of this division and my own. These were all new battalions, some of which had had very handicapping teething troubles. Their higher training was far in advance of their individual and platoon training. Could anyone have foreseen that the whole division would be hurled straight into jungle fighting against the best trained jungle fighters in the world, it would have paid hand over fist to have sent the M.T. to workshops and devoted

the whole of the last month to minor training and the training of junior leaders.

In the few days available I spent as much time as I could with the Brigade that was due to leave first, and saw them start off in their M.T.—complete with their warm battledress. I was never to see them again and only heard later that they had been despatched to Malaya, where they were at once in action and had their Brigadier killed, while they themselves suffered very heavy casualties.

On Christmas Day I was summoned to G.H.Q. with my chief Staff Officers and told that my Divisional H.Q. and one Infantry Brigade were to proceed to Burma, while the remaining Brigade was to go to Malaya. This Brigade also I never saw again. General Hutton, who had been selected to command the troops in Burma, had already left. That evening I went down with a violent go of flu' and the senior members of my Staff were sent off by air without me. I was, however, hot on their heels as soon as the doctors would let me, and arrived in Rangoon on January 9.

The Japs had by that time invaded Burma and taken Victoria Point, our southernmost aerodrome. They had also carried out a somewhat severe air raid on Rangoon, from which the morale of the civil population never really recovered. In all subsequent daylight raids, as soon as the siren went, cars could be seen streaking for the open country at top-speed, and Rangoon itself became a city of the dead. As my seaplane touched the water the siren went; whereupon every activity ceased and we sat there an hour and a half, very much a sitting bird, until the all-clear went.

I found the Army Commander confronted with some really fearsome problems involving the defence of an enormous area with very few troops, and the development of air and ground defence of Rangoon—a dreadful bottleneck of a port. For some reason, the former appreciation had been that the Japs would invade Upper Burma from the direction of Chieng Mai and the 1st Burma Division was disposed well to the north accordingly. It now appeared, however, almost certain that the Japs would be more likely to take the most direct route from Bangkok on to Rangoon, the loss of which would obviously be a crushing blow to us.

It was with the object of trying to block this main approach and to guard our aerodromes that my division was disposed in Lower Burma. The more of Lower Burma territory that was

given up, the closer came the threat to Rangoon. In fact, it was really the threat to Rangoon that dominated the strategical situation throughout this first phase of the operation. My orders were short and clear. I was responsible for the defence of Tenasserim from MERGUI in the south to PAPUN in the north. Speaking from memory the area was about 800 miles long and one glance at the map of Lower Burma showing the long thin strip of Tenasserim with the sea to the west and THAILAND to the east, will show how very vulnerable it was to enemy columns striking from the east. As soon as any of these, however small, entered Tenasserim, they were automatically astride our communications.

The troops at my disposal to hold this enormous area were as follows. At MERGUI, which was a landing ground, there was a battalion and half of Burma Rifles with some local Frontier Force. At TAVOY, another landing ground 300 miles to the north, there was a battalion of Burma Rifles. Again 250 miles to the north was MOULMEIN. This contained the Brigade H.Q. of the Burma Brigade and the third Battalion of the Brigade, a Battalion of the 12th. Frontier Force Rifles from India. The only permanent garrison for the whole of the enormous MOULMEIN area with its important aerodrome was the 8th Burma Rifles, consisting of stalwart Sikhs and P.M.'s enlisted from the Indian element in Burma.

My Divisional H. Q. was to be located in MOULMEIN, with the H. Q. of the Tenasserim Government. A hundred miles away to the east of Moulmein, guarding what was likely to be the Japs' main route of advance through the thickly wooded Dawna hills, was my second Brigade, consisting of one Burma Rifle Battalion, a battalion of the 9th Jats, a Battalion of the 7th Gurkhas and an Indian mountain battery. It will thus be seen that there were enormous gaps between units and that the line of communication was lengthy and unprotected.

The Japs, having already taken Victoria Point and being firmly established wherever they wished from Bangkok to Chieng Mai, were in a good disposition to raid Tenasserim by land, sea and air from positions directly at right angles to our main line of communication. In fact our landing grounds at Mergui and Tavoy were so close to the Japanese that they could only be used as emergency re-fuelling stations. The solution to the problem was, of course, a simple one—more troops. It was obvious that another two divisions between Moulmein and Toungoo would have made the Japanese infiltration impossibly

difficult and, with the Chinese forces gradually moving down from the North, would have held off indefinitely the threat to Rangoon.

As we know, however, with all available re-inforcements being hurried out to Singapore, those extra divisions were not available for Burma, and we just had to make do with what we had. We were, of course, to get re-inforcements later, and very valuable ones too, but on nothing like the scale required. Our preliminary dispositions were in fact the outcome of weakness based on bluff—and as the Japanese information of all our movements and dispositions was always excellent, our bluff was very quickly called.

As regards our Air Force, we were extremely lucky to have some most gallant and efficient American Volunteer Group airmen in Rangoon. They were civilians and free-lances, and were paid very handsomely for every enemy aircraft they shot down. Just as the old method in the British Army of purchasing commissions and seniority produced some very fine commanders, so this somewhat unorthodox volunteer procedure produced some very fine results. In all subsequent Japanese air raids on Rangoon, after the first one in December, their losses were tremendously heavy. The A. V. G. Group were of course gradually re-inforced by R. A. F. bombers and fighters as they became available from elsewhere.

The problem facing the Army Commander was indeed a knotty one. He had no military intelligence service and, from the time the Japanese invasion of Lower Burma started, no information came in from civil sources. As General Alexander told the Press in New Delhi the other day, about 10 per cent. of the population were pro-Japanese, 10 per cent. were pro-British, and the remaining 80 per cent. rather apathetic. The latter would, I am sure, have been actively pro-British had we been in a position to take the offensive. As it was, the organized Japanese minority had an influence out of all proportion to their numbers, with the result that the enemy got good information, food and guides and animal transport, and was always able to get hold of rafts and river boats when he required them.

After a busy afternoon at A. H. Q. I was on the point of visiting the Governor when the air raid alarm went again, and the whole life of the city came to a full stop. Eventually, however, I was able to get to Government House. Incidentally it was one of the most hideous buildings I have ever seen—a newer red brick edition of Portsmouth barracks. The Governor gave

me a most cheerful welcome—he had once been a subaltern in my regiment. I did not see him again until he and his Government had been forced to leave Rangoon for Upper Burma.

Since arising in Calcutta at 0300 hours I had put in a lot of work and was not sorry to get to bed. There were, however, two more air raid alarms during the night but the Army Commander and I were up betimes, as we planned to pay a visit to lower Tenasserim by air. The flight was a somewhat tricky one in view of the proximity of the Japanese Air Force, and the A. O. C. sent a fighter escort with us. There was a slight delay in getting off owing to disorganization caused by the night's air raids, but we landed at Mergui without incident after about two hours' flight. I was very pleased to find there, commanding the Burma Rifle battalion, a very old Indian Army friend—Army and Davis Cup tennis player—with whom I had played tennis in years gone by. He had an excellent show going with his F. F. R. well out, watching all the approaches.

We flew to Tavoy for lunch. Tavoy is a most attractive little place in the centre of the tin mining country. The battalion there, having the responsibility of guarding the aerodrome and the land and sea approaches, was very thin on the ground. Moreover, it was completely untrained, and I was not surprised, when the Japanese attack developed, that the defences were quickly overwhelmed. We arrived at Moulmein at 1600 hours, where the Army Commander left me to return to his H. Q. in Rangoon. We were both extremely pleased later on that we had done this trip on about the last date it could have been carried out.

Although I had never been to Burma before, every place had some sentimental association for me, as my people had been there during the whole of their I. C. S. service, and my father had died there. I was continually being welcomed by old friends of my father's—the first being the Commissioner of Tenasserim, who had been my father's D. C. in Moulmein. We established the very closest liaison from the start, and our ways did not part until I had lost almost the whole of Tenasserim for him, and his job automatically came to an end. His family, with whom I stayed for 10 days, until they had to be evacuated, were kindness itself, besides being an example of cheerfulness and determination to make the best of things at a time of considerable anxiety.

The first person to greet me on the aerodrome was old Subadar Budh Singh, of the 15th Sikhs, whom I had taken leave

of 26 years before with a nasty bullet hole in his chest which looked like being the end of him. He had somehow managed to join up with a Kokine battalion which was being used for aerodrome guards, and here he was, grey-bearded and rather blind, but alert and tough as ever. He insisted on taking me off at once to his quarter guard which he had been coaching up for days for a good old "present arms" (he had never heard of the introduction of the new drill) after the real 15th Sikh pattern. We had all too few Sikhs in the Division—and what a grand show they put up later on when the Japs attacked the aerodrome!

I found that only the air echelon of my Divisional H. Q. had as yet arrived, but that they had been working like Trojans at the many problems, chiefly administrative, that were awaiting urgent solution. I had two busy days looking round Moulmein, meeting a great many people and looking at troops and defences. What a fascinating place Moulmein must have been in peace time, with its high pagoda ridge, its rivers and jungle—its "Burmah girl a settin"! with her cheroot and her picturesque garments! The Commissioner's house stood right on top of the ridge and got every bit of breeze that blew.

Looked at from a defence point of view, however, it could hardly have been worse. The smallest perimeter, which would include the aerodrome and the river front quays, to which ran our main line of communication from Rangoon by steam ferry from Martaban, was 25 miles round. On three sides were rivers, crossable everywhere by boat and raft, and on the third side there was thick jungle, through which ran innumerable tracks. Moreover, the quays and railhead at Martaban, 6,000 yards across the water on the far side of the Gulf of Martaban, had also to be held—and what bombing targets the whole place presented! The Commissioner's house alone, with its flag flying, gave an irresistible target to any airman. I firmly insisted on the removal of the flagstaff, and the house survived for over a fortnight before it took a direct hit from a shell.

On January 13, with my G. I., A/Q and C. R. E., I set off to visit the other brigade up the Dawnas. We had about 100 miles to go, through most picturesque jungle, including two river crossings by ferry. The latter was a tedious business even for one car, so it may be imagined what a long business it was for troops. I felt certain that, if such crossings had to be attempted in face of air opposition, utter chaos would probably result, as there was only one ferry, operated by Burmese boatmen. This did actually happen a little later; the ferry, with a

lorry on it sank in midstream, and the remainder of the M. T. had to be destroyed. My C. R. E. of course, was very quick off the mark with the introduction of every sort of improvement to this very prehistoric method of river crossing, but there was not time for them ever to materialize.

On arrival at Brigade H. Q. we went straight up to visit forward Battalions, and to see the excellent demolitions which had been prepared in case the enemy advanced this far in force. These demolitions had been so sited that whole sections of the road would fall down a precipitous slope; they did, in fact, delay the enemy's advance for at least 10 days.

We climbed a hill to a so-called view-point that merely enabled us to see the tops of a lot more jungle in front of us. In this form of warfare one realized at once what a tremendous advantage lay with the attacker, particularly if he were in superior numbers. He had merely to go on infiltrating forward on a wide front, concentrating eventually on a pre-arranged objective. The tendency is for the defence, in an endeavour to block every route of advance, to make too many detachments, which only detract from strength at the decisive point. The ideal would have been to have feelers out in all directions, consisting of platoons with wireless sets. Unfortunately we were so short of wireless that sometimes we could only give one set to a battalion.

I found the Burma Rifle battalion of this Brigade riddled with malaria—so much so that the Brigade really only consisted of two Battalions. The intelligence officer of the Brigade had been resident in this area for many years, and had many friends on both sides of the border. He informed me that, within about a week, a Japanese division would start advancing towards Moulmein on this line. It appeared at first as though he had exaggerated the numbers, as the initial advance was quite a weak one, but the information he gave me was absolutely accurate, and was for some time the only intelligence we and H. Q. had to go on. Having had a long talk with this officer, who was most unfortunately killed in the first clash, I decided that I would at once incorporate civil officers with local experience in my Divisional Staff.

On January 15, the remainder of my Divisional H. Q. arrived, and we had our first visit from Japanese aircraft. We had a warning system in Moulmein, but not a good enough one to keep aircraft stationed there. From our own point of view I was thankful when the system broke down and we only took

cover when the aircraft were overhead. Whilst we had the sirens, all civil labour closed down for several hours during the day.

About 1100 hours the O. C. Tavoy rang up to say that a column of 300 Japs was approaching Tavoy from the East, and that he had sent two companies out to engage them. The Japs weren't supposed to do this sort of thing at all: having taken Victoria Point they should have invaded Tenasserim from the south, thus allowing each of our posts to withdraw, after the maximum resistance, on to the next one. It was obvious, however, that with our scattered dispositions and enormously lengthy lines of communication, the east-to-west advance continually had us in a quandary, and threatened to cut off portions of our forces to the south of the axis of their advance. They continued therefore, to make all their main advances from east to west right up to the fall of Rangoon and after. Having seen how weak Tavoy was, I ordered O. C. Mergui to re-inforce him with half a battalion. Meanwhile the defensive weakness of Moulmein was worrying me a lot—it was extremely important that it should be held and strongly defended, but we had no men and material.

The Q problem which faced my staff at this time was a particularly difficult one. We were responsible for a line of communication which stretched from Mergui right back to the Sittang bridge. Supplies came by rail and road from Rangoon to Martaban—then came an awful bottleneck of 6,000 yards of water, over which everything had to come by steamer, and then on again to the two forward Brigades by river, rail and road. Train and river services were run by civil personnel, who just would not stand the bombing, and we were gradually forced to take them all over, and the Banks, post offices and telegraph offices into the bargain.

On January 16 I had my first meeting of the defence committee. This consisted of myself and my senior staff officers, and the Commissioner and his senior officials. They put all their knowledge and experience of the country at our disposal, and opposite numbers, military and civil, got down to tackling their problems together. I have often worked with I. C. S. and political officers in India, but have never met any crowd of civilians who were so efficient and so helpful as those drawn from the Burma Civil, Canal Service, Railways and the business community who worked with us for the first two months of the war in Burma. The D. C., Moulmein, and the D. S. P., Moulmein,

were two of the most efficient and the most stout-hearted colleagues one could ever wish for in times of stress. The D. C.'s wife ran the civil first-aid posts, and the minute the alarm sounded she was off down into the bazaar, setting the highest example to Europeans and Burmans alike. The strain was eventually too much for the D. S. P., who was evacuated to India, a very sick man. He was a great loss.

As more districts of Burma were invaded, many of the junior civilians became out of a job. I think the Army could have made far more use of them and of the evacuated business community. They had the priceless advantage of knowing both the people and the language. In the same way I think that the Political Service in India could now spare many of their under 40 officers to join the Indian Army. These could well be replaced by older officers or even by retired officers, of whom there must be many with the necessary experience.

A force of 14 Jap bombers escorted by 5 fighters bombed Moulmein on January 17. They did very little damage, but the Burmese population started a steady evacuation into the surrounding country and labour, which we needed badly, became very hard to get. Meanwhile the news from Tavoy was not good. The O.C. had little confidence in his troops, and they appeared to be putting up very little resistance to the Japanese, who were reported to be strongly re-inforced.

Two days later Tavoy fell. This meant that Mergui was completely cut off, unless we could evacuate the garrison by sea to Rangoon. This again depended on secrecy and careful planning. A start was made at once, and my naval L.O. was sent down by sea to help. Brigade H.Q. from Moulmein, with their third battalion, went down towards Tavoy to assist any parts of the garrison the civil population who had managed to get away by road. They did yeoman work there, and passed through refugees of all sorts, including the O.C. Garrison who, after a hectic four days and 250-mile trek by road, was on the point of a nervous breakdown.

Next day the expected Jap advance through the Dawnas started, and we certainly had plenty to think about. The Japs supported this advance by intensive dive-bombing attacks. One company of the 7th Gurkhas was bombed for four hours; the noise and the moral effect in the thick jungle were very great, but the actual casualties extraordinarily small.

Faced with an infiltration advance of this nature through dense jungle, particularly with such scanty communications, it is

extremely difficult for the local commander to get any reliable estimate of the strength of the opposition. Extremely varying reports reached Brigade H.Q. The Brigadier would certainly have been in the wrong had he let the enemy get round behind him on to the demolitions. He therefore decided to make certain of blowing his demolitions and, having done so, withdrew his force on to Kawkareik. Here, as already mentioned, the ferry broke down and the small pool of M.T. which was the only transport available had to be destroyed, together with all equipment and food which could not be carried on the men.

The Brigade then had a very trying 60-mile march into Moulmein: this was forced on them by dwindling supplies rather than by enemy action. The net result was heavy losses of transport and equipment, with few casualties inflicted on either side. The road, however, was most effectively blown, and the demolitions slowed up the rate of the Japanese advance for several weeks to come. The action rubbed in again the evils of too many detachments and too much dispersion, which had been forced on us by lack of troops and complete lack of information.

On January 21 Jap aircraft were very active over Moulmein. With the exception of 4 Bofors on the aerodrome and two last-war A.A. pieces at Martaban, we had nothing with which to oppose them. Two of our fighters did land in the afternoon just as a formidable force of Jap aircraft came over. The pilots refused to see their aircraft destroyed on the ground, and very gallantly tried to get up and make a fight of it; the odds, however, were too great and they were both shot down. The bombing started a really bad fire in the bazaar, which took the Sappers several hours to get under. It did, however, complete the evacuation of the Burmese population, which might have been difficult to enforce.

I decided that evening that all European and Indian women and children must leave. The aerodrome was already virtually out of action and the only other route, by ferry steamer to Martaban, was becoming more precarious daily. The European women were all working in important jobs, either in the office or in the hospitals, and we were as loath to let them go as they were to give up their jobs. Divisional H.Q., now in the forefront of the battle, was ordered further back, and a general redistribution of forces had to be made to fill the very long gap which still existed between us and Rangoon.

On January 23 the B.G.S. from A.H.Q. arrived, and we spent most of the day looking round the Moulmein defences. It was

obvious to us both that, with no defences to speak of actually constructed, and with the length of perimeter that must be held, the proposition was a difficult one. One Brigade was the most that could be spared for it, and the eventual withdrawal of that Brigade might be a difficult if not impossible operation. However, the Army Commander was still hoping for re-inforcements of at least a division, and the loss of Moulmein would greatly increase the air threat to Rangoon and also the danger of troops being landed there by sea.

That day we had a great air success over Rangoon, the bag being 19 Jap aircraft for certain and another seven probables. The Air Force naturally pressed hard for the retention of Moulmein, and it was decided that it must be held as long as possible by one Brigade consisting of the 12th F.F.R., the 8th Burma Rifles. (Sikhs and P.M.'s), two batteries of Burma Rifles, a mountain battery and the aerodrome defences, consisting of the Bofors guns and the Kokine Battalion aerodrome guard.

In addition to the above troops we had the Brigade withdrawn from Kawkareik, which was being reformed and re-equipped at Martaban, and one of the original Brigades of the 17th Division just arrived from India, at Bilin. This latter Brigade consisted of a battalion of the 7th Gurkhas, a battalion of the 17th Dogras, and a battalion of the 10th Baluch. The Brigade was very far short of being fully trained, and, of course, had no experience of jungle warfare. It had, however, a full complement of carriers, which came in very useful later on for road protection.

Divisional H.Q. moved back on January 24, to Kyaikto, where I shared the P.W.D. bungalow with the Commissioner; H.Q. was established in the local jail. From now on there were indications that Japanese forces were closing in on Moulmein from the east and from the south. The Army Commander and I spent the day there on the 28th and on the morning of the 30th the Japanese attack started. By the evening about two Japanese regiments were in contact and the garrison was virtually cut off. The telephone, however, was never cut; I was in constant communication with the Commander. That night I informed the Army Commander of the situation, and he left it to me as to what action I should take.

Up to nightfall we were doing very well. The Japanese were obviously using good troops as the employment of their artillery, the co-operation with their air arm and the skill and determination with which the infantry pressed forward were all

first-class. In places, however, they suffered severe casualties, and the aerodrome defences, which had been entirely re-sited and reconstructed, proved a very hard nut to crack. Had we had the troops and material to construct proper perimeter defences, and another Brigade to put into it, I am convinced that Moulmein could have held out a considerable time. As it was, however, the situation deteriorated rapidly, the defences were penetrated in several places and the aerodrome cut off. The ferries were still intact, and on the Moulmein side of the water, but it was obvious that the strain on the crews was proving almost too great. Once the crews or the ferries went, all chance of evacuating the garrison would go too.

After a final talk with the Brigadier I ordered him to withdraw if he could at 1700 hours, and we arranged for Rangoon to put up as strong an umbrella as they could to cover the operation. There was a lot of confused fighting in the streets of Moulmein as the garrison fought its way down to the quays. They were only just in time, as the nerves of the ferry crews were at breaking point; it was obvious that they would only do one trip—indeed one could hardly have expected non-military personnel to do more. The journey across under shell and machine-gun fire was a nightmare. Several craft were sunk and a number of men drowned. There were many deeds of gallantry performed, the 12th F.F.R., the Mountain Battery, 8th Burma Rifles and the R.E. particularly distinguishing themselves.

That the bulk of the Force was withdrawn safely in broad daylight under every sort of difficulty reflects the greatest credit on the commanders and troops concerned. There were a good many casualties, and we lost four Bofors, four mountain guns and a good deal of equipment, but very little transport, as we had evacuated most of it beforehand. The Brigade, however, had inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and had given Rangoon an extra week's respite, every day of which was precious.

On the Martaban side every Staff officer was working night and day, sorting out units and feeding and re-equipping the men.

Our new dispositions, though considerably stronger than they had been, were still ordered mainly with the idea of giving up as little of Burma as possible, and so allowing Rangoon elbow-room and giving time for the southward move of the Chinese armies. This resulted in some cases in battalions being as much as 40 miles apart, which of course, from a purely tactical point of view, was not good.

We were now disposed as follows: the southernmost Brigade with its H. Q. at Thaton, had one battalion there, and one down at Martaban, which the Japs were obviously already nibbling at. They had been bombing and shelling it from Moulmein ever since the latter place was evacuated. A third battalion was at Paan on the Salween—an obvious line of approach from the east, and a fourth battalion at Duienzeik, an important river-crossing connecting Thaton with Paan. The Brigade was as concentrated as possible to cover the places they had to hold, but battalions were yet so much separated that a Brigade battle was impossible.

The next Brigade was at Bilin, with one battalion 80 miles to the north at Papun, the northern limit of my responsibility. At Kyaikto was the Burma Brigade which had been in Moulmein. This Brigade had to find detachments as far back as the Sittang bridge, for which I was responsible. This was a large and vital railway bridge over the Sittang river on which our communications with Rangoon depended. Sappers were working night and day to enable it to take road as well as railway traffic. The road from Kyaikto back to Sittang was just being made; it was in a terrible state, feet deep in thick dust and running through dense jungle.

During the next week, whilst the enemy were making a close reconnaissance of our positions, I got a very welcome addition to my strength in the Gurkha Brigade from the 19th Division. I had asked for this Brigade as soon as I got orders to come to Burma, as I knew what a tower of strength they would be in the close jungle fighting we were likely to experience. Unfortunately they arrived very short of pack transport, of which we were so greatly in need. They were located between Kyaikto and Bilin in Divisional reserve. As I had now got four Infantry Brigades and was soon to get a Tank Brigade, I was given a B. G. S. in addition to my G. 1.

On January 10 the Japs took Martaban by a combined sea landing and land attack. The battalion of the 7th Gurkhas defending the place was heavily outnumbered, and had been subjected to a week's intermittent air bombing and shelling. On the 12th the Baluchis at Paan were heavily attacked by about four times their number of Japs and overwhelmed. They were a young battalion with very few old soldiers and a number of very young officers, but they fought like veterans. They were heavily dive-bombed and subjected to intense mortar fire. The

Japs pressed in from all sides and the fighting became hand-to-hand. The C. O. was killed, but the companies fought on under their own officers as long as any organized resistance was possible.

It now became so obvious that the wide dispersion adopted was likely to lead to defeat in detail that the Army Commander's sanction was obtained to the concentration of the Division behind the Bilin river. The Japs tried hard to circumvent this by forced marches through the jungle. We, however, were based on a road and railway, and in spite of their getting a considerable start, we were back with all our stores and transport complete, in time—but only just. As the K. O. Y. L. I. got into their position they met a Japanese battalion and the whole Brigade was soon in action.

From the 15th to the 20th two Brigades fought what was estimated to be a whole Japanese Division on the line of the Bilin river. The fighting was close and hard, but in view of the danger to Rangoon, we had orders to hold this line until A. H. Q. gave permission to withdraw. The 4th, 5th and 7th Gurkhas and the K. O. Y. L. I. distinguished themselves particularly, and wherever ground was lost, regained it by counter-attack. Our Air Force supported us most effectively during this battle.

By the 19th it was obvious that large numbers of Japs were passing round our northern flank. Only one fresh battalion, the 12th F. F. R. remained in hand at Kyaikto, and they were put in on the left flank of the forward brigades to try and stem this infiltration. Their action was partially successful, but there was every indication that the enemy had been strongly re-inforced. We learnt later that a complete new division had been passed round our northern flank with orders to "cut off and destroy the 17th Division at Sittang."

Orders were received on the 20th to withdraw. The forward brigades broke contact extremely skilfully as soon as it got dark, and the enemy followed up warily, having gained a wholesome respect for the hitting-back powers of our troops. So ended the Bilin battle, the most severe engagement of the Burma campaign, and one in which our troops acquitted themselves well. It was the first time the situation admitted of our giving battle in force, supported by some artillery and on ground of our own choosing. Although increasingly outnumbered, we had not given way a yard until ordered, and so again given Rangoon and the higher command another valuable week's respite. The troops, however, were desperately tired—I have only seen troops as weary during the last stages of the Dunkirk operation. Whether they

would ever be able to make Sittang before fresh Jap troops cut in behind us was a very moot point. Morale was extremely high and that helped enormously in keeping troops on the move.

A few days before the Bilin battle started, the Army Commander had had a very narrow escape from death in an aeroplane accident. He and his A. D. C. had gone on a liaison visit in two Lysander aircraft. Both aircraft were compelled to make a forced landing. The A. D. C. was told to make a parachute jump—what a horrid moment!—and did so successfully. The pilot of this aircraft made a crash landing, but escaped with his life. The Army Commander stuck to his aircraft; the machine caught fire on landing, but he managed to pull the unconscious airman out alive; unfortunately he died later in the day. The Army Commander, though terribly bruised and shaken and with water on both knees, came to visit me a few days later, and concealed his injuries so well that neither I nor my Staff knew that the accident had occurred—altogether a very gallant performance.

After the withdrawal from Moulmein I brought a business man with years' of experience of Burma on to my Staff and made him my chief Intelligence Officer. From that day our information started to improve, and we were able to give A. H. Q. a few probable forecasts and appreciations. Early in the Bilin battle he gave information of the danger of our being cut off at Sittang; after Sittang he gave an extremely accurate forecast of the probable Japanese action in cutting the Rangoon—Toungoo and Rangoon—Prome roads and of the route the Japs would probably take in getting to Mandalay. It made me realize what a handicap we suffered from, as compared with the Japanese, in not having prepared beforehand for this campaign.

On January 20 the Japs landed troops by sea about 12 miles south of Kyaikto. We had only a few military police and local frontier force to observe and delay them. On the 21st the withdrawal from Bilin continued, covered by the 3rd Gurkhas, who had been laid back beforehand into a covering position. Divisional H. Q. was now rather in the forefront of the battle, but we could not move back until the rearguard arrived. All through the night of the 21/22nd the weary troops came in to Kyaikto and after only a few hours' rest were pushed on again. Kyaikto was held by the few battalions which had been re-organizing and were not fit to take part in the Bilin battle. During the night the B. M. P. lost touch with the coastal landing troops, and the situation in that direction became obscure and somewhat uncomfortable.

At 0600 hours next morning, after a busy night, the B. G. S. and I were pouring out our morning tea when with loud jackal howls Japanese troops, probably the sea-landing people, who had crept through the jungle, attacked Divisional H. Q. and the railway station. It was still quite dark, and bullets from every direction smacked up against the walls of the jail. The Employment Platoon were at their alarm posts and inside them the officers of the Divisional H. Q. Staff, with drawn revolvers, took their posts.

The Japs were using their favourite, and very effective, device of coloured bullets to inform one another of their whereabouts and of the targets they were engaging. One would have appreciated the firework display more as an outside observer. We got through to Brigade H. Q. on the phone, and a company of the 12th F. F. R. was sent up to re-inforce. It started to get light—the attack had not achieved the surprise expected and the Japs drew off.

The withdrawal by Brigade groups on to Sittang continued during the 22nd. The bridgehead defences there had been considerably strengthened and now consisted of the 12th F. F. R., the remainder of the 10th Baluch, a large detachment of Burma Rifles, a company of the newly-arrived D. W. R. with some mountain guns and A. A. guns. Divisional H. Q. was at the Mokpalin quarries with the Gurkha Brigade. Enemy air action throughout the day was very severe. Our fighters did their best to give us some protection and shot down several enemy bombers.

The Sittang bridge was just ready to take wheeled traffic, and from the late afternoon, all through the night, a steady stream of transport and non-combatant units were passed over. The Japs dared not bomb it until every effort to capture it had failed. It really looked as though we were going to get over in time. That evening a Staff officer from A. H. Q. arrived with information that the Tank Brigade had arrived, was disembarking with all speed in Rangoon, and would join me as early as possible.

At 0300 hours, with the roads getting clearer of transport, the march was resumed. Everything was absolutely quiet. A. H. Q. had informed us that it was likely that the Japs might try and land troops by parachute on the open ground west of Sittang, and take the bridge from that side. It was imperative, therefore, that the Gurkha Brigade should get across as early as possible. On approaching the bridge we found that a lorry had overturned in the middle and for three hours the bridge was

blocked. What vital hours these turned out to be! I went forward to consult the C. R. E. and have a look at the bridge defences.

Eventually the bridge was opened, and Divisional H. Q., Gurkha Brigade H. Q. and the 4th Gurkhas passed over. Suddenly, from the thick jungle to the north, a heavy Japanese attack was put in on the bridgehead defences—the defences gave—and the Japs looked to have got the whole bridge. A counter-attack was quickly organized and most determinedly carried out. The bridgehead was regained and the Japs withdrew, taking my A. D. M. S. and several other officers with them. They were, however, soon strongly re-inforced and they interposed a solid ring between the bridgehead and the remainder of the division. We had failed by six hours to get across intact.

We were now opposed by two divisions—a completely fresh one which had been working round our northern flank for days, and the somewhat mauled one with which we had been in action at Bilin. On the East bank of the river the 3rd and 5th Gurkhas were at once in action in a determined attempt to join up with the bridgehead defences. Behind them the other two brigades were soon engaged. The fighting developed early into a really close jungle battle over which no one above a Battalion Commander had any control. It was a soldiers' battle and a junior leaders' battle. Our troops gave as good as they got, but they were unable to break through to the bridge.

On the west bank we had only Divisional H. Q. and Gurkha Brigade H. Q. and the 4th Gurkhas, and we should have been hard put to it if the expected parachute landings had taken place. After a preliminary wireless message telling all brigades the situation, communications broke down and it was only possible to tell from the noises of battle approximately what was happening. At 1500 hours the bridgehead defences were very heavily and accurately shelled, and the bridgehead again lost. The 4th Gurkhas, the only remaining battalion, was put in to re-take it, and the situation was once again restored. The night was quiet and a few men crossed over to our side of the river on rafts.

At 0400 hours the Gurkha Brigade Commander in charge of the Bridge defences reported by telephone that Japanese pressure had increased, and he could not guarantee to hold the bridge for more than another hour. Military history teems with difficult decisions over bridge demolitions, but I cannot recall a more difficult one than this—to blow a bridge knowing that


three quarters of one's own troops are on the wrong side. However, there was no doubt whatsoever as to the right course. If the Japs had got the bridge, not only could they pass a whole division straight on to Rangoon, but, with both banks of the Sittang in their possession, the chances of getting more of 17th Division over would be very small. I told the Brigadier to blow.

The bridge was most gallantly blown by the Sappers under close fire. The effect on the Japanese was immediate: having failed in their object they drew off and parties of our men, in broad daylight, started to swim and float themselves over. The Sittang is a nasty river to swim and men who did so had to divest themselves of most of their clothes and certainly their boots. On arrival at the far bank they then had some distance to walk on stony ground. The feet of officers and British ranks unused to walking barefoot were in an appalling state.

The Divisional Staff now had a problem of evacuation, re-clothing, re-equipping and feeding, before which all former problems faded into insignificance. Fortunately the Japs definitely had had enough, and allowed us to run trains and lorries to within a mile or two of the river to bring back the wounded and lame. Their casualties had undoubtedly been heavy—an escaped officer estimated that there were 2,000 Japs dead in the vicinity of the bridge alone. Our losses had also been heavy—three valuable C. O.'s killed and many other officers and men, besides heavy losses in guns and equipment. In an action where so many gallant deeds were done, it is somewhat invidious to single out particular units. The 3rd and 5th Gurkhas, however, distinguished themselves particularly, as did the two British battalions, the K. O. Y. L. I. and the D. W. R. The latter battalion had only just arrived and had to be put straight into action.

The Sittang battle is a fitting climax to the first phase of the operations. We learnt many lessons from them which will be, or have been, incorporated in the various training memoranda. No one will deny that in Burma we were unprepared for this type of fighting, and that our troops were completely untrained for it. No true picture can be obtained of the early fighting in Burma unless it is clearly borne in mind that long lines of communications and dispersions were forced on us by other factors than tactical necessity.

It has been said that the troops were road-bound and M. T.-minded. We should have liked more animal transport, of course, for tactical movement and actual fighting, but without



our railway, good M. T. road and modicum of M. T. we could not possibly have maintained troops so widely dispersed or got them back so quickly to other dispositions. In the latter phases of the operations, tactical necessity could be put first and dispersion was only necessary to gain cover from the air. It would be idle to compare this type of operation with the battle of Flanders. The tempo is much slower and the commander has a long time—too long—to think. I am convinced, however, that jungle fighting demands a higher standard of individual training, specialist training and junior leading than any other type of warfare that exists.

BURMA: A NEW TECHNIQUE OF WARFARE

By LT.-COL. G. T. WHEELER

IT IS TOO EARLY to write a full account of the campaign in Burma. The enemy would learn much from such an account for many of our manœuvres must still be inexplicable to him, as his often were to us. It is also reasonable to hope that the full, unexpurgated story of the campaign will never be written for it would be sorry reading in many places. The credit which is due to the British and Indian troops that fought the enemy can hardly be overstated, and the more fully their deeds are related the better. The tale of the Indian refugees, the crumbling of the "home" front of Burma, and the striving for comfort and safety in rear areas are matters that will never be fairly told, so they should remain untold.

To some extent the Japanese have introduced a new technique of warfare. Napoleon over-ran Europe largely because he taught his troops to live on the country, and so achieved a degree of strategical mobility that left his enemies gasping. The Japanese have done the same, but added a standard of tactical infiltration that can be called amazing. This combination of strategical mobility and tactical infiltration produces a most annoyingly ubiquitous enemy. The Japanese is most dangerous when there is no news of him and no contact with him. At such times he nearly always proved to be either where he was least wanted or where it was believed impossible to go; these were frequently the same place.

The Japanese Army has done much preparation to achieve this degree of mobility. The men have been thoroughly trained physically and tactically, and their junior officers have been imbued with a strong offensive spirit which carries them forward without apparent regard to events on their right or left. There is, however, nothing in this aspect of their training which we cannot equal and better. The mental background of the Japanese soldiering is, however, something that we shall not equal during the course of this war. The Japanese are a military nation, which we are not, and they have assiduously cultivated a military and ascetic spirit by every available means of propaganda. Japanese cinemas show films of a single Jap beating many foes with a sword, they extol contempt of comfort and

teach in every way the superiority of their race to other people and to luxury.

In the same period we have preached against war and developed a standard of luxury life which has no place in war. We cannot reverse these facts in a few years, so we must accept them, and look for compensating assets. The first asset is not hard to find. We have a high standard of living and allied to it is a very high industrial capacity. Our potential, if not actual, output of weapons of war could make the Japanese armies look like tribal lashkars; yet in Burma the standard of armament was about equal; we were more heavily armed, the Japanese more appropriately for the country. That must be put right, and it will only be done if both emergency and imagination are used.

Much of our equipment is quite unsuitable for use against the Japanese. Our 3-inch mortar is too heavy, particularly the base plate; any metallurgist would halve the weight without difficulty. Ammunition boots have no place in the jungle. We have no quickly-laid booby traps for use in the ideal setting which jungle provides; no coloured smoke for signalling, no raft-making gadgets, no life belts, no "jungle" tanks, no hand-carts. There is a lot of lee-way to be made up, if we are to barter our superior industrialization for our need for comfort and imported food.

A second asset which we should be able to exploit is our superior wealth. The subject is a delicate one, for wealth in war is largely spent below the level at which decent people breathe freely. Japan has some Allies now who are accustomed to react to money. They should be treated on the grand scale and brought in from the highest in their ranks. As a nation we have rather forgotten the possibilities of buying high commanders. The practice is still popular in the East and we should have a seat in the market.

The last asset which comes readily to mind is the Air Force. The Japanese rushed us in Malaya and Burma. He drove us from our airfields one by one by taking risks with his bomber force which we have learnt not to face. When we, like plumbers, come back with our tools, we must accept risks to rush him off his forward landing grounds and establish the fact beyond all doubt that any Japanese aeroplane which perches within reach of our main bomber force is virtually written off. That is what he did to us in Burma, working at the end of a L. of C. which was longer than he had foreseen; for presumably he did not foresee his rapid move northwards from Rangoon,

The Air Force, too, needs some alterations in its equipment. The first need is probably a slow-falling bomb which bursts on impact with a tree top. The effect of such a bomb would be shattering. Targets for it, which could only be areas, would be easy to find at night when the Japanese lights his fire without discretion (or need for it), and could be found by day as soon as our Intelligence has regained close touch with the local yokels. He lies up in the jungle by day.

The fear of being encircled in the jungle is ever-present, more so than anyone without jungle experience can realize. The sound of shooting in one's rear is unpleasant. It can of course be produced most easily by dropping squibs from aircraft; and this should be done. It is a potent weapon because it loses no force when it is known to the enemy and disregarded by him; it can then be used as a cloak for encircling troops.

The use of aircraft for marking the route for night marches should be examined. Two nights before the Japanese put down a road block north of Rangoon, an Engineer colonel spoke to a Staff Officer at the cross-roads, eighteen miles north of Rangoon and five miles south-east of the eventual site of the road-block:

"That is where he's going to cut us off", he said, putting his pencil point on the exact spot.

"How do you figure that out?" asked the Staff Officer.

"Come up the road a bit and I'll show you."

They walked a few hundred yards up the road to a place where the trees cleared. The engineer officer pointed to the opposite hill, on which three fires were burning. "Those three fires are here," he pointed to his map again, "and if you produce the line it cuts the road at M.S. 23., which is where we shall be cut off in due course."

That was interesting because it proved true. In the case of the Jap it is probable that the fires would be started by an officer's patrol moving a day or two ahead of the main body. They use their officer's patrols with a freedom that amounts to impertinence—and get away with it. In our case, however, we could lay our line of fires more quickly and more accurately by incendiary bombs from aircraft. A special slow-burning incendiary might be necessary. They need not, of course, be exactly on the route as that would invite an ambush.

The Japanese used Arty. R. planes in broad daylight; this would be rated a bit old-fashioned in any other theatre of war. However, our planes are so superior in quality, and should be so superior in quantity, that the time may well come when we can

safely do the same. Ground observation is so difficult that we would be well-advised to train for the eventuality of complete air mastery and the consequent phenomena of daylight Arty R.

Let us leave equipment. There are high-browed experts paid to devise what the army wants, and they still have pay to earn. Organization is not quite so high-brow, though it is at present too complicated for our needs. The Chinese battalion has a strange organization in our eyes, for over half the unit is unarmed. They are, in effect, only doing within the battalion what we do within the army, and it is doubtful whether we produce as many armed men per million as they do.

The tail of a modern British Army has to be seen to be believed. A good porter is much more efficient than many other forms of transport; he carries nearly half-a-mule load, eats one-tenth of a mule's ration in weight, and occupies one-fifth of a mule's road space. In addition he lies down when being bombed and so remains alive much longer than a mule, in war as he does in peace. There is, therefore, a strong case for following the Chinese organization and including at least one, probably two, porter companies in each battalion.

The Japanese solution to the same problem is to use local inhabitants and prisoners of war as porters. There is a legal aspect to this; but it tends to confirm the value of porters as a means of transport. Porters only solve the problem of 1st Line Transport. The Japanese appear to have no rearward transport echelons; they exploit local resources to the full, using bullock-carts, hand-carts, elephants and vehicles captured from us. It is unlikely that we could meet our demand from these sources of supply, so we will have to provide 2nd and 3rd Line Transport as at present. Both can *normally* rely on finding a road on which to work. For abnormal moves, and it is abnormal moves that win battles, we have the advantage of being able to supply by air.

The Japanese advances were often astonishing, but there was always a calculable limit to them, imposed by his need to wait for his transport echelons. The Japanese infantry formations carry about seven days' stores with them; at the end of each seven days they have to halt until the bullock-cart convoy—or whatever it may be catches them up. This is a restriction of movement that our penetrating columns can avoid by air-borne supply.

Possibilities of supply by air are so extensive that they should be examined with great imagination. When dealing

with the German there are many difficulties in the way of operating in his rear; apart from all others there are masses of administrative troops there. This is not so with the Japanese who move forward like an advancing shop window with practically nothing behind. Everyone who has been there agrees that it is much more restful to be behind the Japanese than in front of him. This special feature of his armies gives a quite new importance to supply by air. It should, as has been said, be re-examined, and not by the conservative party.

The organization of rearward troops and higher headquarters is at present unsuitable for the type of war which the Japanese force us to wage. When we have the initiative we may be able to carry the elaborate organization that follows the steelhead of our armies; but even then we should be better without it, for its worst sin is that it consumes transport out of all proportion to its size. It is, however, far easier to say that headquarters and L. of C. troops should be reduced than it is to specify where the reduction should come. Let us consider headquarters first.

An officer who had been up all night walked into a neighbouring headquarters in his own line of work consisting of eight officers. They were all having breakfast. He said that he wanted an officer to do a short job lasting about an hour. One of the breakfasting officers said at once: "There you are, I knew this headquarters wasn't big enough. We want another officer already." There were eight having breakfast, and a job for one, making a total of nine, so mathematically he was right. If there is a flaw in his mathematics there is also a possible opportunity for reduction of headquarters.

Every staff officer should be on the average of being overworked, and many are not. We have allowed ourselves to slide into the habit of always increasing our staffs during rush periods, and never decreasing again when conditions allow. The disease is cumulative because every unemployed staff officer writes letters which are unnecessary and causes needless work elsewhere when they arrive. Burma has seen some headquarters heavily reduced by sickness; the reduction in efficiency was not equivalent, if existent.

Another source of expansion in headquarters is the inefficient individual. The British character, steeped in years of euphemistic confidential reports, is averse to removing any individual from his post if any alternative is possible. The inefficient staff officer can usually be reinforced and left in peace, and

this is done. Japanese methods have been quoted; but the cure for the inefficient officer should be sought among the "liquidating nations"! It would be rather exhilarating to see a message which read "Colonel X unsatisfactory. Inform widow and send replacement." It will never, of course, be sent in English, but it is being sent in other languages. Successful armies speak those languages too.

L. of C. troops do a variety of jobs. Many of them just work at unskilled tasks. The Japanese use local labour, which, though basically unwilling, prefers the work to the alternative. Total war must surely justify the offer of the alternative, and it is only an offer, because none will accept it. Several thousand Indian refugees have perished because labour was unavailable to make the road from Assam into Burma. Many fewer refugees would have made the road, though a threat of force would have been necessary to halt them for the work. Judged solely by results it would have been right to use that threat.

The tactics of the campaign must be treated somewhat sketchily. In fighting the elusive Japanese it is the platoon, or even the section that counts most of all. The Japanese attack boldly in small parties; when these meet resistance they do not rush forward to their death, they withdraw, often hurriedly, and re-appear elsewhere, usually on the flank or rear of the defenders. If, in the meantime, the defenders have moved intelligently they still hold the odds; and it is the very junior leader who has to be intelligent—and quick.

It goes further than that, for a high degree of confidence within each section and between each section is required. When the Japanese is slipping about around a position it may be good tactics to leave one section where it has been located by the enemy and move the rest to ambush him when he re-attacks. The left section must be prepared to fight it out, with confidence that its colleagues will see them through. This is open to the charge of being facile theory; for it is no easy task to stay in the jungle whilst being attacked from apparently all sides by an invisible enemy. The section is, however, armed for the job and can fairly be expected to do so, *provided* it knows that it is part of a well-laid plan to destroy the enemy, and not a human sacrifice. The plan must be simple of execution, ingenious or, at any rate, imaginative of conception and must carry the faith of all.

Tactics higher than the platoon are largely matters of co-ordination. Once objectives are allotted to platoons there is little else to be done except to try to follow the progress of events

and keep the action on a mutual-assistance basis. Our present wireless resources are insufficient for the achievement of this. The Japanese supplements his wireless with such aids as company battle cries, different coloured tracer bullets for different sub-units and a basic attacking drill which leads certain sub-units automatically into certain general areas; by these means his commanders can keep a fairly accurate picture of the progress of their troops.

Strategically it is impossible to deny the Japanese very high praise. He appeared throughout the campaign to base his strategy on the question: "Now what is the move that the British and Chinese will like least?" He then made that move, however seemingly impossible it might be. The best instances of this were his intercepting move from Paan to the Sittang Bridge and his sudden attack on Monywa. The former was made through reputedly impossible country; the latter with a speed and by a route that had not been considered feasible.

There is no doubt that we have got to take a leaf from his book and base our strategy on what we want to do, rather than on what we calculate is administratively possible. We must decide what we want to do and then work out ways and means of doing it, however unconventional they may have to be. We cannot outmanoeuvre the Japanese if we adhere to the administrative limitations which are now accepted. The Army in Burma has already learnt to jettison some of these; for instance the accepted method of forming up twenty men and marching them in a soldier-like manner into a 3-ton lorry, has died. One officer stands in front of the lorry, another loads from the rear; when the officer in front reports that a man has fallen over the driver's cabin the lorry is known to be full. The record was seventy men on one lorry. They were Gurkhas, said to be loaded in two layers standing up, but such stories sprout exaggerations.

There is a tremendous growth of peace-time administrative theory and practice that has got to be cut away; in itself it is probably ideally right, but it is dangerous because it produces formulæ and other impediments to improvisation. Improvisation is bound to be needed whatever resources are available; the Japanese are masters of it. They improvise road and river transport, they improvise for supply of rations from local sources and they even improvise clothing for patrols and assault forces.

We had to improvise the organization of our transport, for there was never enough for such units as we had to be confined to their proper role. All units worked as a pool and carried men

or stores according to existing urgencies. Tanks were used as troop carriers; four men on the outside of each tank; and transport lorries were eventually used to tow guns. The American jeeps, which were an entirely unauthorized windfall, did every sort of transport duty—from reconnaissance to recovery. They proved to be the perfect General-Purpose vehicle, and justified their name, which is derived from the letters "G.P."

Perhaps the most unorthodox improvisation that was resorted to was the use of G.H.Q. staff officers as stokers on the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company's boats. Crews had deserted. The boats had to be kept moving, and, at the time, no other reliable labour was to be found.

Before leaving administrative matters there was one point which, though obvious in itself, came to light with vivid clearness at many times during the campaign. It is that when any commodity is known to be short it will disappear at once. The reason, of course, is hoarding. On several occasions there arose doubt whether there was sufficient petrol to meet all demands. Petrol stocks, already small, just vanished. It is the result of the human desire of every lorry-driver to be able to continue serving his unit for as long as possible, and probably cannot be prevented.

The valuable facts to remember from an administrative point of view are, first, that it is dangerous to disclose impending shortages before it is necessary to do so, and, secondly, that when a shortage has been announced it will be followed by an apparent, but unreal, absence of the store in question. There will, in fact, be large hidden reserves of it.

During the withdrawal up the Chindwin there were rumours of a possible shortage of food; and although stocks ran low in some places, an enormous amount of food was jettisoned by individuals (to the benefit of the deserving refugee) and no one had need to miss a meal. This human trait might well be exploited as a means of transporting certain supplies for which normal transport did not exist.

For instance, if a shortage of, say, lubricating oil were foreseen at any point along the axis of movement, a rumour to that effect at some stage where it was plentiful in bulk, followed by a search of vehicles at the point in question would almost certainly solve the problem of moving the oil from its bulk storage to where it was wanted. It would have been carried in every sort of container, including water bottles, which no order could have achieved so well.

Finally, let us examine some of the popular conceptions and misconceptions about the Japanese soldier. It is said that he does not take prisoners. This is only a half truth; it would be fairer to say that he is not interested in taking prisoners. At times, noticeably when Burmans were present, he will kill prisoners in a completely barbaric manner. Normally, he will use them as labourers until he wants them no more and then neglect them so that escape is easy. He very seldom surrenders himself, and on the few occasions when he has, he has always tried to escape even in the face of certain death. If one is taken prisoner by the Japanese one should attempt escape at the very first moment, and normally one will succeed. That is the general experience of Burma, but it is probable that his divisions vary widely in their treatment of prisoners, as they do in fighting capacity.

The courage of the Japanese is hard to assess. He is very dependent on the example of his officers; and units which lost their officers frequently lost all courage. There was no conclusive evidence in Burma that he feared either the dark or cold steel, as has been stated. He moved and attacked very fearlessly by night; and in close fighting he showed no exceptional aversion to closing with our troops. His main weakness appears to be bad marksmanship; his fire was never anything like as effective as that of our troops, though some of his sniping is fair. There were indications that the rank and file broke when their leader had gone, also that in defeat he packed up and resigned himself to death. At Kyankse a number of Japanese hid in a culvert when hard pressed by Gurkhas and made no attempt to make a stand.

It is difficult to avoid being prosaic when considering what manner of training is required to fit men to defeat the Japanese. Probably the first requirement is to instil a pride in hardihood and contempt of comfort. The Japanese will insist on fighting in difficult country where our superior machines cannot be used. He will have to be chased out of those places, and that will best be done by men who take pride in their ability to out-climb, out-march and finally out-flank him.

The saying that "any fool can be uncomfortable" has done much harm, chiefly because it is true; but it is more honest to say that "only a good soldier can remain efficient in the absence of comfort," for the fool will not remain efficient when his folly has denied him food, sleep and other comforts. The good soldier

will, provided he has had time and opportunity to harden himself for the ordeal.

The next requisite is resourcefulness. There must be no problem too difficult for the soldier who is to run rings round the Japanese. He may have to make a raft, hoist a mortar up a cliff, enforce a local guide or porter, hide in a tree-top or lay a booby-trap. A party of Japanese soldiers drove up to one of our Brigade Headquarters lying in the bottom of a bullock-cart. It was one way of getting there, though it proved to be a bad one.

A necessity which exploits two of the Japanese weaknesses is that of snipers. A good sniper will have endless chances of killing the Japanese officers, for jungle country lends itself to selective sniping. In addition, the bad marksmanship of the Japanese reduces the risk that a sniper runs. For all that a jungle sniper, who will normally work from a tree, requires to be a brave man, and better results are likely to be got from training a brave man to shoot well, than from hoping that a good shot will prove to be brave.

The first round in Burma has gone against us through no fault of the British and Indian fighting troops. Some of the difficulties against which they fought have automatically disappeared with the loss of Burma. There were others which can still recur if the unity of our war effort is not one hundred per cent. The soldier no longer wins battles unaided; he has a right to the whole-hearted help of men in top-hats, in overalls, and blue.

SOME VIVID MEMORIES OF MALAYA

BY MAJOR G. T. HAYES, M.C., I.M.S.

DURING the last war the period of "waiting to go over the top" was one of the most nerve-racking moments for thousands of our soldiers. No such worry assailed many of those who took part in that short but gallant campaign in Malaya. Indeed, to the newcomer the atmosphere was almost fantastic. With the Japanese approximately 80 miles to the north of the first town to which I was sent, the general public were living in a complete "fools' paradise". Dancing and social gatherings were the order of the day. Yet just around the corner was the grim spectre of death, of men fighting for their lives, of women and children being bombed and of soldiers holding out against, at times, very heavy odds.

The complete picture of the campaign can only come from official despatches, but here are some incidents both of military and human interest which may be interesting and useful to your readers.

The methods adopted by the Japanese in order to hoax our troops were on many occasions extremely clever. It was a common occurrence for the Jap, dressed in an allied uniform, to attempt to approach our posts after dark, shouting "Don't shoot, we English." In daylight, trails of rice were frequently seen pointing in the direction of unit concentrations further in the rubber plantation or jungle; to the unwary it seemed that they had resulted from a hole in a sack carried by a coolie.

Direction arms of sign-posts were used upon which to hang a piece of cord, kept in position by a small stone at either end of the string, and indicating concentrations of troops in one or other direction. At times ice-cream vendors and itinerant traders dressed in white clothes attempted to engage troops in conversation, thus acting as a decoy.

Before our gunners could come into action in rubber plantations they had to cut down quite a number of trees to get an arc of fire. This being the case, they were only too pleased when it was possible to bring the guns into action in an area of open country, but they had to be on the lookout for tethered oxen in the vicinity, as these were frequently so placed as a signal to aircraft.

One afternoon a gardener came on to the lawn in front of a certain Divisional Headquarters. Having worked strenuously for some hours with a scythe he departed. No one had paid any particular attention to him until later the Staff Captain happened to walk across the lawn and noticed that a large arrow, about 20 feet in length, had been cut out of the grass, with its apex pointing towards the house. Washed clothes were also on occasions placed on the ground or hung in unobtrusive positions to indicate the positions of troops or unit headquarters.

In the jungle at night, life presents a very different atmosphere, as any who have sat up in a machan realize. All sounds and movement, irrespective of their origin are magnified and usually misplaced as regards their location. To one unaccustomed to the atmosphere, the sharp hollow sound of a rubber nut as it bumps its way to earth amongst the branches would make one peer through the darkness with rifle ready for action.

At night the enemy would advance to within a few hundred yards of our posts, and then detail off a small party to the rear. This latter squad would indulge in hand-clapping, imitating shells in their flight, and sometimes firing small arms, while the main body would put in an attack from the flank. Should the attack fail, as owing to the refusal of our troops to be misled it often did, the Jap would climb up a tree, tie himself to a branch, and make a general nuisance of himself until he was located.

Our troops soon appreciated the value of these tactics, and in putting counter-measures into operation inflicted many casualties. It was a striking fact that when the Jap was played at his own game he had no alternative to offer. Should our patrols contact the enemy in lesser numbers, the latter invariably adopted the tree-climbing method, firing at our troops from the rear after they quite unsuspectingly passed beneath the closely packed jungle trees. The result of this type of jungle warfare was well seen in medical units on evacuation of the casualties, the vast majority of wounds being located in the back of the head, chest and loins.

But it was not only in jungle warfare that the Jap showed his cunning. I remember one evening, after we had evacuated to Singapore Island, our beach defence troops had noticed numbers of large tea chests floating down the Strait. More with the intention of indulging in a little target practice than anything else, a corporal fired a burst of machine-gun fire at a large

chest. He was surprised to see a rifle thrown out over the sides, followed immediately by a Japanese soldier, who swam as fast as he could for the opposite shore. Incidentally, as three-fifths of the Island was under rubber cultivation, it was very easy for any of the enemy to remain under cover and signal any required information to the mainland by lamp.

Time and again the thoroughness of the training of the Japanese soldier was evident. Especially was this the case in regard to first-aid. I remember two Japanese wounded men being brought to the Tan Tock Seng hospital on Singapore Island, in which I was temporarily serving. One of them attempted to snatch a pistol from one of our Indian officers with the intention of committing *harakiri*, but when, with the aid of signs, we showed we were just as anxious to preserve his life as he was to dispose of it he abandoned the attempt. Later one of these men offered to help in attending to our casualties. He was excellent at first-aid, and was capable of removing superficial foreign bodies without supervision. From others I have had proof of the high standard of first-aid training given to the Japanese troops.

Their uniform was somewhat unorthodox. It consisted of a white-coloured sarong around the loins, a straw hat, long knife or sabre carried on a belt and slung across the shoulders, a small canvas bag containing rice, quinine, hydrochloride, and about fifty rounds of .35 ammunition. I saw a very good instance of the close association between the Jap and his German ally. It was in the form of a damaged automatic rifle which was carried by one of the wounded men referred to above. The weapon was smaller than our rifle, weighed about 7—8 lbs., and contained 8 rounds in the magazine. There was no attachment for a bayonet. The only lettering on the rifle was the word "Hamburg" on the left-hand side above the bolt cover.

Incidentally, an amusing incident occurred at this hospital. For some days there had been considerable artillery fire aimed at the vicinity of the hospital. One afternoon some small arms fire was heard at the back of the building. Though it was obviously quite close, we were not unduly alarmed until one of the medicine bottles on a side table in the dressing-room fell to the floor in pieces. An R.A.M.C. sergeant who happened to be attending to a patient at the time thought that the sick attendant had clumsily knocked it over, and told him so in no uncertain language.

Next moment a ricochet off one of the sterilising drums made us realize that the open window in the room was evidently serving as a target. I am afraid I cannot give a lucid description of the events taking place outside the room as we felt very comfortable lying on the floor, while occasional bullets splattered off the walls, fortunately without any further casualties. The noise, however, grew louder, and the frequent crashing of panes of glass, combined with the Japanese now-familiar cry of "Banzai" was not conducive to calm of mind. After what seemed like hours we heard the noise of the familiar "Tommy" gun, or, as one sepoy called it, *Thompson Sahib Bahadur ki banduq*.

Aerial bombardment on the mainland was at times very fierce. On the lines of communications the bombers usually came in three's, in arrow-head formation at about 3,000 feet. The practice was for the leader to bomb the transport on the road, while his companions let fly with machine-guns balanced over the side of the plane, as the transport personnel made for cover in the rubber plantations on either side of the road. From experience we learned that it was safer to take cover in the ditch by the roadside, as by the time one was out of a truck and into a plantation one's arrival usually corresponded with the beaten zone of machine-gun fire from the plane. Casualties from this aerial machine-gunning, however, were not frequent, owing to the fact that the gunners had to fire blind through the rubber trees.

In at least one case I saw the tragic results which followed the selection by Brigade or Battalion headquarters of a prominent house. My medical unit had been ordered to take up a position on the Sedenak Rubber estate, there to establish a main dressing station. In selecting a rendezvous on the estate the most prominent building, the manager's house, was given a wide berth and we settled down in a small hollow about half a mile away.

Because of our past experience of the predilection of neighbouring units for prominent houses as headquarters, we made a large sign in brilliant red and white, with the notice in large letters: "Unexploded Bomb", and placed it on the avenue leading to the manager's house. In spite of this a Brigade headquarters was established there that night. Immediately we struck camp and moved to a safer area.

Next morning at 10.00 hours the bombers came, and after several excursions over the target all was quiet, save for the

intermittent crackling of burning rafters of what was once a substantial residence.

Everyone was in a high state of tension when the order came for complete evacuation to Singapore Island. The Causeway between the island and the mainland was sufficiently wide to take three streams of traffic, and it also had a single-line narrow gauge railway. It was hoped to be able to convoy all troops across, except the rear bridgehead troops, who were to come across in launches after the Causeway was demolished. One-way traffic was the rule on the Causeway. Should a truck have the misfortune to break down during its passage the drivers had orders that it was to be thrown into the Strait.

A full moon was due on the night of January 31—February 1, the night on which the evacuation was timed to take place, and as in the moonlight the Causeway and vicinity would show up very clearly, it was anticipated that heavy aerial and artillery bombardment would take place. The first transport containing troops crossed over at 1900 hours, and until 0600 hours the following morning there was a continuous flow of traffic in three lanes. At the latter hour the last vehicle was signalled across, and there followed the rear bridgehead troops piped by the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

Operations went without a hitch, but instead of the heavy bombardment anticipated, only one shot was heard in the vicinity of the Causeway. Everyone realized the strategic importance of the operation. Everyone's nerves were taut. Indeed, on hearing a report from a Tommy gun, two officers who happened to be sitting on the edge of a slit trench, snatching a hasty meal, went head over heels into the hole, accompanied by bully beef and hot soup.

Needless to say, our days on Singapore Island were busy and exciting. Shelling and aerial bombardment made life a hazardous affair. During the night of February 14—15 we heard rumours of an impending capitulation. I had had orders to report with a party at the docks; buildings were smouldering along the water front, and broken telephone wires were strewn over the roads. As the boat on which we were told we were to embark was nowhere to be seen, and as it was rumoured that the "Cease Fire" was soon to be sounded, our small party of six decided to take cover in a partly demolished godown for the day, and make an effort to locate a boat after dark.

As nightfall came we left our "bolt-hole" and began our search for a small boat, but without success. Next day we again

took cover. All shelling had ceased, but we saw no sign of the Jap. Once again as darkness fell we set out and by very good fortune one of the party found a rowing boat about 14 ft. in length. In his excitement he forgot to mention a minor detail—there was a hole in the floor. An empty bully beef tin soon repaired this.

With our shirts tied together to form a rope we lowered the boat to the water's edge, and prepared to allow her to take the strain. She did this with a vengeance, ripped our shirts, and entered the water with a resounding wallop. Quickly we placed four gallons of water on board, 36 army biscuits, and some tinned fruit. We had three oars, with the stronger man pulling on one side against the other two.

None of us knew anything about navigation; we thought our destination, Sumatra, was only 30 miles away. There was a large oil tank aflame on Pulau Bukum, and using that as a beacon we started off. As dawn broke we were some way from Singapore and had just landed at a small island. During the day we waited ashore, keeping an eye open for anyone who might be there. But nothing happened to disturb the calm of this tropical island. During the day we made substantial pads for our hands (which had suffered through rowing) from mango leaves.

After dusk we embarked again, and headed due west. The night was uneventful and extremely monotonous. Dawn came and with it depression. We had left Singapore forty hours before and by our calculations should now be able to see the Sumatran coast. Water and food were running short. About 1000 hours we sighted a small white sail on the starboard bow—or as the sepoy who originally sighted it remarked: "On the same side as the whole in the boat, Sahib."

After much waving of a shirt tied to an oar we attracted the attention of the fisherman. He offered to pilot us to another island called Murro, where we were assured a substantial launch was obtainable for about 100 dollars, which we luckily possessed. Arriving on the island, things looked promising, but on making inquiries we found that the motor launch belonged to two Malaysians, who were loath to part with it, even for double its value.

Our friend took us to a small shed, where we ate ravenously off rice and fish. Later that evening we managed to persuade the Malayan owner to let us have his boat, and with ample rations and water provided by some other helpers, and with the

aid of a piece of paper on which were diagrams, we set out. Our craft went along at about 4 knots. At dawn we sighted the point we were making for, reputed to be about 10 miles from the coast. At 1000 hours we heard the intermittent drone of three bombers flying very high. We turned off the engine in order to lessen any chance of the wash from the propeller attracting attention, and lay down on the deck. We saw the 'planes pass over and restarted the engine.

Hardly had we done so when we saw a bomber had broken formation and was turning back on its course. We turned the engine off again and as he came round our stern we jumped into the water. At a height of about 500 feet one bomb was released, and we all dived. When I came to the surface it was to find that one of our party was missing, and the launch was beginning to settle down. We tried to locate our casualty, but without success.

Selecting a nearby island we swam to it. Water was a prime necessity, and by digging with the aid of steel helmets we managed to locate some, though it was very muddy. A pair of khaki trousers acted as a slow but sure filter. For three days we occupied ourselves in building a bamboo hut, and on the fifth day we spotted a substantial launch with a dinghy in tow, well off shore.

Our shirts failing to attract attention this time, we decided to fire off our last two rounds of pistol ammunition. This did the trick, and slowly they hove to and we could see three soldiers getting into the dinghy. They were Dutch, and after putting us aboard the dinghy we embarked on the launch and headed once again for Sumatra. On all sides we met with warm hospitality, although the Dutch population now had their own worries.

After a 300-mile journey on top of a bus we eventually reached Padang, on the west coast of Sumatra. There I found a number of our casualties in the military hospital, and was able to relieve a Dutch M. O. for a few days. A week later news came that a British destroyer had arrived in the harbour. The Captain agreed to take us and our casualties to Ceylon, and four and a half days later we landed once more on friendly soil.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION—PAST AND FUTURE

BY THE HON. HAROLD NICOLSON, M.P. *

IN LOOKING at the reactions of British public opinion towards foreign countries and events, I have often noticed that our optimism takes refuge in certain comfortable phrases. It is a very dangerous mental habit. "Human nature at bottom is the same the world over"; "War settles everything"; and "Collective Security" are instances. Another phrase which to-day is beginning to undermine our commonsense is "Federal Union." The phrase is catching on. It seems to be something new, but in fact it is a matter to which few people are giving serious thought.

There are a great variety of federal theories. Some believe in world federation, some in a federation of English-speaking peoples, some in all sorts of federation, but all these varying forms have two principles in common. One is that in international affairs there should be a surrender of sovereignty, which sounds very republican to some people, but which means (if it means anything) that a nation will consent to be ruled by the opinion of other nations as to its vital interests.

If people take it as that and accept it, well and good, but what I am so frightened about is that this phrase "surrender of sovereignty" will seem a great, wonderful, idealistic action which will produce results by itself.

In dealing with international organization it is tremendously important not merely to think of the facts before you think of the theory, but always to take concrete instances, and in the light of them to examine your particular theory. I think this war will show, as the 20 years since 1919 have shown, that idealism is not enough. It is not enough to think of some lovely theory and vary the facts so that they fit the theory.

For instance, this phrase "surrender of sovereignty" means that we should be governed by the opinion of other people in our own vital interests. Suppose the federal authority decided that in the interests of world peace it would be a good thing if Asiatic emigration were allowed into Australia; Australia would be opposed, we should back her and we should be outvoted.

* In an address to the Royal Empire Society in London,

What happens then? That is the question which must be answered.

Take another instance; the federal authority may decide that in the economic interests of the world it would be desirable that piecegoods should be manufactured in those areas where cotton is actually produced and where labour is very cheap. I do not suppose the representatives of Lancashire (England) would agree to that. It would entail enormous sacrifices, but our objections would be outvoted. Would that be popular? Apply similar instances to the United States and ask yourself whether any United States administration would be prepared to make sacrifices where their vital interests were concerned, on the vote of other people.

There would be a Federal Parliament elected, to which the Federal Council would be responsible. That sounds lovely, but how many seats are to be given to each country and on what principle? There is no democratic answer. One cannot say that the powerful countries will be given more seats than non-powerful countries, or that the old countries will be given more than young countries, nor that advanced or civilized countries will be given more than unadvanced or uncivilized.

They will have to go back to the democratic system of one man, one vote, and you obviously get, inevitably, to the point where you have one vote for every million inhabitants of the country concerned, which leads to a position which nobody but a fanatic would deny was utterly impossible. China would have 420 seats, India 360, Japan 90, Germany 80, Great Britain 45, Australia 6 and New Zealand 2. The British Empire would be in an overwhelming permanent minority. Would we place our interests at the disposal of an elected body wherein it would be impossible for us to get a majority vote?

When people discuss international organization the ideas and ideals of the federal unionists blur their minds. I wish to bring home to you as urgently as I can that international organization can never be viewed on the shifting sands of reason. It must always be based upon the rock of organized force. That is the thing we have to get into our heads. Fortunately we have very considerable experience. We have had for 20 years an international organization, and if we analyse, examine and study the workings of the League of Nations, we shall find, I think, that that institution and its Covenant and Charter are about the most intelligent form of international organization which the mind of man has yet devised.

There has always been in the past a tendency to international organization. The individual expanded into the family, the tribe into the city state, the city state into the community. Even the Greeks, who were the most individualistic people in the world, had some sort of League of Nations to advise and sometimes to decide affairs which were not always merely the affairs of the local city.

England became united under the Danish menace, and the United States only became united after the most horrible civil war history has ever known. Force makes for unity and human beings left to themselves have a natural tendency to dis-unite. Therefore we must learn from the experience of the League, whose constitution I consider and will always consider to be about the best written document ever conceived—the wisest, the most sensible, the most precise, written constitution which can be devised for international organization.

I am perfectly certain the League failed not because it was a bad idea, but because it was too good, because it was too idealistic, because it was based upon an assumption of international behaviour, of good international conduct which, had it been a correct assumption, would have rendered any League unnecessary. If people were as good as that; there would be no need for a police force. The League created a body of law but did not create a force to see that that law was carried into effect.

In the 20 years' experience of the League we did learn many useful and encouraging lessons for the future of world organization. We learned that it is possible to create an international secretariat from men of great ability who developed a League mind, a loyalty to something quite outside the interests of their own particular countries. The Secretariat of the League was a great creation, which, if properly expanded and used, might be of the very greatest value.

There were three main mistakes. It was first based upon the assumption that peace and the desire for peace was natural to human beings and that if an atmosphere of reasonableness could be created, compulsive powers would not be needed to enforce doctrines. The second thing we have learned is that the ultimate sanction for law-making must be not ultimate or potential, but actually convincing. The League promised to do everything for everybody, everywhere, at any time, and the League failed very largely because of its inflationary tendency. The third lesson is that men will not readily go to

war (which is a horrible thing to endure) except in their own interests or in interests which they realize to be their own.

What I think we ought to do, what our minds should be working at, is not to scrap the League of Nations, not to scrap the Covenant, but to examine with great care where that splendid machine went wrong in the last 20 years and to consider what parts of it can now be improved. That is the way to approach international organization in the future, not by starting a new idea which is not borne out by the facts, but working on the very close experience we have had and improving where we have gone wrong.

It is to-day easier to indicate the improvements needed than it was in 1919. We now know that the League is no good at all unless it has power. We also know that it is very difficult to give such an organization the appallingly complicated apparatus needed to enforce that power, but unfortunately in modern warfare the aeroplane has become so important that it is not impossible to devise some method for post-war settlement in which the air forces, both civilian and military, of all the members of the League should come under the League, and that will give the power it has hitherto lacked.

The second great necessity is not to allow the Covenant to be broken within the tiniest point without punishment. We must never have another Manchuria or Abyssinia, we must not let one single instance pass without mobilisation of the League. We must have areas of responsibility; we must say if the peace is broken within a certain geographical area we will go to war.

These suggestions are not wholly made without experience, and it is a comforting thought to know that we are getting closer to that sort of line of action. The Atlantic Charter has laid it down almost as a principle that aggressor powers can be defined as aggressor powers; it gets away from the theory that human nature is the same all the time; it lays it down that aggressor powers shall not be denied anything except the power to go to war. Thirdly, the Atlantic Charter makes it clear that areas of co-operation are not only possible but necessary. An outstanding example of the development of this idea is the recent Greek-Yugoslav and Czech-Polish agreements. This is about as far as federation need, to my mind, go.

I look forward to a League of Nations which will be inspired with very much the same ideals as the old League, which will work with very much the same machinery, but which will have infinitely more power, will be more efficient, will not allow

little slips and exceptions, and, working through an air force controlled through League agencies, and working through areas of responsibility will give conviction to all law-breakers, and establish an elastic, non-rigid system by which alone peace can be maintained.

TRIBAL CONTROL ON THE FRONTIER

BY B. BROMHEAD

LORD CHELMSFORD, then Viceroy, made this reference to Waziristan when speaking in Delhi on August 20, 1920: "We hoped that if they (the Mahsuds) were left alone they would leave us alone. This hope has, I regret to say, proved fallacious, and the time has come when we can no longer shut our eyes to the fact... We have decided with the approval of His Majesty's Government that our forces shall remain in occupation of Central Waziristan, that mechanical transport roads shall be constructed throughout the country, ... and that our present line of posts shall be extended as may seem necessary. It is not possible to set any limit to our period of occupation..."

That same year saw the complete defeat of the Mahsuds and the deep penetration of their country by military columns. Owing to a post-War lack of funds, little further action was taken until the operations leading to the military occupation of Razmak in early 1923, but the present policy in dealing with the Waziristan problem was given birth to in 1920.

The basis of the policy was to be control of the tribes by military forces stationed deep in the heart of tribal country, with mobility increased by the construction of mechanical transport roads. Political control was to be further supported by civil armed forces of Scouts to replace the old Frontier Militias. These latter had been drawn in large part from the areas in which they served, and the local elements as then constituted had not been able to withstand the current of revolt. The new Corps of Scouts were to be enlisted from men of a more reliable composition and foreign to the areas in which they served, and in addition their standards of training, administration and equipment were to be greatly raised.

Speaking in the Indian Legislative Assembly in 1923, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India said: "The Government policy is a Forward Policy in a very real sense. It is a policy of progress. It is a big step forward on the long and laborious road towards the pacification through civilization of the most backward and inaccessible and therefore the most truculent and aggressive tribes on our border. Come what may, civilization must be made to penetrate these inaccessible mountains,

for from this inaccessibility arises the economic stringency, crass ignorance, wanton insolence and barbaric cruelty which spring from a sense of security. These are diseases for which civilization in some form or shape is the only cure. It may be thought visionary to talk of the civilization of the Mahsud but you must take long views on the frontier . . ."

The policy was in reality a compromise between the old Forward Policy and the Close Border Policy and was designed primarily to keep the peace of the border, to prevent raiding, and gradually to improve economic conditions and standards of civilization. It was hoped to do this by peaceful means without resort to military force. A further requirement of this policy has also been to prevent large-scale incursions by our tribesmen into Afghanistan.

The object of this article is to review the years that have elapsed since this policy was started, to look at the results of this military occupation, and to make suggestions for the future.

As the first years passed Waziristan settled down to a time of quiet, so much so that it seemed as if the problem had been solved.

One matter of interest during this time was the help given to Nadir Khan by the Waziristan tribes in his defeat of Bachao Saqab and the capture of Kabul. This and later incursions by our tribes in attempts to interfere with events in Afghanistan show the necessity of some form of control over their country, and also indicate the degree to which they are drawn towards the affairs of Kabul. If on the one hand the tribes are affected by what happens in Afghanistan, they are also to an increasing extent influenced by events in British India, and so before going further, concurrent political happenings will be mentioned, for the birth of the new policy in Waziristan synchronized with the start of democratic control in India, and it is obvious that the application of this policy must be in tune with future Indian political developments.

One of the first Acts of the New Indian Legislative Assembly constituted under the Reforms Act of 1919, was to pass a non-official elected members' resolution to recommend changes in the Frontier Province's administration, and Government responded by appointing the North-West Frontier Enquiry Committee, 1922, under the Presidentship of Mr. (now Sir) Denys Bray. The Bray Committee was not specially intended to consider the tribal problem but could not ignore it and in its report made the statement that "Forced by the sheer process of reasoning on the

majority of our Committee . . . in existing conditions it is not merely inexpedient, for all practical purposes it is impossible, to separate the Districts and Tracts." This Committee was one of the first of many signs to show that the Indian politician reciprocated the interest taken by the tribesman in his progress.

The Frontier remained peaceful for some years preceding 1930. In that year, however, political repercussions from administered territory jolted the tribal areas into a lively appreciation of the fact that change was in the air, and ripples of unrest flowed in varying strength across the Frontier, stressing the close unity of the Districts and Tribal Tracts.

From 1930 onwards, a period of comparative peace again followed in Waziristan, but to the North, where perhaps the tribes were more affected by political intrigue and less under armed control, military operations had to be undertaken against the Mohmands and their neighbouring tribes.

Further South also feelings of unrest gradually increased with the years and with political changes, culminating in the election of a Congress Ministry to the newly-formed Provincial Legislature of the Frontier Province. These feelings of unrest were further stirred by inter-communal hatred brought about by such incidents as the publication of the Rangila Rasul newspaper article, the Shahidganj Mosque dispute and the Islam Bibi case, so that once more, under the direction of the Faquir of Ipi, the drums began to beat. In 1936, military columns, engaged in what was meant to be a peace-march through a somewhat inflamed area, were attacked and the repercussions have not yet died down.

With the outbreak of the present World War fresh currents swept through the tribal areas and enemy propaganda aided by money has made more difficult the question of control. Despite this the tribal areas have kept remarkably quiet. This quiet is due to the neutrality of Afghanistan, the attitude of Turkey, and a fairly shrewd judgment on world affairs aided partly, perhaps, by the fact that the dreary succession of lies turned out by Axis propagandists are losing their sting.

So much for the story. What are the results of this policy after 22 years? What are the good and bad points connected with it? Are any changes necessary in a changing world?

On the credit side it may be said that a considerable degree of control has been exercised and has prevented serious Mahsud and Wazir interference with Afghan affairs. The tribes have

also to a great extent been deprived of their inaccessibility. To a small degree ignorance and economic stringency may have been reduced, but I doubt if it can be truthfully said that civilization had made more than a very little progress.

On the debit side it seems that we have made no real or sufficient progress economically, socially or educationally, and "the big step forward in the long and laborious road towards the pacification through civilization of the most backward and inaccessible and, therefore, the most truculent and aggressive tribes on one border" has turned out to be a painful and scarcely visible movement. Tribal discipline has deteriorated, and although control has been kept to an appreciable degree it has been only at an enormous military expenditure, and with an increased bitterness, whilst the safety of the administered territory adjoining tribal territory has not been satisfactorily maintained.

To my mind the following are the reasons for these conditions:

Control has been kept in so far that it has curbed any attempt from Waziristan to invade Afghanistan. This has been done by ground and air threat to the base of such a movement, and by air action against actual hostile movement. Ground action cannot intercept such movement for geographical reasons, but even if troops were withdrawn, the threat of ground action remains as the inaccessibility of the tribes has been overcome, not only by roads but by the ever-increasing efficiency of mechanical vehicles, and of modern weapons compared to the tribesmen's arms, and lastly by the air, and the possible use of air-borne troops.

The reasons for the degree, or lack of degree to which social, educational and economic standards have been raised are in part psychological and in part due to a Finance which cannot support military expenditure and social expenditure at the same time.

The causes of an increase in bitterness are traceable to a large extent to military occupation and the intense dislike of the tribes to the breaking of their purdah by foreign forces. Tribal areas vary in this degree, and there are areas adjoining British territory, and those of strategic importance such as the Khyber, which have been used for centuries to the passage of armies and of merchandise and travellers, which are not sensitive.

On the other hand many areas deep in tribal territory are extremely sensitive. It only needs an officer of, say, a Garhwali

or other Hindu unit to consider the reaction of policing a territory such as Garhwal with Pathan tribesmen, to realize the psychological effect of the presence of foreign troops in sensitive areas of tribal territory.

The results of this occupation are that the tribesmen look upon the regular soldier as an enemy and the soldier very naturally reciprocates the feeling. The writer feels that the analogy of troops in aid of the civil power being kept in the background unless vitally required should hold good in sensitive tribal areas. The psychological effect is the same in both, and troops if used should be used "all out".

The reasons for the deterioration of tribal discipline is probably due to the impact of modern thought and ideas amongst the tribesmen, and is naturally aided by ignorance. Tribal areas differ greatly in this respect and in certain areas, such as Baluchistan, the power of the tribal leaders is still considerable, but even here this power has lessened under the reforms carried out by Sir Arthur Parsons. This weakening of feudal power will probably continue, as such a condition will become more of an anachronism with the years, but the trouble is that as yet there is very little to replace it, and power is apt to devolve to the fanatical or to those natural tribal leaders thrown up in times of unrest who are generally hostile to Government. Control by tribal Jirgah is therefore weak, and unless some force is placed at the disposal of such Jirgahs to maintain discipline and until such time as public opinion is strengthened by education and civilization, this ill-discipline is bound to continue.

The reasons for raidings are chiefly the results of tribal unrest. Raiding is obviously encouraged where control is weak. To the mind of the writer it would appear that from the point of view of control our defence against raiding is not efficient.

There are large gaps in the defence line. This defence in many areas has no depth and does not work in close co-operation. Defence against raiding should be under one control. Such defence should be in depth, and the civil armed forces employed in the close protection of the settled districts should be in very intimate touch with the Scouts posts behind them, in tribal territory.

Moreover, I feel that in the main we have been trying to deal with something intangible, an unrest in the shape of a spasmodic and fanatical revolt, with the too-solid weapon of military force, and that although the idea and ideals of our policy are right, the machinery for implementing them is psychologically wrong, and if possible a machinery more suited to combat

elusive guerillas and at the same time more in sympathy with the tribes is necessary.

There are those that quote the years before 1930 as an example of the success of the present policy. Are they right? I think that the peace of those years was due to the following facts. The Waziristan tribes had suffered from severe defeat and like any other people required time to recuperate. Money due to contracts on new roads and posts eased the economic situation. As far as the Frontier was concerned there was a comparative political lull, and there were no immediate crises of a religious nature sufficient to stir tribal feelings. After 1930 the pendulum began to swing back, and aided by ignorance and intolerance and sufficient religious stimulus, a fanatical minority won control.

A very experienced Frontier official once said that there are no short cuts to the Frontier problem, and that you must let the stone wear itself smooth. This is true. A long view is necessary in Frontier policy, and the making of a road from A to B will not solve the frontier problem, though it may assist control.

One important question has not been mentioned, and this is disarmament. Forcible disarmament might have been carried out after 1920-21 and 1922, if Finance had backed the necessary operations, but the chance was lost, and to forcibly disarm the tribes now would probably involve too great a military expenditure to make it feasible. It seems as if the problem will have to be solved through education and propaganda. We must take a long view in the matter, but it is obvious that until such time as there is eventual disarmament a policy of progress and civilization will be made more difficult.

There are finally certain new factors which did not exist when the present policy and the means for implementing it were formed, and which must be considered in making any suggestions as to the future. The first is that as a result of the Cripps Mission to India the tempo of political thought has been quickened, and the idea of Pakistan brought to the fore. The working of any policy must fit into this political future and in such a future will a "foreign" army fit into tribal control? Secondly, I would like to stress the very great difference there is between the factor of efficiency and dependability of the present Frontier Corps as compared to the old Frontier Militias. These latter failed, not only because of an unreliable composition, but because they were exposed to rumour and intrigue as well as to

hostile attack in small isolated posts, ill-adapted for defence and out of touch with the outer world. They were, according to modern standards, ill-trained and ill-equipped. These factors no longer hold good.

Lastly, if it were humanly possible to release any troops from the duty of tribal control at the present time, they could presumably be of great use elsewhere.

I suggest, therefore, that as far as possible tribal control should be made the duty of the Civil Armed Forces, and that military forces be withdrawn to the greatest possible extent from all duties on the Frontier other than strategical. In saying this I realize that a deterioration of tribal control would affect strategic problems, and that this must be guarded against, so that the rate of withdrawal of the military forces now engaged in the work of tribal control must be governed by this factor.

In broad outline I suggest a partial return to the machinery of control encouraged by Lord Curzon, that is as far as possible by policing tribal country through Tribal Militias backed by a Frontier Force developed from the present Frontier Corps and other Civil Armed Forces. I suggest this difference from Lord Curzon's system of control in so far that such a Frontier Corps must continue to occupy vital areas such as Waziristan to the depth necessary to exert political control and to prevent raiding into the settled districts, and also that the whole of the Civil Armed Forces, both Militias and Frontier Corps, must be united under a single control. The Civil Armed Forces, as at present constituted, have certain weaknesses which need to be eradicated and which vary with the different Corps concerned, but in one respect there is a common weakness in that they are divided into too many water-tight compartments of control with resulting lack of co-operation and economy of Force.

As the Bray Committee stated: "It is not merely inexpedient for all practical purposes: it is impossible to separate the District and the Tracts," and in the same way that the Districts and the Tribal Tracts are inter-related, so are adjoining Tribal Agencies and Provinces. Tribal immigrations, the movements of raiders and of outlaws, and the still more intangible movements of unrest, are no respecters of paper boundaries, and to control these efficiently the pooling and quick switching of forces may be necessary, and unity of control essential. This same weakness in a particular degree prevents an efficient defence against raiding into the settled districts,

The Frontier constabulary in the plains and the Frontier Corps in the Tribal Tracts are at present two separate compartments, so that even where there is depth there is no intimate co-operation. In certain areas there is no depth, as in the Lower Shaktu, in Bhattani country, in the Gomal and the Zilli Khel winter-grazing grounds near Kashmir Kar south of the Gomal, for in these areas there are no posts held by Frontier Corps, so that in the adjoining Districts the single line of far-spaced Frontier constabulary posts is little deterrent to determined raiders. The main difficulty in the close protection of the villages in the settled districts is a lack of information, or delayed information, combined with the distances involved.

The answer to this problem, apart from better intelligence and the means of conveying it, is an increased mobility of the anti-raiding units and closer co-operation between the forces concerned, especially between those that first gain contact and the posts situated at a sufficient depth to enable interception. The writer in dealing with a somewhat similar problem of time and space in the Zhob Valley is forming a *Chiga* or pursuit party carried in four-wheel drive Marmon Harrington trucks with an excellent cross-country performance. Their primary duty is to get contact with raiders, and they are to be supported where the country is suitable by infantry carried in $4\frac{1}{2}$ -ton lorries to the nearest point of disembarkation. These lorries are armoured, and in place of 4 ponies and their riders, can carry a platoon of infantry.

Both armoured lorries and cross-country trucks are fitted to mount light automatics, the latter being fixed on gun-ring mountings as fitted to the old type of Army co-operation plane, and these automatics if necessary give sufficient protection for the vehicles to move independently once their personnel have disembarked. But, as the writer knows from bitter experience, the first essentials are good inter-communication and co-operation, and these must be combined with defence in plenty of depth to allow interception, and above all a single control.

Apart from the technique of dealing with raids, a further need is a very high standard of training, and in this the present Frontier Constabulary Units, with a very small cadre of police officers lacking military training, cannot be expected to attain to quite the same degree as Frontier Corps trained and led by a larger cadre of military officers. This is said with no thought of disparagement to the fine fighting spirit of the constabulary.

A further factor affecting efficiency is that, whilst certain areas such as those policed by Frontier Constabulary and Corps—such as the Zhob Militia—are on the whole quiet, other areas such as those policed by the South Waziristan Scouts and the Tochi Scouts are more or less continually involved in operations, which in the long run are a severe strain on the personnel of the Corps and make routine training difficult, whilst the Corps stationed in quiet areas suffer from the fact that the personnel lack operational experience and a spirit of keenness is hard to maintain.

Taking into consideration these various factors, the following is my suggestion for the formation of a Civil Armed Force to take over the duties of tribal control to the fullest possible extent:

All Civil Armed Forces, including the Frontier Constabulary, in the N.W.F.P. and in Baluchistan, should be amalgamated into a single Corps, for the sake of argument to be called the North-West Frontier Corps. This Corps would include all existing local Corps or Militias enlisted from local tribes for the policing of their own country and the formation of new ones, whenever such a course was possible (for instance I would advocate a Bhit-tani Militia for their own country, as also an Afridi Militia to police the Khajuri plain and Jamrud).

Such local Corps, if raised in time, would provide an incentive to fight against external aggression, and would form the nucleus of a guerilla movement, should their country be overrun. In addition, a Corps of Scouts would be formed from all the available stable elements of the Frontier Corps, whose duty would be to police the areas where political control was vital, to protect the settled districts from raiding where that duty could not be done reliably by local Militias, to form a strong support for such local Corps and assist in their training, and to form a central Reserve for operations anywhere along the Frontier strong enough to operate without Military support.

There are sufficient numbers in the Frontier Constabulary, Zhob Militia, and two Corps of Waziristan Scouts, to form the proposed Corps of Scouts. Additional recruitment would only be necessary in the case of some local Militias whose numbers could stand the strain of extra enlistment for Home Defence. The Corps of Scouts would be subdivided into independent and self-contained wings, under the command of a Wing Commander and necessary staff, and interchangeable along the Frontier.

The whole Corps would be under the Central control of an Inspecting Officer Frontier Corps; and decentralization would be provided by a subdivision into Areas. The Operational Command of Scout Wings and of any local Militias in the area would be centralized under the Commandant of the Area, who would have a permanent staff to control his Command. The areas would include those districts now policed by Frontier constabulary, and those areas at present unpoliced, such as the lower Shaktu, etc. Scouts Wings would be interchangeable from one area to another, their normal tour being, say, two years in any area. The number of Scouts Wings in an area would vary with the commitments of the area. Certain local Corps such as the Chitral Scouts and Gilgit Scouts who could not conveniently be included in an area would remain independently under the I.O.F.C.

To give the necessary punch to enable such a Force to take on heavy opposition, a support wing would be necessary with light armoured vehicles and a proportion of light artillery. I suggest that the Cavalry at D.I.K. could hand over their somewhat antiquated equipment thus freeing their personnel for other use.

The I.O.F.C. would presumably be graded as a Brigadier and given the necessary staff, as he is already more than overworked and understaffed.

Apart from the duty of enforcing control, these Corps should be made the spearhead of a vigorous attempt to spread education and improve social conditions.

The Officers for local Militias should be eventually found from their own tribes as opportunity occurs, and the idea should be that they should form a real "Home Guard" and also enforce the legitimate orders of Jirgahs subject to the approval of the local Government. This is an ideal and its attainment will vary with the tribe concerned, the progress of social ideas, and education. The Mahsuds say of themselves with sad irony, "We are an-untrustworthy people". At present they are apt to be, and with such a tribe a very long view is necessary, but all tribes are not so unreliable.

An experiment on these lines is being made with a certain tribe in the Zhob Militia, with the idea that they should police their territory under the son of the tribal Nawab, who has been granted an emergency commission in the Militia. The latter is not educated to the standard required for the Army, and is indeed

only in the process of learning English, but it must be realized that the standards of some local Corps of this nature enlisted from rather wild material cannot be expected to attain "Foreign" standards, although this naturally does not refer to old Corps, such as the Kurram Militia, and that this standard must depend on their own tribal standards, assisted by education, and amalgamation to the more efficient and stable elements of Frontier Corps for example and training. There will almost certainly be setbacks before the stone wears smooth. The cost must be far cheaper than military control, and it would form a sympathetic channel for the educational and other civilizing agencies which so far have been neglected.

FLOATING DOWN THE INDUS

BY FLYING OFFICER C. D. DUNFORD 'WOOD

"**F**LOATING DOWN the Indus—A suggestion for Ten Days' Leave," which appeared in the Journal some time ago appealed to me so strongly that I decided to make the trip. I recently did so, and the following notes will bring the previous contribution up to date, and, I hope, will be the means of inducing others to enjoy a happy ten days' leave.

I was fortunate in that the S. S. O., Mari Indus, kindly let me have his head mali, Anar Khan. He is the best shikari for this stretch of the river, knowing it like the back of his hand and having taken innumerable shooting parties down. The S. S. O. fixed the bandobast at five days' notice. Shikari and boatmen cost Rs. 140, and Anar Khan required Rs. 50 advance for initial expenses. Looking through his chits the average rate appeared to be Rs. 120 and Rs. 130, so perhaps the extra Rs. 10 was due to "war costs."

Trying to do the shoot as cheaply as possible, I borrowed *degchi*, frying-pan and kettle, cutlery, Hurricane *batties* and oil, and gun cleaning materials. I took a box of tinned stores, and another containing potatoes, *ghee*, *atta*, etc. A valise and weapons completed my kit.

On arrival at Mari Indus, after breakfast in the station, Anar Khan met me, and whilst my kit was going on board rowed me across to Kalabagh. This was an interesting excursion as, apart from buying eggs, milk, wood, a *chattie*, and a few seers of coarse salt for the mugger that Anar Khan insisted would be shot, he showed me round the bazaar and related tales of its murky past. Table lamps and small articles such as ink stands, made of the local pink salt, can be bought very cheaply. We then gave some Gurkhas a lift across the river with a load of cauliflowers, two of which I obtained as bakhshish, and cast off about 9-30 a.m., the first stop being a few miles down river for clay and stones to build a fire place.

The boat was one of the smaller salt boats, which carry their loads down stream sometimes as far as Sukkur, it being cheaper than by rail. Forty feet long, and about nine broad, it had a small fo'c's'le for'ard, where my bearer lived, and a small well where he did the cooking and entertained the crew to morning

tea. Amid-ships a room had been rigged up for the Sahib of *chattai* nailed to poles, the whole being lined inside with violet coloured cloth. It would take about two and a half charpoys comfortably, and two sportsmen could get their camp beds and kit in quite easily. On top of this room was a small platform where stood the helmsman, and half-way up a fifty foot oar (adaptable to take a sail). There I sat scanning the shore for mugger, or merely taking the evening air. Aft was a sort of miniature poop, in which lived four boatmen, Anar Khan, his two small boys, and a set of hookas. Sanitary arrangements were conducted ashore; washing was just a matter of leaping over the side with a bar of soap.

I opened the scoring after lunch with a direct hit on a large turtle, a long range shot with a .22, and, with thoughts of turtle soup, went ashore for it, going up to my thighs in quicksands in the process. But all my bearer could suggest was turtle hash, and the insides looking so repulsive I threw it away, retaining the case as a trophy. These turtles sit by the water's edge on mud flats, with their heads sticking up in the air like old fashioned monitors, and are very wary, launching themselves at the slightest provocation. Having seen no mugger, we tied up for the night at Ganda, where I shot black partridge and quail that evening and the next morning, with the aid of two local villagers and a very able pariah dog who proved to be no mean retriever.

My next shoot was alongside four grass huts called Kopri-walla, but though birds were plentiful the long thick grass made shooting well-nigh impossible. On sighting some mallard we set off in the small boat to try and get within range, the drill being that you lie flat on your face on the floor boards, with gun at hand, whilst Anar Khan, crouching behind the counter, pushes the boat closer and closer. However, we grounded on a shoal, and in the ensuing confusion the duck made off.

Below Kalakhel the first mugger was encountered. The look-out sighted something after breakfast, but a scout sent down the river bank came back and reported it was only a bundle of grass. Anar Khan then took me away after duck, and, on approaching the grass it suddenly came to life and slipped into the water, so we hastily made for the near shore and hid ourselves in the jungle. Some twenty minutes later, after a very careful reconnaissance, a large mugger crept out on to a sand bank just opposite us, about one hundred yards away. Using Anar Khan's posterior as a sand bag I drew a bead on where I

reckoned its neck ought to be, and to my surprise it took the count. After skinning it the boatmen hailed some low caste mugger-eating fishermen, met with further down, and when they heard the good news, they left their work and hurried up the bank to compete with the vultures.

You should not fail to visit Hiranwala for pigeon. About one and a half miles inland is a scattered wood, carpeted with dense "sar" grass, of the razor blade variety, through which you force your way from tree to tree. Then it is just a question of how many birds you want, as they have not been attacked for over two years, and the hundreds I saw became thousands in winter. I thought that I was doing fine, until I discovered that no one had brought a knife with which to "hallal" and that I would have to eat the lot myself, so I packed in then and there. Some five miles away is Kundian Junction where one of the boatmen can be sent to fetch any extra stores required from the refreshment room.

Stage by stage we drifted down, with sorties every morning in the ship's life-boat to search the shallows for duck and mugger, and to shoot various odd birds which the crew fancied for their dinners. Some of their requests were rather outrageous and had to be firmly refused. We never really got within range of the duck, the only ones I shot being with the .22.

The partridge shooting morning and evening never becomes monotonous, whether your eye is in or not. If you have been shooting badly the day before there is always the knowledge that you have nothing in the larder for lunch, which I always found increased my skill. At one nameless village a local guide led us through a thicket of tangled grass, that became taller and taller, then finally the ground gave way underfoot and he lost us in a smelly churned-up bog. After half an hour we eventually managed to fight our way out, our only clue the sound of cattle bells ahead.

The villagers were very keen to help the shoots, and though I always hired but two of them and impressed the boatmen as beaters, cattle and crops were abandoned, the line grew and grew, and at the finishing post it usually meant bakhshish for about ten. Add to this the price of cartridges nowadays and the birds were worth several rupees a head! But an average shot should easily be able to provide for the whole crew, whereas I only managed to feed the afterguard. An acceptable rate of bakhshish was three annas per man for a morning or an evening shoot, and two annas for small boys. Only once was there trouble, and that was one

young man who insisted he was worth three chokras. But after hearing some rather pointed suggestions on the part of the crew he expressed his complete satisfaction and departed.

Field glasses and mosquito net are essential, the former for the mugger watch and the net as protection against the hordes of famished mosquitoes that embark at every port. I found a small tool set handy for constructing a rifle rack, to put up odd nails on which to hang things, and also for re-bending the straightened hooks which the cabin boy baited with *atta* and trailed over the stern, though I never saw him catch anything but turtles.

Anar Khan was an entertaining companion. He talked a most intelligible Urdu, having learnt it at school out of a book like the rest of us, and was ready to discuss anything. He regaled me down the river with local history and water front gossip, and with anecdotes of previous clients. I, for my part, used to tell simple stories out of "Hagha Dagha" some of which brought the house down. He and the skipper, his brother-in-law Fateh Mohammed, managed all the shoots expertly, and when he saw my light go out at night he would order silence for all hands, and I used to fall asleep to the music of the river and the angry buzzing of frustrated anopheles.

On arrival at the bridge of boats, four miles from Dera Ismail Khan, I sent my bearer in for a tonga which cost Rs. 2/8/- for the fifteen miles to Darya Khan Station, plus eight annas toll. Here there is a refreshment room where you can get lunch out of tins, but a better plan is to shoot extra specially well the day before and then take a cold meal with you.

I brought all my tinned stores back again, save for one tin of bully used the first day, having gorged myself on game, fried potatoes, and chappaties, with an occasional egg in lieu of quail for breakfast. Milk and eggs seemed easy enough to get, and there was a drink of "lassi" waiting at most villages after the morning shoot.

The end of October, when I went, is not the best time of year. But if you go in December or January the mugger get so cold swimming that they spend most of the day basking in the sun, and you will also get quail, grey and black partridge, sisi and chikor at Kaffir Kot, pigeon, geese, duck, a few snipe, and if I had been a bit quicker on the draw at Kala Khel I might have had some pig. Actually, if you are keen on roast pork you can arrange to be woken up by a villager when the pig have set to

work in his fields, and then, if there is a moon and you care to secrete yourself nearby and hope that they will come near enough for a night shot, you may be lucky. I tried a few times but they never came within effective range.

My total expenditure, with 200 cartridges and "home comforts" (but excluding rail fares) was Rs. 225/-. Deduct from this, say Rs. 50/-, as an average ten days messing, drinks and visits to the local cinema, and you have only spent Rs. 175/- extra. Rs. 140 of that is for hire of boat, so it is a very cheap holiday really.

A first-aid kit would have been useful, especially if there is to be work for a tin opener, and I could have done with some beer after the evening shoots, instead of whisky and boiled Indus which was all I had. The water tastes all right but you have to get used to the smell, a nasty one, reminiscent of sewers, (unless it was my thermos or the chattie).

This is all the advice I have to offer to anyone thinking of going down the river, beyond to say that it is an ideal trip for two. Larger parties would require tents and have to camp ashore, but then I feel that furniture, hot baths and four-course dinners would creep in, and the whole charm of the simple life be destroyed.

THE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL, INDIA

BY AN EX-STUDENT

"**E**YES AND ye see not, ears and ye hear not," said my Brigadier patiently, after reading the Intelligence Report I had prepared for him. A half forgotten saying, "Brigadiers get the Intelligence Officers they deserve", flashed through my mind, but there are times when silence is golden. "So", continued the Brigadier, "we have at last got a vacancy at the Intelligence School for you. Now don't forget, I want you to come back here, unless G. S. I. claim you on account of your languages for some special job. We must not be too parochial."

Sand, dust, flies, sweat and more sand is my memory of the Sind desert and the journey to Karachi. Why locate the School in Karachi? I wondered. Before long I understood why.

"Welcome gentlemen", boomed the Commandant in his opening address to me and forty odd other students in the rather imposing lecture hall. "I hope you will enjoy your six weeks' course here."

The School, I soon found consisted of: (a) the Officers' Wing in an impressive old building; (b) the V.C.O. and N.C.O. Wing for 80 students in the ultra modern buildings across the road; (c) Field Security Wing, which trains classes of British and Indian students, forms them into sections and sends them to their formations; (d) interrogation classes for a few selected officers with a high standard in specially useful languages or long residence in now enemy countries; (e) special language refresher courses; and (f) Air Photo Interpretation Wing of 20 officer-students, some very senior. This course is run by newly-arrived R. A. F. and Army officers from England.

Primarily the object of the School is to train and select officers for Intelligence appointments in Brigades, Divisions, Corps, Armies and G.H.Q. and for Intelligence units and a host of odd Intelligence appointments in India and overseas. We are reminded that we are here not only to absorb knowledge, but to learn how to impart that knowledge. When we return to our formations or areas we have to be prepared to run short courses for unit and other Intelligence officers and other ranks.

Responsibilities of the unit "I" officer, we find, have increased considerably, and he should have a full-time job attending to

the "I" training in his unit. In addition, he has to be in charge of training the snipers in their Intelligence duties, teaching Navigation or guiding, Security, Censorship, Publicity and Propaganda. Oh! for a chat now with the senior officer who once told me there was nothing for "I" personnel to do till we meet a real enemy; and that then we would find the Intelligence section would train itself!

Meeting a few old friends on the course, I soon found we were placed in syndicates by Formation Intelligence teams, two of them from divisions and one is for a Corps. I envied the fellows in these syndicates, as they all knew each other, and felt very much at home from the first day of the course. They also had the V.C.O.'s from their formations on the course in the V.C.O. Wing, and often worked with them in various exercises. A team which has lived together, worked and played as a team for six weeks has a certain spirit of mutual co-operation which no amount of liaison can normally achieve.

My syndicate, not a team to begin with, very soon became one, although it was composed largely of officers, from Majors to 2nd Lieutenants, who had resided in various enemy countries and knew different languages. A tough young Regular, a R.A.F. pilot, an Indian Police Officer, a Punjabi barrister, an ex-Customs Officer, a young diplomat, a Calcutta box walla, as he called himself, and a tea planter (recently qualified at the Staff College), an advertising expert, and a language teacher each had some special knowledge of use to Intelligence in one or other of its forms. In discussions and schemes we found that each could teach the others a great deal.

In the last war, we were warned, Intelligence officers were regarded as strange-looking specialists, often highly qualified, and wearing green tabs; IN the Army but not quite OF it. "I" officers must now be very much part of the army. They must be good mixers and avoid water-tight compartments. When need arises, they must be able to fit in with the Navy, the Air Force, Police and Civil Administrations and our allies.

To ensure co-operation we must understand enough about Intelligence in all its branches to be able to fit into the vast "I" organization, to know what others expect of us and what we can expect from them. Never again should we hear of Strat. R. being carried out to obtain information already adequately reported through other channels. Nor should we hear of raids to secure identifications already obtained by another formation.

Secrecy and the need for it is stressed at an early stage, and we soon get into the habit of guarding against indiscreet talk and tactfully "riding off" those in our company bordering on the indiscreet. Servants can understand a great deal more than they appear to, and in clubs and other places lip-readers do exist. We soon cultivate the habit of recognizing the oblique or covert interrogation of those we meet in clubs and elsewhere who wish to know more than concerns them.

Our syllabus is laid out under the headings: Staff duties, information, organization, security, censorship, publicity and propaganda, air subjects, navigation, foreign Armies, interrogation, and exercises embodying some or all of the above.

The last item is the largest and most practical of all. Full use is made of all available resources to provide sound and other effects to produce the atmosphere of work in the field. Some of these exercises continue day and night and under conditions which soon bring home to one the necessity for keeping fit. Imagination has not to be called upon unduly to produce the atmosphere of battle, as real aircraft do dive on our H.Q., and very real and unpleasantly near explosions do cover us with sand in the desolate waste of coastal sand-dunes where this exercise is held. All night the wind blows sand and heavy dew into our "I" offices, representing an "I" lay-out, from a unit to a Corps H.Q., with A.L.O., Security units, Press and Civil authorities represented.

Combined operations from the "I" point of view in the form of a beach landing and recce impressed on me how fit one has to be. I confess I was sea-sick in the patrol vessel which carried us out to sea very early in the morning, and I fear I took only a mild interest in the firing at hostile aircraft or dropping of depth charges *en route*. Over the side down a rope and into a small boat we go, and pull for the desolate hostile shore. There, just short of the breakers, the sailors indicate that from there on through the surf we have to swim, and if we cannot swim, never mind, the breakers will wash us ashore. On completion of our recce we return again to the Patrol vessel. The Directing Staff assure us that despite the alarming looking rollers and breakers they have not yet lost a student.

Few of us could "take it" on the more strenuous exercises, were it not for the conditioning we undergo in the form of daily P. T., swimming, rowing, and running parades; while at night, if you have not studied the stars and compass well enough, you

may flounder through a mangrove swamp all night or lose your party and walk for miles in the sand-dunes.

Perhaps the most popular item of the syllabus is Air Intelligence Liaison, the work of the A.L.O. Although some of us had never flown, before, we soon became "bitten" by the desire to become an A.L.O. We cannot all become A.L.O.s, however, and only those who show a special aptitude are given the additional training in their special duties. Our Instructor-Pilot for this subject is a Cavalry Major wearing the Wings of the I.A.F.* I had not realized that the competition at this School to be an A.L.O. would be so keen. When one considers how much depends on this liaison with the Air Force one realizes that the standard of selection and training must be high.

Security enters into every exercise, and very soon one automatically considers this aspect of every situation. Armies do not always fight in deserts. Sometimes they fight in densely-populated areas where the security problem is perhaps the greatest of all. What can the enemy do? What may the population do? The population is composed of individuals. Consider each one (defeatists say it can't be done). Who is he? Who was he? Every man has a past. Who are his friends? Where is he going? What for? One has to be restlessly inquisitive, it appears, to understand individuals of all types, for then only can one visualize how the population as a whole may react to the enemy agency in our midst when the time is ripe.

During the last week of our course a party of G.S.O.I.s arrive on a visit. Some are from those Divisions which have students on the course, while others are about to take up "I" appointments. Most of them appear to have held interesting "I" appointments at some time or other, and many of us were surprised to find how keenly they entered into discussions with even the very junior among us.

With more than a little regret one comes to the end of six weeks' intensive Intelligence training with a desire to take up an Intelligence appointment where one can pass it on, so that each one down to the Sepoy will realize that he is an indispensable link in the service of Intelligence.

*The school has its own aircraft out at the flying school.

BACKGROUND NEWS AND VIEWS

This feature includes extracts from Press and platform on a wide variety of topical subjects.

Post-War Germany

"The damage being done by the Second World War in almost every sphere of human activity will be so enormous that generations will be needed to remedy it even in part. The most terrible result of all cannot be remedied by anybody. In all the countries over-run so far by German barbarism it is the best, the finest, the most courageous people who have been executed. Europe under the German yoke is suffering decapitation Post-war Germany should become a decentralized confederation. A return to the former confederation of the Reich, in a modernized form, is absolutely essential. Prussia's domination over the other elements in the German nation should be broken. Prussia herself should be divided into three or four separate state units. Further, Germany must return to her pre-1938 frontiers, though possibly with rectifications in favour of her neighbours if such are demanded by considerations of European security."—*President Eduard Benes, President, Provisional Czechoslovak Government, writing in "Foreign Affairs."*

Britain's Colonial Policy

"It has suddenly become the fashion after our recent defeats to decry the British Colonial system, more particularly in the Far East. Let me remind you of what, after all, it has achieved and what it stood for. Let me take Hong Kong and Singapore. There, a century ago, Britain acquired a barren rock inhabited by a handful of fishermen, and a derelict village in a mangrove swamp. British administration, British justice and fairplay, drew to those two spots the enterprise and capital of all the world, as well as of this country, and an eager concourse of willing workers from neighbouring countries. They made of them two of the world's most prosperous and happy communities. In Malaya British protection put an end to piracy and the internecine quarrels of minor States. Without interfering with the traditions, the loyalties and the way of life of the Malay population, it found opportunities for the creative enterprise of

Europeans and the free and effective co-operation of other immigrant communities, Chinese and Indian. All of these lived happily together in a little cosmopolitan world free from both racial oppression and racial bitterness. The one thing we did not do was to prepare them for war. We neither enforced military training on them nor taxed them (beyond a trifling local contribution in the case of Singapore, and generous voluntary contributions from the Malay rulers) for their own defence or the common defence of the Empire. We were proud of that policy. To-day we may realize its inadequacy. But it ill becomes those who, in the past, were most vocal in denouncing the British Empire as an empire of militarism and oppression, now to turn round and complain because the peoples of Malaya were unarmed, untrained, and, above all, unused to the thought of war".—*The Rt. Hon. L. S. Amery, M.P., in an address to the Oxford Union.*

Rommel

"Rommel is an altogether exceptional soldier. The son of a Bavarian land-worker, he succeeded in reaching commissioned rank in 1918, when, as a young subaltern, he won the remarkable distinction of the *Pour le Merite* (familiarily known as the P.L.M.). After 1919 he turned strongly Nazi, and, finally, had to leave the Army for his participation in Storm Troop politics and actions. Since then his name has been closely connected with the growth and tactics of the Storm Troop organization. He knows as much about the gangster activities of the S. S. as any other hard-boiled Nazi. Specially selected by Hitler for reinstatement in the Army, he is now the only Nazi general who has not been through an orthodox curriculum."—*Lieutenant-Colonel H. de Watterville, C.B.E., late R.A., in "The Army Quarterly."*

The Basis of Peace

"Until the very last years of the nineteenth century the idea that we might be involved in a world war scarcely entered our heads. For us the epoch of world wars had been ended once for all in 1815 with the Battle of Waterloo. There were wars in Europe and Asia, but we lived in no fear of world wars such as 1914 and 1939. This sense of security was nowhere more strong than in the U. S. A. and in the younger democracies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The reason was that Britain controlled the seas with a fleet so strong that until the close of the nineteenth century no one thought of challenging

its supremacy. This the people in Great Britain were able to do so long as they retained the flying start which the invention of the steam engine and the industrial revolution had given them. At the close of the century the Germans were overtaking that start. They began to think, and not without reason, that a time was in sight when they could afford to build a navy strong enough to wrest from the British control of the sea, and so enable them to transport their armies from Europe to any part of the world. From the moment that the future power of Britain to control the seas was challenged, the era of world wars was reopened, and the system of freedom for which we stand not only in Britain but elsewhere in the world was in jeopardy In 1919 the world was seized with the notion that a general disarmament of nations (which never took place) was the necessary road to peace. The Atlantic Charter, on the other hand, is inspired by the opposite notion based on a terrible experience that the peace of the world will only be maintained so long as the free nations of the world are so strongly armed that aggressors will not think of attacking them."—Mr. Lionel Curtis, addressing the Royal Empire Society in London.

Hitlerisms

"Here are a number of recorded utterances by Hitler:

"I am willing to sign anything. I will do anything to facilitate the success of my policy. I am prepared to guarantee all frontiers and to make non-aggression pacts and friendly alliances with anybody. It would be sheer stupidity to refuse to make use of such measures merely because one might possibly have to break a solemn promise.'

"Generals want to behave like chivalrous knights. I have no use for knights.'

"I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin. I shall simply take systematic measures to dam their great natural fertility.'

"Conscience is a Jewish invention. It is a blemish, like circumcision.'

"Unless you are prepared to be pitiless you will get nowhere. Our opponents are not prepared for it, not because they are human, but because they are too weak.'

"From a Proclamation, Sept. 1, 1933: 'The National Socialist Revolution has rid the State of treachery, and perjury, and in its place has set up an empire of honour, fidelity, and decency.'

"August 26, 1938: 'We do not want any Czechs. When the Czechs have come to an understanding with their other minorities I shall not be interested in the Czech State any more, and as far as I am concerned, I can guarantee it.'

"October 9, 1938: 'Now, as a strong State, we can be ready to pursue a policy of understanding with other States. We want nothing from them. We have no wishes, no claims.'

"January 30, 1939: 'Between Poland and us peace and understanding shall reign.'

"November 10, 1934: 'WHEN HAVE THE GERMAN PEOPLE EVER BROKEN THEIR WORD?'—"Gleaner", in the "Fighting Forces."

CAVALRY AND AIR CO-OPERATION

BY LT.-COLONEL H. S. STEWART

THEORIES that the attack is obsolete and that the defence can always defeat it have been blown "sky-high". Aircraft and fighting vehicles acting in co-operation have proved themselves invincible under favourable circumstances, but the Germans do not owe their victories entirely to them.

Does the experience of these Blitzkriegs establish that the utility of horsed cavalry has passed away in all places and under all conditions? Should any remaining horsed cavalry be given vehicles instead of horses, or can men on horses continue to play some useful part in War? Is horsed cavalry even as obsolete as marching infantry in mobile warfare?

What happened in Poland is still difficult to analyse; but it would seem that, apart from anything else, the Poles did allow themselves to be carried away by their cavalry successes against the Bolsheviks in 1920.

It is doubtful whether in 1939 the Polish cavalry ever completed its mobilisation, and it is not known how far this may have handicapped its action; but it is certain that the Polish cavalry did not prove a serious menace to the Germans, and that it never even became engaged in a serious action. On at least two occasions it attempted to concentrate for the purpose of attacking, but each time it was decimated by low-flying aircraft, not by fighting vehicles.

Instead of undue reliance on cavalry, the following seems to have been fundamental causes for the Polish defeat:

(a) The German invasion was made at least by seventy divisions; these included at least six armoured divisions and four motorised divisions. This was certainly many more than the Poles had available.

(b) Not more than two and a half divisions of the Polish Army had completed mobilization at the outbreak of hostilities.

(c) The Polish frontiers did not lend themselves to defence.

(d) Surprise attacks largely annihilated the Polish Air Force on their aerodromes before fighting actually commenced; and what remained was wiped out within the next few days.

(e) The Polish Army was not in possession of sufficient modern equipment.

Co-operation between German ground and air forces was greatly facilitated by the initial destruction of the Polish Air Force; but the extent to which aircraft proved able to undertake the services of information and protection, and the way that the German armoured divisions pushed forward without infantry support, constituted a surprise.

The Poles could scarcely have hoped to have prevented the German mechanized mobile columns from breaking through the gaps between the various armies defending their frontiers; these gaps were only masked by brigades of cavalry, which were weak in numbers and not well provided with anti-tank weapons. The Poles must have known that unless such penetrating columns could be isolated and overcome in detail before they had a chance to unite, the Polish communications, headquarters, and services of the rear would be destroyed, even should the armies continue to resist.

Actually, with aircraft co-operation the German mechanized formations were able in seven days to penetrate to a depth of some ninety miles along a forty-to-fifty-mile front. The German armoured divisions proved capable of making "bounds" of up to seven miles. This rate of progress was possible because the mechanized armoured formations pushed on with little regard to support from the marching columns; these followed as fast as they could, and are reported to have averaged eighteen miles a day.

The Germans were able to take risks because of their understanding with Russia, and paid little attention to the progress of their supply columns; but had it not been for the advance of the Soviet troops against the Polish Eastern frontier, the mechanized columns might ultimately have been less successful than they were. Various scattered columns, which had penetrated deeply into Poland, in the end had to face great difficulties over the supply of petrol and oil; in spite even of the transportation of considerable consignments by air, supply arrangements did break down.

One factor of the German success was that the air formations accompanying the armoured divisions were under the orders of the ground commanders, and not an independent force merely co-operating. Primarily the aircraft were used for meticulous reconnaissance. After this had revealed exactly where the Polish positions were, bombers, tanks and motorised formations co-operated to prevent the Polish armies from carrying out any adequate anti-tank defence. They immobilized all counter-attacks, and

destroyed communications by which Polish reinforcements could reach the combat area.

Strong columns of horsed cavalry were employed in support of the German mechanized formations, in case these should be held up by obstacles, etc.; but, on account of the weather being so favourable, the mechanized units were never seriously checked. At Mława on September 1, a horsed cavalry formation (taking advantage of a fog) reconnoitred for some armoured divisions that were checked by an anti-tank obstacle; it succeeded in finding a route which enabled the vehicles to attack a position in flank with complete success. On another occasion (where a cavalry brigade acted as the independent flank guard of an armoured division) the German High Command expressed regret that more horsed cavalry was not available.

The Blitzkriegs of the West did not differ materially from that of Poland. The disaster that materialized was certainly not in any way attributable to undue reliance on mounted troops. Far from it; the French were firm believers in a policy of static defence. They lost, first their morale and then the war, primarily because of their "Maginot mentality". This marvellously constructed frontier defence (although it was probably far from complete) had been allowed to become, like the Great Wall of China, synonymous with the national idea of security. Therefore when the Germans began to advance past the flank of the Maginot Line, all hope was lost both by the nation and the army.

A compulsory service army does not have a military morale of its own like a regular or mercenary army; it merely reflects the spirit of the nation. The French political scandals and corruption had so spread defeatism through all grades of French society, that the national morale had been ruined before the war. The country panicked at the first serious defeat, and terror was broadcast by enemy parachutists, native defeatists and by the refugees, who all spread stories that the invading fighting vehicles and aircraft were invincible. The exaggerations of the refugees and the pacifist fifth columnists were in fact far more deadly than the actual achievements of the German mechanization, aircraft, or parachutists. Vehicles and aircraft cannot force river crossings or establish bridge-heads. Nor can they continue their advance unless bridge-heads are captured; fighting men have to do that sort of fighting, even if dive bombers prepare the way.

Primarily the French army training was at fault. Tactics were based on deductions from the fighting of 1918, and gave

little weight to developments subsequent to that period. Doctrine deprecated the exercise of initiative by subordinates, discouraged mobile penetrations, restricted fighting vehicles to close co-operation with infantry, and prescribed that all attacks were to be preceded by heavy artillery bombardments. In other words it classed as heresies the principles which give victory to mobile forces.

While the Germans do not owe their victories to cavalry, they do owe these to the observance of the cavalry principles of mass employment, mobility, morale and surprise. They did have soldiers who possessed "a firm resolve to perish with glory" (Napoleon to Lauriston); and such men cleared the way to victory by capturing bridge-heads.

Surprise was not so much brought by the particular type of weapon used, as by the great numbers of these that were available and by the new and ingenious methods with which these were employed. The Germans breached the French battle line, by surprising the sector where its defences were weakest and its troops of indifferent quality. The way that the German armoured formations rushed through the Ardennes and across the Meuse was a surprise to many besides the French, and revolutionized views which many previously had held about the limitations of fighting vehicles. But this does not necessarily prove that "Panzer" divisions are irresistible. The "Panzer" divisions (partly owing to the breakdown of the French morale) were able to bring about surrenders of the retreating French, without being obliged to call for extensive assistance from the slower moving non-motorized elements supporting them.

Their mobile columns crossed rivers, established bridge-heads and brushed aside French resistance. They cleared the roads of refugees by machine-gunning them and bombing them; brutal undoubtedly, but the alternative would have been a failure to continue the advance. The blocking of roads by the refugees and their vehicles contributed to the French debacle. French army vehicles were frequently unable to get forward even when their drivers were anxious to do so; and to many who did not wish to advance the excuse was excellent. Men on horses are able to move across country, and are less handicapped by blocked roads.

As in Poland, the close co-operation of aircraft with fighting vehicles, disregard by fighting vehicles of reliance on the support of non-mechanized arms, and the substitution of air-bombardment for artillery preparation, were key-notes of the German

tactics. Infiltration (popularly nick-named "soft spot tactics") developed to harmonize with mechanized warfare, was the basis of their attack methods. Great attention was paid to mobility and to the technical efficiency of the wireless communications service. The artillery, when supporting attacks, was made to come into action at ranges as short as three thousand yards, and the rapid opening of fire was considered more important than accuracy. Consequently direct observation was preferred to indirect methods of ranging.

There is reason to believe that the detachments landed from parachutes or troop-carrying aircraft (except in so far as these encouraged or gave rise to fifth column activities), contributed only very little to the victory. The Germans were certainly aided by dive bombers; but dive bombers, even if they can play a great part in overcoming the defence, are not invincible, especially if they are attacked in the air. While the French did lack aircraft, fighting vehicles and other equipment, their breakdown of morale resulted in even those that were available not being used to the best advantage; and the French fighting vehicles were not all directed or even manned by men who had "a firm resolve to perish with glory."

The French in fact had enough tanks to have formed four armoured divisions; but owing to the fatal doctrine that fighting vehicles should primarily be used as an adjunct to the infantry the available vehicles were not organized in self-contained mobile formations, with the exception of the one armoured division which was originally commanded by General de Gaulle.

Very strong horse cavalry formations, well supported by aircraft, could have exploited success once the great gap was created in the French Line; and if they had not been resisted by armoured divisions, could have spread havoc in the French rear areas much as the armoured formations did, only more slowly. But no cavalry on horses could have created a moral effect on the French army and people compatible with that which was produced by the German fighting vehicles and their attendant aircraft. This would not necessarily be the case in all countries and under all conditions.

Strong mounted forces of high morale, with sufficient attached mobile anti-tank weapons and aircraft, might have attempted an effective active defence of the river crossings of Northern France, the prevention of the establishment of bridge-heads, and the surrounding and cutting of communications of the scattered German columns. But it would be unreasonable to imagine that

any cavalry however powerful could have succeeded in saving a degenerate France, where a revolution in every sense was overdue. A nation under popular Government without the will to save itself, cannot be saved by an army.

Though it is difficult to obtain authentic up-to-date information undoubtedly a considerable number of horsed cavalry is still being maintained by most of the various belligerents.

Norway is not a cavalry country, but it is possible that mounted men might have been more useful than vehicles there. However, the experiment was not made. The Northern African desert has proved ideal for fighting vehicles; mounted units would seem to be quite useless there.

In Soviet Russia, on the other hand, reports indicate that mounted men are taking a very important part in the fighting. Some reports credit the Soviet with maintaining as many as forty or more mounted divisions. There is no doubt that Soviet cavalry did do excellent work connected with the repulse of the Germans from the Donets Basin and in the pursuit that followed. The Red Army is credited with teaching the theory that mounted men who act in a proper manner have little to fear from fighting vehicles!

The Japanese are not in any way a horse-loving people, but it is believed that they have actually doubled their horsed cavalry establishment as the result of the campaign in China.

The United States of America, always extremely keen on every new scientific mechanical invention, has not in any way accepted the theory that the horse soldier is obsolete. Their Army still contains a large establishment of horsed cavalry. They are now experimenting with "Portee Cavalry". These units have mechanized conveyances for the horses as well as for the personnel. The value of Portee Cavalry can only be verified by experience under active service conditions.

Mass, Mobility, and Morale are the real causes of the Blitzkrieg victories.

Mass does not imply the crowding of large forces into limited areas; it means having a sufficient force available to achieve success, and to exploit it. The initial dispositions of armies in depth must be those which will facilitate elasticity in the ultimate deployment, and so permit of the employment of sufficient strength at decisive points.

Forces that place their trust in static defence are doomed to defeat. When not counter-balanced by other disadvantages victory inclines to the army possessing the greater mobility. The

Germans realized before war broke out that the tactical development of the age was the increase of mobility made possible by the internal combustion engine. They achieved a mobility greater than any army has possessed since the age of Chenghis Khan and Timur. Mobility more concerns ability to move long distances from point to point, irrespective of roads, rather than on ability to move rapidly along roads.

Cavalry, by reason of its inherent mobility, is therefore really less obsolescent than marching infantry. Army mobility is less benefited by dismounting cavalry than by providing conveyances for arms which still have to march. Units which depend on their legs for locomotion will only be able to play a minor part in modern war, and their up-keep is largely a waste of the national effort. Any increase of fighting vehicle strength should be at the expense of the marching infantry.

It is not enough, however, to give armies means of locomotion, and it is wrong to imagine that many thousands of aeroplanes and tanks, manned and directed by hordes of freedom-loving "citizen" air and ground mechanics, will prove invincible or even mobile in war. It is still the "man behind the gun" who counts. Untrained and undisciplined fighters, even when provided with all appliances of modern science, are a greater danger to their own side than to the enemy. Strict discipline, officers capable of leading, soldiers ready to die and the combination of all arms is still required.

In countries with networks of roads like those of France and Belgium, fighting vehicles supported by aircraft (especially those which attack without any regard to the destruction of non-combatants) can be best resisted by the co-operation of mobile anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns (manned by determined men ready to die at their posts), with aircraft and fighting vehicles.

Town dwellers, who now predominate in all civilized countries, think of countries as road systems because roads and streets radiate in all directions through the areas in which they live and die. They do not fully appreciate that hill-ranges, forests, swamps, in fact even four feet of water, limit the movement of motor-propelled vehicles wherever the road systems of Western civilization are non-existent. The urban-minded "man in the street" uses motor vehicles in his daily life and has come to regard horses and cavalry as a luxury of the privileged classes, out of place in a democratic army. Fighting vehicles, their armour, guns and appearance harmonise with his prejudices, and he places their armour and consequent ability to smash through

things, far above their mobility, to which he gives little consideration.

The Germans have not motorized their whole army. They have created as many "Panzer" divisions as possible, but have allowed the bulk of their ground army to even remain dependent largely on animal transport. They do not consider horsed cavalry obsolete, and strong columns of horsed cavalry normally co-operate with their armoured divisions. While in all the areas fighting vehicles and aircraft have been in the forefront of the battle, the German horsed cavalry in Europe has not been far behind.

Cavalry supported by aircraft can penetrate through gaps between armies much as the mechanized columns can, although it has to move more slowly, and to make shorter bounds, which gives a better chance of resisting it; against this it is less dependent on the maintenance of supply lines or on the continuance of good weather than mechanized forces. Horses at a pinch can continue to work for considerable periods without grain and fodder. During the operations in Palestine, the horses of certain Australian units went three days and four nights without even water. Moreover, cavalry is not stopped by bad weather. Horsed cavalry is best suited to undeveloped countries. The conditions of Eastern Europe suit it far better than those of Western Europe, where the countless roads and commercial stores of petrol and oil greatly assist its mechanized enemies.

Horsed cavalry and mechanized cavalry are not irreconcilable rivals; they can and should co-operate. To ensure that all mobile forces work in harmony, a synchronisation of tactics is essential. This does not necessarily even entail partial mechanization of all cavalry. Under certain circumstances, mechanized cavalry working in close conjunction with air forces can achieve decisive results; under other conditions horsed forces working in close conjunction with air forces may also bring about equally decisive results, although at a much slower tempo. This lack of speed may however destroy the essence of action rapidity.

The remaining horsed cavalry of armies should not have its horses replaced by vehicles, for if horsed formations are not as efficient as mechanized forces under all conditions, neither are mechanized forces always as useful as horsed formations. The activities of horsed units are now far more limited than they were formerly, when horsed units were the only mobile forces and

when there was no danger of air attack. Horsemen are no longer even the most mobile portion of the ground forces.

If horsed cavalry is to be used it must be prepared in emergencies to protect itself against any arm it encounters. Its ability to do this will largely depend on the presence of natural obstacles to free vehicle movement, and on the quantity, quality and mobility of the anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons which accompany it. Mechanized cavalry to an extent is bullet-proof, horsemen are not. On open ground mounted men cannot themselves deal with fighting vehicles which are able to move freely.

Fighting vehicles supported by dive bombers are most dangerous enemies. The attachment of anti-aircraft and anti-tank impedimenta decreases the mobility of mobile troops and so limits their power; but the lack of such arms puts them at the mercy of aircraft and fighting vehicles and will cause them to cease to exist.

Dive bombers are best combated by other aircraft. Although anti-aircraft guns (when the area is limited and the guns plentiful) can to some extent put a "safety umbrella" over stationary objects, it is difficult for them to do this over moving ones. An effective "safety umbrella" requires a large concentration of guns in a small area. In fact the effective defence against all air attacks (more especially in the case of forces that have to move) is protecting aeroplanes rather than anti-aircraft guns. Mobile Columns without escorting aircraft must largely rely on concealment; and a policy of concealment more detracts from mobility than the attachment of impedimenta. Fighting vehicles are more vulnerable to air attack than horsemen.

The most effective defence against fighting vehicles, however, is not other fighting vehicles, but mobile anti-tank guns. An anti-tank gun on a self-propelled mounting without armour, powerful enough to out-range fighting vehicle guns, and mobile enough to move faster than fighting vehicles, can remain at a distance from which its fire will be effective and the fighting vehicle gunfire ineffective. But such anti-tank guns, being primarily defensive weapons, require the co-operation of other arms to exploit success.

In the days gone by, a coherent and harmonious attack of mail-clad Crusading knights could break any Saracen battle-line, and was, comparatively speaking as irresistible as the attack of fighting vehicles. Yet frequently the Knights were defeated, often disastrously. The Saracen light-horse, which gave way to all direct attacks could (by encircling the knights) cut off all supplies

and could harass them by missile fire, so as not to allow them either rest or peace.

The armoured knight was powerless against a horse-archer who could move faster than he could, and who consequently was a far more dangerous enemy than another knight. Now that the fighting vehicle has replaced the knight, the anti-tank gun has replaced the horse-archer. The ancient Crusaders and modern mechanization have a common weakness; inability to move (owing to the cutting-off of regular supplies) renders them comparatively harmless.

Cavalry has nearly always been incorrectly handled; sometimes by its own leaders, more often by the higher commands. Whenever it has been correctly employed in the past it has materially contributed to victory.

It has four spheres of action:

- (a) Along the front of armies prior to their contact.
- (b) On flanks of, or in rear of, armies ready to co-operate in actions subsequent to contact.
- (c) The exploitation of success of the main army, by rapid advances and pursuits.
- (d) Along the rear of armies, covering withdrawals.

It has the greatest scope in (a) and (c). In all cases its main opponent will be enemy mobile forces, but horsed cavalry should be employed in areas where it is unlikely to be exposed to the attack of mechanized cavalry.

In spite of all changes in conditions, cavalry action must remain offensive; numbers are necessary, but surprise can sometimes compensate for lack of strength. In the leading of cavalry no other factor can compensate for lack of daring and enterprise, and there is universal agreement that cavalry action must be audacious, unexpected, etc. But the mere advocacy of such sentiments will not bring them into being. In war, enterprise and audacity will only materialize when those who lead are accustomed to risking life, limb, health and fortune in their peace recreations, and who live under regimes that allow subordinates independent authority.

The power of horsed cavalry apart from mobility has ever lain in intangible forces, and it has always relied more on its effects on human minds than on its injuries to human bodies. Scientific progress, which continually improves devices for attack and defence, cannot change human hearts and instincts. The crews of the fighting vehicles of to-day do not possess hearts and instincts fundamentally different to those of the men who fought

on foot or horseback in the wars of the past. "Machine-minded men", in fact, should have more imagination than the old type had, and should be more susceptible to intangible influences. The crews of fighting vehicles surrounded and cut off from supplies would soon lose morale.

"The charge" was formerly the most romantic of cavalry roles; it has only been during particular periods and for special reasons that mounted attacks have been considered to be the primary work of cavalry. Certainly to-day horsed cavalry has not the power to decide battles by great mounted mass attacks at close interval after the style of Frederic or Napoleon. But against an enemy of shaken morale, especially one lacking mobile armoured support, mounted action can at times be decisive. Mounted attacks at extended interval (by brigades or smaller tactical units) may still often be the easiest and most practical way of capturing positions lightly held and unprotected by physical obstacles which prevent the advance of mounted men.

Morale. Mass Employment, Mobility and Mobile Fire Power, applied by Leadership, Training, Discipline and correct tactics, have been the principles that gave victory to the mobile forces of the past. Now co-operation with aircraft supplements these; and the greater the strength of the enemy in air, the more urgent will be the need of aircraft co-operation.

A LETTER FROM CHITRAL*

Dear . . .

...And now, about Chitral. You know where it is—you said you found it as a small mark on a map thick with chocolate-brown and white, denoting hills of some nature. You were right. There are hills here. In fact it's all hills—and what hills! One gets used to most of them after a bit, but never to that lovely mountain Tīrich Mir, which dominates the main Chitral Valley, and a number of the side valleys, too. It is over 25,000 feet high and there are about forty more of over 20,000 feet scattered round the country. Hills indeed! Unless you've got a trained and properly equipped party, the bigger peaks are virtually unclimbable, while the smaller ones are just bare rocks, and nearly vertical at that, offering few attractions except a swift end. These, of course, are in Northern Chitral.

Down in the South there are hills covered with forests of *deodhar*, going up to 10,000 or 11,000 feet, and very beautiful they are. In the North, however, which I know best, I have so far only managed to visit a few of the more commonplace passes, which the locals with ill-disguised contempt call "Lasht Anen", meaning "flat passes". One of these passes took me up to 16,660 feet, so you will realize that they are not quite so soft as they seem. Nevertheless, much as my standard of flatness may differ from that of the locals, I must confess that I find it great fun, and when once one does get up high, the views are well worth the effort. I got quite a kick out of a view—into Russian Turk-
estan.

The main language of the country, Khowar, is a sort of shot-rubbish dump of various languages, such as Persian, Turki and Pushtu. It's easy enough to learn and well worth the trouble, as one's Urdu does not go very far with the ordinary local. There are all sorts of other languages used in the country, dialects of Pushtu and Punjabi, separate languages such as Turki and Persian and local languages, confined to a few hamlets, such as Palola. I'm trying to pick up a bit of Turki at the moment, as the people who speak it are some of the very nicest in the whole of Chitral.

* The above letter, written by an officer stationed in Chitral, gives such a vivid picture of the country, its customs, and its inhabitants, that we feel many readers will find it of absorbing interest.—*Editor, Journal of the U. S. I.*

They are pastoralists living away up in the North in little settlements of those fascinating black bee-hive tents of which one used to see pictures in books on travel in the Russian steppes. However, learning this language is not all plain sailing, as there seem to be no books on the subject, and one's teachers are all illiterate, which is sometimes a bit confusing, and more often amusing.

About the other inhabitants of Chitral, I quite like them, though lots of people who know more about it than I do say in no measured terms that they don't. However, this is all a matter of taste and all I will say is that they haven't got that attractive "you-be-damned" outlook of the Pathan; but this may be due to the system of government under which they live rather than to any fundamental inferiority. They are tough, cheerful, fond of a joke, sporting and self-reliant. They are desperately poor, which accounts for a lot of the avariciousness of which they are often accused. The vast majority are illiterate, and therefore think on slightly different lines to the person with whom one comes into contact in India, but, taken all in all, they might be a lot worse. And in about twenty years' time, if schemes now operating bear their designed fruit they will be very much more educated than they are now, and then there will be big changes, for the Chitrali is a very quick learner.

How do these people live? The vast majority live on the "fans" of debris brought down by each side-stream to the main river valleys, and there too, they make their fields. How they get even a bare living out of the rocky soil is a mystery, but they seem to manage somehow. They have the right idea about houses. Each little house is separate, and most of them have small lawns in front, beautifully green in the spring and summer, enclosed by drystone walls and shaded by fruit trees. You can imagine how very attractive the villages look in the early spring when the fruit blossom is out and the nearer peaks are still holding traces of snow.

The Chitrali is a sportsman of no mean order. You may have read about the local game of polo. It's great fun, and the best description of it that I can give is to ask you to visualize one of those old polo pictures which one sees sometimes in curio shops in Kashmir. It looks exactly like that. There are no rules to speak of, and each chukker lasts for 20 minutes. There are none of the social trimmings associated with polo elsewhere, and it's just hard galloping, and a "free for all." Anyone plays, you wear what you like, ride what you can get, and say what you

think of the chap who hooks your stick or grips it into his saddle with his knees!

Shikar used to be good in Chitral and even now one gets markhor, whose horns run up to as much as 50 inches, but they are getting rare. The game in the country is being gradually "shot out", because the Chitrali slays everything he can, regardless of age, sex or size, for meat. This seems criminal to us, but I feel that shibboleths about "shootable heads" don't mean much when a man is really hungry—and the Chitrali is often that. Added to this, Chitral is their country, so why shouldn't they use what is in it? Rank heresy this, and of course it doesn't stop me from cursing when I hear that someone has shot four females and three young ones at a sitting. Other game includes oorial, ibex, red bear, and more occasionally, a snow-leopard or a wolf. I saw an otter the other day with a first-class skin, but they are rare.

Chukor are plentiful. And of all the really infuriating birds, commend me to the chukor. That "cheap" and derisive flick of the wings as they sail past, the heap of empty cases getting bigger and bigger, and the pitying look on the face of one's orderly! They get a sort of "Super Chukor" here which they call the ram chukor, and in the south they also get the minaul. Duck one occasionally sees as they pass through on their way north or south, and so far this year I have bagged one mallard, and seen some pochard. I also shot a woodcock the other day. Of rarer birds I have seen a golden eagle, and a few snow-pigeon, and of other forms of life, a few snakes (one brilliant green, which no one will believe!) and butterflies without number.

That about covers the sporting side of Chitral, except that in winter there is ski-ing, better, they say, than in Gulmarg, and, just over the border into Gilgit, streams which are alive with trout.

Altogether, there is not much wrong with Chitral as a station, as you may have gathered from the general tone of this letter, but I have only skated over the top of the subject.

Yours etc.,
BASHGALI.

RECENT ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

"Remember Greece", by Dilys Powell.—The story of Italy's unprovoked attack on Greece.

"A Prophet at Home", by Douglas Reed.—The author writes of an England to which he returned after forty-five years' wandering.

"Mr. Churchill: A Portrait", by Philip Guedalla.—A well-documented survey of the life of the Prime Minister and of contemporary history.

"Army District Court-Martial Procedure", by Major H. M. Shurlock.—The author has assembled a mass of information on the subject, making the volume of real value to those seeking knowledge on Court-Martial procedure.

"The British Army at War", by Brigadier E. D. H. Tollemache, D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C.—The object of this work is to show how the new British Army is manning itself, especially on the mechanised side. The work of all arms is described and illustrated.

"The R.A.F. at War" (illustrated), by the Hon. William Buchan.—This authentic record of how the R.A.F. goes into action, from the construction of the machine to the time it takes its place in the squadron engaged in bombing German supply centres, is of particular interest at the present time.

"So Few" (illustrated), by David Masters.—Nothing that has been written in the field of fiction can excel in thrills this book on "The Immortal Record of the R.A.F." It contains full details of some of the most heroic actions and outstanding feats of individual officers and airmen of the R.A.F.

"The Current of War", by Captain Liddell Hart.—The author, who has for years preached the story of the technique of mechanised warfare, sets out to show how the Nazis have developed and improved upon this skeleton key to the military situation in Europe and North Africa.

"Atlantic Front", by Basil Woon.—This account of the life and death battle on which the future of England and the Empire depends, gives much information on the operation of

convoys and the lives of the gallant seamen who risk everything in the great task of keeping the Home Country well supplied with munitions and food.

"The Nature of Modern Warfare", by Captain Cyril Falls.—

This book contains four Lees Knowles Lectures delivered by the author. The subjects dealt with are: "The Doctrine of Total War"; "The Mechanised Attack"; "Tactics of Defence"; "Notes on Mountain War" and "Immutable Realities" (Strategy).

"Modern Iran" (Illustrated), by L. P. Elwell-Sutton.—

An able study of Iran, a country about which little is generally known. The author includes in the work an examination of the economic foundations of modern Iran, its social and cultural progress, and the probable part Iran will play in the present world situation.

"What to do with Germany", by Colonel T. H. Minshall.—

The author sets out to analyse the German character, examines the causes which have led to the domination of Germany by Prussia, and takes the view that until Germany is freed from this domination neither defeat nor concessions, nor even disarmament, will produce a lasting peace.

"Belgium".— The invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands in May, 1940, will remain one of the outstanding events of the War. This volume, issued by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, sets forth the official records of these events and includes all the important documents relating to them, some of which have not been previously published.

"The Life of Francis Drake", by A. E. W. Mason.—

The usual picture of Drake in men's minds is a brave, bluff man of infinite audacity, a great patriot, a great sailor, a man to whom success came of its own accord. But, as this book shows, that is only half the truth. He was always studying and learning, in many respects he was in advance of his time. He confronted and shattered a vast world-power determined to enslave Britain by changing the naval strategy of England from defence to attack.

"Mediterranean Front", by Alan Moorehead.—

One of the best-known American war correspondents, Mr. Moorehead writes with intimate knowledge of the Middle East Front. He was stationed in Rome for the first six months of the war. A week before Italy came in, he flew to Cairo and was attached

to the then Army of the Nile. In the year following he covered the Libyan campaigns; later went to Abyssinia and entered Addis Ababa with the victorious Allied troops; and then went on to Greece and came back to Crete. His story gives a vivid picture of the various campaigns with which he deals.

"The American Speeches of Lord Lothian".—The Embassy at Washington has always been one of the most important posts in the British Diplomatic Service, and never has there been a more successful British Ambassador to the United States than Lord Lothian. Though he died before the full results of his mission could materialise, his handling of affairs in the United States through a period of high anxiety and complex difficulty was one of the outstanding achievements of the early war period. His speeches, both by reason of their content, and by their fine oratorical construction, will be read long after the present troubles are ended, and will take their place in the literary records of our history.

"Bomber Command" (Illustrated).—A fine descriptive record of Bomber Command's offensive against the Axis during the first 22 months of the War. Profusely illustrated, it tells in graphic style some of the amazing exploits of pilots and crews in their hazardous flights over enemy territory. The concluding words of the book are worth quoting: "The Germans are waging war as they have always waged it: without mercy, respite or limit, with no regard to place or person. Perhaps they may regret the consequences. Perhaps they are already doing so. One thing is certain. Bomber Command will allow no pause, no breathing space. Our attack will go on, fierce because it is relentless, deadly because it is sure."

"Wavell in the Middle East" (illustrated), by Major-General H. Rowan-Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.—An able analysis of the Middle East theatre of war, which, though necessarily somewhat out of date, is most useful to those anxious to be fully informed of the campaigns conducted under the leadership of General Sir Archibald Wavell in an area which ranged for 2,000 miles from the Sea of Galilee to Lake Victoria, and for 1,500 miles across the Sudan to the borders of British Somaliland. Paying tribute to the then Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East, the author has recalled

that shortly before the outbreak of war General Keitel, Chief of the German General Staff, wrote in the *Deutsche Wehr*, the military organ of the Nazi party:

"In the British army to-day there is only one good General, but he is incomparably good. Others have no proper conception of the direction of mechanized warfare, but this officer from 1928 onwards has studied the subject, and he may well prove the dominant personality in any war within the next five years." The distinguished officer he refers to is General Sir Archibald Wavell.

REVIEW

"THE TIGER STRIKES"

AT A TIME when things military are perhaps not going too well for us it is refreshing to read "The Tiger Strikes". Newspaper commentaries on the gallant exploits of Indian troops are satisfying but ephemeral, and it is well to put on permanent record some of the deeds which have shown the world that the valour of Hindustan's army is second to none.

This volume, with its odd flashes of humour and cynicisms, tells plainly and in simple language the story of the fine achievements of the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions in the Middle East, from the almost unbelievable success at Sidi Barrani to the victories in Eritrea and back to the occupation of Syria. In this immense area the British and Indian Armies won for themselves a reputation for gallantry and resource which for many years will remain one of the most inspiring chapters in their history.

The silent approach of the 4th Indian Division over bare desert towards Sidi Barrani is told in detail. As the writer says: "Various reasons have been put forward to explain how this huge body of troops was able to move nearly a hundred miles across completely open desert without being seen by the enemy. In olden days it would have been said simply that God blinded the eyes of the enemy. It is difficult to think of any other adequate explanation."

Towards the end of the battle, orders were received for the 4th Indian Division to proceed to the Sudan. In three days, says the author, the Division had taken over 20,000 prisoners, with many guns, tanks and stores. Three enemy divisions and

the Maletti Mobile Group had been utterly routed, while the Division had suffered less than 700 casualties. Many found it difficult to realize that they had been through their first battle and won such an amazing victory. It had gone so smoothly, without a single hitch, that it seemed very like the usual manœuvres. One sepoy, when asked how he had enjoyed the battle, replied: *Bahut achchha* scheme!

The chapter on the work of the R. I. N. in the Red Sea is unfortunately very brief, but, as the author says, "The Royal Indian Navy has followed the traditions of her big sister, the Royal Navy; it is a silent service." Possibly for that reason he may have wished to spare the blushes of that modest young lady, but sufficient has been included in the volume to show that Indian sailors are in no way behind the Indian soldier in endurance and courage.

Accounts of individual bravery are well and simply told, and the compiler may well be excused for not including more when one reads the lengthy list of awards given in the appendix. Though that list is long, a perusal of the book reveals that many more deeds of sheer heroism must have passed unrecognized. This is borne out by the fact that in all actions, except at Damascus, the opposing forces, not including reserves, were superior in numbers varying from 1.25 to 3 to 1 against us. In many cases, also, their long preparation for operations gave them superior arms and equipment.

The text matter is accompanied by many pictures, and several maps enable the reader to follow the battles more clearly. If one may voice a small criticism, it is that reference to some of the latter would have been easier if they had been placed nearer the matter to which they referred.

An army which has a leavening of men who have passed through the battles described in this book to lead and inspire the younger generation of soldiers and sailors must be assured of eventual victory. We hope that the author is not resting on his laurels, and that, as the war surges on, we may look forward to another volume. It may not be a story of continuous successes, but will surely show that our men are equally stout-hearted in adversity as in success.

R. M. D.

The Journal
of the
United Service Institution of India

Vol. LXXII

OCTOBER, 1942

No. 309

The views expressed in this Journal are in no sense official, and the opinions of contributors in their published articles are not necessarily those of the Council of the Institution.

MATTERS OF MOMENT

THESE ARE THE DAYS when optimism backed by sound reasoning is a tonic. For that reason General Sir Archibald Wavell's broadcast talk as we entered the fourth year of the war was as stimulating as it was sound.

**A Tonic
Broadcast**

His words carried conviction by cold, hard facts, which braced his listeners and confounded those who for ever fret and fuss about our shortcomings. It is well that some one in authority in India has cast up a balance sheet, the sum total of which demonstrates beyond all doubt that this war can have but one result—pre-supposing that we cast aside complacency and face the future with grim resolution. On the credit side we have the four mightiest nations on earth, each led by men of courage, vigour and vision; output of munitions, aeroplanes, tanks, guns and ships is rising; reports from the occupied countries of Europe talk of revolt among the enslaved peoples.

How can the enemy view the situation? Harassed by a less plentiful larder, with labour shortages on all sides, with

**The
Fuehrer's
Anxieties**

the need for conserving stocks, with the prospect of more intensive bombing raids, and with the uncertainty of a second front, not the least of the Fuehrer's anxieties must be the effect of the enormous German losses in Russia on the millions of his dupes in the Fatherland. As the Commander-in-Chief said: "The shape of things to come is taking on an ever grimmer aspect for the German people; their hearts are sinking into their empty stomachs; soon they will sink still lower into their ersatz boots". Hitler may well change the tune of his speeches. By treachery he has achieved his successes; by misleading propaganda he has sought to prove his statement in *Mein Kampf* that the bigger the lie the more likelihood there is that it will be believed. But the iron hand of the Gestapo may prove as brittle as glass when defeat stares him and his followers in the face. The moral to the despondent, the grumbler, and the doubter is plain: Make up your mental balance sheet, and go to your task, whatever it may be, invigorated, heartened, and refreshed.

**

**

**

IT IS, WE BELIEVE, within the sphere of this Journal to survey briefly a subject which attracted considerable attention in Great Britain a short time ago, when the desirability of establishing a Combined General Staff

**A
Combined
General
Staff**

was widely debated. The subject is not new, but the course of the war has led many to search for what is widely held, rightly or wrongly, to be a fault in our system. Lack of a proper and necessary balance between the different arms of the Services has seemed to dog our steps hitherto, and if there is a defect it will be generally agreed that every endeavour should be made to put it right. We do not propose to comment on the pros and cons of the sub-

ject, but it is perhaps permissible to point out that such a reform has in fact been tested out in the present war on a small scale, for a "Combined Operations Headquarters", of which Lord Louis Mountbatten is Chairman, has been responsible for the organisation of the inspiring raids recently made on the French coast. It is justifiable to surmise that if a "Combined General Staff" on a small scale was deemed desirable for those operations, it is likely to be equally efficacious in the war as a whole, for nearly all the factors to be found in major operations are present in these small but effective raids. The summary of the discussion is, however, included in our pages solely with the object of keeping our readers well-informed on an important military subject.

**

**

**

WE MAKE NO APOLOGY for returning to the subject of salvage, which becomes of increasing importance as the war drags on. Elsewhere in this issue will be found a survey of what was done in the Great War and what is being done in India to-day. It will be seen that in the main, the organisation compares favourably with 1914-18, but is the individual, the main-spring of the movement, doing enough? Why not face the facts frankly and admit that he or she is not? We need a more aggressive spirit on this salvage front. Months of planning at Headquarters are now yielding fruit; factories, machinery and staffs are now in full swing, improvising, inventing, and salvaging a wide variety of articles. What is essential now is a nation-wide revival of the spirit which seized the whole British nation a quarter of a century ago. To carry out the bare orders on this particular "war front" is not enough. We want individual men and women to determine that he or she will not waste a single article, and, if its first life is spent, to see that means are found whereby its ingredients can be utilised in other ways. In the last

**The
Salvage
Front**

War salvage played no small part in leading us to victory. In this War its influence will be even greater.

**

**

**

"THE ALLIANCE OF OUR two countries has been born of political and military history: it must become a human reality". These words of sound common sense are culled from the "Ten Commandments" compiled by

**Fostering
Good
Relations**

General Sir Archibald Wavell for members of the Fighting Services in India.

This is a timely opportunity to put them into practice, for with so many newcomers in this country the more each individual strives to learn of India and its peoples, the better will be the relations between the two communities. English customs are as strange to Indians as many Indian practices are to the Britisher. The smile that appears on the face of an Englishman when asked "where the bazaar is in London" is comparable with the look of amazement which greets the new British Officer who regards as strange the fact that his men play football in bare feet.

*

*

*

How, then, can we foster this "human" atmosphere? One method, we suggest, is to establish small "Brains

**Set up
Brains
Trusts**

Trusts" in camps housing British troops, and to invite two or three local Indians, or English-speaking V.C.O.'s, to become members. The response would be immediate, and members of the audience seeking knowledge of any particular Indian custom, whether it deals with religion or any of the hundred and one details of everyday life, would gain valuable first-hand information. Interspersed with such questions would be inquiries of a general nature, which the British members of the Trust might be able to deal with. To inaugurate such a scheme requires little organisation. A Brains Trust would have as Question-

master a man of broad ideas, tact, and intuition; its members could be composed of all ranks; questions could be invited beforehand from those who intend to be present, and the problems selected might well yield much interesting, instructive and entertaining answers. The fruits of such meetings would be a better understanding by Britain's new Citizen Army of the Indian and his customs, a fostering of good relationship between the two communities, and a warmer feeling of friendship. As the Commander-in-Chief has written in another of his "Ten Commandments:" "Our common task is not only to win the war but the peace as well. This we will only be able to do if we remain united. We will only remain united if we understand one another."

**

**

**

BRAZIL'S DECLARATION OF WAR against Germany and Italy, "in face of the acts of war against our sovereignty," has for some time been a foregone conclusion. For years Germany has sought to apply her well-known infiltration policy to this enormous South American Republic, among whose inhabitants are 1,500,000 Italians, nearly 200,000 Germans, and a similar number of Japanese. Economically, by means of barter agreements, Nazi Germany had in the pre-War years exchanged much of her machinery for Brazil's agricultural and mineral products, and by propaganda through the well-organised German and Italian inhabitants, had endeavoured to foster the National Socialist cult there. She achieved a certain measure of success, which, however, has been nullified by the action of her submarine commanders in ruthlessly sinking many Brazilian ships. By her action Brazil has given a significant lead to other Latin American countries, notably Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.

**Brazil
Declares
War**

*

*

*

Strategically, our new Ally will be of great value in providing bases and re-fuelling depots in the ten valuable harbours on her 3,500 mile-long Atlantic seaboard. The passage of Allied convoys in the Central Atlantic will be assisted by the anti-submarine chasers which will now be able to set out from these ports. Moreover, Port Natal being only 1,700 miles from the African mainland will prove to be a valuable bridgehead from which aircraft can fly to West Africa *en route* either for Great Britain or the Middle East. Her armed forces, as such, are comparatively small, numbering only some 100,000 in 1939, but for years her youth has had a good grounding in her conscripted army, so that her reserves are not inconsiderable.

**A
Valuable
Ally**

* * *

In the field of raw materials the United Nations will benefit greatly. As an exporter of minerals used extensively for war equipment, coupled with her agricultural output, Brazil will prove a most useful Ally. She exports, for instance, over 250,000 tons of manganese annually; her coal reserves are estimated at 5,000 million tons; she owns one of the richest iron ore deposits in the world and exports nearly 200,000 tons annually. Rubber is an important natural product of the country, which is also the chief source of carnauba wax, used for electric insulation and gramophone records. As an agricultural producer Brazil will be valuable in augmenting the national larder of Britain. In round figures, she has nearly 20,000,000 acres under cultivation, some 600,000 of which are under maize, 400,000 acres under coffee, and 150,000 acres under rice. She is the second highest producer of cocoa in the world, and third in sugar and tobacco. Brazil now ranks second only to the United States of America in the export of oranges, sending abroad nearly 3,500,000 boxes every year. As a source of meat supplies she is of outstanding importance to the Allied cause. Shipping

**Brazil's
Vast
Resources**

difficulties there are, of course, but the added protection the United Navies will be able to give by the use of Brazilian harbours may have a profound effect on Hitler's submarine campaign in the Atlantic. Thus this new Ally of the democratic cause will not only assist materially the resources of the United Nations, but will give an inspiring lead to those of her neighbours who are hesitating.

**

**

**

IS THERE NEED AMONG US of a revival of faith in the purpose of the British Empire? A member of the Institution says there is, and not a few will agree with him, for there is a spiritual link between that suggestion and

**The
"Empire"
Mind**

the attitude of mind one encounters occasionally to-day. If we are sincere

in our beliefs, for a Jap to land in Burma should be as great an insult to us as for a

German to land in England. Is it? The question is one for the individual to answer honestly. If it is in the negative, can the questioner hope to impart to his men that spark of enthusiasm which will be not the least of the driving force when we evict the invader from Burma, Malaya and other Far Eastern countries?

*

*

*

*

Mr. Amery declared in England recently that the Empire can not merely survive the onslaughts of its enemies,

**A
Spiritual
Impulse**

but prosper beyond the boldest imagination of any of its sons. To do that we must discover a new high purpose in life.

We must have more solid faith in our aims, develop anew an Imperial pride, show the world and posterity that the sons of Britain, the Dominions and India are as virile, determined and unconquerable as their forefathers. This is a subject which deserves to be pondered over by those who are going to lead the Crusade against the Far Eastern gangsters. It will provide the spiritual impulse which has inspired whole nations in the past—and will do so again in the future.

WHEN RISING COSTS of living assail every individual and more and more calls are made on incomes, an appeal for saving may seem strange, but it is not only patriotic but wise to support to the full the national war loans which are being raised. In this field it is but right that officers of the Defence Services should take the lead.

**Support
War
Loans**

Many are doing so, for they realise that the raising of money with which to buy and manufacture weapons of war is a vital section of our war economy. But more can be done. At times such as these a big bank balance is not a matter of pride. Every anna that can be spared should be invested in one or other war loan. A specific instruction to the Bank to allocate ten per cent., or even five per cent. of the proceeds of the monthly pay bill will materially assist the country's Exchequer, and yield the lender interest which would not accrue when it is merely standing to his credit in the bank.

Members are earnestly requested to notify any change of address to the Secretary without delay. Such cooperation will not only help to ease postal traffic at a time when mail services are over burdened, but will also ensure prompt receipt of the Journal each quarter.

"WHAT DO I DO NEXT?"

THE ARMY IN INDIA, in contrast to its enemies, each of whom has no more than a single problem to worry him, must be prepared to fight anywhere from the Western Desert to Burma and beyond. Differences in equipment and tactical methods introduce the inevitable complications in to training, and there must be many a harassed commander who feels that life would be very much simpler if only he could be told what to train for, and then left to get on with it. Unfortunately, and with the best will in the world, this is not always possible, so it is worth while examining the whole problem of training to find out what can be got on with now and what must await a final polish in the part of the world in which the unit or formation is eventually called upon to fight. For of that there can be no doubt; opposed as we are by first-class enemies who are specifically trained for the task they have in hand, we must ensure that our troops do not go into battle unless they too have had equal opportunity for specialised training.

For the purposes of this examination we can conveniently break the subject down into technical training, which covers the whole field of military subjects requiring specialised skill or knowledge; physical training; and mental training. The last two are self-explanatory.

In peace we probably paid more than its fair share of attention to technical training, which generally reached a very high standard; a number of units insisted on physical fitness, though not generally to an extent that is common to-day; and mental training, except for one aspect of it, was very much neglected.

However, we are not training for peace, but for war, and the three headings call for investigation into the extent to which each can be divided into what can and should be done during preparatory or basic training, and what must await the final specialised training under conditions resembling as closely as possible those in which the troops will fight.

It must be obvious that a very considerably expanded war-time army cannot hope to reach the technical standards of its peace-time parent, and it will be as well to face this fact, particularly during the very early stages, and to consider whether a

completely different method of approach is not desirable. Instruction must be much more gradual, while at the same time passing up the various grades as rapidly as possible. This point will require very careful supervision. The average non-commissioned officer, however well he may do at a school of instruction, is not capable of the necessary discrimination, and he will attempt to drag his bewildered listeners through a maze of technicalities which he himself probably no more than half understands. Instruction must be limited to what the learner needs to know at the particular stage he has reached; that and no more.

Again, in peace, we aimed at acquiring a good general knowledge to form a sound working basis to which more specialised knowledge can very rapidly be added as necessary. There is no time for that now. We must concentrate strictly on essentials; and instead of wasting the best part of a morning arguing in how many ways a hill might be captured, we should devote a frugal quarter of an hour to discovering how few alternatives will pass the scrutiny of a really objective examination and emerge as possibilities. We should then go and practise them, for discussion in these days is valueless unless it is linked to execution. And practice, or methods of execution, must be ruthlessly overhauled and standardized for simplicity as far as possible.

We can conclude, for the moment therefore, that our technical training must be very carefully progressed, that it must be rigidly economical, and we are left with the certainty that there will be a lot that will require a final polish on the day before the race.

There is a popular fallacy, which was effectively exploded in an article in the last number of this journal—"Burma: A New Technique of War," that there is no need to harden oneself against discomfort; all will be well on the day. Quite apart from the fact that the physical strain of war can and does reduce men to physical wrecks, the road to this final collapse is marked by a steadily diminishing efficiency. And the road will be all the shorter, and efficiency will disappear all the more rapidly, unless we do something about it. The slum child thrives in conditions which would kill a child film star in a fortnight; not because physically he is any stronger, but because he is used to them.

The first responsibility of a commander in this matter is undoubtedly to mitigate the hardships his men must suffer. Their food and their clothing must be suited to the conditions of the

country, and a very heavy responsibility rests on the medical profession as the expert advisers in these matters. Promiscuous amateur experiments can do more harm than good.

The next step is to ensure that food and extra warmth will be available when wanted. Most commanding officers pick their quartermaster from the second eleven; they would be well advised to give the appointment to the best officer they have. The individual man must then be taught to look after himself, to make the most economical use of what comforts can be provided for him, to avoid the crasser forms of stupidity which can be just as destructive as a self-inflicted wound, and to learn to do his work as efficiently as possible in the circumstances. Finally, a carefully graded course of physical exercise will enormously increase resistance to fatigue, bodily and mental. It seems, then, that a very great deal can be done under this heading in the preliminary stages, and that little should be left to the last except to condition the man to any special climatic atrocity of the country he has to fight in.

The form of mental training which did receive a lot of attention in peace, and which demands equally careful attention in war—for it is a plant of slow growth—is the relations and confidence which must exist at all levels between the leader and the led. In a new unit there will be little of tradition or custom to build on, and, in any case, it is a problem which every leader must solve for himself, for the solution must depend upon the gifts nature has given him. But there are ways how not to do it, and every commander must see that his subordinates are not setting forth on a hopelessly wrong bearing.

The next step is to conquer man's natural reactions to fear. Fear of noise, and fear of that which flies, descend to us from the days when our ancestors lived a good deal further up the tree than we do. But a man can be taught that noise does not kill; and that flies can be swotted. The instinct of self-preservation is naturally far more highly developed in some than in others, but there is no doubt that by proving conclusively to the more cautious that immediate physical dissolution does not inevitably follow a leap from a fifteen-foot wall, a progressively increasing disregard for danger can be fostered. Guts is the Anglo-Saxon word for it.

It will be most important to link this training to any purely physical hardening that may be in progress: obstacle courses must not be just stupidly difficult, and there is ample scope for the introduction of psychological as well as physical hazards.

Lastly, short periods of drill, when men are in a state of considerable physical and mental distress, must be introduced as the tonic to restore control, both to the individual and to the leader.

The patriotic and spiritual aspect cannot be neglected; for such reserves of strength, though often not very obvious to the eye, will not only carry a man through when all else fails him, but will provide the vital spark that can animate a whole army.

Here again much, in fact nearly all, is basic training, and very little should need modification to meet special conditions.

Having examined the problem in detail, what collectively remains to be done? We must train the leader to see everything in its proper proportion and to watch detail without becoming hypnotized by it, for only thus can he hope to co-ordinate the working of his command as a whole. One big lesson he must learn is to decentralize; and for the commander of a newly-raising unit or formation it is a lesson which will try human nature to the last limit. There are three reasons why he must learn it. The first has already been mentioned—decentralization provides the only safe refuge from the demon detail. The second is that, whether he likes it or not, the commander will have to decentralize on the day of battle, so that it is imperative that he practises it now; the third will be discussed in a moment.

Decentralization, as a habit, can and must be introduced as part and parcel of any system of training. The first essential is that the subordinate should know, before he ever begins, what he is out to do. He will require therefore clear orders; and during training he may also require preliminary instruction. But once he sets his hand to it he must feel he is trusted to carry through, and, what is equally important, the leader must feel that confidence too. Interference during execution is justified only to correct the absolutely blatant blunder, criticism generally being reserved until later. And decentralization must go right down to the lowest ranks. Let us accept that when we send a man away with a barrow, we need not send a naik to watch him wheel it.

The second essential to decentralization is the perfection of the whole machinery of command. The leader must feel confident not only that his subordinate can be trusted to carry out his orders, but that the orders once given will inevitably reach the proper subordinate, and in time for him to act on them. For unless he enjoys the resultant freedom from anxiety he will never be free to exercise that essential function of a leader,

which alone and of itself makes decentralization essential. He will not be free to think, and to think ahead. The speed and complexity of modern battle impose upon the commander the need incessantly to study the future development of events, and to prepare for them. Without some forethought he is doomed to ignominious defeat at the hands of a more quick-thinking enemy; without a whole lot of forethought he can never hope to snatch and hold that elusive preliminary to success, the initiative.

Even when the immediate task seems well and truly finished, it is as well to remember that the war, as a whole, is not yet over. Others are moving up to carry on where we left off, and it is more than likely that we can in some measure prepare things for them; and, oddly enough, even the enemy may feel that the last word has not yet been said in the matter. Think and plan with proper care, but when the time for planning is over grudge every moment spent upon the present. In battle there is one, and only one, motto for the successful commander:

"What do I do next?"

BOMBING: THE WORM'S-EYE VIEW

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL G. T. WHEELER

This article is based on collected evidence which has been sifted and collated with the help of a little personal experience. The author makes no claim to have suffered all the indignities which would be necessary to render the article entirely first-hand.

AERIAL BOMBARDMENT and ground-strafting of troops has played such a large part in land operations during the present war that any knowledge which can ameliorate the lot of the target is worthy of study. The necessary knowledge divides itself broadly into two subjects: the methods used by enemy aircraft and the counter-measures which should be taken by troops.

The methods used by enemy aircraft naturally differ for each of the three main types, viz., normal bombers, dive-bombers and fighters. It is, therefore, necessary that troops should learn to distinguish these types very early in their career. The formations in which they fly, and the tactics they employ, help one to recognize each type.

The normal bombers, which include the high-level and low-level bombers, work in a deliberate manner, and their target is usually a well-defined installation which has been selected some time before the raid. It is very exceptional for level bombers to engage an opportunity target, such as a battery coming into action. The reason for this is that it is far more difficult than the soldier believes for a bomber formation to fly over an area and select and bomb any suitable target that may happen to be there. So many mistakes are liable to occur that such an operation is not usually attempted. There are, in any case, plenty of permanent targets in or behind any battle area.

The high-level bomber is more disturbing to troops than the low-level formation, because the target area is harder to determine. Bombers at 18,000 feet passing over troops, even a mile to one side, will cause some apprehension; they have a horrid look of being right overhead. In fact, of course, the higher the bombers the more certain is it that their target is well-defined, and the less need for the small unit or individual to worry. The low-level bomber is probably after some target which is rather

hard to see: a small headquarters or a collection of concealed vehicles. Bomber pilots do not risk light A. A. fire and having our fighters on top of them for no reason.

Level-bombers' targets are usually selected either as a result of aerial reconnaissance or from information supplied by ground troops or fifth columnists. Troops that have been caught congested by a reconnaissance plane or flight will become possible objects for later attack. Similarly, troops engaged with the enemy who see their opponents moving clear of them for no apparent reason have probably been notified to enemy bombers as a target.

Dive-bombers are manned by pilots who have been specially trained to engage targets of opportunity. They come over at about 10,000 to 15,000 feet and dive on any good target within their area. The direction of their dive cannot be foreseen until it starts, so very little warning is given of their attack. In one way this has mental advantages, for the awful ordeal of seeing slow bombers grinding up towards one is avoided; the raid is over and finished with restful speed; in all other ways the event is somewhat shattering!

The dive-bomber has very little control over his aim once his dive is fairly launched, and has practically no power to increase the steepness of his dive; so if a moving vehicle is the target, it should be turned and driven hurriedly towards the diving plane in the hope of passing under it. This is a counsel of perfection which can seldom be followed, though it has been by armoured vehicles in the desert. The German dive-bombers usually come down twice in fairly quick succession on to the same target. The interval between the two attacks is about a minute, and that minute can often be spent very profitably by those who have been caught lying in the open.

Fighters attack from low level, very low, with machine-gun or cannon fire. Their target is usually a vehicle or vehicles moving on a road. They, also, attack twice or even more times. They are seldom alone, so the resultant attack from the target's point of view may seem a rather prolonged event. The attack is more horrid if made by two-seater fighters because the rear-gunner joins in as the machine pulls out of his dive, and for some reason he seems to be more deadly than the pilot.

Now let us see what general rules can be formed from these facts and tendencies of enemy aircraft:

(a) New arrivals in any area need not worry overmuch about level-bombers, unless they are in some permanent target area, such as a railway station or dump site.

(b) The higher the bombers the larger the target, so only very obvious targets should stop work when these pass on their way. It is of course only human for each individual to regard himself as very large and very obvious whenever enemy aircraft are overhead; but this thought must be combated.

(c) Troops who have been caught in good target formation by either enemy reconnaissance aircraft or by enemy ground troops will lengthen their lives if they spend the next twenty minutes reducing their target value.

(d) All troops who can, should disperse when enemy dive-bombers are about. Batteries of artillery should, if possible, avoid these periods for coming into action.

(e) Enemy fighters are harmless to troops so long as they keep high. When they fly in low or start to swoop they are probably after vehicles, so drivers should take some avoiding action. Vehicles, using roads within range of enemy ground-strafters should carry an air sentry, as the driver can neither hear nor see approaching planes.

We now come to the various methods which troops can adopt to save casualties from enemy air action. The Indian follower, and to a less extent the Indian soldier, has a strong natural desire to sit, or even stand, under a tree when bombers are overhead. He reckons that the danger is centred in the bomb falling directly on top of him; and all too frequently dies from the error of this thought. It is, furthermore, extremely difficult to convince him that he is much safer lying in the open than standing under a tree. The process of conversion should begin during his early training.

The first essential of air defence is a warning system suited to the local conditions. Any form of siren or hooter is quite out of place anywhere except in very large headquarters, and even there it probably does more harm by stopping work than it does good by preventing casualties. If heavy A. A. fire is available it is an ideal warning system. It should be the signal for roof-spotters to take posts, and not for a general stampede. When the roof-spotters see that the enemy aircraft are flying straight towards their headquarters they blow a whistle and the staff disperse with speed and dignity to their trenches or shelters. Dignity in an air raid is as essential as restraint in love; if either is missing, the event is apt to become chaotic and will be followed by regret.

Large headquarters frequently have one great advantage in air raids over other military formations, and that is the presence

of women. It has been proved beyond doubt that women are braver than men during a raid. It may be due to the fact that their brain weighs three ounces less than that of a man, but is more likely a compensation given to them by the Almighty for the unfailing courage that men show in the face of mice and spiders. Whatever the cause, there is many an officer and clerk who has had his courage restored by the absolute coolness of a twenty-year-old typist walking slowly to a slit trench. They apparently have no fear whatever.

Bofors and Light automatics cannot engage high bombers, so their fire is not a reliable warning system. Nor is it fair on the gunner to use it as such, for the last thing one wants is to give away an A. A. gun position prematurely.

The most suitable warning system in a Corps or Divisional Headquarters is whistle blasts by an air-sentry. The warning should be given when enemy aircraft are seen to be approaching, and should not wait for the attack to develop. The action taken will, in practice, be for everyone who is not urgently engaged, say telephoning, to come outside and look up.

Those that are unoccupied should walk towards the more distant slit trenches, leaving the closer ones for the last minute rush of those who are more busy. When the attack develops all take cover as best they can, remembering that it is far safer to be lying down in the open than running for a trench at the moment that a bomb bursts. It is, of course, better to lie in a slight depression or ditch rather than on flat ground.

Small headquarters and troops in action normally work to a whistle alarm; but since they cannot do much about it their chief warning system is the bomb itself. This is more satisfactory than it appears at first sight, because a bomb, by its scream, will give anything between three and ten seconds' warning, and one can do a lot in even three seconds when one's heart is in the job. A bomb that screams on a level note and at a fairly constant intensity is safe, because it is some way off. When the scream sounds something like an express train coming out of a tunnel, *i.e.* with greatly increasing intensity, then it is going to fall close and very rapid action is recommended. In practice it takes a brave man (or normal woman!) to do nothing even when the bomb scream is constant.

For all that has been said and written in official manuals, troops who have suffered much from enemy air action will not open fire on enemy planes with their rifles. They fear that it will attract unwelcome attention. In the case of Bofors guns

this may be true; but any airman will agree that a pilot simply does not know when small arms fire is opened on him, so he cannot be influenced by it into retaliation. This fact should be more widely spread, for it is either not known or not believed.

The part that slit trenches play in air defence is possibly exaggerated by the mental comfort that they give to the majority of people. There is a minority which prefers a small ditch or even the open country to a trench; their preference is probably based on a desire to be alone, which is understandable. Slit trenches undoubtedly provide almost complete protection against anything but a direct hit by a bomb and the machine-gun bullets of a steeply diving aeroplane. A ditch is about equally effective against bombs but not so good against bullets. The open country is a good bet against bombs and an unlikely target for machine-gunning.

Sitting in a slit trench is something of an art. One should not lean against the sides, because a near miss will deliver a tremendous shock to the spine if one's back is against the earth-side of the trench. One's head should be below ground level, but not so low that it can be buried by a near miss. Lastly, if the bombs are falling close, one should cover the ears with one's hands to avoid the shock of blast on the ear-drums. There is a belief that the mouth should be open, and it may be right.

The problem of the motorist when faced with ground-strafting is largely unsolved. In the Desert the drill is fairly well established. As soon as the enemy aircraft looks like attacking, the vehicle is put in full-lock to one side or the other and stopped as soon as possible. This is usually sufficient to avoid the first attack. The occupants then dismount hurriedly, run some thirty yards from the vehicle and lie down preparatory to the next attack.

This system does not apply on a Burman highway, where one cannot suddenly turn off the road. The enemy airman naturally selects a stretch of straight road in open country for his operations, so a bolt into the jungle is seldom possible. The usual practice is to stop, dismount and hope for a ditch or borrow-pit by the side of the road. Anything in the nature of a long run for cover is inadvisable against the Japanese, who use bombs on even single vehicles.

At one time in the Desert an attempt was made to piquet all main roads with permanent air-sentries, who, posted on all available prominent hills, hoisted a red flag when enemy aircraft were about. The idea is good, and might well be applied to the main traffic routes of less open country. The lone motorist is quite

powerless to spot enemy aircraft, and the noise of his vehicle prevents him from hearing them. The roof-spotter which most vehicles carry has a tiring job, and it might well be economical to adopt permanent road air-sentries. It would certainly be very comforting to see a sentry with his flag down as one approached a long straight stretch of road. It would relax the nerves of the drivers, which get very taut under constant air threat.

Let us summarise the main facts which concern the individual's protection from air attack:

(a) Indian followers should be provided with, and converted to the use of, slit trenches. Apart from humanitarian reasons, it is well to remember that, at one time, sweepers were top of the priority list for personnel to be flown into Burma. They were above a rather urgently needed major-general! The casualties sustained by officers' cooks from air bombardment were also grievously heavy in Burma; and it is important that such essential and irreplaceable people should have long lives.

(b) The warning system must be designed to suit existing conditions, and the over-riding factor is usually the avoidance of stopping work unnecessarily rather than producing a timely warning. In the case of troops that have suffered much from the enemy air force and seen little of our own the warning system might well take the form of a signal for "own aircraft—resume work" only; for such troops will need no warning about enemy aircraft.

(c) Slit trenches should be dug with an eye to those who will have to use them. There should always be one close to a telephone, and sufficient close to a wireless set for all the operators. As many as possible should be concealed and distant from the main target, for the German particularly will regard slit trenches as indication of a target. In one famous headquarter site in the Desert it was a point of honour for all who occupied it that no slit trenches should be dug. That site was never bombed.

(d) Troops who have had much experience of being bombed, may have learnt a lot about taking cover and interpreting bombing and aeroplane noises, but they will not, on balance with morale, be improved thereby. Such troops need special treatment, particularly in the matter of warning systems. The subject is dealt with later when morale is considered. There is, however, at least one soldier who improved with experience of enemy air action. A headquarters was established near the Lybian border wire. A flight of German bombers came over from the South, and, when still south of the headquarters their bombs were released. A well-known brigadier watching the display from beside

an armoured car moved with dignity to the north side of the car, where he would have the shelter of the turret. All the bombs then burst just north of the car, and for his solution of that problem in aerodynamics he got just one mark. He has it still, under his right eye. The point of the story is, however, that the next time he was bombed he lay down; so some soldiers do improve with experience, but most do not, because constant bombing breeds a fear that induces irrational action.

If ever it were true to say that the moral is to the physical as three is to one, it is true regarding enemy air action. The actual physical damage done by bombing is usually negligible, sometimes considerable, but never disastrous. The moral effect of constant enemy air superiority is usually disastrous and always considerable. This has been proved in Poland, Greece, Crete, Malaya and Burma; and to some extent in France.

When troops have become shaken by air action, the first thing to do is for officers to display, and insist on, dignity during an air alert. Men must continue at their jobs as long as possible and then walk, not run, to slit trenches. Officers must be prepared to stand up as long as possible, and lie down in the open when the time comes. Officers who have to do this should choose the softest possible ground to walk about on, because a bomb bursting in soft ground does most of its damage upwards, not sideways.

Defiles, such as bridges, should be piquetted with reliably stolid officers or sentries who can make encouraging remarks to the men as they approach the defile. The most welcome remark is, of course, "It's one of our's". Unfortunately, this cannot always be said; but any comment such as "It's old Uncle George and his party again, they've been over twice already and can't hit a b..... county" will help the men to get over without checking the traffic.

After a raid officers should talk to their men and let them admit any fear that they felt. It relaxes the nerves and helps a lot for the next raid. Three examples of this will help to show the types of comfort that can be given.

An obviously brave sergeant of the Tank Corps arose with dignity from a ditch where he had been sitting during a brief raid. An officer asked him if he was frightened. He obviously had not been. "A lot more than the two men beside me" he replied. The two men, and everyone else who heard, could be seen relaxing. They felt that their fear had passed unnoticed and, in any case, was nothing to go on worrying about.

Three Japanese dive-bombers once descended on a small headquarters and put six bombs neatly to one side of it, where an orderly was walking. As he got up from the ground someone asked him, "Any damage?" "Yes", he said, "I made a bad mistake, I jumped into a slit and dropped my bottle of beer in the open as I ran. It's broke. Next time I'll be sensible and change places with the bottle." The thought of that man dropping his bottle of beer into a slit trench and lying in the open himself must have helped a lot of people through the next raid.

The last example happened in Burma Army Headquarters in Maymyo. The office chaprassis came from an Orphan School for Burmese boys. One particularly cheerful boy had the name of Maung Maung, which being normally abbreviated to Mg Mg, led to the boy being called "Young Mug Mug" by the English-speaking members.

There was a raid on Maymyo, in which the Japanese milled around overhead looking for a gap in the clouds in a rather disconcerting manner. Finally the bombs fell at least a mile from the headquarters, and clerks and officers walked back to their rooms. On the way an officer said to a Burman clerk: "Ask Young Mug Mug how he felt during the raid." Young Mug Mug had a lot to say in Burmese, then the clerk turned to the officer and said: "He says, Sir, that it was the most enjoyable sight he's ever seen in his life, and he hopes, Sir, that there will be a raid every day."

Thereafter that particular office took little thought of air alarms, for no one could avoid the thought of the joyful anticipation that was coursing through Young Mug Mug's happy heart. The "All Clear" almost brought groans of regret for the ecstasy that had been snatched from a lonely love child. Incidentally, Young Mug Mug reached India intact and is worth acquiring in any war headquarters.

THE HISTORY OF FLYING IN INDIA

By "HEREWARD"

FEW PEOPLE are aware that the earliest flights in India took place in Calcutta as early as the end of 1910. They were purely civilian flights, the first recorded flight by an Army officer in India being by Captain Maxwell, Brigade Major of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, on February 17, 1911. The following day Captain Brancker (later Sir Sefton Brancker) flew as a passenger in a Bristol biplane during Army manoeuvres at Midnapore, the flight being officially observed by Captain Aspinall of the General Staff.

These interesting facts came to light when I set out to trace the origin and growth of the Air Forces in India. This article is the result. It shows how the spirit of airmindedness has developed among the peoples of India, and how aviation has played an increasingly important part in this country in peace and war since 1910.

Following the early flights referred to above, a number of Indian Army officers learnt to fly, mostly while at home on leave, and the first to take his pilot's certificate is believed to have been Captain P. W. L. Broke-Smith, R. E. In 1912 an officer of the Royal Artillery imported at his own expense a Farman biplane and a French pilot, with whom he flew over the Army manoeuvres at Rawalpindi. Although this aircraft was finally wrecked, the flights drew the attention of the military authorities in India to the potentialities of the new arm as an additional source of reconnaissance to the army in the field.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY AVIATION

On June 3, 1913, a proposal was submitted to the Secretary of State for India for the formation of an Indian Flying School at Sitapur in the United Provinces, to open on October, 1, 1913. The intention was to start by training 12 officers in two batches of six each in the first year.

The scheme was approved in a modified form and the first aircraft arrived at Sitapur in December 1913. Flying commenced on February 14, 1914, at which time the instructional staff consisted of Captain S. D. Massey, of the 29th Punjabis as Commandant, the Instructors being Captain Hoare, of the 39th C.I.H.; Captain Pitcher, 39th C.I.H.; and Lieut. Newall, 2nd Gurkhas,

and later Chief of the Air Staff. The Adjutant and Quartermaster was Captain Reilly of the 82nd Punjabis.

In May, 1914, the Indian C.F.S. possessed the following aircraft:

One B. E. (70 h.p. Renault) biplane.

Two B.E. (80 h.p. Gnome) biplanes.

Three Maurice Farman (70 h.p. Renault) biplanes.

It is interesting to note that Indian mechanics were to be trained and employed if the school had continued, but on August 11, 1914, the Government of India sent home a telegram offering to close the school and to send home the personnel to supplement the resources of England in aviation for the war. The officers and aircraft were eventually sent to Egypt as a unit, and there they first saw active service with the Indian Expeditionary Force defending the Suez Canal. Later, the Indian unit was transferred to Mesopotamia, and the winter of 1915 saw the end of the Indian Flying Corps as a separate body.

After the departure of the Indian Central Flying School to Egypt, there was no further military flying in India until December, 1915, when, as a result of an urgent request by the Viceroy, one flight of No. 31 Squadron and a nucleus Aircraft Park arrived at Nowshera for work on the North-West Frontier. Thus No. 31 Squadron was the first regular air force unit to serve in India, and it has maintained an unbroken record of service in this country until the present time. The Squadron crest is the five pointed Star of India with the motto: "In Caelum Indicum Primus"—"First into Indian Skies". On its arrival it was equipped with B.E.2c aircraft. By June, 1916, it was completed to full strength with 18 aircraft, and was commanded by Major C. R. Bradley.

On October 6, 1916—for the first time in India—aircraft were employed on active operations, though for reconnaissance duties only, in the Shabkadar district of the N.W.F.P. The first offensive air operations in India were against the Mohmands in November, 1916.

During 1917, No. 31 Squadron was expanded to five flights and re-equipped with Henri Farman aircraft. By the end of September the fourth and fifth flights were formed into No. 114 Squadron, R.F.C., at Lahore, with a half-flight detachment destined for Aden, the first flight at Aden being carried out on December 5, 1917. In June, 1918, No. 52 Wing R.A.F. was formed at Simla, and assumed command of all R.A.F. units in India and Aden.

The first flight from Egypt to India took place in December, 1918, when Major-General W. G. H. Salmond, Brigadier-General A. E. Borton, and Captain Ross Smith arrived in Karachi.

Post-war re-organization of the air forces in India was entrusted to Brigadier N. D. K. MacEwen, D.S.O., who arrived from England by air on January 15, 1919, having made the first England to India flight. During the year four additional squadrons arrived in India by sea and were located initially as follows: No. 99 Squadron: Ambala; No. 48 Squadron: Quetta; No. 97 Squadron: Allahabad; and No. 20 Squadron: Risalpur.

By the end of the year the air forces were organized under a Group Headquarters, situated with Army Headquarters, and the older types of aircraft had been replaced by Bristol Fighters, D. H. 9s and D.H. 10, with a total of 109 aircraft in India.

Nos. 31 and 114 Squadrons took an active part in the 3rd Afghan War in the summer of 1919, and in 1920 the increase in operations in Waziristan provided ample opportunity for the development of air support for ground forces and of simple though effective methods of inter-communication by the use of smoke and ground strips. Nos. 1 and 3 Fighter Squadrons and the Aircraft Depot were formed during 1920 and, by the end of that year, the air forces were organized into two Wings with Headquarters at Peshawar and Ambala. Air Headquarters moved from Simla to Ambala. A Hill Depot was established at Lower Barian in the Murree Hills in April, 1920.

The policy of retrenchment which followed the Great War resulted in the cessation of supply of stores and equipment from England in 1921, and rendered the R.A.F. virtually ineffective. For the same reason, No. 1 Fighter Squadron was transferred to Iraq in April, 1921, and No. 3 Fighter Squadron was disbanded in September. By the end of 1921, there were 147 officers and 1844 airmen in India and the total of aircraft of all types was 94.

In September, 1922, the Government of India decided on the scheme for the permanent control of Waziristan, and in the same month, Sir John Salmond rendered his report on the future of the Air Forces in India. His recommendations were accepted, and henceforth the R.A.F. in India was to be established on a workable if comparatively small basis. The immediate result of this definition of policy was a marked improvement in the general efficiency of all units. At the end of 1923 there were 225 officers and 1,751 airmen in India, while the total of aircraft had risen to 144. The R.A.F. budget appeared under a separate

head for the first time, and expenditure for 1923 amounted to Rs. 1,93,47,731.

With a view to encouraging the spirit of air-mindedness in India, the first R.A.F. Display took place in Delhi in February, 1927. Aircraft from all units took part, and the display was a great success. Since then, and until the outbreak of the present war, the Air Display became an almost annual event, and was increasingly popular among all sections of the Indian community.

Towards the end of 1927 the first Inter-Command flight passed through India on its way to Australia. This flight consisted of four Supermarine flying boats under Group Captain Cave-Brown-Cave, of whom the following amusing—though unauthenticated—story is told. On arrival at the slipway at Port Darwin, the Group Captain stepped out of his aircraft clad in flying overalls without any visible badges of rank. He was met by the Duty Officer, a young Canadian Flight Lieutenant, who appeared utterly unimpressed by the importance of the occasion. Somewhat disturbed by this unceremonious welcome, the Group Captain said: "I don't suppose you know me. I am Cave-Brown-Cave". Still unabashed the Flight Lieutenant replied: "Is that so? Well I'm glad to know you—my name is Home-Sweet-Home."

With the increase of air activity on the Frontier it became necessary in 1928 to centralise the control of all R.A.F. units and formations in this area under one command. Consequently, No. 1 (Indian) Group was formed in November with Headquarters at Peshawar, and the Officer Commanding was charged with the day-to-day control of all air operations.

In January, 1929, the R.A.F. was further reinforced by the arrival in India of Nos. 11 and 39 Bomber Squadrons, making a total of eight squadrons in this country. Agreement was reached between the Home Government and the Government of India that this force should thenceforward be maintained as the standard peace-time strength of the Air Force in India, with the role of assisting the political and military authorities in the control of the North-West Frontier and in the maintenance of internal security throughout the country. It has since provided the R.A.F. with a very valuable training area, where flying conditions are generally excellent and where personnel can become accustomed to overseas service. We have also been able to develop India as an important link in the chain of R.A.F. Stations throughout the Empire. Aerodrome development during 1929 included work on the Burma-Singapore route at Moulmein, Mergui and Victoria

Point, and the construction of Landing Grounds at Gilgit and Chilas. The latter were to facilitate communications and co-operation with the Scouts.

Since the arrival of No. 31 Squadron in December, 1915, the R.A.F. has played an important part in the control of the N.W.F.P. both in co-operation with land forces and independently.

Flying over the mountainous country of Waziristan, and under conditions where close support of land forces is essential, entails considerable training for both pilots and air-gunners. In addition, the skill with which the tribesman has adapted his tactics to meet attack from the air, and his instinctive flair for concealment and camouflage, make identification and attack from the air extremely difficult.

It has, therefore, been necessary to evolve a series of simple but efficient means of communication between land forces and aircraft, and, in the succession of frontier operations, much has been done to develop and improve rapid inter-communication by ground strip codes and wireless. The mutual confidence now existing between the land and air forces employed on frontier operations and normal Watch and Ward duties is proof of the success of the systems evolved.

R.A.F. operations on the Frontier can be divided into three categories:

(a) In co-operation with military and irregular forces in comparatively major operations for which the area is placed under the control of a military commander.

(b) Routine operations in co-operation with the Frontier Corps, or Constabulary.

(c) Independent operations in which general control remains with H.E. the Governor, N.W.F.P., or with a Political Officer designated by him.

Since the first employment of aircraft in October, 1916, the R.A.F. has been engaged in many operations of all categories, and a very large turnover of personnel has thereby gained valuable experience before the start of the present war.

A Bomber Transport flight was originally formed at Lahore in April, 1929, and began life in India with one aircraft only. The value of this type of aircraft in a country of good flying conditions and great distances was always appreciated, and although the flight was later expanded to a complete squadron, the demands made upon it have at all times been heavy. The aircraft have been employed as transports for the equipment of long distance

flights to other R.A.F. Commands, and have thus obtained much valuable data on the problems of Inter-Command reinforcement.

During the disturbed conditions in Afghanistan in 1928-29, the Transport Flight, augmented by aircraft from Iraq, helped in the evacuation of 712 people from Kabul, at a time when evacuation by other means was impossible. On several occasions since its expansion to squadron strength, the unit has assisted in the relief of the military garrison at Chitral, flying in the new troops and their stores, and bringing back the troops thus relieved.

Together with all other available aircraft, the Transport Squadron took part in the relief and evacuation work following the earthquake at Quetta in June, 1935. This entailed many hours of flying by day and night in the conveyance of doctors, nurses, medical supplies and food to Quetta, and the evacuation of wounded and homeless persons.

In 1932 all Indian enrolled personnel serving with the R.A.F. in India were formed into the Indian Technical and Followers Corps, to be subject to the Indian Air Force Act. This Act came into force on April, 1933, on the formation of the first regular Flight of the Indian Air Force. "A" Flight, No. 1 Squadron, I.A.F., formed at Drigh Road, Karachi, the Indian officers having been trained at Cranwell, and the technical airmen at the R.A.F. Depot, India.

The intention was that the Unit should eventually be manned entirely by Indians, but during the period of its formation and development, R.A.F. officers and N.C.O.'s were to be attached for supervisory duties. This policy persisted throughout the expansion period, and the Indian Air Force has since grown appreciably. A number of units are now commanded by officers from the original squadron.

Units of the Indian Air Force with Indian Commanding Officers have already served with considerable distinction in the present war, and re-equipment with modern aircraft is being welcomed as an incentive to still greater efforts in the future. The young men who are at present joining the I.A.F. as Cadets for flying training are enthusiastic and eager to master the art of flying and fighting with modern aircraft, and there should be no shortage of volunteers for this attractive and obviously vital arm of India's defence.

The newly-sanctioned I.A.F. Ensign and Crest were presented by H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester at Risalpur during his recent extended tour of the India Command.

Snd.

Since the inception of the Indian Air Force, flying and technical training schools have been opened in India, and the general standard of instruction brought into line with the Empire Air Training Scheme, so that pupils pass into the service fully qualified to take their share in the expansion of the service and its part in the general war effort. From the flying training school, several batches of Indian pilots have been sent to England for operational training and subsequent attachment to R.A.F. squadrons, where they have seen service over England and Europe.

Turning to civil aviation in India, the development of air routes in the country began in 1919 with a temporary service between Karachi and Bombay, operated by R.A.F. aircraft and personnel. This was followed by the arrival of three aircraft and operating personnel sent out by Messrs. Handley Page to inaugurate an air mail service between Bombay, Calcutta and Rangoon. Although this venture was not a commercial success, the Company continued its services for two years and helped considerably to lay the foundations for the later Imperial Airways and other trans-continental air services.

In 1925 the site for an Airship Base was fixed at Drigh Road, Karachi, and in 1927 the Base with its mooring mast and airship hangar, was inspected by Sir Sefton Brancker. It will be remembered that the first airship to leave England for Karachi—the R. 101—crashed at Beauvais in France in October, 1930. Among those who lost their lives in this disaster was Sir Sefton Brancker himself, to whom India owes much of the development of aviation.

From 1926 onwards, the general interest in long-distance flying resulted in a great increase in trans-India flights, and a corresponding though gradual improvement in aerodrome and navigational facilities in India. Early in 1927 a Director of Civil Aviation was appointed, and the R.A.F. was relieved of a great deal of work in connection with civil flying.

In preparation for the employment of flying-boats on the Empire air services, the trans-India route at present used was surveyed in 1934. Since then, flying-boats have taken an increasingly important part in the development of the Empire air routes.

The interest in civil and military flying, which began in India almost as early as at home, has led to a slow but nonetheless sure development of aerodrome, supply and navigational facilities, forming the foundation on which the present expansion was based. As a whole, the country was slow to appreciate the possibilities of the aeroplane in peace and in war, and considerable leeway has

had to be made up before Air Forces could play their full and vital part in the defence of India.

The expansion of the Indian Air Force and the excellent work already achieved by its units in this war, are proof that the spirit of air-mindedness exists, ready for encouragement and further development.

With the present organization, the R.A.F. and I.A.F. in India will be able to develop their maximum efforts, and, after the war, the change-over to civil flying will be facilitated by the greatly-improved aerodrome systems now being organized. Air routes in India will have been opened up and developed on a scale never before envisaged, and post-war air travel throughout India will become as familiar as the Indian train.

A COMBINED GENERAL STAFF

ATTENTION WAS RECENTLY focussed in England on the subject of a Combined General Staff, and as the question is one which concerns all students of military matters, the views expressed by several leading authorities in London are summarized below.

Sir Edward Grigg, M.P., former Joint Secretary to the War Office, raised the subject in an article in *The Times*. "Victory", he wrote, "will depend upon close co-ordination of the three fighting services in a common strategical plan. Defects in such co-ordination were evident enough in Norway, Flanders, Greece and Crete. They were heavily paid for by the Navy, and the Army, but accepted as insurmountable in the conditions of that time. Our strength is now much greater, and it should suffice to provide the essential balance between the Services wherever critical operations are in hand."

He recalled General Sir Archibald Wavell's views, expressed in his lectures on generalship, upon the task of any leader who should qualify as a "great captain" in coming wars:

"On the ground that he will have to handle forces moving at a speed and ranging at a distance far exceeding that of the most mobile cavalry of the past, a study of naval strategy and tactics as well as those of cavalry will be essential to him. He must be able to handle air forces with the same knowledge as forces on land. It seems to me immaterial whether he is a soldier who has really studied the air or an airmen who has really studied land forces. It is the combination of the two, never the action of one alone, that will bring success for a future war."

Sir Edward pointed out that a single command over all three services had already been instituted in more than one theatre of war, but such co-ordination in each theatre "could not give what we needed unless the same co-ordination was thoroughly effective in the central system which allots the forces to the different theatres and forms the strategic plans". After writing that General Wavell's experience during his short tenure of the South-West Pacific Command made that plain, Sir Edward continued:

"The fault is manifest; but neither the Naval nor the General nor the Air Staff can justly be held to blame. The

fault is not in any one of them but in the system under which their respective lines of action are combined (or not combined) in a common plan. We know how that system works. The three Chiefs of Staff sit daily together to decide what needs to be done; they have various co-ordinating committees at lower levels to assist them in their plans; the Prime Minister himself presides at their meetings when he feels inclined; and the Prime Minister again reviews their recommendations with the Defence Committee and the War Cabinet when such further scrutiny appears to him to be required.

"This elaborate machinery is unquestionably a great advance upon any system of inter-service co-ordination that has existed before; but it is not producing the balanced strategy or the co-ordination of our strength by sea, land, and air which the exacting task before us demands. . . .

"A considerable measure of agreement exists on the main reform required. It lies in the direction of giving greater scope and power to the Combined General Staffs of the three services which is already at work in sub-committees below the level where decisions are made. Lord Swinton has pointed out that the problem of defence at Singapore was completely transformed at the moment, many months ago, when Indo-China passed under Japanese control. It certainly appears that the need of combined three-service defence which then became grave would have been anticipated and met by a Combined General Staff with adequate opportunity and power. •

"The question is how a Combined General Staff is to be given adequate influence over strategy in its early formative stages at the centre of affairs. I find it hard to believe that a Combined General Staff will give us what we require so long as it has no chief of its own. The Chiefs of Staff whom the Combined Staff sub-committees at present serve have each of their separate pre-occupations, and an immense amount of work to discharge. However able the Combined General Staff, it must be handicapped by the fact that it serves a committee of that tripartite kind.

"It is said that the Chiefs of Staff seldom disagree. If that be indeed so, their recommendations must often be a matter of compromise, a lowest common denomination between incompatible ideas. That is not a method which wins wars. Lord Swinton has suggested that the functions proper to a Chief of the Combined General Staff are not functions which a Minister is best suited to exercise. . . . If I define those functions as I

see them, the type of mind required will not, I think, be in doubt.

"The Chief of the Combined General Staff should have no executive power at all. His post should be a service post, or at any rate, a non-Ministerial one, with no responsibility but that of presiding over the Chiefs of Staff Committee and advising the War Cabinet on the long-range conduct of the war. He would be responsible only for the three main duties of a non-executive kind, namely—

"1. He would as C.C.G.S. be responsible for presenting its plans to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, sifting them with that committee and thereafter submitting them to the War Cabinet.

"2. He would be responsible for seeing that our strategic plans took full account of what the production staff and transport authorities may be expected to achieve. The present system, for instance, puts sudden strains upon our shipping programmes which greater foresight would minimize.

"3. He would above all be responsible that in all operational plans the proper balance between the services was maintained, so that the Commander-in-Chief in the various theatres could use the three services wherever necessary as instruments of a single balanced plan.

"It has, after all, been found essential to appoint a Minister of Production to bring the whole field of production under the direction of a single brain and will. Our strategic plans seem to me to require a similar process of co-ordination under a single mind.

"Whereas, however, production is a highly political business which only a Minister can handle as a whole, that is not the case with professional strategic plans. These latter should be immune from political influence at the formative stage; the merits and demerits of any course of action should be weighed in the first instance by cool and concrete professional minds, and these should work unhampered by political suggestion or surveillance of any kind. The C.C.G.S. should therefore be a professional or non-Ministerial middle-man, bringing all essential factors together and serving all three Service Chiefs by laying combined plans before them, and also by sifting and fusing their special knowledge and separate service ideas".

In a leading article supporting Sir Edward, *The Times* said, *inter alia*:

"A Combined General Staff . . . would be the right body not only to produce that 'balanced strategy' and 'co-ordination of our strength by sea, land and air', but also to establish the appropriate relation between strategy and production through Mr. Lyttleton's 'general staff' at the Ministry of Production. If it is true that resources—and therefore production—condition strategy, it is essential that strategy, planned in advance in all its implications, should have a decisive voice in the planning of production; and failure to dovetail production policy with strategy is not the smallest of the penalties we have paid for the lack of a combined strategic plan.

"Nor would the services of a Combined General Staff be restricted to the function which it can itself discharge. Co-operation between the Services tends already to be more whole-hearted and more effective at the lower than at the higher levels. A new combined organization at the top would give a fresh impetus to co-operation.

"It is wholly desirable that it should be matched and completed by a system of combined headquarters and combined local commands. Only by living together and working together on the same tasks will the best men in all services learn to think and act in terms, not of three separate units assisting one another for a common end, but of a single fighting unit animated by the same spirit and the same conception of a single task."

Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes followed with a letter in the course of which he wrote:

"There are two important lacunæ in our present organisation. First, the machinery for welding our naval, military and air forces into one combined instrument of attack and defence is inadequate. There is the Minister of Defence and the War Cabinet. There is also the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff. But, so far as one can make out, there is no combined staff to prepare plans, and, when they are approved, to ensure that they are carried out. To provide them is the duty of the Minister of Defence or a deputy appointed by him, who for this purpose should have a Combined Staff composed of members of the three services headed by a C.C.G.S. These plans would then be submitted to the War Cabinet for approval. These having been approved, the Combined Staff would have the duty of ensuring that they were carried into effect. If the War Cabinet as a whole does not bear the responsibility, it shrinks into a body whose sole duty is the endorsement of decisions already taken by the Minister of Defence. The crucial factor would be

the choice of a suitable man as C.C.G.S. I think he must be a service officer and not a civilian, if he is to command the confidence of those serving under him, and I cannot think of a better man for the post than General Wavell with his unique experience of the war in all its aspects."

Lord Hankey, who was Secretary of the War Cabinet in the Great War, and up to his retirement a few years ago was Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, said that though it was true Chiefs of Staff seldom disagreed, that was mainly because combined study and experience over many years had produced a large measure of common doctrine. "There is, however, a risk that they may overlook their 'individual and collective responsibility for advising on defence policy as a whole' and tend unconsciously to stitch together the plans of each fighting service instead of focussing all resources on a single war plan. As Mr. Lloyd George said on a notable occasion, 'stitching is not strategy'. Here a C.C.G.S. might render valuable service. Success would depend on the man. He would need the confidence of the Prime Minister, the War Cabinet, and the Chiefs of Staff, as well as a profound and up-to-date knowledge of war and of the system of higher control. He would require drive, tact, and an instinct to leave well alone."

Lord Swinton, former Air Minister, commented that the Combined General Staff must be the Chiefs of Staff in their corporate capacity. It would be radically unsound, he added, to set up a parallel organization divorced from real responsibility. "I agree with Sir Edward Grigg's plea for a man who will be the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff in their corporate capacity, and who can devote his whole time to the task. I think, too, that if the right man can be found, a service Chief is the ideal. At the same time, the economic side is important. Economic needs and risks should always be present in the minds of the Combined General Staff, and should be seen as far forward as strategy itself, envisaged and provided for before economic risks become actual dangers.

"In the choice of a service Chairman two things are necessary: (i) He must have the three-service mind, that of the great captain, as General Wavell has described him. The most brilliant officer in his own service without that mind and outlook is not the man for the job. (ii) Each of the three services must feel they have as complete confidence in this service chief as they would have in a member of their own service. Both these conditions are essential. If these be the spirit and functions of a

Great General Staff I believe that, while a Service Chairman is the ideal, if he has the necessary qualifications, the post can be adequately filled by a civilian with the right kind of mind and outlook, and accustomed to working with Service Chiefs and Service departments."

Viscount Trenchard said a few days later in a debate in the House of Lords: "In the Middle East our air forces, together with naval and army aircraft, have been at one and the same moment co-operating tactically with the naval forces and strategically with the land forces. This example shows how indivisible are all our three fighting forces. They were three elements, but one service."

Lord Winster reminded the House of Lords that in Germany all agencies for attaining victory were co-ordinated in a high command—a general, who was assisted by a combined general staff, which co-ordinated the heads of the three services. For any given operation this combined general staff selected the best man for the operation, regardless of the service to which he belonged and regardless of seniority. This man in turn selected his own staff and drew up his own plans. In other words, he added, whereas Germany enjoyed co-ordination and control we relied on co-operation and agreement.

Commander R. T. Bower, M.P., wrote to *The Times*: "In peace-time in combined operations the three staffs worked together in conditions approximating to those suggested by Sir Edward Grigg in his advocacy of a Great General Staff. In war-time, however, they work separately, but experience has shown that no amount of co-operation can rival integration.

"The daily meeting of the Chiefs of Staff is not enough; it is vitiated by the fact that they all have to devote the greater part of their energies to look at their respective trees, and not enough combined attention is devoted to regarding the wood as a whole.

"It is the machine which has failed, but it can easily be remodelled in the light of our experiences on the lines suggested, and hope lies in the fact that the men to work it are there, a splendid team, all imbued with a sound common doctrine on the waging of war."

THE WAR ON THE SALVAGE FRONT

By THE EDITOR

THIS WAR differs from the Great War in practically everything—but in one sphere it is the same. Salvage, practised with such assiduity and enthusiasm in 1914—1918, is again a vital factor; and India, for decades the land of plenty, must now follow the lead of Great Britain, where salvage of material, properly organized, has resulted in the saving of millions of pounds sterling, thousands of tons of shipping space, besides giving the population a fine opportunity of using its genius in obtaining every ounce of usefulness from articles hitherto discarded as worthless.

What better guide for the present could we have than the Great War? Our troubles to-day are no less severe, and our difficulties equally surmountable. Let us recall, then, how well the Defence Services played their part in this sphere during those years.

Towards the end of the war salvage was prominent in the minds of public and Forces alike. It became a craze. From posters, press, public platform and music hall came the call to save. A Salvage Club was formed, its newspaper showing members how they could turn an article to further use. Ideas came in by the thousand, and *Punch* lightheartedly included a picture of a child holding up a tabby which was in the last stages of decay, the caption reading: "Look, Mummy, I've saved a perfectly good dead cat".

In the Army, as in England to-day, special salvage centres were established, statistics were issued of what had been collected by units, and there developed a healthy rivalry in all formations serving at home and overseas as to which could show the best results.

"Never has the practical genius of the English revealed itself so strongly as in this War", wrote a famous Russian war correspondent in *The Times* in 1916 after a visit to France. "It is marvellous to see the things done. Our soldiers, for instance, throw away their boots when they are worn out. Heaps of them were to be seen in Galicia and Poland. But here in France we see sheds full of old boots, all of which are later repaired or the parts used again in some other form."

Here are some examples of improvisation carried out by the Services in 1914—1918. From the uppers of old boots leather laces were made, the remainder of the upper, if worthless, being used as fuel; solder was recovered from old tins; lead from the linings of tea chests; nosebags and cooks' clothing from old tents; worn-out ground sheets and waterproof capes reappeared as ration bags and cap covers; old oil drums became braziers, kerosine tins were converted into fire buckets, arm or leg baths for hospitals were made from petrol tins, and the spokes of old wheels turned into legs for tables and chairs.

Even the blood of slaughtered animals was commandeered from the A.S.C. butchery and used in place of linseed oil for making paint, according to the "History of the Army Ordnance Services during the Great War."

Initiative had its practical as well as financial reward in Salonika, where the Ordnance Service organized and erected a soap factory—and showed a net profit of £36,000, in addition to saving a substantial shipping tonnage. Waste fats from rations and the carcasses from slaughtered animals, together with any margarine, cheese, etc., that might have been condemned, were collected.

A small plant was erected, and from these by-products the total local army requirements of hard soap, soft soap and dubbin were made. Soaps of higher quality made in the factory were sold to the Canteens; while the French Army sent in its waste products and received soap in exchange. A further valuable by-product was produced—glycerine, an essential munitions ingredient, and according to the above-quoted volume sufficient glycerine was sent to England to make up a quarter of a million 18-pr. shells.

This was not the only example of unusual enterprise in matters pertaining to salvage. It is on record that on the eve of the final offensive in Salonika in 1918 the supply of ink ran dry and operation orders could neither be typed nor duplicated. Lieutenant Baker, an infantry officer chemist working in the Laboratory, obtained some blue aniline dye in Salonika, and, with glycerine produced at the Ordnance soap factory, plus other ingredients, manufactured ink, which was rapidly delivered where needed.

These instances, quoted at random, give a vivid picture of enterprise and initiative in the last war. That the lessons they taught have been well learned can be proved by what is being done in India to-day.

It is often said that the American Continent is the Arsenal for the United Nations. India may be also, though there are some major differences. America has an abundance of raw materials of all kinds, and an industrial organization that has been harnessed to convert raw materials into weapons of war, and into those goods necessary for the economic life of the people.

India, on the other hand, though possessing abundant raw material supplies, has in the past relied very largely on exporting them rather than converting them into manufactured goods to meet her own requirements. The advantage of this policy in peace-time is obvious, and India has thus benefited in having a favourable trade balance for many years past.

During war-time, however, this policy cannot be maintained. Owing to the difficulty in shipping, loss of trade routes and the heavy call made on her to support the needs of armies in the Near East and other fronts, India's industrial production has been unable to expand in proportion to the demands made on her.

A natural consequence of this, therefore, has been "Conservation"—conservation of stocks of all kinds—to endeavour to adjust this unfavourable trade balance, and also to set off, as far as possible, the loss of such areas as Burma, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, all of which previously supplied almost all India's domestic requirements in tin, timber, rubber, quinine and other essential commodities.

Whilst giant strides have been made to increase factory production of every type, the fact still remains that owing to the difficulty of procuring specialized machinery and equipment, production is still far below demand.

Energetic measures have therefore been taken to conserve and economize in every way possible. Salvage dumps are being created at ports and in the various army formations to deal with overseas salvage and salvage which is beyond the capacity of existing installations to deal with. All this is being done to make absolutely certain that all possible action is being taken to re-use all discarded articles to the best advantage of the war effort.

How do the efforts so far made compare with what was done in the Great War? From the following *résumé* of what is being practised now it will be seen that very little escapes the salvage

net. Boots which are completely unserviceable are being robbed of essential parts and re-used, and the scrap remaining is being converted into leather-boards. Unserviceable clothing has all buttons, hooks, eyes, buckles, etc., removed and re-used. Tunics with worn-out sleeves are either patched or with sleeves cut to the elbows made into bush-shirts.

Knitted woollen garments are unravelled and the wool used again for re-knitting, while other woollen and cotton garments are processed by rag-pulling machines to recover wool and cotton. Finger-worn gloves are changed into mittens by cutting off the fingers and binding tape over the loose strands. Unserviceable mosquito-netting is used in a variety of ways in hospitals, and in canteens, as food covers, etc., and it has also been found valuable for camouflage purposes.

All ferrous and non-ferrous scrap is carefully accounted for, and either re-issued to smelting plants or re-converted into ingots. Sump oils from mechanised vehicles and all forms of lubricants are collected and refined; component parts from unserviceable aircraft and M.T. vehicles are being used in maintenance workshops. Glass bottles of all kinds are collected and re-issued for use as beer, fruit-juice and medical necessities containers.

These few examples illustrate what is being done to utilise to their maximum life every type of article. They do not give the complete picture, for, with commendable foresight, a number of Substitutes Committees have been set up for the purpose of inventing (and considering inventions and suggestions), improvising and bringing into use every form of material to replace those which are in short supply.

As in the last war necessity compelled research chemists to seek substitutes for wood and metal (one result of which was the speedy development of plastics in their stead), so in this war India is showing an inventiveness and imagination which may prove the basis of new secondary industries in the post-war world.

Jute fabric tents, for instance, are being made; terne plate is now being used for tin-plate containers; rope-soled shoes and chaplies are replacing boots and rubber-soled shoes; shellac-treated wooden plugs are being used instead of cork and glass stoppers; hollowed out bamboos are utilized as oil fluxes and other liquid containers.

While, therefore, much has already been done, a very great deal more can and must be done in the matter of salvage and conservation. It is a field in which everyone can play a part; it requires the whole-hearted co-operation of every individual. Persistent and sustained effort will assuredly produce results which will not be measured in terms of money but in hastening the day of victory.

REGIMENTAL NICKNAMES—AND THEIR ORIGIN

By T. H. B.

IT IS OFTEN said that unfortunate is the man who has never been human enough to qualify for a nickname. And that goes for most institutions in general and the Army in particular.

In 1816 a military writer said: "Nicknames among military men are familiarly used in a collective sense. Thus: the Light Infantry are called 'Light Bobs'; the Grenadiers 'Tow Rows', and the battalion men 'Flat-foots'; and in many instances whole corps have been particularised in this manner."

Undoubtedly in the past nicknames were in more general use and more widely known than they are to-day. Many regiments, however, still proudly cherish their old nicknames, and it is the object of this article to set down many that have been applied to our regiments from time to time, and to explain briefly how these interesting and historical names have been acquired. Before doing so, it is perhaps better to be clear as to the various designations held by regiments since their formation. Briefly, the position is as follows:

Prior to 1750, regiments were known by the name of their Colonels, more often than not by those who raised them, and the Army List of 1740 designates regiments by their Colonel's name. Numerical designations were assigned to regiments in 1751, but they are not found in official correspondence until 1754.

Despite this, the Colonel was still very much the owner of his regiment, and the numbers found it hard to win their way into general use, as, indeed, did the territorial titles by which the numbers were officially superseded some 130 years later. Right through the "Seven Years' War" people continued to speak of "Kingsley's" or "Bragg's" instead of the 20th or 28th Foot, and even in official documents like the Commission Register names and numbers were used concurrently right down to the end of the 18th century.

In 1881 the Cardwell system, which remains to this day, was introduced. The old single battalion infantry units bearing historic numbers were grouped into pairs—the two forming a single unit—and the old numerical designations were dropped, all being linked with counties or towns, on a territorial basis.

The origins of nicknames are numerous. They can be traced to the names of Colonels who raised the regiments, to the colours of old uniforms and facings, to historical events, both in battle and elsewhere, or sometimes to play or puns on the old numerical titles. Some are comparatively modern, while with the passage of time the source of others has been forgotten and become obscure. Moreover, it should be remembered that it is somewhat easy for any inventive soldier, especially in a canteen or club, to label almost every corps in the Army with an appropriate nickname.

The oldest regiment of the British Infantry of the Line is the Royal Scots. Out of regard for the remoteness of its beginnings it is referred to as "Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard". Legend has it that this rather strange nickname arose in the following manner: whilst serving on the Continent as *Le Regiment de Douglas* (1633—1678) the officers entered into an argument with the French regiment *de Picardie* as to the antiquity of their respective corps. The Frenchmen claimed to have been on guard at the Crucifixion, whereupon the Scotsmen retorted: "Well, if we had been on guard we wouldn't have slept at our posts—and in any case, that night we were acting as Pontius Pilate's bodyguard".

Another famous Highland regiment, The Seaforths, has had two well-known nicknames, "The Macraes" (1st Battalion), from the very large number of men of the Macrae clan who joined the Regiment, and "The King's Men" (2nd Battalion), from its motto (that of the McKenzies) "Cuidich'n Righ", which means: "Help the King" or "He saved the King".

Still another distinguished Highland regiment, the Argyle and Sutherlands, who recently fought so well in Malaya, are justly proud of being known as "The Thin Red Line" from their gallant conduct at Balaklava, where they withstood, without support, the charges of the Russian cavalry and put them to rout. It is the only infantry regiment to carry "Balaklava" on its colour.

And before leaving Highland regiments, why is it that the Gordon Highlanders are always known as "The Gay Gordons"? It is a fact that the flamboyant Duchess of Gordon originally helped her husband to raise the regiment. Wearing a diced bonnet, and mounted on a white horse, she rode around the "feeing" markets and offered a guinea from her lips to each

recruit who stepped forward to join up. This stimulating event took place over 150 years ago, and one is reasonable in wondering why the gaiety has extended to the present day.

Most English regiments, too, have been christened with famous nicknames. Take, for example, The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey). Raised in 1661 to garrison Tangier, part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, wife of King Charles II, it received on its formation the badge of the Paschal Lamb, the crest of the House of Braganza. The name Tangier at once gave rise to the soubriquet "The Tangerines", but its alternative nickname, "Kirke's Lambs" is the correct one. This was derived from the name of its Colonel, and, of course, its badge. During the Peninsula War, The Queens were also known as "The Sleepy Queens", owing to their carelessness in allowing General Brenner to escape at Almeida in 1810.

The Buffs (Royal East Kent Regiment) were originally designated "The Buffs" from being the first whose accoutrements, such as pouches, sword-belts, etc., were made of leather prepared from the buffalo, after the manner of chamois. In 1749 they became known as "The Old Buffs" to distinguish them from the 31st Foot (East Surrey Regiment). This came about from an incident at the Battle of Dettingen. The East Surreys were mistaken by George II for The Buffs, as both regiments had similar buff facings. On being informed of his mistake, the King said: "Well done, then, Young Buffs". The East Surreys still retain this name with esteem, as a memento of their gallant conduct at Dettingen.

The Buffs have also been known as "The Resurrectionists", sometimes attributed to the fact that they lay claim to an ancestry as old as that of the Royal Scots. But more probably it was due to their extraordinary recuperative powers after they had been ridden down by cavalry at Albuera (1811) and in which battle they particularly distinguished themselves. Finally, during the period 1737—1749, The Buffs were also known as "The Buff Howards", to distinguish them from "The Green Howards". Both regiments were serving in Flanders during 1742—45, both Colonels bore the name of Howard, and, as will be remembered, in those days regiments were named after their Colonels. The facings of the second-named regiment were green. Hence its nickname—which is now its official title.

The Royal Northumberland Fusiliers have earned several distinctive nicknames. The one by which they are generally

• •

known, "The Fighting Fifth", arose from a favourite saying of the Duke of Wellington in connection with the services of the regiment in the Peninsula, "The Ever-fighting, Never-failing Fifth". They have also been known as "The Old and Bold" by reason of their long and gallant conduct in war, and as "Lord Wellington's Bodyguard" from their constant association with Wellington. In 1811 The Fifth were attached to headquarters. About 1770 they were known as "The Shiners", which commemorated their reputation for cleanliness and smartness about that time.

The nickname "Elegant Extracts" was given to The Royal Fusiliers by other regiments because from the date of its foundation they had no officers of the rank of Ensign—only full Lieutenants. Thus when an officer was posted to the regiment, an Ensign or Second Lieutenant from another regiment had to be chosen and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant. This custom continued until the Crimea, when, owing to heavy losses in officers, newly-commissioned officers had to be posted direct. During the Great War this title was revived and adopted by the 4th Battalion Concert Party.

The badge of the figure of Britannia, said to have been given to The Royal Norfolk Regiment by Queen Anne, is responsible for it being known as "The Holy Boys". This somewhat irreverent nickname was due, according to one story, to the men selling Bibles for drink in the Peninsula. But it is more reliably due to the Spaniards mistaking the figure on their badge for that of the Virgin Mary.

About the same time, at Salamanca, the 11th Foot (Devons) were nearly cut to pieces by the French, and only about seventy men of all ranks survived. The regiment was, therefore, dubbed "The Bloody Eleventh". Some thirty-one years later the 13th Foot (Somerset Light Infantry) gained fame by their gallant defence of Jallalabad, and thereby earned for themselves the distinguished nickname of "The Illustrious Garrison". To this day they carry the word "Jallalabad" on their badge.

If by chance the reader should see a football match in which the team of certain regiment is taking part the shout "Come on the Snappers" will undoubtedly be heard. This is the nickname by which the 15th Foot (East Yorkshire Regiment) is still familiarly known, and is in memory of the action during the American War, in which a detachment of the 15th was surrounded by the enemy, and, running out of ammunition, the men snapped their

muskets in the usual way, and so deceived the enemy and prevented them from coming any closer.

A tiger, surmounted by the word "Hindoostan", is the badge which recalls their many years of hard service in India and Afghanistan, and is responsible for The Leicestershire Regiment being known as "The Green Tigers" and "The Tigers."

When known as Kingsley's Regiment, the now Lancashire Fusiliers won great fame at Minden in 1759, and hence their nicknames "The Minden Boys" and "Kingsley's Stand". At Minden they suffered 300 casualties and were ordered to rest on the following day, but, at the request of the survivors, this order was cancelled. For this action they were awarded a laurel wreath, and to this day, on the anniversary of the battle, officers and men of the Regiment wear a rose in their headdress because on their way into action, in passing through a rose garden, their predecessors plucked the flowers and decorated their hats with them. Their old numerical designation, 20th Foot, is responsible for their having been known also as "The Double X's" and "The Two Tens".

In a similar way the Cheshire Regiment (22nd Foot) are known as "The Two Two's." They, however, own another and more distinguished nickname—"The Meanee Boys", in commemoration of Meanee (1843), when, under Sir Charles Napier, they were the only white troops among the 1,800 opposed to 22,000 native troops and are thus the only British regiment entitled to the battle honour "Meanee."

The Royal Welch Fusiliers, with their privilege of being led on parade by a goat, were obviously cut out for the name "The Nanny Goats". They also own another unique privilege, that of wearing a flash of black ribbons attached to the back of the collar. In 1805 pig-tails for the Army were abolished, but when the order was promulgated, the 24th were at sea, and so the order did not reach them. They were, therefore, the last to wear the pig-tail, and in commemoration of this they obtained the distinction of wearing the "flash", which represents the leather-bag formerly used to sheath the pig-tail or queue, and so protect the uniform from grease and powder.

It is often erroneously supposed that "The Fore and Afts" or "The Back Numbers" are nicknames of The Gloucestershire Regiment, on account of their conduct at Alexandria in 1801, where they were attacked by French Cavalry. There was not time to form square, and so they were ordered to stand back to back, which they did, and beat off the attack. To commemorate this

• •

event they have the distinction of wearing a second small badge at the back of the cap. While these two names are appropriate, it is believed they are entirely the invention of a well-known military publisher. The only historical nicknames officially recognized are "The Old Braggs's", "Braggs's" and "The Slashers", the first two being derived from their Colonel of that name from 1734 to 1751, and the third from an incident in the American War. This is attributed to two sources. One, from their gallant conduct at the battle of the Bronx, and the other from a story which says that while serving in America some officers of the Regiment dressed themselves up as Indians and cut off the ears of a magistrate by the name of Walker, who had refused to give billets to the families of the regiment during a particularly hard winter.

Alone of all Line regiments, The Worcestershire Regiment were allowed to retain the old valise ornament when it was abolished in 1784. This star is the same as that of The Coldstream Guards—the Star of the Garter, and accounts for their nickname "The Guards of the Line", while their motto "Firm" accounts for another—"The Firms". They own to yet another soubriquet "The Ever-sworded 29th" (1st Battalion). The origin of this is obscure, but until 1850 it was customary for officers to wear swords on all occasions, even in Mess.

It is, of course, somewhat obvious that The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, famous for their defence of Lucknow in 1857, should be christened "The Docs."

The 33rd Foot (The Duke of Wellington's Regiment), commanded by the Duke in 1806, is the only regiment named after a subject other than one of Royal blood. Their crest is that of the Duke of Wellington, and they earned for themselves the title "Immortals" from their conspicuous service in India about the end of the 18th century. The 33rd also used to be called "The Havercake Lads" because a well-known recruiter for the regiment used to invite recruits by displaying an oatcake on the point of sword.

The badge of the Roussillon plume was gained by The Royal Sussex Regiment at Quebec in 1759, when it captured the colours of the French Roussillon Grenadiers. On this standard the golden *fleur-de-lys* were shown, and thus the regiment received the nickname of "Orange Lilies".

The Dorsetshire Regiment, which was the first King's Regiment to fight in India, gained for themselves the motto *Primus in Indis* and earned a quaint nickname in Almanza. Fearing they

would be late for the encounter they were mounted on mules in order to arrive more quickly, and were thereupon given the name of "Sankey's Horse", Sankey being the name of the Colonel.

Prior to 1941, the 1st Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment (Prince of Wales Volunteers), had twenty-nine Colour honours, a number exceeded by only one other corps. They had served in Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia and North and South America, a unique record. Its old title of the 40th Foot (XI.) resulted in it being called "The Excellers".

In 1719 the authorities decided to economize, and one step taken was to form a regiment of invalids. Thus came into existence the 1st Invalids. It is on record that in 1767 the youngest officer was a Captain of 42, there were two totally blind officers—an Ensign of 71 and a Lieutenant of 80—and there was also a major of 82. In 1787 they paraded for the last time as Invalids, and two years later the regiment was thoroughly sound. Wellington was among the officers. In 1822 they became the 41st Welsh—now spelt with a "c"—Regiment of Foot, and, of course, the nickname "The Invalids" has always stuck to them.

Serving at the close of the year 1796 as marines for the third time in their history, a portion of the 2nd Battalion of this regiment was employed on H.M.S. "Brittania", H.M.S. "Courageous", and H.M.S. "Agamemnon", under Nelson. The following year "The Old Agamemnons", as Nelson called them, accompanied him when he transferred his flag to "The Captain", and were present at the battle of Cape St. Vincent. The Welch Regiment is the only regiment to have the honour of bearing "St. Vincent" on its colours.

About 180 years ago, in 1756 to be exact, the 56th Foot had crimson facings. These wore so badly that the Colonel wished to have them changed to blue. This, however, not being allowed, he adopted that particular hue known as "pompadour", so named from its being the favourite colour of Mme. de Pompadour, the beautiful and shrewd mistress of King Louis XI of France. And here is the origin of the nicknames "Saucy Pompy's" or "Pompadours" now used by both battalions of the Essex Regiment. That these were in use over 140 years ago can be seen from the following recruiting poster which appeared in 1800:

"The Highest Bounty in National Bank Notes, or Hard Guineas. 56th Regiment, Major Keating, Now wants Sixty men of Spirit and Enterprise to complete the Fifty-Sixth Regiment, or Old Saucy Pompadours. Any lads chusing to

follow the Honourable Profession of a Soldier, may apply at the Sign of the Fighting Cocks, Rathkeale. The Major begs to remind his countrymen of the preference already given by One Hundred and Sixty County Limerick and Kerry Lads who have joined the Pompadour standard, and he hopes, for a continuance of that partiality which he has so amply experienced".

The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire) served with Wolfe at Quebec, and it is in memory of his death that officers wear a double line of black lace in their gold lace, and it also accounts for the 1st Battalion being known as "Wolfe's Own".

The 48th Foot (Northamptonshire Regiment) achieved great fame at Talavera and in remembrance of this action are known as "The Heroes of Talavera". It was in this battle that their Colonel, the last officer in the British Army to wear the old three-cornered hat or "Nivirais", being seriously wounded, called the next senior officer, bowed, raised his hat, and said: "Major Middlemore, you will have the honour of leading the 48th to the attack."

Whatever others may think of it, the nickname "Dirty Half-Hundred" is not at all what it appears to be at first sight. At Vimiera (1808) the 50th Foot (Queens Own Royal West Kent Regiment) particularly distinguished itself, and when one reads in Napier's account of the battle: "their faces were begrimed with powder and black as their own lapels . . . and 900 tumbling down on Laborde's division of French (5,300 strong) amidst a fearful war-cry and with a shock that nothing could withstand", the reader will realize how glorious a deed this uncomplimentary-sounding nickname commemorates.

Almost everyone has heard of the title "Die-Hards", which The Middlesex Regiment won at Albuhera (1811), when over 400 officers and men fell, and where their Colonel, fatally wounded, rallied the 57th by the cry: "Die hard, my men, die hard". It is unfortunate that this name is frequently used as a term of contempt in these days, when it is to be hoped that those of us who are fated to die *will* "die hard". The 2nd Battalion of this Regiment is known as "The Pothooks" in reference to their number (77th Foot).

The 60th (King's Royal Rifle Corps) and The Rifle Brigade used to wear dark green uniforms in the days when full dress was worn. Hence their nickname "Greenjackets". As Rifle Regiments they carry no colours, and therefore wear their battle honours on their badges and other appointments.

According to one story, it is in tribute to a much-cherished local ballad that the Wiltshire Regiment answer to the title of "The Moonrakers", while another says it is due to some members of the regiment being surprised one dark night dragging a pond with long rakes, looking, as it turned out, for smuggled brandy kegs, or as they said, for the moon. They gained another nickname, "The Springers", because of their alertness during the American War, while yet another, "The Splashers", was earned within the British Isles.

In 1760 they were serving at Carrickfergus Castle. At this time the regiment had a large number of young recruits, and they found themselves, when without guns and with little small arms ammunition, confronted by 1,200 Frenchmen. Consequently, they had to use their buttons as bullets. Later they had to resort to stones and bricks, and, finally, they charged with the bayonet. The Castle was taken in the end, but the 62nd were allowed to march out with the full honours of war, as were, incidentally, the Duke of Aosta and the Italians at Amba Alagi during the present war. In memory of this episode the regiment wore a "splash" or dent on their buttons for some time.

Finally, that grand old regiment, The Royal Irish Fusiliers, who captured the first French eagle in the Peninsula War. This episode accounts for two of their nicknames, "The Aiglers", and "The Eagle Takers", while their motto, "Faugh-a-Ballagh" (Clear The Way) is the reason for two others, "The Old Fogs" and "Faugh-a-Ballagh Boys".

* * * *

Well! there they are—some of the grand old nicknames which recall many years of courageous and hard service of the British Army all over the world. May this Army of ours, which has laid the foundation of the British Commonwealth of Nations, long continue to fight in the cause of freedom for all peoples!

AFTER THE WAR . . . ?

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL G. F. BUNBURY

HAVE YOU DECIDED what you are going to do in England when you have finished with the army and have earned a pension which, even in pre-war days, allowed of few extravagances? Perhaps you are not going to live in England, or have already made up your mind what to do in retirement. If so, this article can have no more than a passing interest for you; it is written for those who are still undecided.

Most of us, despite present preoccupations, find our thoughts wandering from time to time into the future. We have misgivings. We wonder whether post-war England will be anything like the pre-war England of our infrequent but utterly wonderful leaves. We imagine, probably correctly, that the purchasing power of our small pensions will be greatly reduced and that we will be unable to afford the leisure and relaxation we feel we have earned.

But have we earned a twilight of ease just because we have served twenty-five to thirty years in the army? I doubt it. Why should we, because of the years spent in soldiering on good pay, consider that we have no further responsibility to society? Why, having earned our pensions, should we become social parasites at whom the ever-increasing socialist element will jeer?

These jeers are well deserved. The working man does not sit back at the age of fifty and do nothing. He more often than not dies in harness at a ripe old age. The necessity for wearing that harness prolongs his useful life and increases his happiness. Why should not we accept a new harness and thus prolong our usefulness, both to ourselves and to the nation? To what, you may ask, does all this lead? It leads to the possibly unpopular statement that England will not want, and will tolerate only with resentment, the physically fit *bouche inutile*. What, then, is the answer? It is that every one of us must, despite the fact that we have given the noonday of our lives to the army, find some useful occupation which will end only with our death, or with the complete loss of our physical powers.

Some, and they are optimists, may think that they can get jobs. Some may already have useful hobbies. A few may think, erroneously, that their wealth relieves them of the necessity for doing anything but enjoy themselves. Most of us will want to do something useful but do not know how to set about it. Our only

hobby has been our profession. What can we begin at the age of fifty that will be of any practical use? It is to those in this category that the following suggestions are offered.

Without claiming undue originality or perspicacity, the writer believes that many of our national misfortunes have been due to over-industrialization and over-specialization of production. Also that we will regain our national strength and virility only by exploiting to the utmost the natural resources of the country: in fact, by going back to the land.

Any one of us, with little knowledge but plenty of industry, can wrest treasures from the land and thereby find that mental and physical satisfaction which results from quenching the thirst of creative instinct. The financial satisfaction of reducing expenditure by producing foodstuffs at home must also loom large in times when the balancing of the family budget is an acrobatic feat.

On the lowest financial level the "back to the land" enthusiast can get this satisfaction by working an allotment; on the highest he owns or rents a farm. The latter connotes a highly specialized knowledge, and more capital than most of us possess. The retired officer who loves a country life will obviously fall into a category between these two. This middle category itself can be divided into the small holder and the small farmer; that is to say the pensioner with nothing but his pension in the former, and the pensioner with a certain amount of capital in the latter.

If you retire with £1,000 with which to buy yourself a house, and nothing but your pension on which to live, you are a potential small holder. Do not spend your money on a villa in Cheltenham, or in any other of the "army suburbs". Such a sum will purchase a pleasant and convenient small house and a few acres of land in a rural area. Five acres or so of good land will provide you, if you are industrious, with the means of reducing your household expenses by almost £100 a year. With five acres you can keep your family supplied with eggs, vegetables and dairy produce, and at the same time keep yourself fit and happy. Your wife can help to cut down expenses by doing the work of the house and by doing the household laundry at home. This is no longer the weekly nightmare that it used to be, as the modern machines for both washing and ironing are simple to use and, taking into consideration the saving on laundry bills, inexpensive.

But surely with your education and social assets, you are worth more than £100 a year. Undoubtedly you are, but where

can you demand such a wage? If your hobby, be it writing, painting, carpentry or stamp collecting, were to bring you in a steady income of £100 per year you would be delighted. How much more proud you should be if your physical energy and mental balance can reduce your budget by this sum, at the same time keeping you usefully employed?

Now we will see how this saving is to be affected. You must keep a cow and you must learn to milk it; it will keep you in milk, butter and cream for nine months of the year. You must buy your milk for the remaining three months. Learning to milk presents few difficulties, and if you want an occasional day off, a local farmer's son is usually delighted to earn some pocket-money by doing the evening milking for you. A dozen good fowls will, in their youth, provide sufficient eggs for the household and when they stop laying will boil. Fifty pullets, raised from day-old chicks, will give you a chicken once a week. A good vegetable garden with some carefully tended fruit trees will save you packets.

All this will get you out of bed early in the mornings, both in summer and in winter; will keep you healthily and happily occupied all day, and you will find that you have neither the time nor the inclination for the expensive recreations that might have tempted you if you were less busy.

Now for the small farmer. Assume that you have, or have saved, three or four thousand pounds capital. This should buy a good farm house and sufficient suitable outbuildings and land (say 50 acres) to enable you to be practically self-supporting in all your household needs except meat, tea, sugar, tobacco and alcohol. But a word of warning. Do not think that you can be a successful farmer, however small, without some practical and theoretical knowledge of the subject. Many a farmer would be willing to take you and your family as P.G.s for a year, and in return for your manual labour he would gladly teach you all he can. You will thus gain experience of a complete seasonal cycle, and should be ready to plough your own furrow. If you want still more instruction, spend six months at Reading University. There you will be taught exactly what you ask to learn, and the fee is incredibly small.

Now for the job for which you have spent this time of preparation. For the type of small farm envisaged you will have to employ a full-time labourer to help you. His wages will be about £120 per annum and your plans must cater for supplying

your household needs and for making enough cash profit to pay for his hire.

The following suggestions are offered:

- 2 cows (the skim milk to feed the pigs);
- One dozen fowls for laying;
- 50 pullets for the table;
- 10 sows and a boar;
- 12 store cattle;
- $\frac{1}{2}$ acre vegetable garden;
- $\frac{1}{2}$ acre fruit;
- 15 acres for hay or silage for cows and store cattle;
- 1 acre for roots;
- 8 acres of arable land for corn;
- 16 acres for grazing cows and store cattle;
- 6 acres for folding pigs.

The progeny of the sows, sold as weaners, should bring you in sufficient cash profit to pay the wages of your man. The arable land will provide grain for your livestock, and whole-meal flour for the household. The straw will be trodden into muck for your fields by the cattle in the yards during the winter. In the summer the store cattle will each want an acre of pasture, and if they are bought as yearlings in the autumn, and sold as Christmas beef the following year, these should bring in a substantial profit.

The above is only an outline of a scheme which can have untold variations. Your imagination, foresight and initiative is given all the scope required, and the whole-time healthy outdoor work will keep you fitter than you have ever been. Most important, perhaps, is the fact that for the first time in your life you are your own master, answerable to no man. What a pleasant change for a soldier!

These suggestions are not intended to belittle the usefulness of the market gardener, apiarist or fruit grower: they are all producing essentials, and are useful units in the national life. It is suggested, however, that these occupations are somewhat limited in scope, and that they are more dependant on the vagaries of the English climate than general farming.

If this article has stirred the imagination of any it has achieved its object. Whatever you may decide to do, make up your mind that your future life will be useful to England who, debilitated by years of war, needs the brains, courage and physical energy of all of us, for so long as we possess such qualities. Let us, like the phoenix, arise from the ashes of war to a new and happier life.

OUR MILITARY MAN-POWER PROBLEM

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL F. L. ROBERTS

NO ONE WILL deny that the demands on our man-power in this war are far heavier than were similar demands in the last war. Furthermore, the Empire's population has not by any means increased between these two wars to such an extent as to be commensurate with the demands made upon it now. Again, within the army itself there are now many more and varied calls upon our available men than ever entered our peace-time philosophy. The hundred-and-one different weapons and vehicles which our land forces must use, and the various new individual roles which must be carried out, have resulted in varying degrees of specialization, which, in their turn, have increased our requirements in *trained* soldiers of various types and categories.

Consequently, we are not finding it any too easy to provide trained—and by this I mean fully trained—soldiers for our very enlarged and growing land armies. And so what is the result? We are reduced to a process known as “milking”, which, in effect, more or less amounts to “taking away from him even that which he hath.”

Any Officer who has recently returned to India from overseas will bear witness to the fact that this “milking” process, in its application to Indian Army units overseas, results in, or has been resulting, in a drastic if not a dangerous turn-over of personnel. Units which have been 100 per cent. war-experienced in officers and men have been reduced to a 40 per cent. or 30 per cent. strength in war-experienced men after a lapse of a few weeks away from active operations.

Nowadays units in any theatre of war are apt to be moved from non-active areas to very active areas in the space of a few hours. Hence it will be appreciated that a drastic change-over in the quality of their personnel might well be classified as “dangerous”. Modern war imposes such a strain on endurance that those who have experienced its strains and who have proved to themselves that they can “take it” are of far, far, greater value to any fighting force than the percentage which have yet to be tested. This is a factor far more potent to-day than it has ever been in the whole history of warfare.

To turn to the home front in India. There are in India today many battalions which, through no choice or fault of their own, have so far had no experience of modern war. But what they have experienced to no ordinary extent is this process known as "milking". They must have started their war-time careers with a very high percentage of regular soldiers, and the milking system has subsequently drained off a high percentage of their original personnel during the two-and-a-half years that we have been at war.

It may be argued that the drastic result, in the case of these battalions, is a necessary evil which cannot be avoided, and that the situation is not as dangerous with them as it is in the case of battalions overseas. There is, however, one aspect which, if disregarded, might well result in apathy—and apathy at a time like the present is more dangerous than any Fifth Column. I refer to the psychological affect on men who are keyed up to fight and who perforce belong to a unit which is being repeatedly "milked" while they themselves are left behind.

As an example, let us take the case of a war-time battalion raised, probably, soon after war began and consisting of drafts from its sister regular battalions. In this nucleus, with its proportion of recalled reservists, you had a unit the officers and men in which were all imbued with the natural desire of every good soldier—to fight as a part of his own unit. This keenness resulted in the rapid knitting together of the drafts sent to form the units. How long is this keenness likely to be retained at concert-pitch when officers and men must watch "milked" elements of their unit sent away to other units overseas while they themselves remain behind, month after month, to see their own battalion repeatedly reduced to a skeleton of its former self? This may seem to be an exaggeration, but you can't deny the psychological fact that "hope deferred maketh the heart sick."

Having thus criticised our present system, the writer now makes bold to offer a solution to the problem. Let us revert, for a moment, to the title of this article. There are two types of milk considered as being fit for human consumption at any time in India—pasteurized and/or condensed milk (powdered milk is in the latter category).

Now, supposing you were made responsible for feeding several hundred human beings and/or animals on a milk diet for a period of several months—months during which conditions were likely to be so trying as possibly to necessitate extra issues from

your stock of milk. You must bear in mind that, owing to Dame Nature's ways, the people/animals in your charge are apt to increase and to decrease appreciably, in numbers, at short notice; with resultant changes in the demands on your stock of milk. Supposing also that, at the moment of taking over this responsibility for supply of milk diet, you had to make the choice between holding stocks of pasteurized or condensed milk, at an equal bulk tonnage of either. Which would you choose? (You may assume that the pasteurized milk would not go bad, no matter how long you had to keep it.)

Whatever you may say in favour of pasteurized milk, the correct answer is "condensed" milk. The reason is obvious, but in case you feel argumentative let me tell you why.

At the time when you have to make this momentous decision—a decision upon which the lives and future happiness of your population will depend—you cannot possibly state with any accuracy what your daily demand for milk will be. Some foul disease may suddenly deplete your population and thus cause a decreased demand for weeks; on the other hand, an equally sudden increase in your population, whether human or animal, may almost double the demands on your stock; or again, debility among some of your charges may necessitate an extra issue to these weak folk. The pasteurized milk stock remains constant in capacity—ounce for fluid ounce you can't increase your stock unless you water it, which is a foul.

But your stock of condensed milk is ideal—in name as well as in nature—for issue on an as-required basis. Its concentrated form gives you a very much larger stock from which to draw (if you remember, the bulk tonnage in either case was to be the same). This concentrated characteristic of the condensed milk enables you to meet demands with the greatest possible economy without having to stint supply. Look at it whichever way you like, you *must* be prepared for a constant fluctuation in demand, and the only type of milk suited to meet such conditions is condensed milk. See?

Now then, how can we apply this principle to the problem of providing "milk" (in the shape of *trained fighting men*) to our war-time "population"—the units of our Field Armies?

Firstly, what is the procedure now?

Our recruits receive their basic and initial training at selected training units. If time allows, which is seldom, the recruit is given a measure of advanced training in the handling of some of the many weapons used in Active Battalions overseas.

He may, if he is lucky, even undergo a brief period of section training, *i.e.* he begins to be taught that he is part of a machine and that his individual training has been a means to that end. But his training unit can do no more; it is, very rightly, not designed to teach Company and Battalion training.

Even so, the supply of *trained* soldiers from these training establishments does not meet the demands of our active battalions in an ever-increasing army; so we have to "milk" these active battalions, which should be *receivers* of "milk" rather than the donors if they are to be kept up to a high standard of fitness for war.

In other words the present system is rather "pasteurized"—over a period of months we have a more-or-less fixed quantity of trained men, and we transfer them from one unit to another just to meet the immediate demands of the moment. In actual fact we are watering the pasteurized milk, which does neither the consumer nor the milk any good and can never be a satisfactory answer to our problem.

Have I laboured the point? Well then, "him that hath ears to hear, let him hear."

How can we change over from a "pasteurized" to a "condensed" system? By introducing into each Regiment or Group one or more units whose sole object will be to carry out post-recruit training. They become our tins of condensed milk, and this is how I see the system working:

(a) Training battalions should aim only at completing the four-and-a-half months' course necessary to produce the trained rifleman (or his equivalent in other units). On completion of this course the recruits should be consigned to "condensed" battalions only—NOT to Active Battalions in fighting formations.

(b) Condensed battalions to carry out the specialist and collective training which the modern unit expects, or hopes, that its drafts have been through. And, as circumstances demand, these highly trained soldiers are sent as reinforcements—in fact as well as in name—to units of fighting formations, and to form new units.

(c) Units in fighting formations should never be asked to surrender any of their men, except when they themselves find it necessary for purposes of leave, pension, relief and the like. In this connexion it might be argued that Training Battalions could do this work without having to resort to making other battalions do it. The fact is that they could not. You would have to

increase the number of officers and instructors, the amount of equipment and the extent of the accommodation at each T.B.; you would drive an already over-worked commandant mad; and you would submerge and therefore lose that valuable and indispensable outlook which only life in a battalion of trained men can develop—the experience of being part of an active unit organized and trained to function as such.

That is the broad outline of the “condensed” milk scheme. There are one or two points, however, affecting the “condensed” battalions:

(a) Within the equipment of the “condensed” battalion there must be included a proportion of the weapons and vehicles with which the active battalions are armed. To wrap a log of wood in leather and call it a “token” 2-inch mortar will never fit any man who handles it to take his place in a mortar team engaged in active operations. No, these “condensed” battalions *must* have a small proportion of carriers, mortars, trucks, lorries, anti-tank weapons and so on.

(b) Men who return from overseas for a much-needed change after months of strenuous fighting must, after their leave, be posted to “condensed” battalions. There they can pass on the valuable knowledge which they have gained from personal experience. Such officers and men should get their leave from their T.B. and then be sent at once to one of their “condensed” battalions.

Now then! What advantages do we obtain from this proposed system?

The advantages which I see can be summarised as follows:

1. The strain on the administrative staff of training units is appreciably reduced. Instead of having to cope with demands and forecasted demands from a large number of active battalions, that staff can concentrate on training recruits and passing them out to the “condensed” battalions.

2. The number of specialist instructors at training units can be reduced to nil. All you want are drill and musketry instructors. Furthermore, as specialists will no longer be required at the T.B., the average age and length of service of the T.B. instructor can be greater without any loss of efficiency—the instructor will not become out of date.

3. Correspondence as regards the supply and movement of reinforcements will be whittled down to letters between G.H.Q. India and one or two battalions per Regiment, as opposed to

the present necessity for having to write to every unit in the army.

4. The regular flow of man-power from recruiter to training unit and from training unit to "condensed" unit must inevitably make things much easier for those who have to forecast and to control intake and output.

5. The "condensed" battalions would still continue to pull their weight in the internal security problems of India. There might be occasions when heavy demands would reduce them to a 30 per cent. or even 25 per cent. shadow of their former selves, but that would not be for long, nor would it detract from their value as potentials in the meeting of internal security commitments.

6. At a pinch the "condensed" battalions could be used for active service against a tribal enemy on the N. W. Frontier. This step is not advocated except as a last resort, because there would be a natural tendency for local formation commanders to expect a higher standard of "mountain warfare" training to the detriment of the many types of more specialized training which modern open warfare demands.

7. Active battalions would be able to retain their high percentage of war-experienced men, no matter how long they might have to spend between bouts of active operations.

8. The supply of "red hot" items of equipment, *i.e.* those which have to be imported, would mostly go to the active battalions in India which need them. A very reduced minimum only need be allotted to condensed battalions for training. And no M.T. need be allotted to Training Battalions. This alone should make for economy. Added to these factors is another—the men drafted to active battalions would have received training in the use of these valuable weapons and vehicles, and so they would not be so liable to damage the equipment of active battalions.

9. It should be possible to earmark certain active battalions for a N. W. Frontier defence role for the duration of the war; thereby economising on this very expensive hired civilian M.T., and also economising in "red hot" items of equipment. Incidentally, were such earmarking at all possible, it should result in a further economy of man-power, because the strength of such battalions could be reduced to a "S.P.P.-level".

10. The psychological factor of disappointment and resultant loss of keenness is overcome once and for all. Each individual in a "condensed" battalion would know that though the

battalion as such would never go overseas, his turn would come sooner or later. The departure of a draft, instead of postponing the great day as it does now, would mean that the chances of being sent overseas had increased—the keen individual would know that his name had neared the top of the roster.

11. Finally, were this system to be adopted, or one very akin to it, we would be able to spill from our military vocabulary this dreadful phraseology about milking—surely a sign of something weak somewhere. I would suggest, in lieu, the following nomenclature:

“Training” battalions, as at present;

“Drafting” battalions, as suggested in this article; and

“Active” battalions, unadulterated as they used to be.

I am sure there is something in this philosophy, dear reader; and were William Shakespeare alive to-day, I feel equally sure that he would condone my bowdlerisation as being in a righteous cause when I say—

“Whom to milk and whom *not* to milk, that is the question.”

SIDELIGHTS ON GURKHA RECRUITING

By H. R. K. GIBBS

THE PRESENT is no time for giving figures of recruiting, but the future will show what a truly magnificent effort has been made by the small mountain Kingdom of Nepal in providing men for the armed forces of the British Empire. Youngsters who in 1939 were peacefully tending their cattle and sheep in the high pastures of the Himalaya, or tilling the little terraced fields on the hillsides, are to-day driving armoured carriers and manning anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons in the plains of Egypt, Ceylon, Iraq and Persia, and on the threatened frontiers of India.

Incidentally, it is no mean tribute to the training system of the Indian Army that the same lads who are now fully-trained mechanized soldiers, never saw a motor car, an aircraft or even a railway train before they enlisted. How it is done is best known to those hard-worked officers of the various Gurkha Regimental Training Centres, for whom no praise can be too high.

It is, however, concerning the side issues of the great expansion that this article is written. A longish period of work as an Assistant Recruiting Officer has shown the writer some things which may be of general interest.

Next to the actual work of recruiting, dealing with the Gurkha's family affairs is undoubtedly the most important part of the Recruiting staff's work. There is no District Soldiers' Board to deal with these affairs, and all such work falls to the lot of the Recruiting Officer for Gurkhas and his officers. The Gurkha woman, untrammelled by any system of purdah or seclusion, plays a very big part in the management of the family's affairs.

Each year many thousands come into the Recruiting Depots at Kunraghat, Ghoom and Laheria Serai. When the pensioners come to draw their pensions, as often as not their wives come too. During the last cold weather some eleven and a half thousand pensions were paid between December and mid-March in Kunraghat alone. Over and above these, many more thousands come to collect family allotments, receive sums of money sent by serving soldiers or get news of relatives. A very large number of family pension claims are also dealt with each

year. Some of the hill folk come just for the fun of the thing, and the Gurkha Brigade War Memorial Dharamsalas at Kunraghat and Ghoom are always full of family parties, complete with the baby.

Investigation of claims for family pensions and estates of deceased soldiers takes up many hours. Great patience is called for in unravelling the often-complicated family relationships, and when a Gurkha woman is hot on the trail she is not to be put off; she has her say in no uncertain manner. The worried A.R.O. will often find one baby parked in his letter-tray while mother produces lunch for one even smaller, what time an old gentleman who has been brought as a witness insists on telling you how he helped to defend Wana in 1894.

Perhaps the most trying cases are those in which the claim to a family pension is suddenly complicated by the arrival of a hitherto unknown widow. The retired Gurkha Officer especially is prone to take unto himself a young junior wife when he retires in comparative affluence. When in the fullness of time he is gathered to his fathers it is often found that the younger wife has been nominated as his heiress. Thereupon the elder wife comes down to the Recruiting Depot to press her claim and enlist the help of the Recruiting Officer, who, of course, needs the wisdom of Solomon.

In present circumstances disbursing family allotments is a major task. The Gurkha is as a rule very generous in such matters, and his confidence in the ability of his wife to run the home farm during his absence is seldom misplaced, although cases do occur which disprove the adage that absence makes the heart grow fonder.

When the wives, fathers or mothers come to collect the family allotments identification is an important business, and it is often amusing. A hot and bothered Assistant Recruiting Officer must see that moles, scars or other beauty spots are in the places stated in the payment registers. It is not always realized that little girls grow up, and birthmarks and the like should therefore be selected which will cause the minimum of embarrassment to all concerned in the years to come.

Another point often overlooked is that in a country where the people are entirely pastoral and agricultural, cutting grass or corn with a sickle or wood with a kukri is bound to result in a cut finger sometimes or other. A scar on the little finger of the left hand is, therefore, not a reliable means of identification, as fully 90 per cent. of adults have it.

At the other end of the scale is the case of the man who appeared recently to get a new wooden leg. Besides this souvenir of France in 1914 he had the gash of a bullet wound the whole way across his cheek, yet the identification marks officially recognized in his pension papers were still the two small moles on his chest recorded on the day he enlisted in 1909.

Mention has been made of the part played by women in the Gurkha's family life. Anyone who is fortunate enough to travel in Nepal will have ample confirmation of this fact. Some years ago I was able to make a short trip beyond the frontier at Nautanwa to the ridge above Batoli, the first Nepalese town beyond the Terai. The bridge over the Tinu Khola river provided an obvious excuse to rest awhile. Here beside an ancient temple of Siva an enterprising little Gurkha lady had her *bati*, a sort of teashop-cum-pub, which served as a good observation point. Other women carrying firewood, grass or freshly-cut sheaves of corn paused for a rest. Men, too, were similarly engaged, but the majority were women and girls.

All were only too ready to chat to the sahib, while the sight of the camera invariably caused laughter and a thinly-disguised readiness to be photographed. Further up the hill-path were the snug little houses, reminiscent of the crofters cottages of Scotland. All the household work was being done by the women, and many of them were busy hoeing and weeding the inevitable cabbage patch, then full of chillies, beans, spinach and turnips. Here and there an old woman would be spinning or weaving rough homespun cloth, while others chopped firewood for cooking the evening meal.

On the return journey, by one of those unexpected strokes of luck, I was spotted by a little girl of about twelve, who remembered me in the Regiment. She had seen me pass earlier in the day, and had awaited my return. As I approached she jumped from the boulder where she had been looking out for me and seized my arm. Before I had time to think, her name came to my tongue. "Dhannu! What are you doing here?" I asked. "I live with my mother just along the road, where we have a teashop," she replied. "Please come and sit down. I saw you pass this morning, and so I waited for you to come back."

The teashop was just a temporary shed of bamboo and thatch put up for the winter season, when the road is thronged with recruiters and their recruits and the thousands going to and from India for pensions, trade and pilgrimages. Here presided the dumpy but pleasant-looking little Gurkha woman

whom I had so often seen knitting in the verandah of the orderlies' quarters behind the Mess. Her husband had not lived to enjoy his pension for long, and so his widow eked out her savings with the profits of her small catering business. We were soon exchanging news, and I learnt that her only son had joined another Gurkha Regiment. Hot tea, well spiced with pepper, helped our conversation till I regretfully left to begin my return to India through the Terai.

Although Gurkhas are as a whole backward from an educational point of view, except those who live in the British districts near Darjeeling, army service does much to change that. Practically all recruits are illiterate on arrival, but soon pick up a smattering of Hindustani before tackling Roman-Urdu. Many only learn the Devanagri script in later life. Their womenfolk, too, are becoming literate during their residence in India.

Darjeeling, of course, abounds in schools, and many thousands of little Gurkha boys and girls work their way through to the glory of the matriculation. Whether we will in due course see little Gurkha ladies employed as clerks and secretaries remains to be seen, but the recruiting staff has already had two girl applicants. Both were apparently extremely well qualified but they could not be accepted. One has since married a Havildar and settled down to domestic bliss, while the other has returned to her desk as a school mistress. Perhaps their younger sisters or daughters may have better luck in the future.

Of recent years I have twice had the luck to visit Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal. Here, again, the fact is forced on one's attention that women play a big part in the affairs of Nepal. These visits were made during the present war, and news soon got round that a sahib from the Recruiting Depot was present.

The Chancery of the British Legation there deals with many thousands of pensioners and Family Allottees whose homes are nearer to the capital than to the Recruiting Depots in India. News of regiments on active service, and of relations now serving with them, is eagerly sought. However, it is not in Kathmandu that one meets with typical Gurkhas in any great numbers, although a week-end some distance along the road to the district of Gorkha, did enable me to see a fair number.

The valley is unique in its sanctity, and as a historic centre of ancient Buddhist and Hindu culture. Kathmandu is no more typical of the country than London is, say, of the rest of England. The vast majority of the local population is made up of the Newars, an aboriginal race. Although in normal times few

Newars are enlisted in our Gurkha regiments, many fine soldiers have come from them in the past. A perusal of old regimental histories and photograph albums will reveal how many of them have distinguished themselves in past campaigns. As in 1914—1918, so now in this Great War, many Newars are coming forward to enlist and are serving wherever Gurkha units go. The Newars are extremely capable artisans, and the glorious carvings which adorn the windows, doorways and gables of old Kathmandu are their handiwork. Modern developments have tended to do away with much of this craftsmanship, but there are signs that the present Prime Minister, Maharaja Sir Joodha Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana, is awake to the need of keeping such artistic skill alive.

The Valley of Nepal has, however, one great characteristic in common with the rest of the country. Agriculture is intensive and of a very high order of efficiency. Wherever the Gurkha soldier has the chance he soon starts a vegetable patch, and they are skilful gardeners. They grow a great variety of crops, but naturally the staple crops are food crops such as wheat, soya beans, maize and, above all, rice. Allied with agriculture goes animal husbandry, and the breeding of cattle. These pursuits occupy the lives of fully 90 per cent. of the population of Nepal, and form the background against which the character of the people must be studied.

Dealing as he does with the facts of nature, the Gurkha is a realist and philosophically takes things as they come. Naturally truthful, he is straightforward and outspoken even to the point of rudeness. Like all hillmen, he is cheerful and has a greatly developed sense of fun, even if at times it is somewhat crude. Many generations of military ancestors have made him turn to soldiering as a normal part of his life. A system of universal liability for military service obtains in Nepal; indeed the whole system of government is of a military character and all high officials bear military titles.

Pressure of population on the comparatively small area of land in the hill districts means that in normal times of peace many younger sons enlist in the regular Gurkha regiments of the Indian Army, Burma Military Police, Burma Frontier Force, Assam Rifles and Kashmir State Forces. For many years, too, this pressure has caused a steady flow of immigrants into Sikkim, Bhutan and Assam, as well as into the hill districts of the United Provinces. These areas, more particularly those to the east of

Nepal, are now proving valuable reservoirs of recruits for the greatly expanded army of to-day.

Many tribes not represented in the army during peacetime are now furnishing large numbers of excellent recruits, and though the Magar and Gurung of the older regiments together with the Limbu and Rai will always be the *beau ideal* of the recruiting staff, these newcomers are already proving their value as soldiers.

Buddhism was once a great force in Nepal, and though to-day it still lingers on, mainly in the north and east of the country, it has been almost entirely supplanted by Hinduism. The ruling classes are invariably staunchly orthodox in their lives, and Hinduism provides the mainspring of the national culture. As has been noted before, the Valley of Nepal is a centre of intense sanctity and religious custom, and probably no place away from Benares contains so many temples and shrines. You cannot move a yard without encountering some object or building of piety. Every phase of life is affected by religion, and much of the daily life of Kathmandu is centred on religious observance.

The Gurkha soldiers from the mountainous districts away from the valley are more casual and perfunctionary in their religious observances, but nevertheless they are strict about essentials, although they are tolerant of other creeds. They observe the rules of castes, and members of the higher castes enjoy considerable social prestige. Their military traditions have an effect on this matter of caste customs, and tend to put them into a proper perspective; for instance, field service and the exigencies of war conditions override the necessity of practically all restrictive caste rules, and no harm results, provided always that the purification ceremonies of *Pani-Patya* are properly carried out on return from service overseas.

Brahmins and menials are precluded from active military service and are never enlisted as combatants. So great is the desire for service, however, that each year many of these classes try to enlist under false colours. Normally they are detected and rejected by the Recruiting Staff, but occasionally one slips through the net owing to his appearance being exactly similar to that of the class to which he claims to belong. He is invariably found out later on, as in so small a country he cannot get away from his neighbours for long. Should he have shared food with other men of the higher castes, they become *pani band*, i.e. outcasted, and elaborate ceremonies have to be performed to restore them to caste.

No article dealing with Nepal would be complete without a reference to the enormous assistance given by His Highness the Maharaja Sir Joodha Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana. His position is unique. As Prime Minister and Supreme Marshal of Nepal he is the actual ruler of the country, since His Majesty the King of Nepal takes no part in the actual government. The office of Prime Minister is hereditary. The Roll of Succession includes the brothers of the Prime Minister in power according to age, and thereafter his own and his brothers' sons according to age, not necessarily the son of the Prime Minister himself. All departments of the Government come directly under the Maharaja, or *Tin Sirkar* as he is called. He is assisted by the other members of the Rana family.

Sir Joodha has done much to earn the gratitude of the British Government; he is ever ready to facilitate recruiting and he has taken a lively interest in the great expansion of the Gurkha Brigade. A large contingent of Nepalese troops have been assisting in the defence of India since the outbreak of war, and recently a force of Pioneer Battalions has been lent for service in India.

In Nepal itself His Highness has enacted a law to safeguard the rights of the families of Gurkhas now serving in the British forces. He has also had lists called for from all Gurkha units giving the names and addresses of all next-of-kin, in order that his officials may carry out his orders to see that no family shall suffer owing to the absence of their menfolk. This interest and sympathy does not end there, and practical help is extended to the many old pensioners who visit the Recruiting Depots. The Maharaja Joodha Hospital at Kunraghat was his gift, and is maintained by him for their benefit. He has always appreciated that recruiting and welfare are closely inter-connected, and that the Recruiting Staff is indeed more occupied over the twelve months with welfare and records work than with straightforward recruiting.

COMMANDOS AND WAZIRISTAN

BY "WATCH AND WARD"

SINCE ABOUT 1924 Waziristan has been controlled mainly through a Resident, assisted by Political Agents backed up by the Civil Armed Forces and the Army. The Civil Armed Forces are generally employed in rounding up villages, laying ambushes, and showing the Union Jack in the form of large-scale patrolling. The Army in Waziristan, on the other hand, spends most of its time living in Frontier Posts carrying out routine post duties, rather monotonous road protection work combined with the occasional column.

Life for the majority of Army personnel in Waziristan, when every officer and man is genuinely a hundred per cent. keen to see active service in Libya or on the Burma Frontier, tends to be tedious and uninteresting. Admittedly, much theoretical training in extensive warfare tactics is given to both officers and men, but unfortunately there is little or no opportunity for putting this training into actual practice, as specialised Frontier warfare tactics must take priority when operating on the Frontier.

With a view to relieving this monotony and in order to train Army personnel in Waziristan in modern Commando tactics, a scheme ought to be introduced whereby a large number of Commando troops could be trained on the Frontier before being sent to a major theatre of operations. By employing Commando tactics on the Frontier there is an excellent chance of completely surprising the Pathan and giving him a good hard knock which, incidentally, is the only thing he understands!

For years the tribesman has been inwardly ridiculing our somewhat stereotyped military Frontier columns, and he is extremely well acquainted with the tactical drill of such. This, combined with his own detailed knowledge of the Frontier, enables him to adopt the initiative on many occasions, with the result that it is comparatively easy for him to ambush and to snipe troops both on road protection duty and on columns.

Commando troops would have to be selected and trained on lines similar to those in England, with modifications for Frontier conditions. Troops would be specially picked tough men given a liberal danger allowance, and led and trained by

young but experienced Frontier officers. Ex-Scout officers would be invaluable for this work. Officers who have completed a three-year tour of duty with Scouts have automatically developed a keen eye for ground, and they know practically every village, goat track, and nullah in the particular area in which they have served. They speak Pushtu fluently, and having completed three years in a Pathan unit, understand the Pathan mentality.

Such officers, the majority of whom have seen active service, would make excellent Commando leaders, both on the Frontier and in any other theatre of war, and as everyone knows, the Indian Army provides excellent material for the selection of Commando N.C.O.'s and men—Pathans, Punjabi Musalman, Sikhs, and Gurkhas, to mention only a few of the many classes enlisted.

Specialised Commando equipment, essentially light, would have to be used. The main armaments which would have to be issued on a suitable scale might consist of all or any of the following:

- (a) The Service rifle; (b) the Tommy Gun; (c) the Revolver; (d) hand grenades; (e) bandoliers of S.A.A.;
- (f) 2-inch mortar in lieu of the infantry gun and artillery support.

The 2-inch mortar would have to be either manhandled or carried on an improvised light vehicle on the few occasions where the terrain allows of such a vehicle being used. With regard to improvisation, useful lessons can be learned from a study of Japanese methods which have proved so valuable to them in this present war.

Communications within the Commando raiding party might be maintained with small man-pack wireless sets. Such wireless sets as the Marconi H.9A worked off an accumulator are extremely light and give talking communication up to approximately five miles. In mountainous country, such as Waziristan, communication up to a distance of twelve miles has been successfully obtained.

The training of specialised Commando demolition troops to accompany raiding parties would be essential in order to carry out efficient and rapid demolition work destroying towers, etc.

In a country such as Waziristan, Commando detachments would have to be stationed strategically so that each detachment would be able to cover its own allotted area of operation. Plans would have to be prepared whereby the whole of Waziristan

would be covered by a network of Commando troops. A Commando raiding party would not be ordered out on a major operation, except under the authority of the Military Commander in Waziristan, and with the previous concurrence of the Political authorities. Such troops would be invaluable for the rounding-up of villages, carrying out certain demolitions and showing the tribesman that two can play at his own game, *i.e.* laying ambushes, and carrying out raids.

For example, if it were reliably reported that a gang responsible for the killing or wounding of either a Political or Army officer was being harboured in the village of X—provided it was politically advisable to demolish certain towers in that village as well as to round-up this particular gang—Commando troops could be ordered out for this work.

With a view to secrecy, which is so difficult to maintain not only on the Frontier but anywhere in the East, it would be important that locally only the minimum number of people concerned should know about the proposed plan, namely the Resident, the Political Agent concerned, the Military Commander, one senior Staff Officer, and the Commando Officer selected for the operation.

Should the selected Commando officer and his troops be stationed some distance from where the actual planning had taken place, and personal discussions with him were not possible, then his orders would have to be sent to him in the briefest form possible in cipher, being despatched as late as possible in the form of instructions rather than cut and dried orders. He in turn should issue his own orders to his men just before moving off on the raid. It is thought that only the more vital points in the orders need be confirmed in writing for Commando personnel.

At the appointed time Commando troops would move off from camp, normally under cover of darkness, moving to their objectives silently and quickly. On approaching the village in question, suitable dispositions would be adopted to surround it, the village would be systematically searched, all male villagers rounded-up and the necessary demolitions as ordered by the Political authorities carried out. Separate arrangements would have to be made for the Air Force to give the necessary air support from first light or as required.

On occasions Army regular troops could assist in the withdrawal in the form of a layback, but this would be dependent on the time-factor and would only be possible if orders could be given to regular troops after, and not before, the village had been

surrounded by Commando troops. This would be necessary in order to maintain secrecy.

Pathan women would be unmolested and only male villagers collected, but the tendency of the Pathan, when cornered, to disguise himself as a woman must not be forgotten. In the event of any shooting or Pathan trickery, then all male villagers would have to be suitably dealt with by Commandos on the spot. The knowledge that the Army is capable of giving the tribesmen a good hard knock when and where it pleases, might tend to bring about more peaceful conditions in Waziristan.

By employing the above tactics and being extremely mobile, the old Frontier principle of never leaving out a wounded man would have to go by the board. Commando troops would have to accept as normal the fact that casualties unable to make the pace during a withdrawal from a village must be left behind; they must take their chance of being captured, mutilated, and/or killed by tribesmen.

Money, it is said, talks all languages, and it is thought that if the Government were to give each Commando troop a written guarantee that a definite reward would be paid to the individual or individuals returning him alive, it is possible that captured or wounded Commandos would be brought back to camp alive. This "blood money" chit system has been successfully used in the case of R.A.F. pilots operating against the tribesmen in Waziristan.

The main advantages for the employment of Commando troops on the Frontier can be briefly summarised as follows:

- (a) The chance of surprising the tribesmen is extremely good.
- (b) A successful Commando show would give the tribesman a good hard knock—the only thing a Pathan understands.
- (c) Commando raids would tend to abolish long, slow-moving Army columns, and might even, if necessary, be responsible for releasing a fair number of troops, animals, and transport from Waziristan for more important theatres of war.
- (d) Much money could be saved.
- (e) Commando training which, up to date, has proved invaluable in this present war, will give practical active service training to troops who in all probability might be carrying out similar tactics against the Japanese in the near future.

There are many experienced officers serving in the Army at the present time who have seen considerably more active service in the various theatres of war than the majority of Frontier experts, and it would be interesting to know their ideas on the possibility of employing Commando troops on the Frontier. From the pessimistic point of view, even if the employment of Commando troops on the Frontier were not a success then no serious loss to British prestige would have been involved. So why not give a number of both British and Indian troops practice in Commando training under more or less active service conditions?

WHAT SHALL WE TALK?

By "NIMIS"

DISCUSSIONS, sometimes heated, have been going on ever since the writer first saw India, regarding a common language, both for the Indian Army, and for the country as a whole. What has been the result so far? India supplied its own answer in the shape of Hindustani, which caters for large parts of the north, while English has to a smaller extent filled the need for much of the south.

The Army has adopted what is described as Roman Urdu, but only to a very limited extent. It is a sealed book to the English and English-speaking arrivals, and remains so to the great majority; it is no less a foreign language to many of the newer elements, while even to those who speak Urdu as their mother-tongue the Roman script and the large number of English words make it almost a new language to be learnt. In some cases they have to water down the Urdu side of their mother-tongue; in most cases they have to raise its standard.

It might be the place here to put in a plea for ceasing to apply the word Urdu to our present rather debased Hindustani as it is spoken and written. It is a rather bombastic claim to a standard which only the "Urdu" interpreter can really pretend to attain.

The call of the Army for a common language has been expounded too often before in this Journal for it to be gone into here, but it is claimed that the Roman Urdu which has been evolved does not meet our needs, and a better alternative is well worth looking for.

The drawback which seems greatest is the comparative difficulty of Hindustani as a language after the first steps have been taken; a very low standard indeed gets past the compulsory examinations, after which much greater efforts are necessary to raise the students to a level where he can really converse intelligently and freely; and, rightly or wrongly, the number who do so raise themselves is small enough in peace and probably negligible in war. In passing, we might glance at the squabbles which have from time to time arisen in the academic world of India through the Urdu-Hindi controversy.

There is a perfectly good alternative, which no self-respecting Englishman has ever regarded with much favour, though in many bilingual parts of the world it has come into fairly general use. Esperanto is a genuinely used second language in many parts of Europe which are mixed in their languages: Switzerland, the Flemish-Walloon parts of Belgium, Poland; while before the war it was taught quite a lot in Germany.

Poland was its home, and the Russian-Polish-Yiddish-German district of Bielostok was the inspiration of Dr. Zamenhof. The language has now been a living organism for 55 years, and, that it is practically unknown in England, or, at best, looked on as a fad, is not the fault of the language. The time seems ripe for a small-scale experiment in the back areas of India, to see how it would work. It is now proposed to give some idea of the nature of the language; to arrive at a rough estimate of the effort needed to learn it, by comparison with Urdu; of its effectiveness to the Army and to India at large, possibly; and to outline a possible experiment.

The grammar, having been devised *ab initio* and *ad hoc* (if one may quote the other new language we have been recently introduced to), the grammar is naturally regular throughout, and Dr. Zamenhof put the whole thing in 16 rules and into 750 words. There are no "odd" letters in the alphabet of 28: there are some accented ones, to differentiate, for instance G (hard) and G (soft); C is pronounced "TS," while C is as CH in "church;" H is as the Welsh or Scottish "CH." J has the value of Y (consonant), while \hat{J} is as in French. There is an S, pronounced "SH." No letter, vowel or consonant, ever has more than one sound; and, except for two diphthongs, no sound needs more than one letter. Q, W, X and Y drop out, as being more nuisance than they are worth. The remaining letter is U, which appears only as the second component of the diphthongs AU and EU. While the accents shewn are the official ones, any other distinguishing mark is acceptable, such as a dot over the letters, so printing is not difficult.

The structure of the language is not unlike Basic English, but in a more developed form, in that the whole thing is built on quite a small number of "roots." The uses to which these can be put are far more numerous than in Basic; a single root, for example, by the use of some half-dozen prefixes and 25 suffixes, forms innumerable words; again, by altering the termination one can make a substantive, a verb, a number of adjectives and an adverb at least from every root.

These roots are taken, where they are in general use in European languages, from the Latin; some are English, German or Dutch; and knowledge of a couple of European languages or of Latin gives one the meaning of practically all of them, at sight.

To take a random example of a few of the uses to which such a root can be put:

<i>Doni</i>	... To give.
<i>Donas</i>	... Give (s). (No change for person).
<i>Donis</i>	... Gave.
<i>Dono</i>	... Gift.
<i>Doninda</i>	... Worth giving.
<i>Donulega</i>	... Munificent.
<i>Donanto</i>	... Giver (with present sense).
<i>Doninto</i>	... Giver (with past sense).
<i>Done</i>	... In Giving.

Added to these roots there is of course a complete system of prepositions, conjunctions and pronouns, as minor means of "making the wheels go round:" the correlative pronouns are all formed on a comprehensive but simple framework, and most of the prepositions and conjunctions come straight from Latin, such as *Apud*, *Dum*, *Sed*, *Ekster*, *Adiau*, *Hodiau*, and so on.

To give an idea of what the language looks like, the reader may care to run his eye over the following, and see how much of it he knows already. It is a passage from a normal leading article in an Esperanto newspaper, and has not in any way been "simplified." It expresses the writer's mind, without suppression. How many British Officers can say as much for their Urdu?

Kiam la lernanto de Esperanto—post la kurso—farigis kapabla uzi nian lingvon, starigas al li la demando—"Por kio utilas al mi Esperanto?" Se li ne ricevas tujaŭ respondon al tiu demando, eble lia fervoro malvarmigis; iom post iom li forlasos niajn vicojn; car lia scio estas sencala.

An often-heard criticism is of the somewhat monotonous tone of the language; that, however, seems to be a defect of its qualities, and the alternative would presumably be many hours of drudging at irregularities.

Which brings us to the probable time it would take to learn. The really good linguist, it is estimated, with a background of Latin and one or two other languages known, would read Esperanto books fluently after two or three hours' study, and speak and understand it quite well after ten.

The average British Officer, who now devotes anything over 120 hours to acquiring a villainous brand of dog Hindustani, could certainly learn Esperanto to perfection for practical purposes in that time, and would be well past his present so-called "Urdu" standard in less than half. And so, probably would the brighter 50 per cent. of British soldiers. Other ranks, British and Indian, would not need to learn 100 per cent., but it should be a *sine qua non* for promotion in all branches in the services in India. An hour a day for three months would bring any potential N.C.O. up to such a standard that he could study a text-book and carry on a reasonable conversation with anyone. The real studying of a text-book in Roman Urdu is a standard that few N.C.O.'s have yet attained, even of the classes which claim it as their mother-tongue, in the writer's experience. The reading takes all their attention, and the digestion of the matter read is too much of an effort.

To sum up, therefore, there is this to be said for Esperanto for India:

It is far easier, for those who have to learn a new language, than any of the possible alternatives—English, Basic English or Urdu, Roman or otherwise.

For those with Urdu as their mother-tongue, it is probably as easy to learn as Roman Urdu, which, as written in the Army with a third English words, is to all intents a new language.

Esperanto has all the machinery for putting across any kind of matter, however technical, and to assimilate it into itself. Any technical term not in the dictionary can be readily arrived at by common sense.

It is a neutral language, and thus cannot ever raise any racial repercussions.

Against all this there is, of course, besides dead conservatism, the reluctance to change horses in midstream, and a number of transition problems, but there seems to be nothing particularly fatal here.

It is now desired to outline an initial experiment on a very small scale to ascertain what might be the prospects of success. It is presumed there must be quite a number of officers surplus to immediate requirements in the country at the moment, with the formation of Pools, stragglers arriving, and convalescents. Probably there are, too, a number of British Ranks, V.C.O.'s and I.O.R.'s in the same boat, who would be available to make up a small class from each category, so that it could be really established whether it was a practicable thing to teach or not.

Should the estimate which was given above prove correct—60 hours for an English speaker and 120 hours for an Indian—the experiment should go on, and we may have found our cultural and training medium for the future without interfering very much with our other activities more directly war-winning.

In conclusion, it may be said that the writer has been out of touch with Esperanto affairs these twenty years or more; but at that time there was a very active British Esperanto Association, besides many international and foreign ones, and ample expert assistance would have been available. Whether this is still so or not, an organization could be built up quite easily; there must be a number serving in India who have enough knowledge to pass on. Acquiring a knowledge of the language in the days referred to was quite worth while, in view of the interesting people it was possible to meet on Esperanto Conferences and so on; the writer has never unfortunately been to one, but he has found quite a fair amount of Esperanto conversation in practice—particularly aboard an Italian ship with Shanghai passengers, almost all of whom were quite fluent.

Should any members of the institute be interested, the writer would be delighted to hear from them.

EDITORIAL NOTE

[The subject of Urdu study is one exercising the minds of so many British Officers in India at the present time that we felt it would be helpful to obtain the views of an authority on the subject of languages. The above article was accordingly shown to Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. Gifford, O.B.E., Secretary to the Board of Examiners, who comments as follows :

"The principle which strikes me after reading this article is that the author bases his arguments on two premises: (i) that Urdu is difficult, and (ii) that Esperanto is easy. Let us take each in turn, and apply to each the query: "Difficult for whom—British or Indian?"

"Urdu is difficult". Urdu of the standard required for everyday use in the Indian Army is not really a difficult language for any foreigner to learn. The basic rules of grammar are few and not irregular; the vocabulary required in the Indian Army is not enormous, being eked out by an ever-increasing importation of English words for technicalities. Once the newly-arrived student has mastered the elementary grammar and has disabused himself of the only too common idea that Urdu study is a schoolroom subject to be loathed and avoided in the true British schoolboy fashion, he will find that his progress in fluency will surprise even himself. For the Indian of any race, Urdu as spoken in the Indian Army is in structure and spirit much more easily acquired than any foreign importation can hope to be. Methods of thought and forms of expression are the same in all truly Indian languages, and experience and experiment have shown that it is the only practical solution of the problem as to what is the best *lingua franca* for the Indian Army.

"Now to (ii). Esperanto is of European origin. It represents the efforts of a very ingenious European to evolve the simplest form of speech possible from European languages. For the British student who has a smattering of French and a nodding acquaintance with Latin it offers few difficulties, except that for technicalities he must turn to European rather than to English sources; but to the ordinary British soldier I would say that it offered many difficulties, and to the Indian soldier it would mean the acquisition of a form of speech foreign to him in construction and vocabulary, pronunciation and script."]

MUSINGS ON SEA-TROUT FISHING

BY LT.-COLONEL R. B. PHAYRE, M.C.

IT SEEMS AN odd time, and an odd country, in which to muse on the habits of the sea-trout (*Salmo trutta*). There are moments when a diversion from vital interests creates a peaceful atmosphere; and there are few more restful subjects that I can think of, for the mind of many a keen angler wanders to some particular favourite water, be it in England, Wales, Scotland or Ireland, which he longs to visit again at the first opportunity. It is for such as these that I make no apology for venturing to jot down a few notes—the outcome of personal experience.

Fishing for sea-trout in the United Kingdom has a great appeal to many anglers. Not only is he a great sporting fish, fighting to the last with leap after leap, but he is excellent for the table, many gourmets preferring him to the salmon.

He has many idiosyncracies and, consequently, is well worthy of study. For a good few years, after going on pension, I had the leisure to attempt a little very elementary research work on his habits in the South-Western counties of England. I fished for him at night, at dawn, and spent hours by a salmon ladder near my house watching him overcome the spates on his journey up to the gravel bottoms of brooks and leats where he breeds; but I must confess, at once, that I have very little indeed to show for my efforts, though I scrutinized his lies through polarized glasses.

A good deal of scientific research work has now been carried out by means of marked fish, so more information is coming in; even so, there is still a great deal that we should like to learn. The textbook on the subject is "Life of the Sea-trout," by G. H. Nall, and other writers have devoted chapters or paragraphs which are of interest.

Perhaps the most curious point about sea-trout is that, in parts of the United Kingdom, he can be caught with comparative ease in daylight on fly or minnow, whereas in the South-West counties of England it is the rarest thing to get him to rise before the half-light in the evening. Then he begins to move, and will take freely all night up to the half-light at dawn on the next morning. All sorts of theories have been evolved, and it has become quite a controversial subject. You may take a peal in

Devon and Cornwall by day on a small dry-fly, but most anglers will agree that it is very exceptional in those waters.

Various experiments were carried out with the aid of a submerged telescope. Gut casts of varying thickness were moved among a shoal of salmon, and it obviously frightened them, even down to the fineness of 4x. A black thread was then experimented with and they took no notice, although the thread moved among a shoal of them; further experiments are being made with *Trutta*.

Sea-trout, like salmon, return to the same river, and even to the same side-stream, in which their ova hatched out. Such information is, of course, obtained from marked fish. Further details are available from catches in trawls. They have been captured off the coasts of Holland and Denmark, but evidence shows that they do not, as a rule, travel anything like the same distances as salmon, but are often taken in the estuaries.

Life History of Sea-trout Ova.—Ova hatches out quickly in warm water and slowly in cold water (some 30 to 90 days). Warm water and good feed affects the fry and parr stage, consequently their stay in fresh water before their first migration to the sea averages three years (from 1 to 5 years). In appearance they are very similar to brown trout, but they keep in shoals more than brown trout do.

Smolts.—Conditions being favourable, they move to the sea usually from March to May when they change their colour to silver. At this stage they closely resemble salmon smolts, but are usually a trifle longer as they have been a greater time in fresh water. Although they may migrate for the first time, their age may vary by a year or two, the older fish putting on weight much more speedily when it reaches the sea. Size depends mainly on the amount of food procurable.

Records show that Scottish fish are taken off the coasts of Denmark and Holland; one from N. E. Scotland was caught in Ireland.

As a general rule they return to spawn much more quickly than salmon, the time varying from six months to even four years. All these facts can be obtained by scale reading; this is an art in itself, and is better left to the expert: for in this case "a little knowledge" may prove misleading.

Some experts consider that the farther the sea-trout travel, the more feed they get, which accounts for the larger fish. Other migrants seem to hibernate in the brackish waters of the

estuaries, which is said to account for the smaller run of fish. Unlike the salmon, they certainly feed in fresh water, but not to the same extent as brown trout.

My personal experience, in South-Western rivers, has led me to expect a run of heavy fish in the early summer, starting usually in May, and a later run in the late summer and early autumn. These latter are commonly known as school peal, and vary between $\frac{3}{4}$ to $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. Both types spawn about October and November. Some sea-trout remain in fresh water, and, after a time, closely resemble brown trout, although their colour changes to silver for a short period during the spring of each year.

Trutta avoids rivers which have muddy bottoms. It is especially marked in certain rivers where the estuaries are close together or, in rare cases, where a common estuary is shared. In the muddy rivers the catches are negligible, whereas the season's bag in the adjoining, non-muddy river, runs into four figures.

In Welsh rivers, such as the Dovey and Towey, the sizes of the *Sewin*, as they call them, run to fantastic weights, and it takes an expert to distinguish them from salmon. Sea-trout up to 18 lbs. have been taken on rod and line, and records show that one of $23\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. was taken in the nets. This weight was beaten in the Orkneys, where a sea-trout of 29 lbs. was killed on a line baited for sea fish. The age of this fish is not recorded. As a rule *trutta* does not live beyond 13 years. Major Kenneth Dawson mentions a Dovey fish of 16 lbs. which had spawned three times and which was only six-and-a-half years old.

On the South-Western rivers I have heard of sea-trout up to 10 lbs. and have observed fish of approximately this size in the pools. My best sport has been with maiden, fresh-run fish from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 lbs. Their stream-lined bodies are very beautiful; pure silver, with very few spots.

Observation in the pools will show a blank on one day, when the next will disclose a shoal of heavy fish lying in the shady spots, usually after a run following a spate.

As *trutta* is such a shy fish he will generally take best in coloured water. By day it is advisable to fish as fine as one dare, but at night it is courting disaster to fish too fine, and a cast not lighter than 1x is considered essential. One yard in length is quite sufficient; its short length helps to obviate the difficulties of knotting up the cast in the dark, which so often happens, unseen

by the angler. I am afraid it gives me a sinister satisfaction when I see the acknowledged expert making mistakes, for I make so many myself.

This night fishing is a difficult business. Some skilled anglers use a dropper. There is a good deal to be said for this in theory, for a dark fly at the tail and a light one on the dropper can be used. Against this, there is the multiplied danger of a tangle or a knotted cast, which is so fatal, should a heavy fish take; it also adds to the extreme difficulty of landing a useful fish at night, when the dropper may sometimes catch up in the net or undergrowth, and consequently a valuable prize is lost. After bitter experience, I decided to discard the dropper and my results were definitely more successful.

Very useful baskets can also be obtained with the thread-line. The baits should be small, not over $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches, the trace should be of gut or fine Alasticum wire of about 5 lbs. breaking strain, used in conjunction with a thread-line having a breaking strain of about 6 lbs. A celluloid scarab cover is very effective in places where a natural bait is permitted. Baits should be fished near the surface at night.

All minnows, or fly, should be presented as delicately as possible, so as not to disturb feeding fish which are very easily put down. As a general rule it adds to the angler's difficulties if he indulges in long casting. To prevent a "drowned" line it is advisable to grease the line, with the exception of the last five yards. *Trutta* often moves down to the tail of the pool at night, possibly just above a dam where there is a fall. It is, frequently, very shallow water, well oxygenated.

When he takes, the fun begins. Unlike the salmon, the initial rush is often a very long one, when this is over he often comes back a beaten fish. His mouth is very tender; consequently it is inadvisable to hold him too hard; it is better to let him run, exerting only very light pressure. Any sudden check may lose him, so it is advisable to ensure that the reel runs smoothly, and that it is set only with sufficient tension to prevent the line over-running. I was driven to this expedient by my inexperience in holding a fish too hard; consequently, at first, I lost many through bad fishing. With a lighter touch, many more fish were landed.

When the bank is lined with over-hanging bushes, the sea-trout will often rush for them. At night it is very hard to see your fish, and, if the rod is very short, it is not at all easy to steer him clear of trouble.

Landing in the dark always presents a problem. The fish should be played out completely; the landing net should not be too shallow and have a wide mouth. I have found an electric torch to be essential, never forgetting a spare bulb, for many are the tosses taken at night, and there is always the cross-country walk home, or to the car, to be considered.

My experience has been that it is advisable to make a careful reconnaissance beforehand in order to see not only where the fish are lying, but also the ground you may have to traverse in the dark. Where night fishing is concerned, never attempt to cast until the fish are beginning to move, and the half-light has well set in. Concealment is essential; avoid any vibration on the bank. A great deal can be done beforehand to see that the selected landing place is free from snags, and that the background is cleared as much as possible. This can sometimes be effected a day or two before it is decided to fish the pool.

Once the fish are taking well, it usually pays to "stay put." A number of fish can often be killed from one stance; besides, it is often difficult to move about at night, especially when encumbered with gear. If the fish go off completely, it is time to think about moving; they will sometimes be found to be taking well in another pool, perhaps a hundred yards away. A rest at the original pool may be effective. I recollect on one occasion I relinquished my ground, prematurely, after taking a number of fish. A friend came along, so I warned him that the pool seemed to be fished out. Undeterred, he was into a fish at his first cast, which I helped to land for him, and a very nice seven-pounder at that.

Fishing by moonlight is rather a controversial point on which many anglers hold very firm theories, often diametrically opposed to each other. On bright moonlight nights, bottom food is on the move, and fish are inclined to feed on the bottom freely; consequently, after a bright moonlight night, many fish appear to be gorged and will not rise. My own view is that moonlight nights are favourable to sea-trout, but care must be taken, as in sunlight, not to cast a shadow on the water.

Low mist has been found to be not unfavourable, but mist, rising in wisps from the water, is generally most adverse to making a good basket. Thundery weather I find most deleterious to good results; on the other hand some of the largest fish have been killed during thunderstorms. My favourite water is when the river is fining down after a spate.

At one time I began to feel that I was really beginning to learn something about sea-trout, but what a disillusionment! Ideal days came when conditions seemed perfect, but there was never a touch. On other days, when the portents seemed to be most unfavourable, every fish in the river seemed to be taking. Many anglers for *trutta* come to this stage, when their previous experience melts into mediocrity, and they own themselves to be completely baffled. Nevertheless, they sally forth again, and would sooner win this battle of wits than land any other fish.

The selection of flies and lures for sea-trout is rather a vexed question. Anglers will tell you, after their fourth quick one, in the strictest confidence of course, of some infallible tip. I have made notes of these and have tried them out, but not, unfortunately, with the devastating success predicted by the exponent.

One day, when fishing on some famous private water in Devon, I came across a local fisherman of repute who was allowed one day each year on this particular beat. It was a brilliant summer's day, and I had been doing little good. He told me that he, invariably, used a "pheasant's tail", fished dry, both for brown and sea-trout. He had taken two peal on dry fly, which he showed me, and I should have been proud to emulate this feat.

Another angler, who was reputed to have killed more *trutta* than most on these waters, said he always fished with one fly, of which he kindly gave me a specimen. It resembled a Logie more than any other type, and I killed a number of fish with it.

Major Kenneth Dawson, a well-known authority on the subject, gives a list of useful universal favourites which will kill anywhere: Mallard and Claret, Teal and Red, Teal and Silver, Zulu, Butcher, Mallard and Yellow, Peter Ross and Blae and Black. He is right when he says, "It pays best to use the flies in which one has the most confidence." Mr. Eyde, another authority, however, pins his faith to one particular fly. Jungle cock wing, silver body, black hackle and a red tail; and he adds, "Substitute a yellow tail, as fly-dressers sometimes do, and I condemn the fly as useless." That, of course, is that!

Others prefer 3 ins. lures (with 3 hooks like the "Terror"), sand eels (fresh and artificial) spoons (1½ inch gold and silver), pearl spoons, and worm on Pennell tackle fished under the bank (when permitted); these are all recommended. A strip, cut from

the belly of a fresh-run sea-trout, gurnet, or mackerel, is also popular, especially in some parts of Scotland. In the Shetlands, a red fly of the Cardinal type is reputed to be a great killer.

* * * *

In the quiet evening hours of relaxation after a heavy day, the mind of the angler may conjure up a picture of his favourite stretch of water.

My favourite bit of country is one of the lesser rivers of the South-West counties. The car purrs down the narrow lanes with their high banks, and is parked behind one of the farm gates. There follows a trek down a side lane which, in wet weather, is intersected with watercourses. A locked gate with barbed wire has to be surmounted. The sloping fields show specks of white, the scuts of startled rabbits as they dash for their burrows. A labourer passes with a curt "good-evening". He lives in the solitary thatched cottage by the river, and is suspected of being a poacher, but has never been caught red-handed.

Some partridges are calling from the meadow above, and a buzzard wheels, mewing in the sky. There is the bass croak of the raven as he makes his way to his rocky heights, and the impertinent, tenor yap of some belated jackdaws.

Two more barbed wire gates to be passed, and then comes the faint rustle of the river as it dances over its rocky bed. The hush of the evening begins to set in, with a whisper of wind through the spruces, oaks and silver birches which lie below the ancient camps on the heights. A wary old cock pheasant crows from his roosting place.

The river is a deep, peaty brown after the recent spate, and there are signs that it has fallen at least a couple of feet. An old red salmon leaps in the pool, but it is too early to commence operations for one could easily observe a fly if cast from the bank. There is time for a pipe under the old oak tree.

The water bailiff passes along the far bank on his formidable walk along the beat. He tells of successes of the day, and wishes a cheery good night, and good luck.

The dusk creeps on. The thrush and the blackbird have concluded their evening chant, but there is still a faint twitter of the birds in the trees, and the croak of the frogs in the marshy borders is beginning. A heron, with leaden wings, neck and wings outstretched, sails rather low over the water.

A few moths are fluttering over the river, and there are two dimples as the brown trout rise. Soon, there is a wedge of water across the pool; then another. Later there is a silvery flash as the sea-trout leaps with a peculiar whirring noise of its tail, as if some wild-fowl were rising.

It is time to get to work. There is the thermos flask in the car, and sandwiches and a bottle of beer handy in the bag. If *trutta* is taking well, it will, probably, be a case of staying all night till the morning half light. Time is no object; the first cast is made and accepted straightaway. The reel sings as the gallant fish makes his rush upstream. It is now quite dark, and all around is the infinite peace of the English countryside.

SHORT STORY**THE HUNTED**

By "BEVIS"

IT WAS RAINING as the train crawled up the Nilgiris. Quite like home, I had been told. And it was, even down to the cold drizzle that is so characteristic of the Highlands in summer. The clouds through which we were passing allowed us to see just a few yards on either side of the track, revealing thick woods: occasionally a sudden gap showed a clear drop down to the plains below. Then the rain and mist closed the white barrier round us again.

Gradually the woods thinned out. Wellington had been passed. Stretches of green turf appeared between the trees. Still the drizzling rain beat down, blowing in the unglazed windows of the carriages. Yet the clouds seemed to have thinned out as Ootacamund station loomed ahead. I could see faintly the houses lining the semi-circle of hills.

I took a taxi to the house where I was going to stay. It lay along a sunken green lake, and the fir trees that surrounded it made it even more difficult to believe that one was in India. The lady in charge must have had to deal with a large number of officers recently, as she showed me round in military terms, calling the dining room the mess, and so on: finally she introduced me to such of the guests as happened to be in at the moment.

"Lieutenant Davies. He's in the Lancers".

"Mechanised, I presume."

"Lieutenant Potson, Artillery. I'm sorry, I've forgotten your name".

"Captain Mallory, usually known as Paddy".

"Whell, and how d'ye do"?

He had tow-coloured hair and an exuberant moustache. His thick-set body and red round face exuded geniality; only his clear, grey eyes seemed somehow out of place. What you might call the buffoon type, I thought: he gets on in the world by letting other people laugh at him.

He took one hand out of his thick grey corduroy trousers and thrust it at me.

"You'll find it as weth as the Shannon here, my bhoys."

With a kind of mental jerk I found myself suddenly back at the small south German town of Deggendorf on the Danube. It was the summer just before the war, and we were drifting down

the swift-flowing river from Ulm to Vienna in fold-boats. We stopped usually at "Jugendherbergen", and at this particular one we had found a party of Austrian medical students. One of them, I remembered, had clowned particularly well, and amused us especially with his imitation in the vernacular of an Irish peasant.

For a moment I hesitated and started to blush, as if caught thinking something that I shouldn't: I glanced sideways; but Captain Mallory evidently hadn't noticed. He was in the middle of giving me full particulars about the amusements here: what the golf was like and the riding and shooting.

I had wondered at the time how he managed to speak Irish so well. Now I came to think of it, he hadn't said whether he was Irish or German: I had just assumed the latter because all his friends were. If it was possibly the same man, he had no moustache then, and had looked much thinner and younger. It seemed fantastic that I could associate someone I'd just met with a medical student that I had once known for a few hours, but every gesture of his seemed to strengthen the impression in my mind.

I suppose I should have mentioned my suspicions straight away and left the matter in other hands. But I was on leave and somehow wanted to test the correctness of my theory myself. I saw a lot of Paddy the next few days: we played golf together and walked together, when the weather allowed, but more often sat indoors and grouched together at the rain. All the time I was watching for the slightest clue to justify my suspicions. I argued to myself that a broad Irish brogue was probably the best way of concealing any trace of a German accent: and the last person people would tend to suspect is the cheerful clown who takes nothing seriously.

At last one morning he announced after breakfast: "Faith, and to-morrow I shall be leaving for a few days' shooting."

"Coming back here, Paddy?"

"No, I'll take the bus the way to Mysore."

"Sorry about that." There was general regret.

The next morning I tried my last test. In the midst of the general fluster of his departure I stretched out my hand.

"Good-bye", I said, and bowed slightly and clicked my heels. I believe this is one of the most instinctive actions of a German. I watched his feet: for a moment I thought I had caught him off his guard—his legs jerked and he began a stiff, formal bow. Then suddenly he seemed to regain some control of himself.

"Sure", he said quite illogically, and turned away.

Yet I was still uncertain. Had my imagination magnified his action? At any rate, I had shown my hand.

* * * *

A few days later I set off for the neighbourhood of the Mekund River: fishing was really the object of my leave. The first day I tried the reservoir. I had put on some fairly strong gut and a sizeable lake fly in the hope of catching some of the large rainbow trout that are said to abound there: but my success was meagre. The rain began to come through my raincoat: I tried to shelter behind a rock, but without much avail. With rainfall like this, I decided, it was only natural that Ooty downs should be such a brilliant green. The solitude seemed almost uncanny: only a few native cattle showed up as grey spots half way up the side of the hill, and a jackal stood silhouetted on the crest of a ridge.

The light was failing early when I decided to try my luck for the last time, casting long with the wind behind me. The third cast I hooked something, but the steady pull immediately told me it wasn't a fish. I struck right and left to try and free the hook; it seemed to have caught fairly fast, but I found I could reel in slowly. It felt as though I had caught a waterlogged piece of timber: I could feel it bumping over the rocky bed as I reeled in. In the grey light I saw a dark shape in the shallows, with a white splodge at one end.

With a sudden shock I realized what I had caught. I jerked frantically at the line, and as it swished free, I turned and stumbled off. The fly still swung on the end of the gut, and caught in it was a piece of watersoaked grey corduroy.

BACKGROUND NEWS AND VIEWS

How Long Will the War Last?

"President Roosevelt has said that 'we are going to have a couple of years, perhaps three years, before we can make sure that our type of civilization is going to survive.' As this timetable is interpreted by Washington, the most reasonable estimate is as follows:

"*In 1942:* Try to halt Hitler. Here the vital point is to bring all possible aid to Russia, while carrying out all practicable diversions, and keeping the Middle East as well defended as possible. If Hitler is stopped throughout this year, it is generally concluded that his jig is up. If he gets to oil and other resources in 1942, the prospect is for a very long war.

"*In 1943:* Finish the job on Hitler, if he has been stopped in 1942. It is felt that the Nazi decline in power might come rather swiftly, after another winter—or even sooner, provided Hitler does not get to or flank the Caucasus. Meantime, 1943 should see the war of attrition against Japan intensify, pushing back over ground that has now been lost.

"*In 1944:* Bring the war to a climax against both Germany and Japan, trying hard for a decisive knock-out. If Hitler is held in 1942, it is felt that, though the overthrow of Japan may be even more difficult than the defeat of Germany, it is no less certain."—*The Round Table*.

Post-War Germany

"Advocates of federalism seem to agree that Germany is to be disarmed. But when the central administrative body of the federation is established, shall Germany be represented on it or not? If not, that is to say, if Germany remains outside, the federation will not be a federation at all, but an anti-German alliance. If Germany is to be inside, and therefore to be represented on the central body, she will demand equality of status with the other Powers and either secure it or leave the federation. If she leaves, the federation will become an anti-German alliance from which Germany will try to detach as many Powers as she can by threats or bribes or through the emergence of common interests. The Third World War will be the outcome. If Germany secures equality of status with the other Powers in the federation, she will have, or will insist on having, equality

with respect to national armaments. If her demand is not fulfilled, she will leave the federation. If it is fulfilled, she will again be the greatest military Power in Europe, not only potentially, but in fact. And she will become master of all Europe, through the instrumentality of the federation—that is to say, by working from inside. Or, if not, she will leave it, and make herself master of Europe by working from outside, unless the other Powers combine against her in anticipation of the Third World War—that is to say, unless they revert to the military alliance of the Second World War. This is not new. It happened after the last war. Germany was kept outside the League of Nations, then she was admitted, then she claimed equality and secured it, then, with irrefutable logic, she claimed equality with regard to armaments and secured it 'in principle,' then she translated the principle into practice, and then, finding the League unsuited to her purpose, namely, domination, she left it and is now attempting to achieve that domination by other means."—*The Nineteenth Century*.

Complex Modern Warfare

"It has been said of French generals that they were generally well prepared at the beginning of each new war to fight the one that had gone before—if not the war preceding that. That copyright does not belong to them exclusively. Even German generals have difficulty in learning fast. Not only is there something inherently conservative in the military mind, but strategy and tactics are so fluid that useful military textbooks go out of date faster than millinery. All that can be stated with certainty is that modern warfare is complex in its smallest detail. Purely military problems, as distinguished from the economics and politics of war, have arisen in ever-increasing number to tax the imagination of those in command. As a result there has been a steady drift away from formal rules. While there has been a tendency, notably in Germany, to centralise power in one commander, responsible to the head of the State, this has been accompanied by the delegation of increasing authority to lower-ranking, even N.C.O.'s in the field. Indeed, it is generally agreed that only by giving small units 'their head', allowing them to exercise their own judgment, can the powerful calculus of modern tactics be brought to function. Absolutism as a part of tactics is on the decline. It survives in anachronistic glory on the parade ground. There it persists as a tribute to the misty heroics of the past. That is not to say that heel-clicking and zombie obedience have vanished. The desire to turn each

soldier into a robot still befuddles many military men. But once the fighting begins and staffs are routed from their cosy corners staff officers have sense enough to realize that precision tactics and blind obedience of the Gallant Six Hundred variety fill cemeteries and win few battles, while soldiers who can make up their minds on the spot, who can even change their minds without permission, may live to fight and perhaps win another day".—From *"Men and Tools of War,"* by James R. Newman, published by Doubleday, Doran & Co., New York.

Doped German Parachutists

"The dope the Germans use for parachutists neutralises their fear and gives them a feeling of exhilaration. But 60 seconds after you kill one of these men his face changes colour to a duck-egg green. The dope is responsible. Ten thousand German parachutists dropped on Crete; we collected the identity cards of between 8,000 and 9,000 casualties. It was not the parachutists, however, who took Crete but the air-borne troops who followed. They showed sheer disregard of losses. We could not kill them fast enough before we were overwhelmed. On one aerodrome alone I counted one morning 250 crashed Ju. 52's, and there were 40 or 50 nearby. The whole thing was utterly fantastic".—Lieutenant G. W. Turner-Lashmar, R.A., lecturing to the Forces in England.

Stream-Crossing Methods

"All fighting units need to know a number of stream-crossing expedients. In its early phase training should be conducted at a quiet pond or lake or at a stream with a slow current A quarter-ton truck with normal load (including men) can be launched, floated across a stream, and beached, if both banks slope gently. Four men can do the job, using any of the following methods: First wet the bank at the site of the launching in order to make it easy to slide the truck into the stream. Then spread the canvas cover of a 2½-ton truck on the bank at the water's edge and drive the quarter-ton truck on to the centre of the canvas. Raise the edges of the canvas at the front and rear of the truck and fasten the short tie ropes to convenient points on the truck. Next, raise the edges of the canvas at the sides of the truck, tighten the drawropes about the sides, and tie them, being careful that the canvas is not folded sharply at the ends (like a clerk does in wrapping a shoe-box) because the canvas may leak at the creases. There are several ways of getting the vehicle across. If the stream is not too deep the men

can push it across by wading; it can be poled across by three or four men sitting in the vehicle, using saplings, or paddled across by three or four men sitting in the vehicles using shovels as paddles. It can be towed across by using a light towing line (such as a field telephone wire) which is first stretched across by a swimmer; towed across by running the cable of a truck-winch on the near side of the stream through a snatch-block attached to a tree on the far side, thence back to the floating vehicle, or pulled across (hand over hand) by men on the vehicle; or along a rope or cable stretched across the stream and anchored at both ends."—*From an article in the American "Infantry Journal," by Colonel Sterling A. Wood and Colonel Roy N. Hagerty.*

Signal Wire Throwers

"United States Army Signal Corps engineers have developed a wire thrower by which wire can be thrown from a moving vehicle to distances up to 125 feet away and at vehicle speeds up to 35 miles m.p.h. An operator has control of the distance and slack by varying the speed of the thrower. By using the new wire thrower, wire can be laid at greater speeds and placed farther off the road, thus requiring a minimum of servicing."—*"The Journal of the Franklin Institute," U.S.A.*

The School of Hate

"The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Bernard Paget, has done well in banning the use of strong language and other similar methods of instilling blood-lust or hate in the course of battle training. It is not surprising, perhaps, that a revolution against the extremes of pacifism should lead impatient, undisciplined minds to the other extremes of stupid brutality, but every good soldier knows that the brute is as dangerous as the coward, and is, indeed, most likely also to prove one, making up in violence of language and gesture what he lacks in simple courage. Experience has shown that the best soldiers are of finer quality and are revolted by foul language and 'blood-baths'. Natural love of adventure and high-spirit equip young men for the most hazardous enterprises, and older men actuated by patriotism and a sense of duty will, when the moment comes, face the enemy with the utmost staunchness and combative spirit. What both need is a most exact and thorough training in the use of their arms and a detailed knowledge of possible conditions in which they may be placed. The combative spirit is awakened, and should only be awakened, in action. Until then attention should be concentrated on invigorating and hardening the body, train-

ing in arms, the developing of initiative and the instilling of confidence in the leadership. When it comes to a fight nature can then be relied upon to do the rest. It is only when natural vitality has been sapped that recourse is had to such repugnant practices as oaths and blood-baths. These are, indeed, a sign of decadence."—*The Spectator*.

America's Colossal 'Plane Output

"Strangely little notice has been taken of the figures issued concerning Ford aircraft production. The gist of it was that Ford's will employ about 90,000 workers; production will be 24 four-motor bombers per day—one an hour. There is to be a five-and-a-half-day week; this gives 132 aircraft per week. . . . As a sign of America's expanding air interests, we might assess this huge Ford plant as one-tenth of the total U.S.A. potential. On this basis America can hope to put in the field in measurable time some 60,000 large warplanes of formidable attack power. Turn back the clock a moment and review some of the statements of America's production. Carefully shifting the military corn from the civil chaff, the following summarises what the world thought of the true figures: In 1938, not more than 50 modern fighting and bombing aeroplanes per month; in 1939, not more than 300 per month, but increasing to the end of the year. In the following year, as the new factories swung into production mainly on the strength of British money which financed them in the shape of hitherto unheard of contracts, production crossed the 500 mark and neared 1,000 a month. The succeeding year saw a spurt until, at its close, figures in excess of 2,000 a month were being hushed around 'informed' quarters by people who had singularly little claim, if any, to accurate knowledge. To-day the best bazaars believe American production has topped 3,000 and may have exceeded 3,500 per month. For the sake of argument, presume the war over and the need for active aerial combat terminated by December, 1943. At that time America can be expected to have a formidable aircraft industry producing at least 4,000 aircraft a month, and an aggregate of around 100,000 first-class fighting and bombing aeroplanes, many of which will possess maximum ranges of 10,000 miles."—*"Fougueux", writing in The Aeroplane*.

Effect of 1,000 'Plane Raids

"Abetz, the German Ambassador in Paris, has revealed facts about the appalling devastation caused in Cologne by the 1,000 'plane R.A.F. raid. It eclipsed all previous records, he

said. According to information in possession of the Government, the number of deaths amounted to between 11,000 and 15,000 and the number of injured more than twice as many. Nearly all the premises of the great banks, business houses, insurance companies, and administrative concerns and several of the large industrial plants were totally destroyed; railway repair shops were wiped out and shunting yards made unusable. One reason why the number of persons evacuated from Cologne was so high (250,000 were sent away out of a total population of 760,000) was the unrest among the population at the inadequacy of the protection against air raids, as many anti-aircraft units had been sent to Russia only a few days before the raid. The R.A.F. bombs were so powerful that even reinforced concrete air raid shelters 25 ft. to 30 ft. below ground level had been pulverized, and hundreds of persons trapped".—A *Special correspondent of the London "Times."*

REVIEW**CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE,
VOLUME II**

HERE IS AN excellent and well-indexed reference book for anyone who thinks about or is interested in Britain's present and post-war problems. It traces the growth of our Empire from the Treaty of Versailles of 1783, when Britain showed her ability to recover from a serious defeat, down to 1870. This was the period of our greatest Colonial expansion, and the pages of this book are full of lessons which we might well re-learn and take to heart.

To-day many people declare that the attitude of not a few Englishmen towards the Empire alternates between flag-wagging patriotism and complete lack of interest. There are few who realise its vital importance to our world supremacy and high standard of living. Some think of it as an expensive hobby from which the capitalist draws a large income, and others as an organization which will cause us to be drawn into disputes with our less fortunate neighbours in Europe, but the vast majority of Englishmen are content to sit back and look with pride at a map of the world one quarter of which is coloured red.

To bring home to Englishmen the importance of the Empire it is essential that every one should have an understanding of its background and growth. Trade and the need for new markets sent British seamen to every corner of the world, and in this book it is clearly shown that the British Empire grew up not as a result of an imperialistic urge or political factors, but through the initiative of individuals who were determined that British trade should have its place in the sun of every latitude, and who compelled the government of their day to protect their interests wherever they had been established.

Statesmen down the ages were afraid that this initiative would draw us into disputes with our neighbours. Spain, Portugal, France and Holland were all at one time or another our rivals in different parts of the world, and the wars of Europe invariably led to fighting with them in America, Africa and India. The struggle to keep open our markets, for it was in terms of markets that the Empire was regarded, and to maintain them free from European rivals was long and hard.

The two theories which this book advances, and is bound to advance by the very fact of its tracing the growth of the British Empire, are its economic basis and the necessity of Imperial solidarity. Britain needs the support of the Empire, and the Empire the support of Britain if we are to maintain British world supremacy.

A. G. T.

RECENT ADDITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

- "Battle for the World"**, by Max Werner.—The strategy and diplomacy of the second World War is dealt with at length. The book is well indexed.
- "The Last Enemy"**, by Richard Hillary.—A vivid narrative of war service in the R.A.F. by a writer who, at the outbreak of war, was still up at Oxford.
- "The Chinese Army"**, by Evans Fordyce Carlson.—A well-documented volume containing much information about an Army which has astonished the world.
- "The Teak Box"**, by C. C. R. Murphy.—A collection of short stories by a well-known author, who in the past has contributed a number of articles to this journal.
- "Etajima"**, by Cecil Bullock.—An Englishman's account of life at the Imperial Japanese Naval College during the three years he spent there teaching the cadets English.
- "Soviet Economy and the War"**, by Maurice Dobb.—A treatise on Russia which gives some interesting facts on Soviet industrial plans, collective farms, and Trade Unions.
- "Life on the Land"**, by Fred Kitchen.—Written by an agricultural worker, the author has succeeded in bringing into the book a breath of real country air. The woodcut illustrations are excellently done.
- "Tanks"** (illustrated), by Professor A. M. Low.—This book contains a general account of tanks, written for the man-in-the-street. The author avoids technical descriptions of these "Martian Monsters" and has condensed a mass of historical and scientific facts into the book.
- "Arise to Conquer"**.—Wing-Commander Gleed has written an exciting account of his experiences with the R.A.F. in France and in the Battle of Britain. His stories of his fellow-pilots, their high spirits, love of ragging, their superstitions, and their courage make the book of real interest.
- "The Royal Navy at War"**.—Profusely illustrated and written by Vice-Admiral J. E. T. Harper, this work is a panorama

in book form of the Royal Navy's varied and ever-changing task of defending Britain's shores and ensuring supplies to the Home Country.

"Khaki and Gown".—This autobiography by Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood is of especial interest to all who serve in the Indian Army. Well indexed, and most interestingly written, it is, as Mr. Winston Churchill says in his Foreword, "the story of an officer who carried a Field-Marshal's baton in his knapsack".

Oxford Pamphlets.—Five further pamphlets on world affairs are now available in the Library. They are entitled: "Greece", by Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley Casson; "Great Britain and China", by Sir John Pratt; "Who Mussolini Is", by Ivor Thomas; "War at Sea To-day", by Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond; and "German Geopolitics", by H. W. Weigert.

"Grand Strategy", by H. A. Sargeant and Geoffrey West.—The authors set out to show that wars are not won in the field alone, nor in the sea, nor in the air. "Behind military strategy lies the strategy of politics. Differing methods of warfare are not developed fortuitously; they are the organic outcome of social changes. Only by the successful co-ordination of military policy with the whole social structure can wars be won".

"The German New Order in Poland".—This 570-page book, published by the Polish Ministry of Information, is the second Black Book of Poland. It describes events which have no precedent in history. Massacres, tortures, persecutions, compulsory transfers of vast populations, mass utilization of human beings for war purposes, and wanton brutality are graphically described. The book shows the systematic way in which the Hun is endeavouring to wipe out both the spiritual culture and the leaders of a whole nation.

"Pattern of Conquest", by Joseph C. Harsch.—The author, former Berlin correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, presents a vivid picture of Germany at war. He shows how the country functioned during the first two years of the conflict, the type of military machine Hitler has evolved, and what its elements of strength and weakness are. Mr. Harsch left Germany in 1942 "with a complete conviction that not only can Germany be beaten but

that it could collapse and the whole Nazi structure disintegrate with a speed and completeness which would equal that of the French collapse in 1940".

"Hitler's Reich and Churchill's Britain".—This recorded account of a conversation between two well-known American *Time* journalists, Stephen Laird and Walter Graebner, makes intensely interesting reading. Stephen Laird was in Germany until June, 1941, while his colleague has been in London for three years. To English readers the impressions of the former on war-time Germany will come, in many cases, as a surprise. He reveals much of the everyday life of the German, says that the German people are immensely afraid of losing the war and "believe that if they do lose every Dutchman, Pole, Frenchman, Czech will be after them with a pitchfork or whatever is handy."

"The Art of War", by Arthur Birnie, with maps and battle plans by J. F. Horrabin.—The theme of the book is that in spite of constantly changing conditions there are certain fundamental principles that have revealed themselves in the history of warfare. Neglect of these spells disaster, and by way of proof Mr. Birnie takes the reader through a history of warfare from the days of the Persian attack on Greece to present-day Nazi aggression. Although maintaining that there are these fundamental laws of warfare, the author explains how constant revision in field tactics has been made necessary by successive changes in offensive and defensive weapons.

"Military Operations in East Africa", Volume 1.—This official history of the East African Campaign in the Great War will be of particular interest to many of our readers in view of the gallant work done by the Indian Expeditionary Force which fought and helped to conquer what is now Tanganyika Territory. Indian troops sailed from Bombay on August 19, 1914, and reached Mombasa on September 1, while a further contingent arrived two months later, and took part in the ill-fated attempt to capture Tanga a few days afterwards. The tragic happenings on that occasion are told in detail, and are accompanied by a description of the operations from the German side. The volume, which runs to 600 pages, has a fine index, and the 76 sketch maps are especially helpful.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR**MARCHING RECORDS OF THE INDIAN ARMY**

To The Editor, U. S. I. "Journal."

SIR,

It would be interesting to know what marching records are being put up by the Indian Army in this war.

My own Battalion marched approximately 1,200 miles during the Burma campaign. We started from Moulmein on January 31 and finally came to rest at Palel on May 25. During the first month of these four months, we had quite heavy fighting. Our record march was from just south of Tharawaddy to Okhpu, a distance of 43 miles, which we did in 16 hours, including a two-hour halt *en route* for food. For the greater part of this march tanks and M.T. were driving through us, with their legacy of dust, fumes and noise, to say nothing of the chagrin of having to see others travel in comfort while we slogged along on foot. For several miles we had to march through a burning teak forest. Not a single man fell out.

Between April 11 and May 25 we marched approximately 700 miles with the rest of the 2nd Brigade. This was mostly over bullock-cart tracks, and was done entirely by night and without a single day's rest. We never knew but when we might be attacked. For the greater part we lived off the country, but this "living" was at times extremely meagre. Chickens were a coveted luxury; atta, eggs and vegetables were practically unknown. It was a typical gypsy life, but should prove an invaluable experience, as before we have the Jap beat, I opine most of us will have to condition ourselves to that life. There was little sickness; our main trouble was feet, as boots completely gave out and there were no replacements. The reaction came with India, when we had to hang about near Imphal with nothing much to do, living under shelters improvised in the jungle with the monsoon on us. The sick were then evacuated daily.

There was frequent controversy as to the best timings for this continual night marching. Our day-time could not be given solely over to rest. There was patrolling, digging, foraging, etc., to be done and the rest problem became acute. Personally, I favoured marching from 1800 to 2200 hours, sleep by the wayside

until 0400 hours, and then on until 0800 hours. This gave us some hours of darkness for sleeping, split up a dreary night march, and was safe from enemy air action. Others favoured mid-night to 0800 hours.

Proud as we were of our marching powers, we had to give way before those of the 12th Mountain Battery. They marched every inch of the way from Moulmein to Imphal. When I last saw their Commander, Major Hume, they were just short of the frontier, and had then done over 1,800 miles in under four months. Goodness knows how many more miles they piled on before they really halted. Often they were left marching along with no other troops between themselves and the enemy, and yet they were magnificently cheerful, with a brew of tea always at hand. Theirs must be a unique record, especially as they added to it the honour of bringing their guns out of Burma.

Yours faithfully,

A. V. PERRY,

Major,

Att. 8th (F.F.) Bn., Burma Rifles.

[Letters to the Editor on subjects of military topical interest for publication in the Journal are welcome.]

Printed by E. G. Tilt (Manager) at
The Civil & Military Gazette, Ltd., 48 The Mall, Lahore,
and edited and published by Captain H. C. Druett for the
United Service Institution of India, Simla.

All Rights Reserved.

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

1. The United Service Institution of India is situated at Simla and is open daily, including Sundays, from 9 a.m. to sunset.
2. Officers wishing to become members of the United Service Institution of India should apply to the Secretary.
3. The reading room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of Service interest that are published.
4. There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free. Members not resident in Simla may have books from the library sent to them post free. (See Secretary's Notes.)
5. The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October which is issued, postage free, to members in any part of the world.
6. Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution for which payment is made. Information for the guidance of contributors will be found in the Secretary's Notes.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services, whether they belong to the Imperial Forces, to forces raised by the Government of India, by an Indian State, by a British Dominion or Colony, and all gazetted officials of the Government of India or of a Provincial Government shall be entitled to become members, without ballot, on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.

Other gentlemen may become members if proposed and seconded by a member of the Institution and approved by the Council.

2. Life members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of a lump sum of Rs. 160, which sum includes entrance fee.

3. Ordinary members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee* (see para. 4) of Rs. 10 on joining, and an annual subscription of Rs. 10 (or 15s.) to be paid in advance.

The period of subscription commences on the 1st January.

An ex-member on rejoining the Institution will be charged a second entrance fee of Rs. 10 if since the date on which he ceased to be a member he has served or resided in India. In other cases no charge will be made.

4. British Service, Dominion and Colonial officers serving in India shall pay an entrance fee* of Rs. 7 only.

5. Members receive the Journal of the Institution post free to any part of the world. Members in India may obtain books from the library which are issued postage free; the borrower will pay the return postage.

6. Government institutions and offices, military libraries, messes and clubs wishing to subscribe for the Journal shall pay Rs. 10 per annum. Non-members shall pay Rs. 10 per annum plus postage. Single copies of the Journal will be supplied to non-members at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy, plus postage.

7. If a member fails to pay his subscription for any year (commencing 1st January) by 1st June of that year, a registered notice shall be sent to him by the Secretary inviting his attention to the fact. If the subscription is not paid by 1st January following, his name shall be struck off the roll of members and, if the Executive Committee so decide, posted in the hall of the Institution for six months, or until the subscription is paid.

8. An ordinary member wishing to resign at any time during a year in which one or more Journals have been sent to him must pay his subscription in full for that year and notify his wish to resign before his name can be struck off the list of members.

9. Members who join the Institution on or after the 1st October and pay the entrance fee and annual subscription on joining will not be charged a further subscription on the following 1st January, unless the Journals for the current year have been supplied.

10. Members are responsible that they keep the Secretary carefully posted in regard to changes of rank and address. Duplicate copies of the Journal will not be supplied free to members when the original has been posted to a member's last known address and has not been returned by the post.

11. All communications should be addressed to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla.

* For the duration of the war, the entrance fees shall be waived.

I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st October to 31st December 1941:

LIFE MEMBER

Brigadier W. G. H. Gough, M.C.

ORDINARY MEMBERS

Sir G. P. Burton, M.A., K.C.I.E., I.C.S.

Balbir Singh, Esq., I.P.

R. A. P. Hare, Esq., I.P.

W. Humphrey, Esq., I.P.

P. Mc A. Stewart, Esq. I.P.

M. F. Thomson, Esq., A.M.I.E.

F. S. Young, Esq., C.I.E., I.P.

Lieut.-Colonel L. T. Firbank, O.B.E.

Lieut.-Colonel G. J. D. Kellie, M.C.

Lieut.-Colonel A. Newton, O.B.E.

Major P. A. E. Dumas.

Major J. G. Hurrell.

Major L. F. Steele.

Major W. R. G. deW. Warren.

Captain E. F. Foxton.

Captain T. Harvey.

Captain J. S. Thompson.

2nd Lieut. J. C. Thompson.

Officer Cadet Bal Ram Harnal.

" " B. N. Basu.

" " Chandan Singh Vatsia.

" " K. K. Masud.

" " Mohindar Singh Bajwa.

" " Mohd. Sharif Khan.

" " Niranjan Singh.

" " Rajinder Singh.

" " F. R. Sardar.

" " Sarfaraz Khan.

II.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

Preference is given to articles dealing with naval, military or air force matters likely to be of topical interest to the majority of readers of the Journal. Historical articles should have a direct bearing on the present war. One entirely non-military story and one article of financial interest to officers is included in each number of the Journal. The latter may be concerned with travel

sport, housing or any other subject which affects officers' pay and expenditure.

Articles may vary in length up to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten, with double spacing between lines, on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment up to Rs. 150 is made on publication according to the value of the contribution.

With reference to R.A.I., Paragraph 333, and K.R. 535, the Executive Council of the Institution will take action, when necessary, to obtain the sanction of the Chief of the General Staff to the publication of an article in the Journal.

Members who wish to remain anonymous will inform the Secretary of the fact and include a pen-name if they so wish. In such cases the real name of the author is known to nobody except the Secretary, who has been instructed to divulge it to no one.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit or amend any matter; if such alterations affect the sense of the article, it will be referred to the author before publication, unless the author has stated that the article may be edited as thought necessary without reference to him.

The April number of the Journal goes to Press on February 25th. Editing and selecting articles takes about ten days, so, as a general rule, articles should be submitted to the editor by February 15th. An article which may not be edited without reference to the author should arrive at least ten days earlier. From the Editor's point of view, February 1st is about the ideal date on which to receive articles. All these dates apply equivalently to the other numbers of the Journal.

III.—READING ROOM AND LIBRARY

(1) The library is only open to members, who are requested to look on books as transferable to their friends.

Books are only issued on loan to members who are resident in India. Members borrowing books from the library in person must make the necessary entry in the register and record their address in India.

(2) Applications for books from members at outstations are dealt with as early as possible and books are sent post free by registered parcel post. They must be returned, carefully packed, by registered parcel post within two months of the date of issue, or immediately on recall.

(3) A member may not have on loan, at any one time, more than three books or sets of books without the Secretary's permission. Papers, magazines and works catalogued under the headings of "Works of Reference," "Not to be taken out" and "Confidential" may not be removed from the Institution.

(4) No particular limit is set on the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council wishing to make the library as useful as possible to members. This rule is, however, subject to the following limitations:

(a) If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue, a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled.

(b) A member wishing to retain a book for a period over two months from the date of issue must notify the Secretary to that effect, otherwise the book will be recalled.

(5) If a book is not returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost or defaced books that are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the member will be required to pay the cost so fixed.

(6) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(7) The revised 1940 catalogue is available at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy plus postage.

IV.—OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

V.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

VI.—THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

(a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.

(b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

Note.—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal: but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

*Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from the Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

VII.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1942.

"In modern warfare the interests and operations of the three services—land, sea, and air—are inseparable. A doctrine of "Combined Warfare" in the widest sense of these words is necessary. Outline such a doctrine, and the organization to implement it, in relation with the problem of Imperial Defence."

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1942.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1942 number of the Journal.
- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

VIII.—ADDRESSES

The difficulties of tracing addresses are now very much increased. Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of changes in their addresses or if possible give a permanent address which will always find them, e.g., a Bank.

IX.—HONORARY MEMBERSHIP OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

Honorary membership of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.1, is extended to commissioned officers of any military unit from the Dominions, India, or the Colonies, who may be visiting the United Kingdom during the war. They will be admitted to the Institution's premises on presentation of their cards.

X.—A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE SERIES, 1939


Sets of papers of the abovementioned series, with 4 maps, are available for sale at Rs. 8 per set.

(i) Precis of lectures and papers ... Rs. 2/-

(ii) Strategy and Tactics papers, including
4 maps ... Rs. 6/-

XI.—ENTRANCE FEES

The Council of the Institution have decided that for the duration of the war entrance fees shall be waived. Ordinary members shall, therefore, be admitted to the Institution on payment of an annual subscription of Rs. 10/-



UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

1. The United Service Institution of India is situated at Simla and is open daily, including Sundays, from 9 a.m. to sunset.
2. Officers wishing to become members of the United Service Institution of India should apply to the Secretary.
3. The reading room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of Service interest that are published.
4. There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free. Members not resident in Simla may have books from the library sent to them post free. (See Secretary's Notes.)
5. The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October which is issued, postage free, to members in any part of the world.
6. Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution for which payment is made. Information for the guidance of contributors will be found in the Secretary's Notes.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services, whether they belong to the Imperial Forces, to forces raised by the Government of India, by an Indian State, by a British Dominion or Colony, and all gazetted officials of the Government of India or of a Provincial Government shall be entitled to become members, without ballot, on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.

Other gentlemen may become members if proposed and seconded by a member of the Institution and approved by the Council.

2. Life members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of a lump sum of Rs. 160, which sum includes entrance fee.

3. Ordinary members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee* (see para. 4) of Rs. 10 on joining, and an annual subscription of Rs. 10 (or 15s.) to be paid in advance.

The period of subscription commences on the 1st January.

An ex-member on rejoining the Institution will be charged a second entrance fee of Rs. 10 if since the date on which he ceased to be a member he has served or resided in India. In other cases no charge will be made.

4. British Service, Dominion and Colonial officers serving in India shall pay an entrance fee* of Rs. 7 only.

5. Members receive the Journal of the Institution post free to any part of the world. Members in India may obtain books from the library which are issued postage free; the borrower will pay the return postage.

6. Government institutions and offices, military libraries, messes and clubs wishing to subscribe for the Journal shall pay Rs. 10 per annum. Non-members shall pay Rs. 10 per annum plus postage. Single copies of the Journal will be supplied to non-members at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy, plus postage.

7. If a member fails to pay his subscription for any year (commencing 1st January) by 1st June of that year, a registered notice shall be sent to him by the Secretary inviting his attention to the fact. If the subscription is not paid by 1st January following, his name shall be struck off the roll of members and, if the Executive Committee so decide, posted in the hall of the Institution for six months, or until the subscription is paid.

8. An ordinary member wishing to resign at any time during a year in which one or more Journals have been sent to him must pay his subscription in full for that year and notify his wish to resign before his name can be struck off the list of members.

9. Members who join the Institution on or after the 1st October and pay the entrance fee and annual subscription on joining will not be charged a further subscription on the following 1st January, unless the Journals for the current year have been supplied.

10. Members are responsible that they keep the Secretary carefully posted in regard to changes of rank and address. Duplicate copies of the Journal will not be supplied free to members when the original has been posted to a member's last known address and has not been returned by the post.

11. All communications should be addressed to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla.

* For the duration of the war, the entrance fees shall be waived.

I.—NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from 1st January to 31st March 1942:

Lieut.-General E. L. Morris, C.B., O.B.E., M.C.

Lieut.-Colonel K. Jermyn.

Lieut.-Colonel R. B. Phayre, M.C.

Wing Commander H. E. Nowell, R.A.F.

Captain C. P. Chenevix-Trench.

Captain R. C. Eldridge.

Captain S. Evans.

Captain A. G. Packer.

Captain R. E. G. Twelvetrees.

Lieut. P. M. Glover.

Officer Cadet C. Ghose.

„ „ Makhan Singh.

„ „ J. C. Pande.

„ „ Randhir Singh Nag.

„ „ Rifat Pasha Sheikh.

„ „ D. D. St. Romaine.

„ „ Tejinder Singh Gill.

S. G. Barve, Esq., I.C.S.

J. B. F. Field, Esq., I.P.

H. T. Lane, Esq., I.C.S.

A. P. Low, Esq., I.C.S.

W. R. C. Smith, Esq., C.I.E., I.P.

II.—CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL

Preference is given to articles dealing with naval, military or air force matters likely to be of topical interest to the majority of readers of the Journal. Historical articles should have a direct bearing on the present war. One entirely non-military story and one article of financial interest to officers is included in each number of the Journal. The latter may be concerned with travel, sport, housing or any other subject which affects officers' pay and expenditure.

Articles may vary in length up to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten, with double spacing between lines, on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment up to Rs. 150 is made on publication according to the value of the contribution.

With reference to R.A.I., Paragraph 333, and K.R. 535, the Executive Council of the Institution will take action, when necessary, to obtain the sanction of the Chief of the General Staff to the publication of an article in the Journal.

Members who wish to remain anonymous will inform the Secretary of the fact and include a pen-name if they so wish. In such cases the real name of the author is known to nobody except the Secretary, who has been instructed to divulge it to no one.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit or amend any matter; if such alterations affect the sense of the article, it will be referred to the author before publication, unless the author has stated that the article may be edited as thought necessary without reference to him.

The July number of the Journal goes to Press on May 25th. Editing and selecting articles takes about ten days, so, as a general rule, articles should be submitted to the editor by May 15th. An article which may not be edited without reference to the author should arrive at least ten days earlier. From the Editor's point of view, May 1st is about the ideal date on which to receive articles. All these dates apply equivalently to the other numbers of the Journal.

III.—READING ROOM AND LIBRARY

(1) The library is only open to members, who are requested to look on books as transferable to their friends.

Books are only issued on loan to members who are resident in India. Members borrowing books from the library in person must make the necessary entry in the register and record their address in India.

(2) Applications for books from members at outstations are dealt with as early as possible and books are sent post free by registered parcel post. They must be returned, carefully packed, by registered parcel post within two months of the date of issue, or immediately on recall.

(3) A member may not have on loan, at any one time, more than three books or sets of books without the Secretary's permission. Papers, magazines and works catalogued under the headings of "Works of Reference," "Not to be taken out" and "Confidential" may not be removed from the Institution.

(4) No particular limit is set on the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council wishing to make the library as useful as possible to members. This rule is, however, subject to the following limitations:

- (a) If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue, a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled.
- (b) A member wishing to retain a book for a period over two months from the date of issue must notify the Secretary to that effect, otherwise the book will be recalled.

(5) If a book is not returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost or defaced books that are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the member will be required to pay the cost so fixed.

(6) The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

(7) The revised 1940 catalogue is available at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy plus postage.

IV.—OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time and while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Simla.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals, etc., presented to the Institution.

V.—HISTORICAL RESEARCH

The U. S. I. is prepared to supply members and units with typewritten copies of old Indian Army List pages, at the rate of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

VI.—THE MacGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL

1. The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year.

2. The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

3. For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

4. The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

5. The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

(a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.

(b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

Note.—The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

6. The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

7. Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal: but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

* Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

8. When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

VII.—GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council has chosen the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1942.

"In modern warfare the interests and operations of the three services—land, sea, and air—are inseparable. A doctrine of "Combined Warfare" in the widest sense of these words is necessary. Outline such a doctrine, and the organization to implement it, in relation with the problem of Imperial Defence."

The following are the conditions of the competition:

- (1) The competition is open to all gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India and to all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces including Territorial Forces, wherever those forces have been raised and to officers of the Indian States Forces.
- (2) Essays must be typewritten and submitted in triplicate.
- (3) When reference is made to any work, the title of such work is to be quoted.
- (4) Essays are to be strictly anonymous. Each must have a motto, and, enclosed with the essay, there should be sent a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside and the name of the competitor inside.
- (5) Essays will not be accepted unless received by the Secretary on or before the 30th June 1942.
- (6) Essays will be submitted for adjudication to three judges chosen by the Council. The judges may recommend a money award, not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution for, the medal. The decision of the three judges will be submitted to the Council, who will decide whether the medal is to be awarded and whether the essay is to be published. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October 1942 number of the Journal.
- (7) All essays submitted are to become the property of the United Service Institution of India absolutely, and authors will not be at liberty to make any use whatsoever of their essays without the sanction of the Council.

- (8) Essays should not exceed fifteen pages of the size and style of the Journal exclusive of any appendices, tables or maps.

VIII.—ADDRESSES

The difficulties of tracing addresses are now very much increased. Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of changes in their addresses or if possible give a permanent address which will always find them, e.g., a Bank.

IX.—HONORARY MEMBERSHIP OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION

Honorary membership of the Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, London, S.W.1, is extended to commissioned officers of any military unit from the Dominions, India, or the Colonies, who may be visiting the United Kingdom during the war. They will be admitted to the Institution's premises on presentation of their cards.


X.—A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE SERIES, 1939

Sets of papers of the abovementioned series, with 4 maps, are available for sale at Rs. 8 per set.

- | | | |
|---|-----|---------|
| (i) Precis of lectures and papers | ... | Rs. 2/- |
| (ii) Strategy and Tactics papers, including
4 maps | ... | Rs. 6/- |

XI.—ENTRANCE FEES

The Council of the Institution have decided that for the duration of the war entrance fees shall be waived. Ordinary members shall, therefore, be admitted to the Institution on payment of an annual subscription of Rs. 10/-.



UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

1. The United Service Institution of India is situated at Simla and is open daily, including Sundays, from 9 a.m. to sunset.
2. Officers wishing to become members of the United Service Institution of India should apply to the Secretary.
3. The reading room of the Institution is provided with the leading illustrated papers, newspapers, magazines, and journals of Service interest that are published.
4. There is a well-stocked library in the Institution, from which members can obtain books on loan free. Members not resident in Simla may have books from the library sent to them post free. (See Secretary's Notes.)
5. The Institution publishes a Quarterly Journal in the months of January, April, July and October which is issued, postage free, to members in any part of the world.
6. Members and the public are invited to contribute articles to the Journal of the Institution, for which payment is made. Information for the guidance of contributors will be found in the Secretary's Notes.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services, whether they belong to the Imperial Forces, to forces raised by the Government of India, by an Indian State, by a British Dominion or Colony, and all gazetted officials of the Government of India or of a Provincial Government shall be entitled to become members, without ballot, on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.

Other gentlemen may become members if proposed and seconded by a member of the Institution and approved by the Council.

2. Life members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of a lump sum of Rs. 160, which sum includes entrance fee.

3. Ordinary members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee* (see para. 4) of Rs. 10 on joining, and an annual subscription of Rs. 10 (or 15s.) to be paid in advance.

The period of subscription commences on the 1st January.

An ex-member on rejoining the Institution will be charged a second entrance fee of Rs. 10 if since the date on which he ceased to be a member he has served or resided in India. In other cases no charge will be made.

4. British Service, Dominion and Colonial officers serving in India shall pay an entrance fee* of Rs. 7 only.

5. Members receive the Journal of the Institution post free to any part of the world. Members in India may obtain books from the library which are issued postage free, the borrower paying the return postage.

6. Government institutions and offices, military libraries, messes and clubs wishing to subscribe for the Journal shall pay Rs. 10 per annum. Non-members shall pay Rs. 10 per annum plus postage. Single copies of the Journal will be supplied to non-members at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy, plus postage.

7. If a member fails to pay his subscription for any year (commencing 1st January) by 1st June of that year, a registered notice shall be sent to him by the Secretary inviting his attention to the fact. If the subscription is not paid by 1st January following, his name shall be struck off the roll of members and, if the Executive Committee so decide, posted in the hall of the Institution for six months, or until the subscription is paid.

8. An ordinary member wishing to resign at any time during a year in which one or more Journals have been sent to him must pay his subscription in full for that year and notify his wish to resign before his name can be struck off the list of members.

9. Members who join the Institution on or after the 1st October and pay the entrance fee and annual subscription on joining will not be charged a further subscription on the following 1st January, unless the Journals for the current year have been supplied.

10. Members are responsible that they keep the Secretary carefully posted in regard to changes of rank and address. Duplicate copies of the Journal will not be supplied free to members when the original has been posted to a member's last known address and has not been returned by the post.

11. All communications should be addressed to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla.

* For the duration of the war, the entrance fee has been waived.

NOTES BY THE SECRETARY

1. COUNCIL

Members of the Council of the Institution for 1942-43 include:

Ex-officio Members: Chief of the General Staff (President); Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Air Forces in India (Vice-President); Secretary, Defence Department; Secretary, External Affairs Department.

Elected Members: Lieut-General C. A. Bird, C.B., D.S.O.; Major-General H. Finnis, C.B., M.C.; Colonel Sir C. B. Dashwood Strettell, K.C.I.E., C.B.; Sir F. H. Puckle, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S.; Sir Frederick Tymms, C.I.E., M.C.; P. Mason, Esq., C.B.E., I.C.S.; Lieut-Colonel R. E. Holloway, M.B.E., R.E.; Group Captain H. E. Nowell, O.B.E., R.A.F.

The Executive Committee for 1942-43 is composed of: Lieut-General C. A. Bird, C.B., D.S.O., (Chairman); Colonel Sir C. B. Dashwood Strettell, K.C.I.E., C.B.; P. Mason, Esq., C.B.E., I.C.S.; Lieut-Colonel R. E. Holloway, M.B.E., R.E.; Group Captain H. E. Nowell, O.B.E., R.A.F.

2. BIRTHDAY HONOURS

Among those honoured in the Birthday Honours List were Dr. T. E. Gregory, D.Sc., who received a Knighthood, and Lieut-General W. G. H. Vickers, O.B.E., who was awarded a K.C.B. Both formerly served on the Council of the Institution. Group Captain H. E. Nowell, a member of the Council and of the Executive Committee, was awarded the O.B.E.

3. NEW MEMBERS

The following new members joined the Institution from April 1, 1942, to June 30, 1942:

Life Members

His Highness Sir Kameshwara Singh, K.C.I.E., the Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga.
Major I. A. J. Edwards-Stuart.

Ordinary Members

H. E. Sir Andrew Clow, K.C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S., Governor of Assam.
Air Chief Marshal Sir R. E. C. Peirse, K.C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C., Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces India.
Major-General G. O. DeR. Channer, C.B.E., M.C.
Colonel R. M. Jonas, I.A.O.C.
Lieut-Colonel R. O. Chamier.

Lieut.-Colonel R. E. F. G. North.

Lieut.-Colonel N. E. I. Pocock, M.C.

Major E. D. Chaytor.

Major G. S. N. Richardson.

Flying Officer C. D. Dunford Wood.

2nd Lieut. J. P. Williams.

C. D. Lettington, Esq.

J. Natarajan, Esq., Principal Information Officer, Government of India.

J. B. Vesugar, Esq., I.S.E.

4. *CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE JOURNAL*

Preference is given to articles dealing with naval, military or air force matters likely to be of topical interest to the majority of readers of the Journal. Historical articles should have a direct bearing on the present war. One entirely non-military story and one article of other interest to officers is included in each number of the Journal. The latter may be concerned with travel, sport, housing or any other subject which affects officers' pay and expenditure.

Articles may vary in length up to ten thousand words. They should be submitted in duplicate and typewritten, with double spacing between lines, on one side of the paper. Manuscript articles cannot be considered. Payment up to Rs. 150 is made on publication according to the value of the contribution.

With reference to R.A.I., Paragraph 333, and K.R. 535, the Executive Council of the Institution will take action, when necessary, to obtain the sanction of the Chief of the General Staff to the publication of an article in the Journal.

Members who wish to remain anonymous will inform the Secretary of the fact and include a pen-name if they so wish. In such cases the real name of the author is known to nobody except the Secretary, who has been instructed to divulge it to no one.

The Committee reserve to themselves the right to omit or amend any matter; if such alterations affect the sense of the article, it will be referred to the author before publication, unless the author has stated that the article may be edited as thought necessary without reference to him.

The October number of the Journal goes to Press on August 25th. Editing and selecting articles takes about ten days, so, as a general rule, articles should be submitted to the editor by May 15th. An article which may not be edited without reference

to the author should arrive at least ten days earlier. From the Editor's point of view, August 1st is about the ideal date on which to receive articles. All these dates apply equivalently to the other numbers of the Journal.

5. *READING-ROOM AND LIBRARY*

The library is only open to members of the Institution. Only members resident in India may have books on loan. In the case of volumes being borrowed from the library in person, the necessary entry must be made in the Register kept for that purpose. The address in India of the member borrowing the book must be recorded.

Members living outside Simla may borrow books by post, the volumes being sent post-free by registered parcel-post. They must be returned, carefully packed, by registered parcel-post within two months of the date of issue, or immediately on recall. Members who are unacquainted with the correct title of a volume, or who wish to receive a volume on a certain subject, are invited to send an inquiry to the Secretary, who will endeavour to secure the desired book.

Copies of the revised 1940 catalogue of books maintained in the Library are available at Rs. 2/8/- per copy, plus As. -/11/- postage.

A member may not have on loan, at any one time, more than three books or sets of books without the Secretary's permission. Papers, magazines and works catalogued under the headings of "Works of Reference," "Not to be taken out" and "Confidential" may not be removed from the Institution.

No particular limit is set on the number of days for which a member may keep a book, the Council wishing to make the library as useful as possible to members. This rule is, however, subject to the following limitations:

(a) If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue, a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled.

(b) A member wishing to retain a book for a period over two months from the date of issue must notify the Secretary to that effect, otherwise the book will be recalled.

If a book is not returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, if so required by the Executive

Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the member to whom they were issued. In the case of lost or defaced books that are out of print, the value shall be fixed by the Executive Committee and the member will be required to pay the cost so fixed.

The issue of a book under these rules to any member implies the latter's compliance with the rules and the willingness to have them enforced, if necessary, against him.

6. *OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES*

A valuable collection of old and rare books which have been presented to the Institution from time to time may be inspected by members in Simla. They are, however, not available for circulation.

Gifts of rare volumes, trophies, medals, etc., which members may desire to present to the Institution, will be gratefully received.

Copies of old Indian Army Lists dating back to 1795 are available for inspection at the office of the Institution in Simla. Any member or unit desirous of receiving typewritten copies of pages from such records may have them on payment of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

7. *THE MACGREGOR MEMORIAL MEDAL*

The MacGregor Memorial Medal for 1941-1942 has been awarded to Captain M. W. H. White, M.B.E., for his exploratory work of four passes between Northern Chitral and Wakhan.

Particulars governing the award of this Medal are as follows:

(1) The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor, who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year. Members of Overseas Commands who fulfil the conditions in paragraph 5, are cordially invited to enter for this award.

(2) The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

(3) For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

(4) The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

(5) The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

(a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.

(b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

(6) The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

(7) Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal: but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

(8) When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

8. ADDRESSES

Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of change in their addresses; or, if they so wish, to have their Journal and other matter sent to them c/o their Bank.

* Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

9. *ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, LONDON*

Commissioned officers from India, the Dominion or the Colonies who may be visiting London are invited to become honorary members of the Royal United Service Institution. They will be admitted to the Institution's premises on presentation of their cards.

10.—*A. H. Q. STAFF COLLEGE COURSE SERIES, 1939*

Sets of papers of the abovementioned series, with 4 maps, are available for sale at Rs. 8 per set.

(i) *Precis of lectures and papers* ... Rs. 2/-

(ii) *Strategy and Tactics papers, including*
4 maps ... Rs. 6/-

11. *MEMBERSHIP*

As will be seen from the rules of membership which appear elsewhere in this issue, the entrance fee to the Institution has been waived for the duration of the War. Ordinary members may, therefore, be admitted to the Institution on payment of an annual subscription of Rs. 10.



By Appointment

To The Late King George V

RANKEN & Co., Ltd.

**CALCUTTA, SIMLA, DELHI, LAHORE,
RAWALPINDI & MURREE**

ESTABLISHED IN CALCUTTA 1770

**CIVIL & MILITARY TAILORS
GENTLEMEN'S OUTFITTERS
AND BREECHES MAKERS**

**ESTIMATES SUPPLIED FOR
FULL-DRESS AND MESS DRESS
UNIFORMS OF ALL REGIMENTS**

By Appointment to

**His Excellency General Sir Robert A. Cassels,
G.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O.,
Former Commander-in-Chief in India.**

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

The headquarter building of the United Service Institution of India in Simla is open daily, including Sundays, from 9 a.m. to sunset. It contains a reading room, in which is available a wide range of illustrated periodicals, newspapers, magazines, etc., as well as a number of Service journals. A well-stocked library is also open to members, who may borrow volumes without charge, while members stationed elsewhere may obtain books on loan post-free.

Members also receive, post-free, each of the quarterly issues of the Journal of the Institution.

Rules of Membership

1. All officers of the Defence Services, whether they belong to the Imperial Forces, to forces raised by the Government of India, by an Indian State, by a British Dominion or Colony, and all gazetted officials of the Government of India or of a Provincial Government shall be entitled to become members, without ballot, on payment of the entrance fee and subscription.

Other gentlemen may become members if proposed and seconded by a member of the Institution and approved by the Council.

2. Life members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of a lump sum of Rs. 160, which sum includes entrance fee.

3. Ordinary members of the Institution shall be admitted on payment of an entrance fee* (see para. 4.) of Rs. 10 on joining, and an annual subscription of Rs. 10 (or 15s.) to be paid in advance.

The period of subscription commences on the 1st January.

An ex-member on rejoining the Institution will be charged a second entrance fee of Rs. 10 if since the date on which he ceased to be a member he has served or resided in India. In other cases no charge will be made.

4. British Service, Dominion and Colonial officers serving in India shall pay an entrance fee* of Rs. 7 only.

5. Members receive the Journal of the Institution post free to any part of the world. Members in India may obtain books from the library which are issued postage free, the borrower paying the return postage.

6. Government institutions and offices, military libraries, messes and clubs wishing to subscribe for the Journal shall pay Rs. 10 per annum. Non-members shall pay Rs. 10 per annum plus postage. Single copies of the Journal will be supplied to non-members at Rs. 2-8-0 per copy, plus postage.

7. If a member fails to pay his subscription for any year (commencing 1st January) by 1st June of that year, a registered notice shall be sent to him by the Secretary inviting his attention to the fact. If the subscription is not paid by 1st January following, his name shall be struck off the roll of members and, if the Executive Committee so decide, posted in the hall of the Institution for six months, or until the subscription is paid.

8. An ordinary member wishing to resign at any time during a year in which one or more Journals have been sent to him must pay his subscription in full for that year and notify his wish to resign before his name can be struck off the list of members.


9. Members who join the Institution on or after the 1st October and pay the entrance fee and annual subscription on joining will not be charged a further subscription on the following 1st January, unless the Journals for the current year have been supplied.

10. Members are responsible that they keep the Secretary carefully posted in regard to changes of rank and address. Duplicate copies of the Journal will not be supplied free to members when the original has been posted to a member's last known address and has not been returned by the post.

11. All communications should be addressed to the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla.

* For the duration of the war, the entrance fee has been waived.

SPECIALISTS in OFFICERS' UNIFORM :



KHAKI OFFICERS' GREATCOATS

Made from best English Treble
Milled and Waterproofed Melton.

Correct in all details.

Rs. 150/-

*Badges of Rank and Metal Buttons
extra.*



BATTLE DRESS

Of best English all wool Serge.
All details correct according
to Regulations.

Blouse and Trousers.

Rs. 90/-

*Patterns and self measurement form
on request.*

ARMY & NAVY STORES LTD.
FORT **BOMBAY**

Telegrams: ARMISTICE, BOMBAY.

United Service Institution of India

PATRON :

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

VICE-PATRONS :

His Excellency the Governor of Madras.
His Excellency the Governor of Bombay.
His Excellency the Governor of Bengal.
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India.
His Excellency the Governor of the United Provinces.
His Excellency the Governor of the Punjab.
His Excellency the Governor of Bihar.
His Excellency the Governor of Central Provinces.
His Excellency the Governor of Assam.
His Excellency the Governor of the N. W. Frontier Province.
His Excellency the Governor of Sind.
His Excellency the Governor of Orissa.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command.

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, 1942-43.

Ex-officio Members :

The Chief of the General Staff (President).
The Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces in India (Vice-President).
The Secretary, Defence Department.
The Secretary, External Affairs Department.

Elected Members :

Lieut.-General C. A. Bird, C.B., D.S.O.	Sir Frederick Tymms, C.I.E., M.C.
Major-General H. Finnis, C.B., M.C.	P. Mason, Esq., C.B.E., I.C.S.
Colonel Sir C. B. Dashwood Strettell, K.C.I.E., C.B.	Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Hol- loway, M.B.E., R.E.
Sir F. H. Fuckle, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S.	Group Captain H. E. Nowell, O.B.E., R.A.F.

MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 1942-43.

President: Lieut.-General C. A. Bird, C.B., D.S.O.
Members: Colonel Sir C. B. Dashwood Strettell, K.C.I.E., C.B.
P. Mason, Esq., C.B.E., I.C.S.
Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Holloway, M.B.E., R.E.
Group Captain H. E. Nowell, O.B.E., R.A.F.
Secretary and Editor: Captain H. C. Druett.
Bankers: Lloyds Bank, Limited, Simla.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council has selected the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1943 :

"Consider the foreign relations of a self-governing Union of India and their bearing on the problem of the defence of the country."

Entries are invited from all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces, from gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India, and from officers of the Indian States Forces.

Essays, which should be typewritten (double spacing) and submitted in triplicate, must be received by the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla, on or before June 30, 1943. In order that the anonymity of each candidate should be preserved, a motto should be written at the top of each entry. A sealed envelope, bearing on the outside the motto, and containing inside the name and address of the author of the essay, must accompany each entry.

Entries should not exceed fifteen pages (approx. 8,000 words) of the size and style of the Journal. Should any authority be quoted in the essay, the title of the work referred to should be given.

Three judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend a money award not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution of, the Gold Medal, and will submit their decision to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October, 1943 issue of the Journal.

Copyright of all essays submitted will be reserved by the Council of the United Service Institution of India.

NOTES BY THE SECRETARY

Our July Issue

The July issue of the Journal aroused considerable interest among officers throughout India, and many readers have expressed appreciation of the exclusive descriptive articles on the fighting in Burma and Malaya. A few copies of the number are still available, and those wishing to receive one should apply as soon as possible.

New Members

Among the new members of the Institution enrolled during the period July 1, 1942, to September 30, 1942, were:

Badshah, Captain M. M.,	Eyles, Captain F. E.,
Bell, Captain A. J. N.,	
Biggs, 2nd Lieut. M. K.,	Faridkot, His Highness Sir
Bird, Lieut.-Colonel W. T.,	Har Indar Singh, Brar
Blaber, Lieut.-Colonel H. R.,	Bans Bahadur, K.C.S.I.,
Blair, Captain R. E.,	Maharaja of,
Bodeker, Captain W. B. T.,	Fisher, Major F. A. B.,
Breton, 2nd Lieut. M. W. H.,	Gibb, Major F. W.,
Burns, 2nd Lieut. B. S.,	Godfrey, Lieut. D. J.,
Butler, Captain B.,	Gordon, Brigadier R.,
	Grenyer, Captain F. R.,
Calmon, Flight Lieut. R. J.,	Gul Nawaz Khan, Captain.,
R.A.F.,	
Clayton, Brigadier E. H.,	Habibullah Khan, Captain
O.B.E.,	M.,
Collins, Captain P. R.,	Hamilton, Mr. A. P. F.,
Condon, Major M. J.,	O.B.E., M.C., I.F.S.,
	Harold, Captain E.,
Daniel, Lieut.-Colonel J.,	Harpham, Captain W.,
Darby, Captain T. R.,	Harris, Lieut.-Colonel A.,
Davis, Lieut.-Colonel H. A.,	M.C., R.A.O.C.,
R.E.,	Hawkins, Major J. W.,
Denny, Major J. R.,	Hastings, Captain Guy Hol-
Donaghy, Captain P. R. P.,	land,
Dunn, Captain P. O.,	Hayes, Major G. T. M., M.C.,
Dykes, Lieut.-Colonel O. C. T.,	I.M.S.,
M.C.,	

- | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Hazari, Captain G. P., | Napier, Captain J. E. M., |
| Hemming, Captain D., | Nesbitt-Hawes, Brigadier R., |
| Hesketh, Brigadier W., | C.B.E., E.D. |
| Hinds, 2nd Lieut. H. V., | Noakes, Captain G. W., R.A., |
| Holder, 2nd Lieut. R. J. C., | O'Gara, Captain J., |
| Hulme, Captain H. R., | O'Hagan, Revd. C. G., |
| Hutchison, Captain E. A., | Ovans, Major M. E., M.C., |
| Jeffreys, 2nd Lieut. F. S., | Parker, Captain L. J., |
| Johanson, Major J. L., | Payne, Lieut.-Colonel R. A., |
| John, Lieut. J. M., | Pelly, Lieut.-Colonel H. R., |
| Johnstone, Major T. G. B., | Pritam Singh, Major, |
| Jones, Major B. O., | Rahman, 2nd Lieut. Azizur |
| Jones, Lieut.-Colonel S. G. D., | Rashid, Captain S. A., |
| Jones-Davies, Major H. M. O., | Rau, Lieut. R. L., |
| R.A., | Rushbrook, Captain J. F., |
| Killick, 2nd Lieut. J. N. C., | Savory, Captain A.C.S., |
| King, Lieut.-Colonel T. C., | Shepherd, Pilot Officer R. H., |
| Klein, Captain M. B., I.M.S., | R.A.F., |
| Lewis, Major D. Ll., | Smith, Major H. M. V. N., |
| Lunt, Captain J. D., | I.A.O.C., |
| Marett, Major R., | Stephens, Lieut.-Colonel |
| Maurice, Major J. O. F., | A. L., R.E., |
| Maybury, Mr. M. A., Burma | Stewart, Lieut.-Colonel H. S., |
| Civil Service, | Stone, Captain G. E. I., |
| McCarthy, Lieut.-Colonel | Stump, Major E. A., |
| E. D., O.B.E., | Surjan Singh, Captain, |
| McConkey, Lieut.-Colonel | Talbot, Captain H. P., |
| A. I. G., | Taneja, Major B. L., I.M.S., |
| McCutcheon, Major D. S., | Thompson, Lieut.-Colonel |
| McMahon, Lieut. C. A., | C. E., |
| Medworth, Captain G. R., | Trower, 2nd Lieut. A. G., |
| Menzies, Colonel R., O.B.E., | R.A., |
| V.D., | Walter, 2nd Lieut. N. I. Mc. N., |
| Mohd. Abbas Beg, Captain, | Ward, Lieut.-Colonel R. S. B., |
| Montgomery, 2nd Lieut. | R.E., |
| T. D., | Watt, Mr. W. R., O.B.E., |
| Mootham, Major O. H., | Weber, 2nd Lieut. J. P., |
| Mulcahy-Morgan, 2nd Lieut. | Weigall, Major G. S. C., |
| P., | Wild, Captain Kendal D., |
| | Willis, Captain A. W., |
| | Wilson, Major J., |
| | Woodgate, Captain J. A. |

The number of Officers' Messes subscribing to the Journal has been greatly augmented during the last quarter, some 102 messes having been added to our subscription list.

The following Clubs have also been added to the list of those already subscribing to the Journal:

Bangalore United Service Club.	Madras Club.
Bareilly Club.	Ootacamund Club.
Bengal Club.	Peshawar Club.
Bombay Gymkhana Club.	Quetta Club.
Cosmopolitan Club, Madras.	Royal Bombay Yacht Club.
Dacca Club.	Royal Western Indian Turf Club.
Dalhousie Club.	Sind Club.
Imperial Delhi Gymkhana Club.	Trichinopoly Club.
	Wheler Club, Meerut.

Contributions to the Journal

Articles on all naval, military, and Air Force matters of topical interest are welcomed. They may run to 10,000 words, but contributions of 4,000 to 5,000 words are preferred. Historical articles should have a bearing on the present war. One non-military story and an article of general interest may be included in each issue.

Contributions should be typewritten, double spacing, and in view of the need for paper economy, may be typed on both sides, providing a moderately thick paper is used. Many would-be contributors are possibly unable to submit articles already typed. In such cases they may be sent in manuscript form, and arrangements will be made for them to be typed in Simla, the small charge being deducted from the contributor's fee. Payment for articles is made on publication, at rates up to Rs. 150 according to the value of the contribution.

All articles of a military nature are submitted to the authorities before publication, for security reasons. No further articles concerning operations in Burma and Malaya can be accepted, unless they are of direct military training interest and value.

Contributions may, if the author desires, appear under a pseudonym. In such cases, the name of the author remains strictly confidential. The right to omit or amend any part of an article is reserved by the Executive Committee.

Reading Room and Library

The Library is open, and only available to, members of the Institution. Books may be loaned to members resident in India, and those borrowing works in person must enter the particulars in the book provided. Members stationed elsewhere than Simla may receive books on application. Such volumes are sent post free by registered parcel-post; they must be returned within two months, or immediately on recall. No more than three volumes may be issued to members at any one time. Reference books and works marked "Confidential" may not be removed from the library.

A catalogue of books in the library may be obtained on payment of Rs. 2/8/- per copy, plus As. -/11/- postage.

In order that the Library may be as useful as possible to members, it is requested that if a member wishes to retain a work for more than two months, he should notify the Secretary to that effect. If, after the expiration of three weeks from the date of issue, a book is wanted by another member, it will be recalled.

Should a book not be returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, the cost of lost or defaced books being refunded by the member to whom they were issued. Such volumes which may have become out of print will be valued by the Executive Committee, the member being required to pay the cost so fixed.

The issue of a book under the above rules to any member implies the latter's agreement with the regulations.

Gold Medal Essay Competition

Particulars concerning the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1943 are published elsewhere in this issue.

Old Books and Trophies

A valuable collection of old and rare books which have been presented to the Institution from time to time may be inspected by members in Simla. They are, however, not available for circulation.

Gifts of rare volumes, trophies, medals, etc., which members may desire to present to the Institution, will be gratefully received.

Copies of old Indian Army Lists dating back to 1795 are available for inspection at the office of the Institution in Simla. Any member or unit desirous of receiving typewritten copies of pages from such records may have them on payment of Rs. 2 per typewritten page.

The MacGregor Memorial Medal

The MacGregor Memorial Medal for 1941-1942 has been awarded to Captain M. W. H. White, M.B.E., for his exploratory work of four passes between Northern Chitral and Wakhan.

Particulars governing the award of this Medal are as follows:

(1) The MacGregor Memorial Medal was founded in 1888 as a memorial to the late Major-General Sir Charles MacGregor, who founded the United Service Institution of India. The medals are awarded for the best military reconnaissances or journeys of exploration of the year. Members of Overseas Commands who fulfil the conditions in paragraph 5, are cordially invited to enter for this award.

(2) The following awards are made annually in the month of June:

(a) For officers—British or Indian—silver medal.

(b) For soldiers—British or Indian—silver medal with Rs. 100 gratuity.

(3) For especially valuable work, a gold medal may be awarded in place of one of the silver medals, or in addition to the silver medals, whenever the administrators of the Fund deem it desirable. Also the Council may award a special additional silver medal without gratuity, to a soldier, for especially good work.

(4) The award of medals is made by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, as Vice-Patron, and the Council of the United Service Institution of India, who were appointed administrators of the Fund by the MacGregor Memorial Committee.

(5) The following are eligible for the award, whether at the time of the reconnaissance they were in military or civil employ:

(a) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Navy, Army, Royal Air Force and the Dominion Forces, while serving on the Indian establishment.

(b) Officers and other ranks of the Royal Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force and of the Indian States Forces, wherever serving.

The term "Indian Army" includes the Indian Auxiliary and Territorial Forces, Frontier Militia, Levies, Military Police and Military Corps under local governments.

(6) The medal may be worn in uniform by Indian soldiers on ceremonial parades, suspended round the neck by the ribbon issued with the medal.*

(7) Personal risk to life during the reconnaissance or exploration is not a necessary qualification for the award of the medal: but, in the event of two journeys being of equal value, the man who has incurred the greater risk will be considered to have the greater claim to the award.

(8) When the work of the year has either not been of sufficient value or notice of it has been received too late for consideration before the Council Meeting, the medal may be awarded for any reconnaissance during previous years considered by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to deserve it.

Addresses

Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of change in their addresses; or, if they so wish, to have their Journal and other matter sent to them c/o their Bank.

Royal United Service Institution, London

Commissioned officers from India, the Dominions or the Colonies who may be visiting London are invited to become honorary members of the Royal United Service Institution. They will be admitted to the Institution's premises on presentation of their cards.

A.H.Q. Staff College Course

Sets of papers of the above-mentioned series, with 4 maps, are available for sale at Rs. 8 per set.

- | | |
|---|-------------|
| (i) Precis of lectures and papers | ... Rs. 2/- |
| (ii) Strategy and Tactics papers, including
4 maps | ... Rs. 6/- |

Membership

As will be seen from the rules of membership which appear elsewhere in this issue, the entrance fee to the Institution has been waived for the duration of the War. Ordinary members may, therefore, be admitted to the Institution on payment of an annual subscription of Rs. 10.

* Replacements of the ribbon may be obtained on payment from Secretary, U.S.I., Simla.

United Service Institution of India

PATRON :

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India.

VICE-PATRONS :

His Excellency the Governor of Madras.
His Excellency the Governor of Bombay.
His Excellency the Governor of Bengal.
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India.
His Excellency the Governor of the United Provinces.
His Excellency the Governor of the Punjab.
His Excellency the Governor of Bihar.
His Excellency the Governor of Central Provinces.
His Excellency the Governor of Assam.
His Excellency the Governor of the N. W. Frontier Province.
His Excellency the Governor of Sind.
His Excellency the Governor of Orissa.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Northern Command.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command.
General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command.

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, 1942-43.

Ex-officio Members :

1. The Chief of the General Staff (President).
2. The Air Officer Commanding, Air Forces in India (Vice-President).
3. The Secretary, Defence Department.
4. The Secretary, External Affairs Department.

Elected Members :

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Lieut.-General C. A. Bird, C.B., D.S.O. | 5. Sir Frederick Tymms, C.I.E., M.C. |
| 2. Major-General H. Finnis, C.B., M.C. | 6. P. Mason, Esq., C.B.E., I.C.S. |
| 3. Colonel Sir C. B. Dashwood Strettell, K.C.I.E., C.B. | 7. Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Holloway, M.B.E., R.E. |
| 4. Sir F. H. Puckle, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., I.C.S. | 8. Group Captain H. E. Nowell, O.B.E., R.A.F. |

MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 1942-43.

President: Lieut.-General C. A. Bird, C.B., D.S.O.

Members: Colonel Sir C. B. Dashwood Strettell, K.C.I.E., C.B.
P. Mason, Esq., C.B.E., I.C.S.
Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Holloway, M.B.E., R.E.
Group Captain H. E. Nowell, O.B.E., R.A.F.

Secretary and Editor: Captain H. C. Druett.

Bankers: Lloyds Bank, Limited, Simla.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY COMPETITION

The Council has selected the following subject for the Gold Medal Prize Essay Competition for 1943:

"Consider the foreign relations of a self-governing Union of India and their bearing on the problem of the defence of the country."

Entries are invited from all commissioned officers of His Majesty's Forces, from gazetted officers of the Civil Administration in India, and from officers of the Indian States Forces.

Essays, which should be typewritten (double spacing) and submitted in triplicate, must be received by the Secretary, United Service Institution of India, Simla, on or before June 30, 1943. In order that the anonymity of each candidate should be preserved, a motto should be written at the top of each entry. A sealed envelope, bearing on the outside the motto, and containing inside the name and address of the author of the essay, must accompany each entry.

Entries should not exceed fifteen pages (approx. 8,000 words) of the size and style of the Journal. Should any authority be quoted in the essay, the title of the work referred to should be given.

Three judges chosen by the Council will adjudicate. They may recommend a money award not exceeding Rs. 500, either in addition to, or in substitution of, the Gold Medal, and will submit their decision to the Council. The name of the successful candidate will be published in the October, 1943 issue of the Journal.

Copyright of all essays submitted will be reserved by the Council of the United Service Institution of India.